HERBERTSPENCER. 


THE 


DATA  OF  ETHICS 


BY 

HERBERT  SPENCER 


New  York  :  46  East  14TH  Street 
THOMAS  Y.  CROWELL  &  CO. 

Boston  :  100  Purchase  Street 


no 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE. 


A  KEFERENCE  to  the  programme  of  the  "  System  of 
Synthetic  Philosophy"  will  show  that  the  chapters 
herewith  issued  constitute  the  first  division  of  the  work 
on  the  Principles  of  Morality^  with  which  the  System 
ends.  As  the  second  and  third  volumes  of  the  Princi- 
ples of  Sociology  are  as  yet  unpublished,  this  instalment 
of  the  succeeding  work  appears  out  of  its  place. 

I  have  been  led  thus  to  deviate  from  the  order  origi- 
nally set  down,  by  the  fear  that  persistence  in  conform- 
ing to  it  might  result  in  leaving  the  final  work  of  the 
series  unexecuted.  Hints,  repeated  of  late  years  with 
increasing  frequency  and  distinctness,  have  shown  me 
that  health  may  permanently  fail,  even  if  life  does  not 
end,  before  I  reach  the  last  part  of  the  task  I  have 
marked  out  for  myself.  This  last  part  of  the  task  it 
is  to  which  I  regard  all  the  preceding  parts  as  subsidiary. 
Written  as  far  back  as  1842,  my  first  essay,  consist- 
ing of  letters  on  The  Proper  Sphere  of  Giovernnient^ 
vaguely  indicated  what  I  conceived  to  be  certain  gen- 
eral principles  of  right  and  wrong  in  political  conduct ; 
and  from  that  time  onward  my  ultimate  purpose,  lying 
behind  all  proximate  purposes,  has  been  that  of  finding 
for  the  principles  of  right  and  wrong,  in  conduct  at 
large,  a  scientific  basis.  To  leave  this  purpose  unful- 
filled, after  making  so  extensive  a  preparation  for  ful- 

iii 


iv 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE. 


filling  it,  would  be  a  failure  the  probability  of  which 
I  do  not  like  to  contemplate,  and  I  am  anxious  to  pre- 
clude it,  if  not  wholly,  still  jjartially.  Hence  the  step 
I  now  take.  Though  this  first  division  of  the  work 
terminating  the  Synthetic  Philosophy  cannot,  of  course, 
contain  the  specific  conclusions  to  be  set  forth  in  the 
entire  work,  yet  it  implies  them  in  such  wise  that,  defi- 
nitely to  formulate  them  requires  nothing  beyond  logical 
deduction. 

I  am  the  more  anxious  to  indicate  in  outline,  if  I 
cannot  complete,  this  final  work,  because  the  establish- 
ment of  rules  of  right  conduct  on  a  scientific  basis 
is  a  pressing  need.  Now  that  moral  injunctions  are 
losing  the  authority  given  by  their  supposed  sacred 
origin,  the  secularization  of  morals  is  becoming  impera- 
tive. Few  things  can  happen  more  disastrous  than  the 
decay  and  death  of  a  regulative  system  no  longer  fit, 
before  another  and  fitter  regulative  system  has  grown 
up  to  replace  it.  Most  of  those  who  reject  the  current 
creed  appear  to  assume  that  the  controlling  agency 
furnished  by  it  may  safely  be  thrown  aside,  and  the 
vacancy  left  unfilled  by  any  other  controlling  agency. 
Meanwhile,  those  who  defend  the  current  creed  allege 
that  in  the  absence  of  the  guidance  it  yields,  no  guid- 
ance can  exist:  divine  commandments  they  think  the 
only  possible  guides.  Thus,  between  these  extreme 
opponents,  there  is  a  certain  community.  The  one 
holds  that  the  gap  left  by  disappearance  of  the  code 
of  supernatural  ethics  need  not  be  filled  by  a  code  of 
natural  ethics,  and  the  other  holds  that  it  cannot  be  so 
filled.  Both  contemplate  a  vacuum,  which  the  one 
wishes  and  the  other  fears.  As  the  change  which  prom- 
ises or  threatens  to  bring  about  this  state,  desired  or 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE. 


V 


dreaded,  is  rapidly  progressing,  those  wlio  believe  that 
the  vacuum  can  be  filled,  and  tRat  it  must  be  filled, 
are  called  on  to  do  something  in  pursuance  of  their 
belief. 

To  this  more  special  reason  I  may  add  a  more  general 
reason.  Great  mischief  has  been  done  by  the  repellent 
aspect  habitually  given  to  moral  rule  by  its  expositors, 
and  immense  benefits  are  to  be  anticipated  from  pre- 
senting moral  rule  under  that  attractive  aspect  which  it 
has  when  undistorted  by  superstition  and  ascetism.  If 
a  father,  sternly  enforcing  numerous  commands,  some 
needful  and  some  needless,  adds  to  his  severe  control  a 
behavior  wholly  unsympathetic ;  if  his  children  have 
to  take  their  pleasures  by  stealth,  or,  when  timidly 
looking  up  from  their  play,  ever  meet  a  cold  glance  or 
more  frequently  a  frown,  his  government  will  inevi- 
tably be  disliked,  if  not  hated,  and  the  aim  will  be  to 
evade  it  as  much  as  possible.  Contrariwise,  a  father 
who,  equally  firm  in  maintaining  restraints  needful  for 
the  well-being  of  his  children  or  the  well-being  of  other 
persons,  not  only  avoids  needless  restraints,  but,  giving 
his  sanction  to  all  legitimate  gratifications  and  provid- 
ing the  means  for  them,  looks  6n  at  their  gambols  with 
an  approving  smile,  can  scarcely  fail  to  gain  an  influ- 
ence which,  no  less  efficient  for  the  time  being,  will 
also  be  permanently  efficient.  The  controls  of  such 
two  fathers  symbolize  the  controls  of  Morality  as  it  is 
and  Morality  as  it  should  be. 

Nor  does  mischief  result  only  from  this  undue  sever- 
ity of  the  ethical  doctrine  bequeathed  us  by  the  harsh 
past.  Further  mischief  results  from  the  impracticabil- 
ity of  its  ideal.  In  violent  reaction  against  the  utter 
selfishness  of  life  as  carried  on  in  barbarous  societies,  it 


vi 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE, 


has  insisted  on  a  life  utterly  unselfish.  But  just  as  the 
rampant  egoism  of  a  brutal  militancy  was  not  to  be 
remedied  by  attempts  at  the  absolute  subjection  of  the 
ego  in  convents  and  monasteries,  so  neither  is  the  mis- 
conduct of  ordinary  humanity,  as  now  existing,  to  be 
remedied  by  upholding  a  standard  of  abnegation  beyond 
human  achievement.  Rather  the  effect  is  to  produce  a 
despairing  abandonment  of  all  attempts  at  a  higher 
life.  And  not  only  does  an  effort  to  achieve  the  impos- 
sible end  in  this  way,  but  it  simultaneously  discredits 
the  possible.  By  association  with  rules  that  cannot  be 
obeyed,  rules  that  can  be  obeyed  lose  their  authority. 

Much  adverse  comment  will,  I  doubt  not,  be  passed 
on  the  theory  of  right  conduct  which  the  following 
pages  shadow  forth.  Critics  of  a  certain  class,  far  from 
rejoicing  that  ethical  principles  otherwise  derived  by 
them,  coincide  with  ethical  principles  scientifically  de- 
rived, are  offended  by  the  coincidence.  Instead  of  rec- 
ognizing essential  likeness  they  enlarge  on  superficial 
difference.  Since  the  days  of  persecution,  a  curious 
change  has  taken  place  in  the  behavior  of  so-called 
orthodoxy  toward  so-called  heterodox}^  The  time  was 
when  a  heretic,  forced  by  torture  to  recant,  satisfied 
authority  by  external  conformity :  apparent  agreement 
sufficed,  however  profound  continued  to  be  the  real 
disagreement.  But  now  that  the  heretic  can  no  longer 
be  coerced  into  professing  the  ordinary  belief,  his  belief 
is  made  to  appear  as  much  opposed  to  the  ordinary  as 
possible.  Does  he  diverge  from  established  theological 
dogma?  Then  he  shall  be  an  atheist;  however  inad- 
missible he  considers  the  term.  Does  he  think  spirit- 
ualistic interpretations  of  phenomena  not  valid?  Then 
he  shall  be  classed  as  a  materialist ;  indignantly  though 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE. 


vii 


he  repudiates  the  name.  And  in  like  manner,  what 
differences  exist  between  natural  morality  and  super- 
natural morality,  it  has  become  the  policy  to  exaggerate 
into  fundamental  antagonisms.  In  pursuance  of  this 
policy,  there  will  probably  be  singled  out  for  reproba- 
tion from  this  volume,  doctrines  which,  taken  by  them- 
selves, may  readily  be  made  to  seem  utterly  wrong. 
With  a  view  to  clearness,  I  have  treated  separately 
some  correlative  aspects  of  conduct,  drawing  conclu- 
sions either  of  which  becomes  untrue  if  divorced  from 
the  other ;  and  have  thus  given  abundant  opportunity 
for  misrepresentation. 

The  relations  of  this  work  to  works  preceding  it  in 
the  series  are  such  as  to  involve  frequent  reference. 
Containing,  as  it  does,  the  outcome  of  principles  set 
forth  in  each  of  them,  I  have  found  it  impracticable  to 
dispense  with  re-statements  of  those  principles.  Fur- 
ther, the  presentation  of  them  in  their  relations  to  dif- 
ferent ethical  theories,  has  made  it  needful,  in  every 
case,  briefly  to  remind  the  reader  what  they  are,  and 
how  they  are  derived.  Hence  an  amount  of  repetition 
which  to  some  will  probably  appear  tedious.  I  do  not, 
however,  much  regret  this  almost  unavoidable  result ; 
for  only  by  varied  iteration  can  alien  conceptions  be 
forced  on  reluctant  minds. 

June,  1879. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.   Conduct  in  General   1 

II.   The  Evolution  of  Conduct   7 

III.  Good  and  Bad  Conduct   22 

IV.  Ways  of  Judging  Conduct   52 

V.   The  Physical  View   72 

VI.   The  Biological  View   85 

VII.   The  Psychological  View   117 

VIII.   The  Sociological  View   152 

IX.   Criticisms  and  Explanations   173 

X.  The  Relativity  of  Pains  and  Pleasures  .   .  .201 

XI.   Egoism  versus  Altruism   216 

XII.   Altruism  versus  Egoism   232 

XIII.  Trial  and  Compromise   253 

XIV.  Conciliation   280 

XV.   Absolute  and  Relative  Ethics   299 

XVI.    The  Scope  of  Ethics   326 

ix 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  1. 

CONDUCT  IN  GENERAL. 

§  1.  The  doctrine  that  correlatives  imply  one  an- 
other—  that  a  father  cannot  be  thought  of  without 
thinking  of  a  child,  and  that  there  can  be  no  con- 
sciousness of  superior  without  a  consciousness  of  in- 
ferior—  has  for  one  of  its  common  examples  the  neces- 
sary connection  between  the  conceptions  of  whole  and 
part.  Beyond  the  primary  truth  that  no  idea  of  a 
whole  can  be  framed  without  a  nascent  idea  of  parts 
constituting  it,  and  that  no  idea  of  a  part  can  be  framed 
without  a  nascent  idea  of  some  whole  to  which  it  be- 
longs, there  is  the  secondary  truth  that  there  can  be  no 
correct  idea  of  a  part  without  a  correct  idea  of  the  cor- 
relative whole.  There  are  several  ways  in  which  inade- 
quate knowledge  of  the  one  involves  inadequate  knowl- 
edge of  the  other. 

If  the  part  is  conceived  without  any  reference  to  the 
whole,  it  becomes  itself  a  whole  —  an  independent 
entity ;  and  its  relations  to  existence  in  general  are 
misapprehended.  Further,  the  size  of  the  part  as  com- 
pared with  the  size  of  the  whole  must  be  misappre- 
hended unless  the  whole  is  not  only  recognized  as 
including  it,  but  is  figured  in  its  total  extent.  And 

1 


2 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


again,  the  position  which  the  part  occupies  in  relation 
to  other  parts,  cannot  be  rightly  conceived  unless  there 
is  some  conception  of  the  whole  in  its  distribution  as 
well  as  in  its  amount. 

Still  more  when  part  and  whole,  instead  of  being 
statically  related  only,  are  dynamically  related,  must 
there  be  a  general  understanding  of  the  whole  before 
the  part  can  be  understood.  By  a  savage  who  has 
never  seen  a  vehicle,  no  idea  can  be  formed  of  the  use 
and  action  of  a  wheel.  To  the  unsymmetrically -pierced 
disk  of  an  eccentric,  no  place  or  purpose  can  be  ascribed 
by  a  rustic  unacquainted  with  machinery.  Even  a 
mechanician,  if  he  has  never  looked  into  a  piano,  will, 
if  shown  a  damper,  be  unable  to  conceive  its  function 
or  relative  value. 

Most  of  all,  however,  where  the  whole  is  organic, 
does  complete  comprehension  of  a  part  imply  extensive 
comprehension  of  the  whole.  Suppose  a  being  ignorant 
of  the  human  body  to  find  a  detached  arm.  If  not  mis- 
conceived by  him  as  a  supposed  whole,  instead  of  being 
conceived  as  a  part,  still  its  relations  to  other  parts, 
and  its  structure,  would  be  wholly  inexplicable.  Ad- 
mitting that  the  co-operation  of  its  bones  and  muscles 
might  be  divined,  yet  no  thought  could  be  framed  of 
the  share  taken  by  the  arm  in  the  actions  of  the  un- 
known whole  it  belonged  to  ;  nor  could  any  interpreta- 
tion be  put  upon  the  nerves  and  vessels  ramifying 
through  it,  which  severally  refer  to  certain  central 
organs.  A  theory  of  the  structure  of  the  arm  implies  a 
theory  of  the  structure  of  the  body  at  large. 

And  this  truth  holds  not  of  material  aggregates  only, 
but  of  immaterial  aggregates,  —  aggregated  motions, 
deeds,  thoughts,  words.    The  moon's  movements  can- 


CONDUCT  IN  GENERAL. 


8 


not  be  fully  interpreted  without  taking  into  account  the 
movements  of  the  solar  system  at  large.  The  process 
of  loading  a  gun  is  meaningless  until  the  subsequent 
actions  performed  with  the  gun  are  known.  A  frag- 
ment of  a  sentence,  if  not  unintelligible,  is  wrongly  in- 
terpreted in  the  absence  of  the  remainder.  Cut  off  its 
beginning  and  end,  and  the  rest  of  a  demonstration 
proves  nothing.  Evidence  given  by  a  plaintiff  often 
misleads  until  the  evidence  which  the  defendant  pro- 
duces is  joined  with  it. 

§  2.  Conduct  is  a  whole;  and,  in  a  sense,  it  is  an 
organic  whole  —  an  aggregate  of  interdependent  actions 
performed  by  an  organism.  That  division  or  aspect  of 
conduct  with  which  Ethics  deals,  is  a  part  of  this 
organic  whole,  —  a  part  having  its  components  inextri- 
cably bound  up  with  the  rest.  As  currently  conceived, 
stirring  the  fire,  or  reading  a  newspaper,  or  eating  a 
meal,  are  acts  with  which  Morality  has  no  concern. 
Opening  the  window  to  air  the  room,  putting  on  an 
overcoat  when  the  weather  is  cold,  are  thought  of  as 
having  no  ethical  significance.  These,  however,  are  all 
portions  of  conduct.  The  behavior  we  call  good  and 
the  behavior  we  call  bad  are  included,  along  with  the 
behavior  we  call  indifferent,  under  the  conception  of 
behavior  at  large.  The  whole  of  which  Ethics  forms  a 
part,  is  the  whole  constituted  by  the  theory  of  conduct 
in  general ;  and  this  whole  must  be  understood  before 
the  part  can  be  understood.  Let.  us  consider  this  propo- 
sition more  closely. 

And  first,  how  shall  we  define  conduct?  It  is  not 
co-extensive  with  the  aggregate  of  actions,  though  it  is 
nearly  so.    Such  actions  as  those  of  an  epileptic  in  a  fit 


4 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


are  not  included  in  our  conception  of  conduct :  the  con- 
ception excludes  purposeless  actions.  And  in  recogniz- 
ing this  exclusion,  we  simultaneously  recognize  all  that 
is  included.  The  definition  of  conduct  which  emerges 
is  either  acts  adjusted  to  ends,  or  else  the  adjustment  of 
acts  to  ends,  according  as  we  contemplate  the  formed 
body  of  acts,  or  think  of  the  form  alone.  And  conduct 
in  its  full  acceptation  must  be  taken  as  comprehending 
all  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends,  from  the  simplest  to 
the  most  complex,  whatever  their  special  natures  and 
whether  considered  separately  or  in  their  totality. 

Conduct  in  general  being  thus  distinguished  from  the 
somewhat  larger  whole  constituted  by  actions  in  gen- 
eral, let  us  next  ask  what  distinction  is  habitually  made 
between  the  conduct  on  which  ethical  judgments  are 
passed,  and  the  remainder  of  conduct.  As  already  said, 
a  large  part  of  ordinary  conduct  is  indifferent.  Shall  I 
walk  to  the  waterfall  to-day?  or  shall  I  ramble  along 
the  seashore  ?  Here  the  ends  are  ethically  indifferent. 
If  I  go  to  the  waterfall,  shall  I  go  over  the  moor  or 
take  the  path  through  the  wood  ?  Here  the  means  are 
ethically  indifferent.  And  from  hour  to  hour  most  of 
the  things  we  do  are  not  to  be  judged  as  either  good  or 
bad  in  respect  of  either  ends  or  means. 

No  less  clear  is  it  that  the  transition  from  indifferent 
acts  to  acts  which  are  good  or  bad  is  gradual.  If  a 
friend  who  is  with  me  has  explored  the  sea-shore,  but 
has  not  seen  the  waterfall,  the  choice  of  one  or  other 
end  is  no  longer  ethically  indifferent.  And  if,  the 
waterfall  being  fixed  on  as  our  goal,  the  way  over  the 
moor  is  too  long  for  his  strength,  while  the  shorter 
way  through  the  wood  is  not,  the  choice  of  means  is  no 
longer  ethically  indifferent.    Again,  if  a  probable  result 


CONDUCT  IN  GENERAL. 


6 


of  making  the  one  excursion  rather  than  the  other,  is 
that  I  shall  not  be  back  in  time  to  keep  an  appointment, 
or  if  taking  the  longer  route  entails  this  risk,  while 
taking  the  shorter  does  not,  the  decision  in  favor  of  one 
or  other  end  or  means  acquires  in  another  way  an  ethi- 
cal character;  and  if  the  appointment  is  one  of  some 
importance,  or  one  of  great  importance,  or  one  of  life- 
and-death  importance,  to  self  or  others,  the  ethical  char- 
acter becomes  pronounced.  These  instances  will  suffi- 
ciently suggest  the  truth  that  conduct  with  which  Mo- 
rality is  not  concerned,  passes  into  conduct  which  is  moral 
or  immoral,  by  small  degrees  and  in  countless  ways. 

But  the  conduct  that  has  to  be  conceived  scientifi- 
cally before  we  can  scientifically  conceive  those  modes 
of  conduct  which  are  the  objects  of  ethical  judgments, 
is  a  conduct  immensely  wider  in  range  than  that  just 
indicated.  Complete  comprehension  of  conduct  is  not 
to  be  obtained  by  contemplating  the  conduct  of  human 
beings  only ;  we  have  to  regard  this  as  a  part  of  uni- 
versal conduct,  —  conduct  as  exhibited  by  all  living 
creatures.  For  evidently  this  comes  within  our  defini- 
tion—  acts  adjusted  to  ends.  The  conduct  of  the 
higher  animals  as  compared  with  that  of  man,  and  the 
conduct  of  the  lower  animals  as  compared  with  that 
of  the  higher,  mainly  differ  in  this,  that  the  adjust- 
ments of  acts  to  ends  are  relatively  simple  and  rela- 
tively incomplete.  And  as  in  other  cases,  so  in  this 
case,  we  must  interpret  the  more  developed  by  the  less 
developed.  Just  as,  fully  to  understand  the  part  of 
conduct  which  Ethics  deals  with,  we  must  study 
human  conduct  as  a  whole;  so,  fully  to  understand 
human  conduct  as  a  whole,  we  must  study  it  as  a  part 
of  that  larger  whole  constituted  by  the  conduct  of  ani- 
mate beings  in  general. 


6 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


Nor  is  even  this  whole  conceived  with  the  needful 
fulness,  so  long  as  we  think  only  of  the  conduct  at 
present  displayed  around  us.  We  have  to  include  in 
our  conception  the  less-developed  conduct  out  of  which 
this  has  arisen  in  course  of  time.  We  have  to  regard 
the  conduct  now  shown  us  by  creatures  of  all  orders, 
as  an  outcome  of  the  conduct  which  has  brought  life  of 
every  kind  to  its  present  height.  And  this  is  tanta- 
mount to  saying  that  our  preparatory  step  must  be  to 
study  the  evolution  of  conduct. 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT 


7 


CHAPTER  11. 

THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT. 

§  3.  We  have  become  quite  familiar  with  the  idea  of 
an  evolution  of  structures  throughout  the  ascending 
types  of  animals.  To  a  considerable  degree  we  have 
become  familiar  with  the  thought  that  an  evolution  of 
functions  has  gone  on  pari  passu  with  the  evolution  of 
structures.  Now,  advancing  a  step,  we  have  to  frame 
a  conception  of  the  evolution  of  conduct,  as  correlated 
with  this  evolution  of  structures  and  functions. 

These  three  subjects  are  to  be  definitely  distinguished. 
Obviously  the  facts  comparative  morphology  sets  forth 
form  a  whole  which,  though  it  cannot  be  treated  in 
general  or  in  detail  without  taking  into  account  facts 
belonging  to  comparative  physiology,  is  essentially  inde- 
pendent. No  less  clear  is  it  that  we  may  devote  our 
attention  exclusively  to  that  progressive  differentiation 
of  functions,  and  combination  of  functions,  which 
accompanies  the  development  of  structures  —  may  say 
no  more  about  the  characters  and  connections  of  organs 
than  is  implied  in  describing  their  separate  and  joint 
actions.  And  the  subject  of  conduct  lies  outside  the 
subject  of  functions,  if  not  as  far  as  this  lies  outside 
the  subject  of  structures,  still  far  enough  to  make  it 
substantially  separate.  For  those  functions  which  are 
already  variously  compounded  to  achieve  what  we  regard 
as  single  bodily  acts,  are  endlessly  re-compounded  to 


8 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


achieve  that  co-ordination  of  bodily  acts  which  is  known 
as  conduct. 

We  are  concerned  with  functions  in  the  true  sense, 
while  we  think  of  them  as  processes  carried  on  within 
the  body ;  and,  without  exceeding  the  limits  of  physi- 
ology, we  may  treat  of  their  adjusted  combinations,  so 
long  as  these  are  regarded  as  parts  of  the  vital  con- 
sensus. If  we  observe  how  the  lungs  aerate  the  blood 
which  the  heart  sends  to  them ;  how  heart  and  lungs 
together  supply  aerated  blood  to  the  stomach,  and  so 
enable  ,it  to  do  its  Avork ;  how  these  co-operate  with 
sundry  secreting  and  excreting  glands  to  further  diges- 
tion and  to  remove  waste  matter ;  and  how  all  of  them 
join  to  keep  the  brain  in  a  fit  condition  for  carrying 
on  those  actions  which  indirectly  conduce  to  main- 
tenance of  the  life  at  large ;  we  are  dealing  with  func- 
tions. Even  when  considering  how  parts  that  act 
directly  on  the  environment  —  legs,  arms,  wings  —  per- 
form their  duties,  we  are  still  concerned  with  functions 
in  that  aspect  of  them  constituting  physiology,  so  long 
as  we  restrict  our  attention  to  internal  processes,  and  to 
internal  combinations  of  them. 

But  we  enter  on  the  subject  of  conduct  when  we 
begin  to  study  such  combinations  among  the  actions 
of  sensory  and  motor  organs  as  are  externally  mani- 
fested. Suppose  that  instead  of  observing  those  con- 
tractions of  muscles  hy  which  the  optic  axes  are 
converged  and  the  foci  of  the  eyes  adjusted  (which  is  a 
portion  of  physiology),  and  that  instead  of  observing 
the  co-operation  of  other  nerves,  muscles,  and  bones, 
by  which  a  hand  is  moved  to  a  particular  place  and 
the  fingers  closed  (which  is  also  a  portion  of  physi- 
ology), we  observe  a  weapon  being  seized  by  a  hand 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT. 


9 


under  guidance  of  tlie  eyes.  We  now  pass  from  the 
thought  of  combined  internal  functions  to  the  thought 
of  combined  external  motions.  Doubtless,  if  we  could 
trace  the  cerebral  processes  which  accompany  these, 
we  should  find  an  inner  physiological  co-ordination 
corresponding  with  the  outer  co-ordination  of  actions. 
But  this  admission  is  consistent  with  the  assertion,  that 
when  we  ignore  the  internal  combination  and  attend 
only  to  the  external  combination,  we  pass  from  a  por- 
tion of  physiology  to  a  portion  of  conduct.  For  though 
it  may  be  objected  that  the  external  combination 
instanced  is  too  simple  to  be  rightly  included  under  the 
name  conduct,  yet  a  moment's  thought  shows  that  it  is 
joined  with  what  we  call  conduct  by  insensible  grada- 
tions. Suppose  the  weapon  seized  is  used  to  ward  off  a 
blow.  Suppose  a  counter  blow  is  given.  Suppose  the 
aggressor  runs  and  is  chased.  Suppose  there  comes  a 
struggle  and  a  handing  him  over  to  the  police.  Sup- 
pose there  follow  the  many  and  varied  acts  constituting 
a  prosecution.  Obviously  the  initial  adjustment  of  an 
act  to  an  end,  inseparable  from  the  rest,  must  be  in- 
cluded with  them  under  the  same  general  head ;  and 
obviously  from  this  initial  simple  adjustment,  having 
intrinsically  no  moral  character,  we  pass  by  degrees  to 
the  most  complex  adjustments  and  to  those  on  which 
moral  judgments  are  passed. 

Hence,  excluding  all  internal  co-ordinations,  our  sub- 
ject here  is  the  aggregate  of  all  external  co-ordinations ; 
and  this  aggregate  includes  not  only  the  simplest  as  well 
as  the  most  complex  performed  by  human  beings,  but 
also  those  performed  by  all  inferior  beings  considered  as 
less  or  more  evolved. 


10 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


§  4.  Already  the  question :  What  constitutes  advance 
in  the  evolution  of  conduct,  as  we  trace  it  up  from  the 
lowest  types  of  living  creatures  to  the  highest?  has 
been  answered  by  implication.  A  few  examples  will 
now  bring  the  answer  into  conspicuous  relief. 

We  saw  that  conduct  is  distinguished  from  the  totality 
of  actions  by  excluding  purposeless  actions ;  but  during 
evolution  this  distinction  arises  by  degrees.  In  the  very 
lowest  creatures  most  of  the  movements  from  moment 
to  moment  made,  have  not  more  recognizable  aims  than 
have  the  struggles  of  an  epileptic.  An  infusorium 
swims  randomly  about,  determined  in  its  course  not  by 
a  perceived  object  to  be  pursued  or  escaped,  but,  appar- 
ently, by  varying  stimuli  in  its  medium ;  and  its  acts, 
unadjusted  in  any  appreciable  way  to  ends,  lead  it  now 
into  contact  with  some  nutritive  substance  which  it 
absorbs,  and  now  into  the  neighborhood  of  some  crea- 
ture by  which  it  is  swallowed  and  digested.  Lacking 
those  developed  senses  and  motor  powers  which  higher 
animals  possess,  ninetjMiine  in  the  hundred  of  these 
minute  animals,  severally  living  for  but  a  few  hours, 
disappear  either  by  innutrition  or  by  destruction.  The 
conduct  is  constituted  of  actions  so  little  adjusted  to 
ends,  that  life  continues  only  as  long  as  the  accidents 
of  the  environment  are  favorable.  But  when,  among 
aquatic  creatures,  we  observe  one  which,  though  still 
low  in  type,  is  much  higher  than  the  infusorium — say 
a  rotifer  —  we  see  how,  along  with  larger  size,  more 
developed  structures,  and  greater  power  of  combining 
functions,  there  goes  an  advance  in  conduct.  We  see 
liow  by  its  whirling  cilia  it  sucks  in  as  food  these  small 
animals  moving  around ;  how  its  prehensile  tail  it 
fixes  itself  to  some  fit  object ;  how  by  withdrawing  its 


THE  EVOLUTION  OE  CONDUCT. 


11 


outer  organs  and  contracting  its  body,  it  preserves  itself 
from  this  or  that  injury  from  time  to  time  threatened  ; 
and  how  thus,  by  better  adjusting  its  own  actions,  it 
becomes  less  dependent  on  the  actions  going  on  around, 
and  so  preserves  itself  for  a  longer  period. 

A  superior  sub-kingdom,  as  the  Mollusca,  still  better 
exemplifies  this  contrast.  When  we  compare  a  low 
mollusk,  such  as  a  floating  ascidian,  with  a  high  mollusk, 
such  as  a  cephalopod,  we  are  again  shown  that  greater 
organic  evolution  is  accompanied  by  more  evolved 
conduct.  At  the  mercy  of  every  marine  creature  large 
enough  to  swallow  it,  and  drifted  about  by  currents 
which  may  chance  to  keep  it  at  sea,  or  may  chance  to 
leave  it  fatally  stranded,  the  ascidian  displays  but 
little  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  in  comparison  with  the 
cephalopod ;  which,  now  crawling  over  the  beach,  now 
exploring  the  rocky  crevices,  now  swimming  through 
the  open  water,  now  darting  after  a  fish,  now  hiding 
itself  from  some  larger  animal  in  a  cloud  of  ink,  and 
using  its  suckered  arms  at  one  time  for  anchoring  itself 
and  at  another  for  holding  fast  its  prey,  selects  and  com- 
bines and  proportions  its  movements  from  minute  to 
minute,  so  as  to  evade  dangers  which  threaten,  while 
utilizing  chances  of  food  which  offer:  so  showing  us 
varied  activities  which,  in  achieving  special  ends, 
achieve  the  general  end  of  securing  continuance  of  the 
activities. 

Among  vertebrate  animals  we  similarly  trace  up, 
along  with  advance  in  structures  and  functions,  this 
advance  in  conduct.  A  fish  roaming  about  at  hazard 
in  search  of  something  to  eat,  able  to  detect  it  by  smell 
or  sight  only  within  short  distances,  and  now  and  again 
rushing  away  in  alarm  on  the  approach  of  a  bigger  fish, 


12 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


makes  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  that  are  relatively 
few  and  simple  in  their  kinds ;  and  shows  us,  as  a  con- 
sequence, how  small  is  the  average  duration  of  life. 
So  few  survive  to  maturity,  that,  to  make  up  for 
destruction  of  unhatched  young  and  small  fry  and  half- 
grown  individuals,  a  million  ova  have  to  be  spawned 
by  a  codfish  that  two  may  reach  the  spawning  age. 
Conversely,  by  a  highly  evolved  mammal,  such  as  an 
elephant,  those  general  actions  performed  in  common 
with  the  fish  are  far  better  adjusted  to  their  ends.  By 
sight  as  well,  probably,  as  by  odor,  it  detects  food  at 
relatively  great  distances ;  and  when,  at  intervals, 
there  arises  a  need  for  escape,  relatively  great  speed 
is  attained.  But  the  chief  difference  arises  from  the 
addition  of  new  sets  of  adjustments.  We  have  com- 
bined actions  which  facilitate  nutrition  —  the  breaking 
off  of  succulent  and  fruit-bearing  branches,  the  select- 
ing of  edible  growths  throughout  a  comparatively  wide 
reach ;  and,  in  case  of  danger,  safety  can  be  achieved 
not  by  flight  only,  but,  if  necessary,  by  defence  oi 
attack :  bringing  into  combined  use  tusks,  trunk,  and 
ponderous  feet.  Further,  we  see  various  subsidiary 
acts  adjusted  to  subsidiary  ends —  now  the  going  into  a 
river  for  coolness,  and  using  the  trunk  as  a  means  of 
projecting  water  over  the  bodj^ ;  now  the  employment 
of  a  bough  for  sweeping  away  flies  from  the  back ;  now 
the  making  of  signal  sounds  to  alarm  the  herd,  and 
adapting  the  actions  to  sucli  sounds  when  made  by 
others.  Evidently,  the  effect  of  this  more  highly 
evolved  conduct  is  to  secure  the  balance  of  the  organic 
actions  throughout  far  longer  periods. 

And  now,  on  studying  the  doings  of  the  highest  of 
mammals,  mankind,  we  not  only  find  that  the  adjust- 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT.  13 


ments  of  acts  to  ends  are  both  more  numerous  and 
better  than  among  lower  mammals,  but  we  find  the 
same  thing  on  comparing  the  doings  of  higher  races 
of  men  with  those  of  lower  races.  If  we  take  any 
one  of  the  major  ends  achieved,  we  see  greater 
completeness  of  achievement  by  civilized  than  by 
savage ;  and  we  also  see  an  achievement  of  relatively 
numerous  minor  ends  subserving  major  ends.  Is  it  in 
nutrition?  The  food  is  obtained  more  regularly  in 
response  to  appetite  ;  it  is  far  higher  in  quality ;  it  is 
free  from  dirt ;  it  is  greater  in  variety ;  it  is  better 
prepared.  Is  it  in  warmth?  The  characters  of  the 
fabrics  and  forms  of  the  articles  used  for  clothing,  and 
the  adaptations  of  them  to  requirements  from  day  to 
day  and  hour  to  hour,  are  much  superior.  Is  it  in 
dwellings  ?  Between  the  shelter  of  boughs  and  grass 
which  the  lowest  savage  builds,  and  the  mansion  of 
the  civilized  man,  the  contrast  in  aspect  is  not  more 
extreme  than  is  the  contrast  in  number  and  efficiency 
of  the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  betrayed  in  their 
respective  constructions.  And  when  with  the  ordinary 
activities  of  the  savage  we  compare  the  ordinary 
civilized  activities  —  as  the  business  of  the  trader,  which 
involves  multiplied  and  complex  transactions  extend- 
ing over  long  periods,  or  as  professional  avocations, 
prepared  for  by  elaborate  studies,  and  daily  carried  on 
in  endlessly  varied  forms,  or  as  political  discussions 
and  agitations,  directed  now  to  the  carrying  of  this 
measure  and  now  to  the  defeating  of  that  —  we  see 
sets  of  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends,  not  only  im- 
mensely exceeding  those  seen  among  lower  races  of 
men  in  variety  and  intricacy,  but  sets  to  which  lower 
races  of  men  present  nothing  analogous.    And  along 


14 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


with  this  greater  elaboration  of  life  produced  by  the  pur^ 
suit  of  more  numerous  ends,  there  goes  that  increased 
duration  of  life  which  constitutes  the  supreme  end. 

And  here  is  suggested  the  need  for  supplementing 
this  conception  of  evolving  conduct.  For,  besides, 
being  an  improving  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends,  such 
as  furthers  prolongation  of  life,  it  is  such  as  furthers 
increased  amount  of  life.  Reconsideration  of  the 
examples  above  given  will  show  that  length  of  life  is 
not  by  itself  a  measure  of  evolution  of  conduct ;  but 
that  quantity  of  life  must  be  taken  into  account.  An 
oyster,  adapted  by  its  structure  to  the  diffused  food 
contained  in  the  water  it  draws  in,  and  shielded  by  its 
shell  from  nearly  all  dangers,  may  live  longer  than  a 
cuttle-fish,  which  has  such  superior  powers  of  dealing 
with  numerous  contingencies ;  but  then,  the  sum  of 
vital  activities  during  any  given  interval  is  far  less  in 
the  oyster  than  in  the  cuttle-fish.  So  a  worm,  ordi- 
narily sheltered  from  most  enemies  by  the  earth  it 
burrows  through,  which  also  supplies  a  sufficiency  of 
its  poor  food,  may  have  greater  longevity  than  many 
of  its  annulose  relatives,  the  insects ;  but  one  of  these, 
during  its  existence  as  larva  and  imago,  may  experi- 
ence a  greater  quantity  of  the  changes  which  consti- 
tute life.  Nor  is  it  otherwise  when  we  compare  the 
more  evolved  with  the  less  evolved  among  mankind. 
The  difference  between  the  average  lengths  of  the 
lives  of  savage  and  civilized  is  no  true  measure  of  the 
difference  between  the  totalities  of  their  two  lives, 
considered  as  aggregates  of  thought,  feeling,  and 
action.  Hence,  estimating  life  by  multiplying  its 
length  into  its  breadth,  we  must  say  that  the  augmenta- 
tion of  it  which  accompanies  evolution  of  conduct, 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT. 


15 


results  from  increase  of  both  factors.  The  more  mul- 
tiplied and  varied  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends,  by 
which  the  more  developed  creature  from  hour  to  hour 
fulfils  more  numerous  requirements,  severally  add  to 
the  activities  that  are  carried  on  abreast,  and  severally 
help  to  make  greater  the  period  through  which  such 
simultaneous  activities  endure.  Each  further  evolu- 
tion of  conduct  widens  the  aggregate  of  actions  while 
conducing  to  elongation  of  it. 

§  5.  Turn  we  now  to  a  further  aspect  of  the  phenom- 
ena, separate  from,  but  necessarily  associated  with,  the 
last.  Thus  far  we  have  considered  only  those  adjust- 
ments of  acts  to  ends  which  have  for  their  final  purpose 
complete  individual  life.  Now  we  have  to  consider 
those  adjustments  which  have  to  their  final  purpose  the 
life  of  the  species. 

Self-preservation  in  each  generation  has  all  along  de- 
pended on  the  preservation  of  offspring  by  preceding 
generations.  And  in  proportion  as  evolution  of  the 
conduct  subserving  individual  life  is  high,  implying 
high  organization,  there  must  previously  have  been  a 
highly  evolved  conduct  subserving  nurture  of  the 
young.  Throughout  the  ascending  grades  of  the  ani- 
mal kingdom,  this  second  kind  of  conduct  presents 
stages  of  advance  like  those  which  we  have  observed 
in  the  first.  Low  down,  where  structures  and  functions 
are  little  developed,  and  the  power  of  adjusting  acts  to 
ends  but  slight,  there  is  no  conduct,  properly  so  named, 
furthering  salvation  of  the  species.  Race-maintaining 
conduct,  like  self-maintaining  conduct,  arises  gradually 
out  of  that  which  cannot  be  called  conduct :  adjusted 
actions  are  preceded  by  unadjusted  ones. 


16 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


Protozoa  spontaneously  divide  and  subdivide,  in  con- 
sequence of  physical  changes  over  which  they  have  no 
control ;  or,  at  other  times,  after  a  period  of  quiescence, 
break  up  into  minute  portions  which  severally  grow 
into  new  individuals.  In  neither  case  can  conduct  be 
alleged.  Higher  up,  the  process  is  that  of  ripening,  at 
intervals,  germ-cells  and  sperm-cells,  which,  on  occasion, 
are  sent  forth  into  the  surrounding  water  and  left  to 
their  fate:  perhaps  one  in  ten  thousand  surviving  to 
maturity.  Here,  again,  we  see  only  development  and 
dispersion  going  on  apart  from  parental  care.  Types 
above  these,  as  fish  which  choose  fit  places  in  which  to 
deposit  their  ova,  or  as  the  higher  crustaceans  which 
carry  masses  of  ova  about  until  they  are  hatched,  ex- 
hibit  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  which  we  may  properly 
call  conduct,  though  it  is  of  the  simplest  kind.  Where, 
as  among  certain  fish,  the  male  keeps  guard  over  the 
eggs,  driving  away  intruders,  there  is  an  additional 
adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  ;  and  the  applicability  of  the 
name  conduct  is  more  decided. 

Passing  at  once  to  creatures  far  superior,  such  as 
birds,  which,  building  nests  and  sitting  on  their  eggs, 
feed  their  broods  for  considerable  periods,  and  give 
them  aid  after  they  can  fly  ;  or  such  as  mammals,  which, 
suckling  their  young  for  a  time,  continue  afterward  to 
bring  them  food  or  protect  them  while  they  feed,  until 
they  reach  ages  at  which  they  can  provide  for  them- 
selves ;  we  are  shown  how  this  conduct  which  furthers 
race  maintenance  evolves  hand-in-hand  with  the  con- 
duct which  furthers  self-maintenance.  That  better 
organization  which  makes  possible  the  last,  makes  possi- 
ble the  first  also. 

Mankind  exhibit  a  great  pi'ogress  of  like  nature. 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT, 


17 


Compared  with  brutes,  the  savage,  higher  in  his  self- 
maintaining  conduct,  is  higher  too  in  his  race-maintain- 
ing conduct.  A  larger  number  of  the  wants  of  off- 
spring are  provided  for;  and  parental  care,  enduring 
longer,  extends  to  the  disciplining  of  offspring  in  arts 
and  habits  which  fit  them  for  their  conditions  of  exist- 
ence. Conduct  of  this  order,  equally  with  conduct  of 
the  first  order,  we  see  becoming  evolved  in  a  still 
greater  degree  as  we  ascend  from  savage  to  civilized. 
The  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  in  the  rearing  of  chil- 
dren become  far  more  elaborate,  alike  in  number  of  ends 
met,  variety  of  means  used,  and  efficiency  of  their 
adaptations ;  and  the  aid  and  oversight  are  continued 
throughout  a  much  greater  part  of  early  life. 

In  tracing  up  the  evolution  of  conduct,  so  that  we 
may  frame  a  true  conception  of  conduct  in  general,  we 
have  thus  to  recognize  these  two  kinds  as  mutually  de- 
pendent. Speaking  generally,  neither  can  evolve  with- 
out evolution  of  the  other ;  and  the  highest  evolutions 
of  the  two  must  be  reached  simultaneously. 

§  6.  To  conclude,  however,  that  on  reaching  a  per- 
fect adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  subserving  individual 
life  and  the  rearing  of  offspring,  the  evolution  of  con- 
duct becomes  complete,  is  to  conclude  erroneously.  Or 
rather,  I  should  say,  it  is  an  error  to  suppose  that 
either  of  these  kinds  of  conduct  can  assume  its  highest 
form,  without  its  highest  form  being  assumed  by  a  third 
kind  of  conduct  yet  to  be  named. 

The  multitudinous  creatures  of  all  kinds  which  fill 
the  earth,  cannot  live  AvhoUy  apart  from  one  another, 
but  are  more  or  less  in  presence  of  one  another  —  are 
interfered  with  by  one  another.    In  large  measure  the 


18 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  which  we  have  been  con« 
sidering,  are  components  of  that  ''struggle  for  exist- 
ence "  carried  on  both  between  members  of  the  same 
species  and  between  members  of  different  species ;  and, 
very  generally,  a  successful  adjastment  made  by  one 
creature  involves  an  unsuccessful  adjustment  made  by 
another  creature,  either  of  the  same  kind  or  of  a  differ- 
ent kind.  That  the  carnivore  may  live,  herbivores 
must  die ;  and  that  its  young  may  be  reared,  the  young 
of  weaker  creatures  must  be  orphaned.  Maintenance 
of  the  hawk  and  its  brood  involves  the  deaths  of  many 
small  birds ;  and  that  small  birds  may  multiply,  their 
progeny  must  be  fed  with  innumerable  sacrificed  worms 
and  larvae.  Competition  among  members  of  the  same 
species  has  allied,  though  less  conspicuous,  results. 
The  stronger  often  carries  off  by  force  the  prey  which 
the  weaker  has  caught.  Monopolizing  certain  hunting 
grounds,  the  more  ferocious  drive  others  of  their  kind 
into  less  favorable  places.  With  plant-eating  animals, 
too,  the  like  holds :  the  better  food  is  secured  by  the 
more  vigorous  individuals,  while  the  less  vigorous  and 
worse  fed,  succumb  either  directly  from  innutrition  or 
indirectly  from  resulting  inability  to  escape  enemies. 
That  is  to  say,  among  creatures  whose  lives  are  carried 
on  antagonistically,  each  of  the  two  kinds  of  conduct 
delineated  above  must  remain  imperfectly  evolved. 
Even  in  such  few  kinds  of  them  as  have  little  to  fear 
from  enemies  or  competitors,  as  lions  or  tigers,  there 
is  still  inevitable  failure  in  the  adjustments  of  acts  to 
ends  toward  the  close  of  life.  Death  by  starvation  from 
inability  to  catch  prey,  shows  a  falling  short  of  con- 
duct from  its  ideal. 

This  imperfectly  evolved  conduct  introduces  us  by 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT. 


19 


antithesis  to  conduct  that  is  perfectly  evolved.  Con- 
templating these  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  which 
miss  completeness  because  they  cannot  be  made  by  one 
creature  without  other  creatures  being  prevented  from 
making  them,  raises  the  thought  of  adjustments  sucli 
that  each  creature  may  make  them  without  preventing 
them  from  being  made  by  other  creatures.  That  the 
highest  form  of  conduct  must  be  so  distinguished,  is  an 
inevitable  implication ;  for,  while  the  form  of  conduct 
is  such  that  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  by  some  neces- 
sitate non-adjustments  by  others,  there  remains  room 
for  modifications  which  bring  conduct  into  a  form  avoid- 
ing this,  and  so  making  the  totality  of  life  greater. 

From  the  abstract  let  us  pass  to  the  concrete.  Rec- 
ognizing men  as  the  beings  whose  conduct  is  most 
evolved,  let  us  ask  under  what  conditions  their  conduct, 
in  all  three  aspects  of  its  evolution,  reaches  its  limit 
Clearly,  while  the  lives  led  are  entirely  predatory,  as 
those  of  savages,  the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  fall 
short  of  this  highest  form  of  conduct  in  every  way 
Individual  life,  ill  carried  on  from  hour  to  hour,  is  pre- 
maturely cut  short ;  the  fostering  of  offspring  often  fails, 
and  is  incomplete  when  it  does  not  fail ;  and  in  so  far 
as  the  ends  of  self -maintenance  and  race-maintenance 
are  met,  they  are  met  by  destruction  of  other  beings  of 
different  kind  or  of  like  kind.  In  social  groups  formed 
by  compounding  and  re-compounding  primitive  hordes, 
conduct  remains  imperfectly  evolved  in  proportion  as 
there  continue  antagonisms  between  the  groups  and 
antagonisms  between  members  of  the  same  group  — 
two  traits  necessarily  associated ;  since  the  nature  which 
prompts  international  aggression  prompts  aggression  of 
individuals  on  one  another.    Hence  the  limit  of  evolu' 


20 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


tion  can  be  reached  by  conduct  only  in  permanently 
peaceful  societies.  That  perfect  adjustment  of  acts  to 
ends  in  maintaining  individual  life  and  rearing  new 
individuals,  which  is  effected  by  each  without  hindering 
others  from  effecting  like  perfect  adjustments,  is,  in  its 
very  definition,  shown  to  constitute  a  kind  of  conduct 
that  can  be  approached  only  as  war  decreases  and  dies  out. 

A  gap  in  this  outline  must  now  be  filled  up.  There 
remains  a  further  advance  not  yet  even  hinted.  For 
beyond  so  behaving  that  each  achieves  his  ends  without 
preventing  others  from  achieving  their  ends,  the  mem- 
bers of  a  society  may  give  mutual  help  in  the  achieve- 
ment of  ends.  And  if,  either  indirectly  by  industrial 
co-operation,  or  directly  by  volunteered  aid,  fellow- 
citizens  can  make  easier  for  one  another  the  adjustments 
of  acts  to  ends,  then  their  conduct  assumes  a  still  higher 
phase  of  evolution ;  since  whatever  facilitates  the  mak- 
ing of  adjustments  by  each,  increases  the  totality  of  the 
adjustments  made,  and  serves  to  render  the  lives  of  all 
more  complete. 

§  7.  The  reader  who  recalls  certain  passages  in  First 
Principles.,  in  the  Principles  of  Biology^  and  in  the 
Principles  of  Psychology.,  will  perceive  above  a  re-state- 
ment, in  another  form,  of  generalizations  set  forth  in 
those  works.  Especially  will  he  be  reminded  of  the 
proposition  that  Life  is  the  definite  combination  of 
heterogeneous  changes,  both  simultaneous  and  succes- 
sive, in  correspondence  with  external  co-existences  and 
sequences;"  and  still  more  of  that  abridged  and  less 
specific  formula,  in  which  Life  is  said  to  be  "  the  con- 
tinuous adjustment  of  internal  relations  to  external 
relations." 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT, 


21 


The  presentation  of  the  facts  here  made  differs  from 
the  presentations  before  made,  mainly  by  ignoring  the 
inner  part  of  the  correspondence  and  attending  exclu- 
sively to  that  outer  part  constituted  of  visible  actions. 
But  the  two  are  in  harmony ;  and  the  reader  who  wishes 
further  to  prepare  himself  for  dealing  with  our  present 
topic  from  the  evolution  point  of  view,  may  advantage- 
ously join  to  the  foregoing  more  special  aspect  of  the 
phenomena,  the  more  general  aspects  before  delineated. 

After  this  passing  remark,  I  recur  to  the  main  propo- 
sition set  forth  in  these  two  chapters,  which  has,  I  think, 
been  fully  justified.  Guided  by  the  truth  that  as  the 
conduct  with  which  Ethics  deals  is  part  of  conduct  at 
large,  conduct  at  large  must  be  generally  understood 
before  this  part  can  be  specially  understood;  and 
guided  by  the  further  truth  that  to  understand  conduct 
at  large  -we  must  understand  the  evolution  of  con- 
duct, we  have  been  led  to  see  that  Ethics  has  for  its 
subject-matter  that  form  which  universal  conduct  as- 
sumes during  the  last  stages  of  its  evolution.  We 
have  also  concluded  that  these  last  stages  in  the  evolu- 
tion of  conduct  are  those  displayed  by  the  highest  type 
of  being,  when  he  is  forced,  by  increase  of  numbers,  to 
live  more  and  more  in  presence  of  his  fellows.  And 
there  has  followed  the  corollary  that  conduct  gains  ethi- 
cal sanction  in  proportion  as  the  activities,  becoming 
less  and  less  militant  and  more  and  more  industrial,  are 
such  as  do  not  necessitate  mutual  injury  or  hinderance, 
but  consist  Avith,  and  are  furthered  by,  co-operation  and 
mutual  aid. 

These  implications  of  the  Evolution-Hypothesis,  we 
shall  now  see,  harmonize  with  the  leading  moral  ideas 
men  have  otherwise  reached. 


22 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  III. 

GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 

§  8.  By  comparing  its  meanings  in  different  connec- 
tions and  observing  what  they  have  in  common,  we 
learn  the  essential  meaning  of  a  word ;  and  the  essen- 
tial meaning  of  a  word  that  is  variously  applied,  may 
best  be  learned  by  comparing  with  one  another  those 
applications  of  it  which  diverge  most  widely.  Let  us 
thus  ascertain  what  good  and  bad  mean. 

In  which  cases  do  we  distinguish  as  good,  a  knife,  a 
gun,  a  house  ?  And  what  trait  leads  us  to  speak  of 
a  bad  umbrella  or  a  bad  pair  of  boots?  The  characters 
here  predicted  by  the  words  good  and  bad,  are  not 
intrinsic  characters ;  for,  apart  from  human  wants,  such 
things  have  neither  merits  nor  demerits.  We  call  these 
articles  good  or  bad  according  as  they  are  Avell  or  ill 
adapted  to  achieve  prescribed  ends.  The  good  knife  is 
one  v/hich  will  cut ;  the  good  gun  is  one  which  carries 
far  and  true  ;  the  good  house  is  one  which  duly  yields 
the  shelter,  comfort,  and  accommodation  sought  for. 
Conversely,  the  badness  alleged  of  the  umbrella  or  the 
pair  of  boots,  refers  to  their  failures  in  fulfilling  the 
ends  of  keeping  off  the  rain  and  comfortably  protecting 
the  feet,  with  due  regard  to  appearances. 

So  is  it  when  we  pass  from  inanimate  objects  to  in- 
animate actions.  We  call  a  day  bad  in  which  storms 
prevent  us  from  satisfying  certain  of  our  desires.  A 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 


23 


good  season  is  the  expression  used  when  the  weather 
has  favored  the  production  of  valuable  crops. 

If  from  lifeless  things  and  actions  we  pass  to  living 
ones,  we  similarly  find  that  these  words  in  their  current 
applications  refer  to  efficient  subservience.  The  good- 
ness or  badness  of  a  pointer  or  a  hunter,  of  a  sheep  or 
an  ox,  ignoring  all  other  attributes  of  these  creatures, 
refer  in  the  one  case  to  the  fitness  of  their  actions  for 
effecting  the  ends  men  use  them  for,  and  in  the  other 
case  to  the  qualities  of  their  flesh  as  adapting  it  to  sup- 
port human  life. 

And  those  doings  of  men  which,  morally  considered, 
are  indifferent,  we  class  as  good  or  bad  according  to 
their  success  or  failure.  A  good  jump  is  a  jump  which, 
remoter  ends  ignored,  well  achieves  the  immediate  pur- 
pose of  a  jump ;  and  a  stroke  at  billiards  is  called  good 
when  the  movements  are  skilfully  adjusted  to  the 
requirements.  Oppositely,  the  badness  of  a  walk  that 
is  shuffling  and  an  utterance  that  is  indistinct,  is  alleged 
because  of  the  relative  non-adaptations  of  the  acts  to 
the  ends. 

Thus  recognizing  the  meanings  of  good  and  bad  as 
otherwise  used,  we  shall  understand  better  their  mean- 
ings as  used  in  characterizing  conduct  under  its  ethical 
aspects.  Here,  too,  observation  shows  that  we  apply 
them  according  as  the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  are, 
or  are  not,  efficient.  This  truth  is  somewhat  disguised. 
The  entanglement  of  social  relations  is  such  that  men's 
actions  often  simultaneously  affect  the  welfares  of  self, 
of  offspring,  and  of  fellow-citizens.  Hence  results  con- 
fusion in  judging  of  actions  as  good  or  bad;  since 
actions  well  fitted  to  achieve  ends  of  one  order,  may 
prevent  ends  of  the  other  orders  from  being  achieved. 


24 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


Nevertheless,  when  we  disentangle  the  three  orders  of 
ends,  and  consider  each  separately,  it  becomes  clear  that 
the  conduct  which  achieves  each  kind  of  end  is  regarded 
as  relatively  good ;  and  is  regarded  as  relatively  bad  if 
it  fails  to  achieve  it. 

Take  first  the  primary  set  of  adjustments  —  those 
subserving  individual  life.  Apart  from  approval  or 
disapproval  of  his  ulterior  aims,  a  man  who  fights  is 
said  to  make  a  good  defence,  if  his  defence  is  well 
adapted  for  self-preservation ;  and,  the  judgments  on 
other  aspects  of  his  conduct  remaining  the  same,  he 
brings  down  on  himself  an  unfavorable  verdict,  in  so 
far  as  his  immediate  acts  are  concerned,  if  these  are 
futile.  The  goodness  ascribed  to  a  man  of  business,  as 
such,  is  measured  by  the  activity  and  ability  with  which 
he  buys  and  sells  to  advantage  ;  and  may  co-exist  with 
a  hard  treatment  of  dependents  which  is  reprobated. 
Though,  in  repeatedly  lending  money  to  a  friend  who 
sinks  one  loan  after  another,  a  man  is  doing  that 
which,  considered  in  itself,  is  held  praiseworthy;  yet, 
if  he  does  it  to  the  extent  of  bringing  on  his  own  ruin, 
he  is  held  blameworthy  for  a  self-sacrifice  carried  too 
far.  And  thus  is  it  with  the  opinions  we  express  from 
hour  to  hour  on  those  acts  of  people  around  which 
bear  on  their  health  and  personal  welfare.  "You 
should  not  have  done  that,"  is  the  reproof  given  to 
one  who  crosses  the  street  amid  a  dangerous  rush  of 
vehicles.  You  ought  to  have  changed  your  clothes," 
is  said  to  another  who  has  taken  cold  after  getting  wet. 
"  You  were  right  to  take  a  receipt,"  You  were  wrong 
to  invest  without  advice,"  are  common  criticisms.  All 
such  approving  and  disapproving  utterances  make  the 
tacit  assertion  that,  other  things  equal,  conduct  is  right 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 


25 


or  wrong  according  as  its  special  acts,  wqW  or  ill 
adjusted  to  special  ends,  do  or  do  not  further  the 
general  end  of  self-preservation. 

These  ethical  judgments  we  pass  on  self-regarding 
acts  are  ordinarily  little  emphasized;  partly  because 
the  promptings  of  the  self-regarding  desires,  generally 
strong  enough,  do  not  need  moral  enforcement,  and 
partly  because  the  promptings  of  the  other-regarding 
desires,  less  strong,  and  often  over-ridden,  do  need 
moral  enforcement.  Hence  results  a  contrast.  On 
turning  to  that  second  class  of  adjustments  of  acts  to 
ends  which  subserve  the  rearing  of  offspring,  we  no 
longer  find  any  obscurity  in  the  application  of  the 
words  good  and  bad  to  them,  according  as  they  are 
efficient  or  inefficient.  The  expressions  good  nursing 
and  bad  nursing,  whether  they  refer  to  the  supply  of 
food,  the  quantity  and  amount  of  clothing,  or  the  due 
ministration  to  infantine  wants  from  hour  to  hour, 
tacitly  recognize  as  special  ends  which  ought  to  be 
fulfilled,  the  furthering  of  the  vital  functions,  with  a 
view  to  the  general  end  of  continued  life  and  growth. 
A  mother  is  called  good  who,  ministering  to  all  the 
physical  needs  of  her  children,  also  adjusts  her  be- 
havior in  ways  conducive  to  their  mental  health ;  and 
a  bad  father  is  one  who  either  does  not  provide  the 
necessaries  of  life  for  his  family,  or  otherwise  acts  in  a 
manner  injurious  to  their  bodies  or  minds.  Similarly 
of  the  education  given  to  them,  or  provided  for  them. 
Goodness  or  badness  is  affirmed  of  it  (often  with  little 
consistency,  however)  according  as  its  methods  are  so 
adapted  to  physical  and  psychical  requirements,  as  to 
further  the  children's  lives  for  the  time  being,  while 
preparing  them  for  carrying  on  complete  and  prolonged 
adult  life. 


26 


THE  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 


Most  emphatic,  however,  are  the  applications  of  the 
words  good  and  bad  to  conduct  throughout  that  third 
division  of  it  comprising  the  deeds  by  which  men  affect 
one  another.  In  maintaining  their  own  lives  and  fos- 
tering their  offspring,  men's  adjustments  of  acts  to 
ends  are  so  apt  to  hinder  the  kindred  adjustments  of 
other  men,  that  insistence  on  the  needful  limitations 
has  to  be  perpetual ;  and  the  mischiefs  caused  by  men's 
interferences  with  one  another's  life-subserving  actions 
are  so  great  that  the  interdicts  have  to  be  peremptory. 
Hence  the  fact  that  the  words  good  and  bad  have 
come  to  be  specially  associated  with  acts  which  further 
the  complete  living  of  others,  and  acts  which  obstruct 
their  complete  living.  Goodness,  standing  by  itself, 
suggests,  above  all  other  things,  the  conduct  of  one 
who  aids  the  sick  in  re-acquiring  normal  vitality, 
assists  the  unfortunate  to  recover  the  means  of  main- 
taining themselves,  defends  those  who  are  threatened 
with  harm  in  person,  property,  or  reputation,  and  aids 
whatever  promises  to  improve  the  living  of  all  his 
fellows.  Contrariwise,  badness  brings  to  mind,  as  its 
leading  correlative,  the  conduct  of  one  who,  in  carrying 
on  his  own  life,  damages  the  lives  of  others  by  injuring 
their  bodies,  destroying  their  possessions,  defrauding 
them,  calumniating  them. 

Always,  then,  acts  are  called  good  or  bad  according 
as  they  are  well  or  ill  adjusted  to  ends ;  and  whatever 
inconsistency  there  is  in  our  uses  of  the  words  arises 
from  inconsistency  of  the  ends.  Here,  however,  the 
study  of  conduct  in  general,  and  of  the  evolution  of 
conduct,  have  prepared  us  to  liarmonize  these  interpre- 
tations. The  foregoing  exposition  shows  that  the  con- 
duct to  which  we  apply  the  name  good,  is  the  relatively 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 


27 


more  evolved  conduct ;  and  that  bad  is  the  name  we 
apply  to  conduct  which  is  relatively  less  evolved.  We 
saw  that  evolution,  tending  ever  toward  self-preserva- 
tion, reaches  its  limit  when  individual  life  is  the  great- 
est, both  in  length  and  breadth ;  and  now  we  see  that, 
leaving  other  ends  aside,  we  regard  as  good  the  conduct 
furthering  self-preservation,  and  as  bad  the  conduct 
tending  to  self-destruction.  It  was  shown  that  along 
with  increasing  power  of  maintaining  individual  life, 
which  evolution  brings,  there  goes  increasing  power  of 
perpetuating  the  species  by  fostering  progeny,  and  that 
in  this  direction  evolution  reaches  its  limit  when  the 
needful  number  of  young,  preserved  to  maturity,  are 
then  fit  for  a  life  that  is  complete  in  fulness  and  dura- 
tion ;  and  here  it  turns  out  that  parental  conduct  is 
called  good  or  bad  as  it  approaches  or  falls  short  of  this 
ideal  result.  Lastly,  we  inferred  that  establishment  of 
an  associated  state,  both  makes  possible  and  requires  a 
form  of  conduct  such  that  life  may  be  completed  in  each 
and  in  his  offspring,  not  only  without  preventing  com- 
pletion of  it  in  others,  but  with  furtherance  of  it  in 
others ;  and  we  have  found  above,  that  this  is  the  form 
of  conduct  most  emphatically  termed  good.  Moreover, 
just  as  we  there  saw  that  evolution  becomes  the  highest 
possible  when  the  conduct  simultaneously  achieves  the 
greatest  totality  of  life  in  self,  in  offspring,  and  in 
fellow-men  ;  so  here  we  see  that  the  conduct  called  good 
rises  to  the  conduct  conceived  as  best,  when  it  fulfils 
all  three  classes  of  ends  at  the  same  time. 

§  9.  Is  there  any  postulate  involved  in  these  judg- 
ments on  conduct  ?  Is  there  any  assumption  made  in 
calling  good  the  acts  conductive  to  life,  in  self  or  others, 


28 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


and  bad  those  which  directly  or  indirectly  tend  toward 
death,  special  or  general  ?  Yes ;  an  assumption  of 
extreme  significance  has  been  made,  —  an  assumption 
underlying  all  moral  estimates. 

The  question  to  be  definitely  raised  and  answered 
before  entering  on  any  ethical  discussion,  is  the  ques- 
tion of  late  much  agitated:  Is  life  worth  living? 
Shall  we  take  the  pessimist  view?  or  shall  we  take 
the  optimist  view  ?  or  shall  we,  after  weighing  pessi- 
mistic and  optimistic  arguments,  conclude  that  the 
balance  is  in  favor  of  a  qualified  optimism  ? 

On  the  answer  to  this  question  depends  entirely 
every  decision  concerning  the  goodness  or  badness  of 
conduct.  By  those  who  think  life  is  not  a  benefit  but 
a  misfortune,  conduct  which  prolongs  it  is  to  be 
blamed  rather  than  praised ;  the  ending  of  an  unde- 
sirable existence  being  the  thing  to  be  wished,  that 
which  causes  the  ending  of  it  must  be  applauded; 
while  actions  furthering  its  continuance,  either  in  self 
or  others,  must  be  reprobated.  Those  who,  on  the 
other  hand,  take  an  optimistic  view,  or  who,  if  not 
pure  optimists,  yet  hold  that  in  life  the  good  exceeds 
the  evil,  are  committed  to  opposite  estimates ;  and 
must  regard  as  conduct  to  be  approved  that  which  fos- 
ters life  in  self  and  others,  and  as  conduct  to  be 
disapproved  that  which  injures  or  endangers  life  in 
self  or  others. 

The  ultimate  question,  therefore,  is :  Has  evolution 
been  a  mistake ;  and  especially  that  evolution  which 
improves  the  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  in  ascending 
stages  of  organization?  If  it  is  held  that  there  had 
better  not  have  been  any  animate  existence  at  all,  and 
that  the  sooner  it  comes  to  an  end  the  better ;  then  one 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT, 


29 


set  of  conclusions  with  respect  to  conduct  emerges.  If, 
contrariwise,  it  is  held  that  there  is  a  balance  in  favor 
of  animate  existence,  and  if,  still  further,  it  is  held  that 
in  the  future  this  balance  may  be  increased ;  then  the 
opposite  set  of  conclusions  emerges.  Even  should  it 
be  alleged  that  the  worth  of  life  is  not  to  be  judged 
by  its  intrinsic  character,  but  rather  by  its  extrinsic 
sequences  —  by  certain  results  to  be  anticipated  when 
life  has  passed  —  the  ultimate  issue  reappears  in  a  new 
shape.  For  though  the  accompanying  creed  may  neg- 
ative a  deliberate  shortening  of  life  that  is  miserable, 
it  cannot  justify  a  gratuitous  lengthening  of  such  life. 
Legislation  conducive  to  increased  longevity  would,  on 
the  pessimistic  view,  remain  blamable,  while  it  would 
be  praiseworthy  on  the  optimistic  view. 

But  now,  have  these  irreconcilable  opinions  anything 
in  common  ?  Men  being  divisible  into  two  schools  dif- 
fering on  this  ultimate  question,  the  inquiry  arises :  Is 
there  anything  which  their  radically  opposed  views 
alike  take  for  granted  ?  In  the  optimistic  proposition, 
tacitly  made  when  using  the  words  good  and  bad  after 
the  ordinary  manner ;  and  in  the  pessimistic  proposi- 
tion overtly  made,  which  implies  that  the  words  good 
and  bad  should  be  used  in  the  reverse  senses ;  does  ex- 
amination disclose  any  joint  proposition  —  any  proposi- 
tion which,  contained  in  both  of  them,  may  be  held 
more  certain  than  either  —  any  universally  asserted 
proposition  ? 

§  10.  Yes,  there  is  one  postulate  in  which  pessimists 
and  optimists  agree.  Both  their  arguments  assume  it 
to  be  self-evident  that  life  is  good  or  bad,  according  as 
it  does,  or  does  not,  bring  a  surplus  of  agreeable  feel- 


30 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


ing.  The  pessimist  says  he  condemns  life  because  it 
results  in  more  pain  than  pleasure.  The  optimist  de- 
fends life  in  the  belief  that  it  brings  more  pleasure  than 
pain.  Eacli  makes  the  kind  of  sentiency  which  accom- 
panies life  the  test.  They  agree  that  the  justification 
for  life  as  a  state  of  being,  turns  on  this  issue  —  whether 
the  average  consciousness  rises  above  indifference  point 
into  pleasurable  feeling,  or  falls  below  it  into  painful 
feeling.  The  implication  common  to  their  antagonist 
views  is,  that  conduct  should  conduce  to  preservation  of 
the  individual,  of  the  family,  and  of  the  society,  only 
supposing  that  life  brings  more  happiness  than  misery. 

Changing  the  venue  cannot  alter  the  verdict.  If 
either  the  pessimist,  while  saying  that  the  pains  of  life 
predominate,  or  the  optimist,  while  saying  that  the 
pleasures  predominate,  urges  that  the  pains  borne  here 
are  to  be  compensated  by  pleasures  received  hereafter ; 
and  that  so  life,  whether  or  not  justified  in  its  immedi- 
ate results,  is  justified  in  its  ultimate  results ;  the  impli- 
cation remains  the  same.  The  decision  is  still  reached 
by  balancing  pleasures  against  pains.  Animate  exist- 
ence would  be  judged  by  both  a  curse,  if  to  a  surplus 
of  misery  borne  here  were  added  a  surplus  of  misery  to 
be  borne  hereafter.  And  for  either  to  regard  animate 
existence  as  a  blessing,  if  here  its  pains  were  held  to 
exceed  its  pleasures,  he  must  hold  that  hereafter  its 
pleasures  will  exceed  its  pains.  Thus  there  is  no  escape 
from  the  admission  that  in  calling  good  the  conduct 
which  subserves  life,  and  bad  the  conduct  which  hinders 
or  destroys  it,  and  in  so  implying  that  life  is  a  blessing 
and  not  a  curse,  we  are  inevitably  asserting  that  conduct 
is  good  or  bad  according  as  its  total  effects  are  pleasur- 
able or  painful. 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 


31 


One  theory  only  is  imaginable  in  pursuance  of  which 
other  interpretations  of  good  and  bad  can  be  given. 
This  theory  is  that  men  were  created  with  the  intention 
that  they  should  be  sources  of  misery  to  themselves ; 
and  that  they  are  bound  to  continue  living,  that  their 
creator  may  have  tlie  satisfaction  of  contemplating  their 
misery.  Though  this  is  not  a  theory  avowedly  enter- 
tained by  many,  —  though  it  is  not  formulated  by  any 
in  this  distinct  way,  —  yet  not  a  few  do  accept  it  under 
a  disguised  form.  Inferior  creeds  are  pervaded  by  the 
belief  that  the  sight  of  suffering  is  pleasing  to  the  gods. 
Derived  from  bloodthirsty  ancestors,  such  gods  are  nat- 
urally conceived  as  gratified  by  the  infliction  of  pain : 
when  living  they  delighted  in  torturing  other  beings ; 
and  witnessing  torture  is  supposed  still  to  give  them 
delight.  The  implied  conceptions  long  survive.  It 
needs  but  to  name  Indian  fakirs  who  hang  on  hooks, 
and  Eastern  dervishes  who  gash  themselves,  to  show 
that  in  societies  considerably  advanced  are  still  to  be 
found  many  who  think  that  submission  to  anguish 
brings  divine  favor.  And  without  enlarging  on  facts 
and  penances,  it  will  be  clear  that  there  has  existed, 
and  still  exists,  among  Christian  peoples,  the  belief  that 
the  Deity  whom  Jephthah  thought  to  propitiate  by 
sacrificing  his  daughter,  may  be  propitiated  by  self- 
inflicted  pains.  Further,  the  conception  accompanying 
this,  that  acts  pleasing  to  self  are  offensive  to  God,  has 
survived  along  with  it,  and  still  widely  prevails  ;  if  not 
in  formulated  dogmas,  yet  in  beliefs  that  are  manifestly 
operative. 

Doubtless,  in  modern  days  such  beliefs  have  assumed 
qualified  forms.  The  satisfactions  which  ferocious  gods 
were  supposed  to  feel  in  contemplating  tortures,  has 


32 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


been,  in  large  measure,  transformed  into  the  satisfaction 
felt  by  a  deity  in  contemplating  that  self-infliction  of 
pain  which  is  held  to  further  eventual  happiness.  But 
clearly  those  who  entertain  this  modified  view  are 
excluded  from  the  class  whose  position  we  are  here 
considering.  Restricting  ourselves  to  this  class,  —  sup 
posing  that  from  the  savage  who  immolates  victims  to  a 
cannibal  god,  there  are  descendants  among  the  civilized, 
who  hold  that  mankind  were  made  for  suffering,  and 
that  it  is  their  duty  to  continue  living  in  misery  for  the 
delight  of  their  maker,  —  we  can  only  recognize  the  fact 
that  devil-worshippers  are  not  yet  extinct. 

Omitting  people  of  this  class,  if  there  are  any,  as 
beyond  or  beneath  argument,  we  find  that  all  others 
avowedly  or  tacitly  hold  that  the  final  justification  for 
maintaining  life  can  only  be  the  reception  from  it  of  a 
surplus  of  pleasurable  feeling  over  painful  feeling ;  and 
that  goodness  or  badness  can  be  ascribed  to  acts  which 
subserve  life  or  hinder  life  only  on  this  supposition. 

And  here  Ave  are  brought  round  to  those  primary 
meanings  of  the  words  good  and  bad,  which  we  passed 
over  when  considering  their  secondary  meanings.  For 
on  remembering  that  we  call  good  and  bad  the  things 
which  immediately  produce  agreeable  and  disagreeable 
sensations,  and  also  the  sensations  themselves,  —  a  good 
wine,  a  good  appetite,  a  bad  smell,  a  bad  headache,  — 
we  see  that  by  referring  directly  to  pleasures  and  pains, 
these  meanings  harmonize  with  those  which  indirectly 
refer  to  pleasures  and  pains.  If  we  call  good  the  enjoy- 
able state  itself,  as  a  good  laugh — if  we  call  good  the 
proximate  cause  of  an  enjoyable  state,  as  good  music  — 
if  we  call  good  any  agent  which  conduces  immediately 
or  remotely  to  an  enjoyable  state,  as  a  good  shop,  a  good 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 


33 


teacher  —  if  we  call  good  considered  intrinsically,  eacli 
act  so  adjusted  to  its  end  as  to  further  self-preservation 
and  that  surplus  of  enjoyment  wliich  makes  self-pres- 
ervation desirable  —  if  we  call  good  every  kind  of  con- 
duct which  aids  the  lives  of  others,  and  do  this  under 
the  belief  that  life  brings  more  happiness  than  misery ; 
then  it  becomes  undeniable,  that,  taking  into  account 
immediate  and  remote  effects  on  all  persons,  the  good 
is  universally  the  pleasurable. 

§  11.  Sundry  influences  —  moral,  theological,  and 
political  —  conspire  to  make  people  disguise  from  them- 
selves this  truth.  As  in  narrower  cases  so  in  this 
widest  case,  they  become  so  pre-occupied  with  the 
means  by  which  an  end  is  achieved,  as  eventually  to 
mistake  it  for  the  end.  Just  as  money,  which  is  the 
means  of  satisfying  wants,  comes  to  be  regarded  by  a 
miser  as  the  sole  thing  to  be  worked  for,  leaving  the 
wants  unsatisfied ;  so  the  conduct  men  have  found 
preferable  because  most  conducive  to  happiness  has 
come  to  be  thought  of  as  intrinsically  preferable,  not 
only  to  be  made  a  proximate  end  (whicli  it  should  be), 
but  to  be  made  an  ultimate  end,  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
true  ultimate  end.  And  yet  cross-examination  quickly 
compels  every  one  to  confess  the  true  ultimate  end. 
Just  as  the  miser,  asked  to  justify  himself,  is  obliged  to 
allege  the  power  of  money  to  purchase  desirable  things, 
as  his  reason  for  prizing  it ;  so  the  moralist  who  thinks 
this  conduct  intrinsically  good  and  that  intrinsically  bad, 
if  pushed  home,  has  no  choice  but  to  fall  back  on  their 
pleasure-giving  and  pain-giving  effects.  To  prove  this 
it  needs  but  to  observe  how  impossible  it  would  be  to 
think  of  them  as  we  do,  if  their  effects  were  reversed. 


34 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


Suppose  that  gashes  and  bruises  caused  agreeable  sen- 
sations, and  brought  in  their  train  increased  power  of 
doing  work  and  receiving  enjoyment ;  should  we  regard 
assault  in  the  same  manner  as  at  present?  Or  suppose 
that  self-mutilation,  say  by  cutting  off  a  hand,  was  both 
intrinsically  pleasant  and  furthered  performance  of  the 
processes  by  which  personal  welfare  and  the  welfare  of 
dependents  is  achieved;  should  we  hold  as  now,  that 
deliberate  injury  to  one's  own  body  is  to  be  reprobated? 
Or  again,  suppose  that  picking  a  man's  pocket  excited 
in  him  joyful  emotions,  by  brightening  his  prospects ; 
would  theft  be  counted  among  crimes,  as  in  existing 
law  books  and  moral  codes  ?  In  these  extreme  cases, 
no  one  can  deny  that  what  we  call  the  badness  of 
actions  is  ascribed  to  them  solely  for  the  reason  that 
they  entail  pain,  immediate  or  remote,  and  would  not 
be  so  ascribed  did  they  entail  pleasure. 

If  we  examine  our  conceptions  on  their  obverse  side, 
this  general  fact  forces  itself  on  our  attention  with 
equal  distinctness.  Imagine  that  ministering  to  a  sick 
person  always  increased  the  pains  of  illness.  Imagine 
that  an  orphan's  relatives  who  took  charge  of  it,  thereby 
necessarily  brought  miseries  upon  it.  Imagine  that 
liquidating  another  man's  pecuniary  claims  on  you  re- 
dounded to  his  disadvantage.  Imagine  that  crediting  a 
man  with  noble  behavior  hindered  his  social  welfare 
and  consequent  gratification.  What  should  we  say  to 
these  acts  which  now  fall  into  the  class  we  call  praise- 
worthy? Should  we  not  contrariwise  class  them  as 
blameworthy  ? 

Using,  then,  as  our  tests,  these  most  pronounced 
forms  of  good  and  bad  conduct,  we  find  it  unquestion- 
able that  our  ideas  of  their  goodness  and  badness  really 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 


35 


originate  from  our  consciousness  of  the  certainty  or 
probability  that  they  will  produce  pleasures  or  pains 
somewhere.  And  this  truth  is  brought  out  with  equal 
clearness  by  examining  the  standards  of  different  moral 
schools ;  for  analysis  shows  that  every  one  of  them 
derives  its  authority  from  this  ultimate  standard.  Ethi- 
cal systems  are  roughly  distinguishable  according  as 
they  take  for  their  cardinal  ideas  (1)  the  character  of 
the  agent ;  (2)  the  nature  of  his  motive  ;  (3)  the  quality 
of  his  deeds ;  and  (4)  the  results.  Each  of  these  may 
be  characterized  as  good  or  bad ;  and  those  who  do  not 
estimate  a  mode  of  life  by  its  effects  on  happiness,  esti- 
mate it  by  the  implied  goodness  or  badness  in  the  agent, 
in  his  motive,  or  in  his  deeds.  We  have  perfection  in 
the  agent  set  up  as  a  test  by  which  conduct  is  to  be 
judged.  Apart  from  the  agent  we  have  his  feeling  con- 
sidered as  moral.  And  apart  from  the  feeling  we  have 
his  action  considered  as  virtuous. 

Though  the  distinctions  thus  indicated  have  so  little 
definiteness  that  the  words  marking  them  are  used  in- 
terchangeably, yet  there  correspond  to  them  doctrines 
partially  unlike  one  another ;  which  Ave  may  here  con- 
veniently examine  separately,  with  the  view  of  showing 
that  all  their  tests  of  goodness  are  derivative. 

§  12.  It  is  strange  that  a  notion  so  abstract  as  that 
of  perfection,  or  a  certain  ideal  completeness  of  nature., 
should  ever  have  been  thought  one  from  which  a  system 
of  guidance  can  be  evolved ;  as  it  was  in  a  general  way 
by  Plato,  and  more  distinctly  by  Jonathan  Edwards. 
Perfection  is  synonymous  with  goodness  in  the  highest 
degree  ;  and  hence,  to  define  good  conduct  in  terms  of 
perfection,  is  indirectly  to  define  good  conduct  in  terms 


36 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


of  itself.  Naturally,  therefore,  it  happens  that  the 
notion  of  perfection  like  the  notion  of  goodness  can  be 
framed  only  in  relation  to  ends. 

We  allege  imperfection  of  any  inanimate  thing,  as  a 
tool,  if  it  lacks  some  part  needful  for  effectual  action, 
or  if  some  part  is  so  shaped  as  not  to  fulfil  its  purpose 
in  the  best  manner.  Perfection  is  alleged  of  a  watch 
if  it  keeps  exact  time,  however  plain  its  case ;  and 
imperfection  is  alleged  of  it  because  of  inaccurate  time- 
keeping, however  beautifully  it  is  ornamented.  Though 
we  call  things  imperfect  if  we  detect  in  them  any 
injuries  or  flaws,  even  when  these  do  not  detract  from 
efficiency;  yet  we  do  this  because  they  imply  that 
inferior  workmanship,  or  that  wear  and  tear,  with  which 
inefficiency  is  commonly  joined  in  experience  :  absence 
of  minor  imperfections  being  habitually  associated  with 
absence  of  major  imperfections. 

As  applied  to  living  things,  the  word  perfection  has 
the  same  meaning.  The  idea  of  perfect  shape  in  a 
race-horse  is  derived  by  generalization  from  those 
observed  traits  of  race-horses  which  have  usually  gone 
along  with  attainment  of  the  highest  speed ;  and  the 
idea  of  perfect  constitution  in  a  race-horse  similarly 
refers  to  the  endurance  which  enables  him  to  continue 
that  speed  for  the  longest  time.  With  men,  physically 
considered,  it  is  the  same :  we  are  able  to  furnish  no 
other  test  of  perfection  than  that  of  complete  power 
in  all  the  organs  to  fulfil  their  respective  functions. 
That  our  conception  of  perfect  balance  among  the 
internal  parts,  and  of  perfect  proportion  among  the  ex- 
ternal parts,  originates  thus,  is  made  clear  by  observ- 
ing that  imperfection  of  any  viscus,  as  lungs,  heart,  or 
liver,  is  ascribed  for  no  other  reason  than  inability  to 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 


37 


meet  in  full  the  demands  which  the  activities  of  the  or- 
ganism make  on  it ;  and  on  observing  that  the  conception 
of  insufficient  size,  or  of  too  great  size,  in  a  limb,  is 
derived  from  accumulated  experiences  respecting  that 
ratio  among  the  limbs  which  furthers  in  the  highest 
degree  the  performance  of  all  needful  actions. 

And  of  perfection  in  mental  nature  we  have  no  other 
measure.  If  imperfection  of  memory,  of  judgment,  of 
temper,  is  alleged,  it  is  alleged  because  of  inadequacy 
to  the  requirements  of  life  ;  and  to  imagine  a  perfect 
balance  of  the  intellectual  powers  and  of  the  emotions, 
is  to  imagine  that  proportion  among  them  which 
insures  an  entire  discharge  of  each  and  every  obligation 
as  the  occasion  calls  for  it. 

So  that  the  perfection  of  man  considered  as  an  agent, 
means  the  being  constituted  for  effecting  complete 
adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  of  every  kind.  And  since, 
as  shown  above,  the  complete  adjustment  of  acts  to 
ends  is  that  which  both  secures  and  constitutes  the  life 
that  is  most  evolved,  alike  in  breadth  and  length ;  while, 
as  also  shown,  the  justification  for  whatever  increases 
life  is  the  reception  from  life  of  more  happiness  than 
misery;  it  follows  tliat  conduciveness  to  happiness  is 
the  ultimate  test  of  perfection  in  a  man's  nature.  To 
be  fully  convinced  of  this,  it  needs  but  to  observe  how 
the  proposition  looks  when  inverted.  It  needs  but  to 
suppose  that  every  approach  toward  perfection  involved 
greater  misery  to  self,  or  others,  or  both,  to  show  by 
opposition  that  approach  to  perfection  really  means 
approach  to  that  which  secures  greater  happiness. 

§  13.  Pass  we  now  from  the  view  of  those  who  make 
excellence  of  being  the  standard,  to  the  view  of  those 


88 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


who  make  virtuousness  of  action  the  standard.  I  do 
not  here  refer  to  moralists  who,  having  decided  empiri- 
cally or  rationally,  inductively  or  deductively,  that  acts 
of  certain  kinds  have  the  character  we  call  virtuous, 
argue  that  such  acts  are  to  be  performed  without  regard 
to  proximate  consequences :  these  have  ample  justifica- 
tion. But  I  refer  to  moralists  who  suppose  themselves 
to  have  conceptions  of  virtue  as  an  end,  underived  from 
any  other  end,  who  think  that  the  idea  of  virtue  is  not 
resolvable  into  simpler  ideas. 

This  is  the  doctrine  which  appears  to  have  been  enter- 
tained by  Aristotle.  I  say,  appears  to  have  been, 
because  his  statements  are  far  from  consistent  with  one 
another.  Recognizing  happiness  as  the  supreme  end  of 
human  endeavor,  it  would  at  first  sight  seem  that  he 
cannot  be  taken  as  typical  of  those  who  make  virtue 
the  supreme  end.  Yet  he  puts  himself  in  this  category 
by  seeking  to  define  happiness  in  terms  of  virtue,  in- 
stead of  defining  virtue  in  terms  of  happiness.  The 
imperfect  separation  of  words  from  things,  which  char- 
acterizes Greek  speculation  in  general,  seems  to  have 
been  the  cause  of  this.  In  primitive  thought  the  name 
and  the  object  named  are  associated  in  such  wise  that 
the  one  is  regarded  as  a  part  of  the  other  —  so  much  so, 
that  knowing  a  savage's  name  is  considered  by  him  as 
having  some  of  his  being,  and  a  consequent  power  to 
work  evil  on  him.  This  belief  in  a  real  connection 
between  word  and  thing,  continuing  through  lower 
stages  of  progress,  and  long  surviving  in  the  tacit 
assumption  that  the  meanings  of  words  are  intrinsic, 
pervades  the  dialogues  of  Plato,  and  is  traceable  even 
in  Aristotle.  For  otherwise  it  is  not  easy  to  see  why 
he  should  liave  so  incompletely  disassociated  the  ab- 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 


39 


stract  idea  of  happiness  from  particular  forms  of  hap- 
piness. 

Naturally  where  the  divorcing  of  words  as  symbols, 
from  things  as  symbolized,  is  imperfect,  there  must  be 
difficulty  in  giving  to  abstract  words  a  sufficiently 
abstract  meaning.  If  in  the  first  stages  of  language  the 
concrete  name  cannot  be  separated  in  thought  from 
the  concrete  object  it  belongs  to,  it  is  inferable  that  in 
the  course  of  forming  successively  higher  grades  of 
abstract  names,  there  will  have  to  be  resisted  the  tend- 
ency to  interpret  each  more  abstract  name  in  terms  of 
some  one  class  of  the  less  abstract  names  it  covers. 
Hence,  I  think,  the  fact  that  Aristotle  supposes  happi- 
ness to  be  associated  with  some  one  order  of  human 
activities,  rather  than  with  all  orders  of  human  activi- 
ties. Instead  of  including  in  it  the  pleasurable  feel- 
ings accompanying  actions  that  constitute  mere  liv- 
ing, which  actions  he  says  man  has  in  common  with 
vegetables  ;  and  instead  of  making  it  include  the  mental 
states  which  the  life  of  external  perception  yields,  which 
he  says  man  has  in  common  with  animals  at  large ;  he 
excludes  these  from  his  idea  of  happiness,  and  includes 
in  it  only  the  modes  of  consciousness  accompanying 
rational  life.  Asserting  that  the  proper  work  of  man 
"  consists  in  the  active  exercise  of  the  mental  capacities 
conformably  to  reason,"  he  concludes  that  the  supreme 
good  of  man  will  consist  in  performing  this  Avork  with 
excellence  or  virtue :  herein  he  will  obtain  happiness." 
And  he  finds  confirmation  for  his  view  in  its  corre- 
spondence with  views  previously  enunciated;  saying, 
"  Our  notion  nearly  agrees  with  theirs  who  place  happi- 
ness in  virtue  ;  for  we  say  that  it  consists  in  the  action 
of  virtue ;  that  is,  not  merely  in  the  possession,  but  in 
the  use." 


40 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


Now  the  implied  belief  that  virtue  can  be  defined 
otherwise  than  in  terms  of  happiness  (for  else  the  propo- 
sition is  that  happiness  is  to  be  obtained  by  actions  con- 
ducive to  happiness)  is  allied  to  the  Platonic  belief 
that  there  is  an  ideal  or  absolute  good,  which  gives  to 
particular  and  relative  goods  their  property  of  goodness ; 
and  an  argument  analogous  to  that  which  Aristotle  uses 
against  Plato's  conception  of  good,  may  be  used  against 
his  own  conception  of  virtue.  As  with  good,  so  with 
virtue  —  it  is  not  singular  but  plural:  in  Aristotle's 
own  classification,  virtue,  when  treated  of  at  large,  is 
transformed  into  virtues.  Those  which  he  calls  virtues 
must  be  so  called  in  consequence  of  some  common 
character  that  is  either  intrinsic  or  extrinsic.  We  may 
class  things  together  either  because  they  are  made  alike 
by  all  having  in  themselves  some  peculiarity,  as  w^e  do 
vertebrate  animals  because  they  all  have  vertebral 
columns ;  or  Ave  may  class  them  together  because  of 
some  community  in  their  outer  relations,  as  when  we 
group  saws,  knives,  mallets,  harrows,  under  the  head  of 
tools.  Are  the  virtues  classed  as  such  because  of  some 
intrinsic  community  of  nature  ?  Then  there  must  be 
identifiable  a  common  trait  in  all  the  cardinal  virtues 
which  Aristotle  s]3ecifies :  Courage,  Temperance,  Liber- 
ality, Magnanimity,  Magnificence,  Meekness,  Amiability 
or  Friendliness,  Truthfulness,  Justice."  What  now  is 
the  trait  possessed  in  common  by  Magnificence  and 
Meekness  ?  and  if  any  such  common  trait  can  be  disen- 
tangled, is  it  that  whicii  also  constitutes  the  essential 
trait  in  Truthfulness?  The  answer  must  be,  No.  Tlie 
virtues,  then,  not  being  classed  as  such  because  of  an 
intrinsic  community  of  character,  must  be  classed  as 
Kuch  because  of  something  extrinsic;  and  this  some 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 


41 


thing  can  be  nothing  else  than  the  happiness  which 
Aristotle  says  consists  in  the  practice  of  them.  They 
are  united  by  their  common  relation  to  this  result; 
while  they  are  not  united  by  their  inner  natures. 

Perhaps  still  more  clearly  may  the  inference  be  drawn 
thus :  If  virtue  is  primordial  and  independent,  no  reason 
can  be  given  why  there  should  be  any  correspondence 
between  virtuous  conduct  and  conduct  that  is  pleasure- 
giving  in  its  total  effects  on  self,  or  others,  or  both ;  and 
if  there  is  not  a  necessary  correspondence,  it  is  conceiv- 
able that  the  conduct  classed  as  virtuous  should  be 
pain-giving  in  its  total  effects.  That  we  may  see  the 
consequence  of  so  conceiving  it,  let  us  take  the  two 
virtues  considered  as  typically  such  in  ancient  times 
and  in  modern  times — courage  and  chastity.  By  the 
hypothesis,  then,  courage,  displayed  alike  in  self-defence 
and  in  defence  of  country,  is  to  be  conceived  as  not 
only  entailing  pains  incidentally,  but  as  being  necessarily 
a  cause  of  misery  to  the  individual  and  to  the  state ; 
while,  by  implication,  the  absence  of  it  redounds  to 
personal  and  general  well-being.  Similarl}^',  by  the 
hypothesis,  we  have  to  conceive  that  irregular  sexual 
relations  are  directly  and  indirectly  beneficial  —  that 
adultery  is  conducive  to  domestic  harmony  and  the 
careful  rearing  of  children ;  while  marital  relations,  in 
proportion  as  they  are  persistent,  generate  discord 
between  husband  and  wife,  and  entail  on  their  offspring 
suffering,  disease,  and  death.  Unless  it  is  asserted  that 
courage  and  chastity  could  still  be  thought  of  as  virtues 
though  thus  productive  of  misery,  it  must  be  admitted 
that  the  conception  of  virtue  cannot  be  separated  from 
the  conception  of  happiness-producing  conduct;  and 
that  as  this  holds  of  all  the  virtues,  however  otherwise 


42 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


unlike,  it  is  from  their  conduciveness  to  happiness  that 
they  come  to  be  classed  as  virtues. 

§  14.  When  from  those  ethical  estimates  which  take 
perfection  of  nature,  or  virtuousness  of  action,  as  tests, 
we  pass  to  those  which  take  for  test  rectitude  of  motive, 
we  approach  the  intuitional  theory  of  morals  ;  and  we 
may  conveniently  deal  with  such  estimates  by  a  criti- 
cism on  this  theory. 

By  the  intuitional  theory  I  here  mean,  not  that  which 
recognizes  as  produced  by  the  inherited  effects  of  con- 
tinued experiences,  the  feelings  of  liking  and  aversion 
we  have  to  acts  of  certain  kinds ;  but  I  mean  the 
theory  which  regards  such  feelings  as  divinely  given, 
and  as  independent  of  results  experienced  by  self  or 
ancestors.  There  is  therefore,"  says  Hutcheson,  "  as 
each  one  by  close  attention  and  reflection  may  convince 
himself,  a  natural  and  immediate  determination  to  ap- 
prove certain  affections  and  actions  consequent  upon 
them ; "  and  since,  in  common  with  others  of  his  time, 
he  believes  in  the  special  creation  of  man,  and  all  other 
beings,  this  ''natural  sense  of  immediate  excellence"  he 
considers  as  a  supernaturally  derived  guide.  Though 
he  says  that  the  feelings  and  acts  thus  intuitively  rec- 
ognized as  good,  ''  all  agree  in  one  general  character, 
of  tending  to  the  happiness  of  others ; "  yet  he  is 
obliged  to  conceive  this  as  a  pre-ordained  correspond- 
ence. Nevertheless,  it  may  be  shown  that  conducive- 
ness to  happiness,  here  represented  as  an  incidental 
trait  of  the  acts  which  receive  these  innate  moral 
approvals,  is  really  the  test  by  which  these  approvals 
are  recognized  as  moral.  The  intuitionists  place  con- 
fidence in  these  verdicts  of  conscience  simply  because 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 


43 


they  vaguely,  if  not  distinctly,  perceive  them  to  be 
consonant  with  the  disclosures  of  that  ultimate  test. 
Observe  the  proof. 

By  the  hypothesis,  the  wrongness  of  murder  is 
known  by  a  moral  intuition  which  the  human  mind 
was  originally  constituted  to  yield ;  and  the  hypothesis, 
therefore,  negatives  the  admission  that  this  sense  of 
its  wrongness  arises,  immediately  or  remotely,  from 
the  consciousness  that  murder  involves  deduction  from 
happiness,  directly  and  indirectly.  But  if  you  ask  an 
adherent  of  this  doctrine  to  contrast  his  intuition  with 
that  of  the  Fijian,  who,  considering  murder  an  honor- 
able action,  is  restless  until  he  has  distinguished  him- 
self by  killing  some  one ;  and  if  you  inquire  of  him 
in  what  way  the  civilized  intuition  is  to  be  justified  in 
opposition  to  the  intuition  of  the  savage,  no  course  is 
open  save  that  of  showing  how  conformity  to  the  one 
conduces  to  well-being,  while  conformity  to  the  other 
entails  suffering,  individual  and  general.  When  asked 
why  tlie  moral  sense  which  tells  him  that  it  is  wrong 
to  take  another  man's  goods,  should  be  obeyed  rather 
than  the  moral  sense  of  a  Turcoman,  who  proves  how 
meritorious  he  considers  theft  to  be  by  making  pil- 
grimages to  the  tombs  of  noted  robbers  to  make  offer- 
ings, the  intuitionist  can  do  nothing  but  urge  tliat, 
certainly  under  conditions  like  ours,  if  not  also  under 
conditions  like  those  of  the  Turcomans,  disregard  of 
men's  claims  to  their  property  not  onlj^  inflicts  imme- 
diate misery,  but  involves  a  social  state  inconsistent 
with  happiness.  Or  if,  again,  there  is  required  from 
him  a  justification  for  his  feeling  of  repugnance  to 
lying,  in  contrast  with  the  feeling  of  an  Egyptian,  who 
prides  himself  on  skill  in  lying  (even  thinking  it  praise- 


44 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


worthy  to  deceive  without  any  further  end  than  that 
of  practising  deception),  he  can  do  no  more  than  point 
to  the  social  prosperity  furthered  by  entire  trust  be- 
tween man  and  man,  and  the  social  disorganization  that 
follows  universal  untruthfulness,  consequences  that  are 
necessarily  conducive  to  agreeable  feelings  and  dis- 
agreeable feelings  respectively. 

The  unavoidable  conclusion  is,  then,  that  the  intui- 
tionist  does  not,  and  cannot,  ignore  the  ultimate  deriva- 
tions of  right  and  wrong  from  pleasure  and  pain. 
However  much  he  may  be  guided,  and  rightly  guided, 
by  the  decisions  of  conscience  respecting  the  characters 
of  acts,  he  has  come  to  have  confidence  in  these  decis- 
ions because  he  perceives,  vaguely  but  positively,  that 
conformity  to  them  furthers  the  welfare  of  himself  and 
others,  and  that  disregard  of  them  entails  in  the  long 
run  suffering  on  all.  Require  him  to  name  any  moral- 
sense  judgment  by  which  he  knows  as  right  some  kind 
of  act  that  will  bring  a  surplus  of  pain,  taking  into 
account  the  totals  in  this  life  and  in  any  assumed  other 
life,  and  you  find  him  unable  to  name  one:  a  fact 
proving  that  underneath  all  these  intuitions  respecting 
the  goodness  or  badness  of  acts  there  lies  the  funda- 
mental assumption  that  acts  are  good  or  bad  according 
as  their  aggregate  effects  increase  men's  happiness,  or 
increase  their  misery. 

§  15.  It  is  curious  to  see  how  the  devil-worship  of 
the  savage,  surviving  in  various  disguises  among  the 
civilized,  and  leaving  as  one  of  its  products  that 
asceticism  which  in  many  forms  and  degrees  still  pre- 
vails widely,  is  to  be  found  influencing  in  marked  ways 
men  who  have  apparently  emancipated  themselves,  not 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 


46 


only  from  primitive  superstitions  but  from  more 
developed  superstitions.  Views  of  life  and  conduct 
which  originated  with  those  who  propitiated  deified 
ancestors  by  self-tortures  enter  even  still  into  the 
ethical  theories  of  many  persons  who  have  years  since 
cast  away  the  theology  of  the  past,  and  suppose  them- 
selves to  be  no  longer  influenced  by  it. 

In  the  writings  of  one  who  rejects  dogmatic  Chris- 
tianity, together  with  the  Hebrew  cult  which  preceded 
it,  a  career  of  conquest  costing  tens  of  thousands  of 
lives  is  narrated  with  a  sympathy  comparable  to  that 
rejoicing  which  the  Hebrew  traditions  show  us  over 
destruction  of  enemies  in  the  name  of  God.  You  may 
find,  too,  a  delight  in  contemplating  the  exercise  of 
despotic  power,  joined  with  insistance  on  the  salutari- 
ness  of  a  state  in  which  the  wills  of  slaves  and  citizens 
are  humbly  subject  to  the  wills  of  masters  and  rulers  — 
a  sentiment  also  reminding  us  of  that  ancient  Oriental 
life  which  biblical  narratives  portray.  Along  with  this 
worship  of  the  strong  man — along  with  this  justifica- 
tion of  whatever  force  may  be  needed  for  carrying  out 
his  ambition  —  along  with  this  yearning  for  a  form  of 
society  in  which  supremacy  pf  the  few  is  unrestrained 
and  the  virtue  of  the  many  consists  in  obedience  to 
them,  we  not  unnaturally  find  repudiation  of  the 
ethical  theory  which  takes,  in  some  shape  or  other,  the 
greatest  happiness  as  the  end  of  conduct ;  we  not  un- 
naturally find  this  utilitarian  philosophy  designated  by 
the  contemptuous  title  of  pig-philosophy."  And  then, 
serving  to  show  what  comprehension  there  has  been  of 
the  philosophy  so  nicknamed,  we  are  told  that  not 
happiness  but  blessedness  must  be  the  end. 

Obviously,  the  implication  is  that  blessedness  is  not 


46 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


a  kind  of  happiness  ;  and  this  implication  at  once  sug- 
gests the  question :  What  mode  of  feeling  is  it  ?  If  it 
is  a  state  of  consciousness  at  all,  it  is  necessarily  one 
of  three  states  —  painful,  indifferent,  or  pleasurable. 
Does  it  leave  the  possessor  at  the  zero  point  of  sen- 
tiency  ?  Then  it  leaves  him  just  as  he  would  be  if  he 
had  not  got  it.  Does  it  not  leave  him  at  the  zero 
point?  Then  it  must  leave  him  below  zero  or  above 
zero. 

Each  of  these  possibilities  may  be  conceived  under 
two  forms.  That  to  which  the  term  blessedness  is 
applied  may  be  a  particular  state  of  consciousness  — 
one  among  the  many  states  that  occur ;  and  on  this 
supposition  Ave  have  to  recognize  it  as  a  pleasurable 
state,  an  indifferent  state,  or  a  painful  state.  Other- 
wise, blessedness  is  a  word  not  applicable  to  a  particular 
state  of  consciousness,  but  characterizes  the  aggregate 
of  its  states ;  and  in  this  case  the  average  of  the  aggre- 
gate is  to  be  conceived  as  one  in  which  the  pleasurable 
predominates,  or  one  in  which  the  painful  predominates, 
or  one  in  which  pleasures  and  pains  exactly  cancel  one 
another.  Let  us  take  in  turn  these  two  imaginable 
applications  of  the  word. 

Blessed  are  the  merciful ; "  "  Blessed  are  the  peace- 
makers ;  "  "  Blessed  is  he  that  considereth  the  poor ;  " 
are  sayings  which  we  may  fairly  take  as  conveying  the 
accepted  meaning  of  blessedness.  What  now  shall  we 
say  of  one  who  is,  for  the  time  being,  blessed  in  per- 
forming an  act  of  mercy?  Is  his  mental  state  pleasur- 
able? If  so,  the  hypothesis  is  abandoned:  blessedness 
is  a  particular  form  of  happiness.  Is  the  state  indif- 
ferent or  painful  ?  In  that  case  the  blessed  man  is  so 
devoid  of  sympathy  that  relieving  another  from  pain, 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 


47 


or  the  fear  of  pain,  leaves  him  either  wholly  unmoved, 
or  gives  him  an  unpleasant  emotion.  Again,  if  one  who 
is  blessed  in  making  peace  receives  no  gratification 
from  the  act,  then  seeing  men  injure  each  other  does 
not  affect  him  at  all,  or  gives  him  a  pleasure  which  is 
changed  into  a  pain  when  he  prevents  the  injury. 
Once  more,  to  say  that  the  blessedness  of  one  who 
" considereth  the  poor"  implies  no  agreeable  feeling,  is 
to  say  that  his  consideration  for  the  poor  leaves  him 
without  feeling  or  entails  on  him  a  disagreeable  feeling. 
So  that  if  blessedness  is  a  particular  mode  of  conscious- 
ness temporarily  existing  as  a  concomitant  of  each  kind 
of  beneficent  action,  those  who  deny  that  it  is  a  pleas- 
ure, or  constituent  of  happiness,  confess  themselves 
either  not  pleased  by  the  welfare  of  others  or  displeased 
by  it. 

Otherwise  understood,  blessedness  must,  as  we  have 
seen,  refer  to  the  totality  of  feelings  experienced  during 
the  life  of  one  who  occupies  himself  with  the  actions 
the  word  connotes.  This  also  presents  the  three  pos- 
sibilities —  surplus  of  pleasures,  surplus  of  pains, 
equality  of  the  two.  If  the  pleasurable  states  are  in 
excess,  then  the  blessed  life  can  be  distinguished  from 
any  other  pleasurable  life  only  by  the  relative  amount, 
or  the  quality,  of  its  pleasures :  it  is  a  life  which  makes 
happiness  of  a  certain  kind  and  degree  its  end ;  and  the 
assumption  that  blessedness  is  not  a  form  of  happiness, 
lapses.  If  the  blessed  life  is  one  in  Avhich  the  pleasures 
and  the  pains  received  balance  one  another,  so  produ- 
cing an  average  that  is  indifferent;  or  if  it  is  one  in 
which  the  pleasures  are  outbalanced  by  the  pains,  then 
the  blessed  life  has  the  character  which  the  pessimist 
alleges  of  life  at  large,  and  therefore  regards  it  as  cursed. 


48 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


Annihilation  is  best,  lie  will  argue,  since  if  an  average 
that  is  indifferent  is  the  outcome  of  the  blessed  life, 
annihilation  at  once  achieves  it ;  and  if  a  surplus  of  suf- 
fering is  the  outcome  of  this  highest  kind  of  life  called 
blessed,  still  more  should  life  in  general  be  ended. 

A  possible  rejoinder  must  be  named  and  disposed  of. 
While  it  is  admitted  that  the  particular  kind  of  con- 
sciousness accompanying  conduct  that  is  blessed,  is 
pleasurable,  it  may  be  contended  that  pursuance  of  this 
conduct,  and  receipt  of  the  pleasure,  brings  by  the  im- 
plied self-denial,  and  persistent  effort,  and  perhaps  bodily 
injury,  a  suffering  that  exceeds  it  in  amount.  And  it 
may  then  be  urged  that  blessedness,  characterized  by 
this  excess  of  aggregate  pains  over  aggregate  pleasures, 
should  nevertheless  be  pursued  as  an  end,  rather  than 
the  happiness  constituted  by  excess  of  pleasures  over 
pains.  But  now,  defensible  though  this  conception  of 
blessedness  may  be  when  limited  to  one  individual,  or 
some  individuals,  it  becomes  indefensible  when  extended 
to  all  individuals ;  as  it  must  be  if  blessedness  is  taken 
for  the  end  of  conduct.  To  see  this  we  need  but  ask 
for  what  purpose  are  these  pains  in  excess  of  pleasures 
to  be  borne.  Blessedness  being  the  ideal  state  for  all 
persons,  and  the  self-sacrifices  made  by  each  person  in 
pursuance  of  this  ideal  state,  having  for  their  end  to 
help  all  other  persons  in  achieving  the  like  ideal  state, 
it  results  that  the  blessed  though  painful  state  of  each 
is  to  be  acquired  by  furthering  the  like  blessed  though 
painful  states  of  others :  the  blessed  consciousness  is  to 
be  constituted  by  the  contemplation  of  their  conscious- 
nesses in  a  condition  of  average  suffering.  Does  any 
one  accei)t  this  inference  ?  If  not,  his  rejection  of  it 
involves  the  admission  that  the  motive  for  bearing  pains 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 


49 


m  performing  acts  called  blessed,  is  not  the  obtaining 
for  others  like  pains  of  blessedness,  but  the  obtaining  of 
pleasures  for  others,  and  that  thus  pleasure  somewhere 
is  the  tacitly  implied  ultimate  end. 

In  brief,  then,  blessedness  has  for  its  necessary  con- 
dition of  existence,  increased  happiness,  positive  or 
negative,  in  some  consciousness  or  other,  and  disap- 
pears utterly  if  we  assume  that  the  actions  called  blessed 
are  known  to  cause  decrease  of  happiness  in  others  as 
well  as  in  the  actor. 

§  16.  To  make  clear  the  meaning  of  the  general 
argument  set  forth  in  this  chapter,  its  successive  parts 
must  be  briefly  summarized. 

That  which  in  the  last  chapter  we  found  to  be  highly 
evolved  conduct,  is  that  which,  in  this  chapter,  we  find 
to  be  what  is  called  good  conduct ;  and  the  ideal  goal 
to  the  natural  evolution  of  conduct  there  recognized 
we  here  recognize  as  the  ideal  standard  of  conduct 
ethically  considered. 

The  acts  adjusted  to  ends  which,  w^hile  constituting 
the  outer  visible  life  from  moment  to  moment  further 
the  continuance  of  life,  we  saw  become,  as  evolution 
progresses,  better  adjusted,  until  finally  they  make  the 
life  of  each  individual  entire  in  length  and  breadth,  at 
the  same  time  that  they  efficiently  subserve  the  rear- 
ing of  young,  and  do  both  these,  not  only  without  hin- 
dering other  individuals  from  doing  the  like,  but  while 
giving  aid  to  them  in  doing  tlie  like.  And  here  we 
see  that  goodness  is  asserted  of  such  conduct  under 
each  of  these  three  aspects.  Other  things  equal,  well- 
adjusted,  self-conserving  acts  we  call  good  :  other  things 
equal,  we  call  good  the  acts  that  are  well  adjusted  for 


50 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


bringing  up  progeny  capable  of  complete  living ;  and 
other  things  equal,  we  ascribe  goodness  to  acts  which 
further  the  complete  living  of  others. 

This  judging  as  good,  conduct  which  conduces  to  life 
in  each  and  all,  we  found  to  involve  the  assumption  that 
animate  existence  is  desirable.  By  the  pessimist,  con- 
duct which  subserves  life  cannot  consistently  be  called 
good :  to  call  it  good  implies  some  form  of  optimism. 
We  saw,  however,  that  pessimists  and  optimists  both 
start  with  the  postulate  that  life  is  a  blessing  or  a  curse, 
according  as  the  average  consciousness  accompanying  it 
is  pleasurable  or  painful.  And  since  avowed  or  implied 
pessimists,  and  optimists  of  one  or  other  shade,  taken 
together  constitute  all  men,  it  results  that  this  postu- 
late is  universally  accepted.  Whence  it  follows  that  if 
w^e  call  good  the  conduct  conducive  to  life,  we  can  do 
so  only  w4th  the  implication  that  it  is  conducive  to  a 
surplus  of  pleasures  over  pains. 

The  truth  that  conduct  is  considered  by  us  as  good 
or  bad,  according  as  its  aggregate  results,  to  self  or 
others  or  both,  are  pleasurable  or  painful,  we  found  on 
examination  to  be  involved  in  all  the  current  judgments 
on  conduct :  the  proof  being  that  reversing  the  appli- 
cations of  the  words  creates  absurdities.  And  we  found 
that  every  other  proposed  standard  of  conduct  derives 
its  authority  from  this  standard.  Whether  perfection 
of  nature  is  the  assigned  proper  aim,  or  virtuousness  of 
action,  or  rectitude  of  motive,  we  saw  that  definition 
of  the  perfection,  the  virtue,  the  rectitude,  inevitably 
brings  us  down  to  happiness  experienced  in  some  form, 
at  some  time,  by  some  person,  as  the  fundamental  idea. 
Nor  could  we  discover  any  intelligible  conception  of 
blessedness,  save  one  whicli  implies  a  raising  of  con- 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT, 


51 


sciousness,  individual  or  general,  to  a  happier  state ; 
either  by  mitigating  pains  or  increasing  pleasures. 

Even  with  those  who  judge  of  conduct  from  the 
religious  point  of  view,  rather  than  from  the  ethical 
point  of  view,  it  is  the  same.  Men  who  seek  to  propi- 
tiate God  by  inflicting  pains  on  themselves,  or  refrain 
from  pleasures  to  avoid  offending  him,  do  so  to  escape 
greater  ultimate  pains  or  to  get  greater  ultimate  pleas- 
ures. If  by  positive  or  negative  suffering  here,  they 
expected  to  achieve  more  suffering  hereafter,  they  would 
not  do  as  they  do.  That  which  they  now  think  -duty 
they  would  not  think  duty  if  it  promised  eternal  mis- 
ery instead  of  eternal  happiness.  Nay,  if  there  be  any 
who  believe  that  human  beings  were  created  to  be 
unhappy,  and  that  they  ought  to  continue  living  to 
display  their  unhappiness  for  the  satisfaction  of  their 
creator,  such  believers  are  obliged  to  use  this  standard 
of  judgment ;  for  the  pleasure  of  their  diabolical  god  is 
the  end  to  be  achieved. 

So  that  no  school  can  avoid  taking  for  the  ultimate 
moral  aim  a  desirable  state  of  feeling  called  by  whatever 
name  —  gratification,  enjoyment,  happiness.  Pleasure 
somewhere,  at  some  time,  to  some  being  or  beings,  is 
an  inexpugnable  element  of  the  conception.  It  is  as 
much  a  necessary  form  of  moral  intuition  as  space  is  a 
necessary  form  of  intellectual  intuition. 


62 


THE  DA  TA  OF  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT. 

§  17.  Intellectual  progress  is  by  no  one  trait  so 
adequately  characterized  as  by  development  of  the 
idea  of  causation,  since  development  of  this  idea 
involves  development  of  so  many  other  ideas.  Before 
any  Avay  can  be  made,  thought  and  language  must 
have  advanced  far  enough  to  render  properties  or  attri- 
butes thinkable  as  such,  apart  from  objects ;  which,  in 
low  stages  of  human  intelligence,  they  are  not.  Again, 
even  the  simplest  notion  of  cause,  as  we  understand  it, 
can  be  reached  only  after  many  like  instances  have 
been  grouped  into  a  simple  generalization ;  and  through 
all  ascending  steps,  higher  notions  of  causation  imply 
wider  notions  of  generality.  Further,  as  there  must 
be  clustered  in  the  mind  concrete  causes  of  many  kinds 
before  there  can  emerge  the  conception  of  cause,  apart 
from  particular  causes,  it  follows  that  progress  in 
abstractness  of  thought  is  implied.  Concomitantly, 
there  is  implied  the  recognition  of  constant  relations 
among  phenomena,  generating  ideas  of  uniformity  of 
sequence  and  of  co-existence  —  the  idea  of  natural 
law.  These  advances  can  go  on  only  as  fast  as  per- 
ceptions and  resulting  thoughts  are  made  definite  by 
the  use  of  measures  serving  to  familiarize  the  mind 
with  exact  correspondence,  truth,  certainty.  And  only 
when  growing  science  accumulates  examples  of  quanti- 


WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT. 


53 


tative  relations,  foreseen  and  verified,  throughout  a 
widening  range  of  phenomena,  does  causation  come  to 
be  conceived  as  necessary  and  universah  So  that 
though  all  these  cardinal  conceptions  aid  one  another 
in  developing,  we  may  properly  say  that  the  conception 
of  causation  especially  depends  for  its  development  on 
the  development  of  the  rest ;  and  therefore  is  the  best 
measure  of  intellectual  development  at  large. 

How  slowly,  as  a  consequence  of  its  dependence,  the 
conception  of  causation  evolves,  a  glance  at  the  evi- 
dence shows.  We  hear  with  surprise  of  the  savage 
who,  falling  down  a  precipice,  ascribes  the  failure  of 
his  foothold  to  a  malicious  demon ;  and  we  smile  at  the 
kindred  notion  of  the  ancient  Greek,  that  his  death 
was  prevented  by  a  goddess  who  unfastened  for  him 
the  thong  of  the  helmet  by  which  his  enemy  was  drag- 
ging him.  But  daily,  without  surprise,  we  hear  men 
who  describe  themselves  as  saved  from  shipwreck  by 
"divine  interposition,"  who  speak  of  having  "provi- 
dentially "  missed  a  train  which  met  with  a  fatal  dis- 
aster, and  who  call  it  a  "mercy"  to  have  escaped 
injury  from  a  falling  chimney-pot — men  who,  in  such 
cases,  recognize  physical  causation  no  more  than  do 
the  uncivilized  or  semi-civilized.  The  Veddah  who 
thinks  that  failure  to  hit  an  animal  with  his  arrow 
resulted  from  inadequate  invocation  of  an  ancestral 
spirit,  and  the  Christian  priest  who  says  prayers  over 
a  sick  man  in  the  expectation  that  the  course  of  his 
disease  will  so  be  stayed,  differ  only  in  respect  of  the 
agent  from  whom  they  expect  eupernatural  aid,  and 
the  phenomena  to  be  altered  by  him:  the  necessary 
relations  among  causes  and  effects  are  tacitly  ignored 
by  the  last  as  much  as  by  the  first.    Deficient  belief 


64 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


in  causation  is,  indeed,  exemplified  even  in  those  whose 
discipline  has  been  specially  fitted  to  generate  this 
belief  —  even  in  men  of  science.  For  a  generation  after 
geologists  had  become  uniformitarians  in  Geology,  they 
remained  catastrophists  in  Biology:  while  recognizing 
none  but  natural  agencies  in  the  genesis  of  the  earth's 
crust,  they  ascribed  to  supernatural  agency  the  genesis 
of  the  organisms  on  its  surface.  Nay,  more  —  among 
those  who  are  convinced  that  living  things  in  general 
have  been  evolved  by  the  continued  interaction  of 
forces  everywhere  operating,  there  are  some  who  make 
an  exception  of  man ;  or  who,  if  they  admit  that  his 
body  has  been  evolved  in  the  same  manner  as  the  bodies 
of  other  creatures,  allege  that  his  mind  has  been  not 
evolved  but  specially  created.  If,  then,  universal  and 
necessary  causation  is  only  now  approaching  full  recog- 
nition, even  by  those  whose  investigations  are  daily 
re-illustrating  it,  we  may  expect  to  find  it  very  little 
recognized  among  men  at  large,  whose  culture  has  not 
been  calculated  to  impress  them  vdth  it ;  and  we  may 
expect  to  find  it  least  recognized  by  them  in  respect  of 
those  classes  of  phenomena  amid  which,  in  consequence 
of  their  complexity,  causation  is  most  difficult  to  trace 
—  the  psychical,  the  social,  the  moral. 

Why  do  I  here  make  these  reflections  on  what  seems 
an  irrelevant  subject  ?  I  do  it  because  on  studying  the 
various  ethical  theories  I  am  struck  with  the  fact  that 
they  are  all  characterized  either  by  entire  absence  of 
the  idea  of  causation,  or  by  inadequate  presence  of  it. 
Whether  theological,  political,  intuitional,  or  utilitarian, 
they  all  display,  if  not  in  the  same  degree,  still  each  in 
a  large  degree,  the  defects  which  result  from  this  lack. 
We  will  consider  them  in  the  order  named. 


WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT.  55 


§  18.  The  school  of  morals  properly  to  be  considered 
as  the  still  extant  representative  of  the  most  ancient 
school,  is  that  which  recognizes  no  other  rule  of  con- 
duct than  the  alleged  will  of  God.  It  originates  with 
the  savage,  whose  only  restraint,  beyond  fear  of  his 
fellow-man,  is  fear  of  an  ancestral  spirit;  and  whose 
notion  of  moral  duty,  as  distinguished  from  his  notion  of 
social  prudence,  arises  from  this  fear.  Here  the  ethical 
doctrine  and  the  religious  doctrine  are  identical  —  have 
in  no  degree  differentiated. 

This  primitive  form  of  ethical  doctrine,  changed 
only  by  the  gradual  dying  out  of  multitudinous  minor 
supernatural  agents  and  accompanying  development  of 
one  universal  supernatural  agent,  survives  in  great 
strength  down  to  our  own  day.  Religious  creeds, 
established  and  dissenting,  all  embody  the  belief  that 
right  and  wrong  are  right  and  wrong  simply  in  virtue 
of  divine  enactment.  And  this  tacit  assumption  has 
passed  from  systems  of  theology  into  systems  of  moral- 
ity; or  rather  let  us  say  that  moral  systems  in  early 
stages  of  development,  little  differentiated  from  the 
accompanying  theological  systems,  have  participated  in 
this  assumption.  We  see  this  in  the  works  of  the 
Stoics,  as  well  as  in  the  works  of  certain  Christian 
moralists.  Among  recent  ones  I  may  instance  the 
JEssays  on  the  Principles  of  Morality^  by  Jonathan 
Dymond,  a  Quaker,  which  makes  the  authority  of 
the  Deity  the  sole  ground  of  duty,  and  His  communi- 
cated will  the  only  ultimate  standard  of  right  and 
wrong."  Nor  is  it  by  writers  belonging  to  so  relatively 
unphilosophical  a  sect  only  that  this  view  is  held ;  it 
is  held  with  a  difference  by  writers  belonging  to  sects 
contrariwise  distinguished.    For  these  assert  that  in 


56 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


the  absence  of  belief  in  a  deity,  there  would  be 
no  moral  guidance ;  and  this  amounts  to  asserting 
that  moral  truths  have  no  other  origin  than  the  will 
of  God,  which,  if  not  considered  as  revealed  in 
sacred  writings,  must  be  considered  as  revealed  in  con- 
science. 

This  assumption,  when  examined,  proves  to  be 
suicidal.  If  there  are  no  other  origins  for  right  and 
wrong  than  this  enunciated  or  intuited  divine  will, 
then,  as  alleged,  were  there  no  knowledge  of  the  divine 
will,  the  acts  now  known  as  wrong  would  not  be 
known  as  wrong.  But  if  men  did  not  know  such  acts 
to  be  wrong  because  contrary  to  the  divine  will,  and  so, 
in  committing  them,  did  not  offend  by  disobedience; 
and,  if  they  could  not  otherwise  know  them  to  be 
wrong,  then  they  might  commit  them  indifferently  with 
the  acts  now  classed  as  right ;  the  results,  practically 
considered,  would  be  the  same.  In  so  far  as  secular 
matters  are  concerned,  there  would  be  no  difference 
between  the  two ;  for  to  say  that  in  the  affairs  of  life 
any  evils  would  arise  from  continuing  to  do  the  acts 
called  wrong,  and  ceasing  to  do  the  acts  called  right,  is 
to  say  that  these  produce  in  themselves  certain  mis- 
chievous consequences  and  certain  beneficial  conse- 
quences ;  which  is  to  say  there  is  another  source  for 
moral  rules  than  the  revealed  or  inferred  divide  will ; 
tliey  may  be  established  by  induction  from  these 
observed  consequences. 

From  this  implication  I  see  no  escape.  It  must  be 
either  admitted  or  denied  that  the  acts  called  good  and 
the  acts  called  bad,  naturally  conduce,  the  one  to 
liuman  well-being  and  the  otlier  to  human  ill-being.  Is 
it  admitted?    Then  the  admission  amountis  to  an  asser- 


WA  YS  OF  JUDGTNG  CONDUCT. 


57 


tioii  that  the  conduciveness  is  shown  by  experience  ; 
and  this  involves  abandonment  of  the  doctrine  that 
there  is  no  origin  for  morals  apart  from  divine  injunc- 
tions. Is  it  denied  that  acts  classed  as  good  and  bad 
differ  in  their  effect  ?  Then  it  is  tacitly  affirmed  that 
human  affairs  would  go  on  just  as  well  in  ignorance  of 
the  distinction ;  and  the  alleged  need  for  command- 
ments from  God  disappears. 

And  here  we  see  how  entirely  wanting  is  the  concep- 
tion of  cause.  This  notion  that  such  and  such  actions 
are  made  respectively  good  and  bad  simply  by  divine 
injunction,  is  tantamount  to  the  notion  that  such  and 
such  actions  have  not  in  the  nature  of  things  such 
and  such  kinds  of  effects.  If  there  is  not  an  uncon- 
sciousness of  causation,  tliere  is  an  ignoring  of  it. 

§  19.  Following  Plato  and  Aristotle,  who  make  State 
enactments  the  sources  of  right  and  wrong;  and  fol- 
lowing Hobbes,  who  holds  that  there  can  be  neither 
justice  nor  injustice  till  a  regularly  constituted  coercive 
power  exists  to  issue  and  enforce  commands ;  not  a  few 
modern  thinkers  hold  that  there  is  no  other  origin  for 
good  and  bad  in  conduct  than  law.  And  this  implies 
the  belief  that  moral  obligation  originates  with  acts  of 
parliament,  and  can  be  changed  this  way  or  that  way 
by  majorities.  They  ridicule  the  idea  that  men  have 
any  natural  rights,  and  allege  that  rights  are  wholly 
results  of  convention :  the  necessary  implication  being 
that  duties  are  so  too. 

Before  considering  whether  this  theory  coheres  with 
outside  truths,  let  us  observe  how  far  it  is  coherent 
within  itself. 

In  pursuance  of  his  argument  that  rights  and  duties 


58 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


originate  with  established  social  arrangements,  Hobbes 
says  :  — 

Where  no  covenant  hath  proceeded,  there  hath  no  right  been 
transferred,  and  every  man  has  a  right  to  everything;  and  consequently, 
no  action  can  be  unjust.  But  when  a  covenant  is  made,  then  to  break 
it  is  unjust;  and  the  definition  of  injustice  is  no  other  than  the  not  per- 
formance of  covenant.  And  whatsoever  is  not  unjust  is  just.  There- 
fore, before  tlie  names  of  just  and  unjust  can  have  place,  there  must 
be  some  coercive  power  to  compel  men  equally  to  the  performance  of 
their  covenants,  by  the  terror  of  some  punishment  greater  than  the 
benefit  they  expect  by  the  breach  of  their  covenant."  i 

In  this  paragraph  the  essential  propositions  are :  jus- 
tice is  fulfilment  of  covenant;  fulfilment  of  covenant 
implies  a  power  of  enforcing  it :  "  just  and  unjust  can 
have  no  place,"  unless  men  are  compelled  to  perform 
their  covenants.  But  this  is  to  say  that  men  cmivot 
perform  their  covenants  without  compulsion.  Grant 
that  justice  is  performance  of  covenant.  Now  suppose 
it  to  be  performed  voluntarily :  there  is  justice.  In 
such  case,  however,  there  is  justice  in  the  absence  of 
coercion ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  hypothesis.  The 
only  conceivable  rejoinder  is  an  absurd  one  —  voluntary 
performance  of  covenant  is  impossible.  Assert  this, 
and  the  doctrine  that  right  and  wrong  come  into  exist- 
ence with  the  establishment  of  sovereignty  is  defensible. 
Decline  to  assert  it,  and  the  doctrine  vanishes. 

From  inner  incongruities  pass  now  to  outer  ones. 
The  justification  for  his  doctrine  of  absolute  civil  au- 
thority as  the  source  of  rules  of  conduct,  Hobbes  seeks 
in  the  miseries  entailed  by  the  chronic  war  between 
man  and  man  wliich  must  exist  in  the  absence  of  society  ; 
holding  that  under  any  kind  of  government  a  better 
life  is  possible  than  in  the  state  of  nature.  Now 

1  Leviathan^  ch.  xv. 


WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT. 


59 


whether  we  accept  the  gratuitous  and  baseless  theory 
that  men  surrendered  their  liberties  to  a  sovereign 
power  of  some  kind,  with  a  view  to  the  promised  in- 
crease of  satisfactions ;  or  whether  we  accept  the  rational 
theory,  inductively  based,  that  a  state  of  political  sub- 
ordination gradually  became  established  through  expe- 
rience of  the  increased  satisfactions  derived  under  it ; 
it  equally  remains  obvious  that  the  acts  of  the  sover- 
eign power  have  no  other  warrant  than  their  subser- 
vience to  the  purpose  for  which  it  came  into  existence. 
The  necessities  which  initiate  government,  themselves 
prescribe  the  actions  of  government.  If  its  actions  do 
not  respond  to  the  necessities,  they  are  unwarranted. 
The  authority  of  law  is,  then,  by  the  hypothesis,  derived ; 
and  can  never  transcend  the  authority  of  that  from 
which  it  is  derived.  If  general  good,  or  welfare,  or 
utility,  is  the  supreme  end,  and  if  State  enactments  are 
justified  as  means  to  this  supreme  end,  then.  State 
enactments  have  such  authority  only  as  arises  from  con- 
duciveness  to  this  supreme  end.  When  they  are  right, 
it  is  only  because  the  original  authority  indorses  them  ; 
and  they  are  wrong  if  they  do  not  bear  its  indorsement. 
That  is  to  say,  conduct  cannot  be  made  good  or  bad  by 
law ;  but  its  goodness  or  badness  is  to  the  last  deter- 
mined by  its  effects  as  naturally  furthering,  or  not  fur- 
thering, the  lives  of  citizens. 

Still  more  when  considered  in  the  concrete,  than  when 
considered  in  the  abstract,  do  the  views  of  Hobbes  and 
his  disciples  prove  to  be  inconsistent.  Joining  in  the 
general  belief  that  without  such  security  for  life  as 
enables  men  to  go  fearlessly  about  their  business,  there 
can  be  neither  happiness  nor  prosperity,  individual  or 
general,  they  agree  that  measures  for  preventing  mur- 


60 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


cler,  maiislaugliter,  assault,  etc.,  ai'e  requisite  ;  and  they 
advocate  this  or  that  penal  system  as  furnishing  the 
best  deterrents :  so  arguing,  both  in  respect  of  the  evils 
and  the  remedies,  that  such  and  such  causes  will,  by  the 
nature  of  things,  produce  such  and  such  effects.  They 
recognize  as  inferable  d  priori^  the  truth  that  men  will 
not  lay  by  property  unless  they  can  count  with  great 
probability  on  reaping  advantages  from  it ;  that  conse- 
quently, where  robbery  is  unchecked,  or  w^here  a  rapa- 
cious ruler  appropriates  whatever  earnings  his  subjects 
do  not  effectually  hide,  production  will  scarcely  exceed 
immediate  consumption  ;  and  that  necessarily  there  will 
be  none  of  that  accumulation  of  capital  required  for 
social  development,  with  all  its  aids  to  welfare.  In 
neither  case,  however,  do  they  perceive  that  they  are 
tacitly  asserting  the  need  for  certain  restraints  on  con- 
duct as  deducible  from  the  necessary  conditions  to  com- 
plete life  in  the  social  state;  and  are  so  making  the 
authority  of  law  derivative  and  not  original. 

If  it  be  said  by  any  belonging  to  this  school,  that  cer- 
tain moral  obligations,  to  be  distinguished  as  cardinal, 
must  be  admitted  to  have  a  basis  deeper  than  legisla- 
tion, and  that  it  is  for  legislation  not  to  create  but 
merely  to  enforce  them  —  if,  I  say,  admitting  this,  they 
go  on  to  allege  a  legislative  origin  for  minor  claims  and 
duties  ;  then  we  have  the  implication  that  whereas  some 
kinds  of  conduct  do,  in  the  nature  of  things,  tend  to 
work  out  certain  kinds  of  results,  other  kinds  of  con- 
duct do  not,  in  the  nature  of  things,  tend  to  work  out 
certain  kinds  of  results.  AVhile  of  these  acts  the  nat- 
urally good  or  bad  consequences  must  be  allowed,  it 
may  be  denied  of  those  acts  that  they  have  naturally 
good  or  bad  consequences.    Only  after  asserting  this 


WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT.  61 


can  it  be  consistently  asserted  that  acts  of  the  last  class 
are  made  right  or  wrong  by  law.  For  if  such  acts  have 
any  intrinsic  tendencies  to  produce  beneficial  or  mis- 
chievous effects,  then  these  intrinsic  tendencies  furnish 
the  warrant  for  legislative  requirements  or  interdicts ; 
and  to  say  that  the  requirements  or  interdicts  make 
them  right  or  wrong  is  to  say  that  they  have  no  intrinsic 
tendencies  to  produce  beneficial  or  mischievous  effects. 

Here,  then,  we  have  another  theory  betraying  defi- 
cient consciousness  of  causation.  An  adequate  con- 
sciousness of  causation  yields  the  irresistible  belief  that 
from  the  most  serious  to  the  most  trivial  actions  of 
men  in  society,  there  must  flow  consequences  which, 
quite  apart  from  legal  agency,  conduce  to  well-being 
or  ill-being  in  greater  or  smaller  degrees.  If  murders 
are  socially  injurious,  whether  forbidden  by  law  or  not 
—  if  one  man's  appropriation  of  another's  gains  by 
force  brings  special  and  general  evils,  whether  it  is  or 
is  not  contrary  to  a  ruler's  edicts  —  if  non-fulfilment 
of  contract,  if  cheating,  if  adulteration,  work  mischiefs 
on  a  community  in  proportion  as  they  are  common, 
quite  irrespective  of  prohibitions ;  then,  is  it  not  mani- 
fest that  the  like  holds  throughout  all  the  details  of 
men's  behavior?  Is  it  not  clear  that  when  legislation 
insists  on  certain  acts  which  have  naturally  beneficial 
effects,  and  forbids  others  that  have  naturally  injuri- 
ous effects,  the  acts  are  not  made  good  or  bad  by  legis- 
lation ;  but  the  legislation  derives  its  authority  from 
the  natural  effects  of  the  acts  ?  Non-recognition  of  this 
implies  non-recognition  of  natural  causation. 

§  20.  Nor  is  it  otherwise  with  the  pure  intuitionists, 
who  hold  that  moral  perceptions  are  innate  in  the 


62 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


original  sense  —  thinkers  whose  view  is  that  men  have 
been  divinely  endowed  with  moral  faculties ;  not  that 
these  have  resulted  from  inherited  modifications  caused 
by  accumulated  experiences. 

To  affirm  that  we  know  some  things  to  be  right  and 
other  things  to  be  wrong,  by  virtue  of  a  supernaturally 
given  conscience ;  and  tlius  tacitly  to  affirm  that  we 
do  not  otherwise  know  right  from  wrong,  is  tacitly  to 
deny  any  natural  relations  between  acts  and  results. 
For,  if  there  exist  any  sucli  relations,  then  we  may 
ascertain  b}^  induction,  or  deduction,  or  both,  what 
these  are.  And  if  it  be  admitted  that  because  of  such 
natural  relations,  happiness  is  produced  by  this  kind 
of  conduct,  wliich  is  therefore  to  be  approved,  while 
misery  is  produced  by  that  kind  of  conduct,  which  is 
therefore  to  be  condemned;  then  it  is  admitted  that 
tlie  rightness  or  wrongness  of  actions  is  determinable, 
and  must  finally  be  determined,  by  the  goodness  or 
badness  of  the  effects  tliat  flow  from  them;  which  is 
contrary  to  the  hypotliesis. 

It  may,  indeed,  be  rejoined  that  effects  are  deliber- 
ately ignored  by  this  school ;  which  teaches  tliat  courses 
recognized  by  moral  intuition  as  right,  must  be  pursued 
without  regard  to  consequences.  But  on  inquiry  it 
turns  out  that  the  consequences  to  be  disregarded  are 
particular  consequences,  and  not  general  consequences. 
When,  for  example,  it  is  said  that  property  lost  by 
another  ought  to  be  restored,  irrespective  of  evil  to  the 
finder,  who  possibly  may,  by  restoring  it,  lose  that 
which  would  have  preserved  him  from  starvation,  it  is 
meant  that  in  pursuance  of  the  principle,  the  immedi- 
ate and  special  consequences  must  be  disregarded,  not 
the  diffused  and  remote  consequences.    By  which  we 


WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT. 


68 


are  shown  that  though  the  theory  forbids  overt  recog- 
nition of  causation,  there  is  an  unavowed  recognition 
of  it. 

And  this  implies  the  trait  to  which  I  am  drawing 
attention.  The  conception  of  natural  causation  is  so 
imperfectly  developed,  that  there  is  only  an  indistinct 
consciousness  that  throughout  the  whole  of  human  con- 
duct necessary  relations  of  causes  and  effects  prevail, 
and  that  from  them  are  ultimately  derived  all  moral 
rules,  however  much  these  may  be  proximately  derived 
from  moral  intuitions. 

§  21.  Strange  to  say,  even  the  utilitarian  school, 
which,  at  first  sight,  appears  to  be  distinguished  from 
the  rest  by  recognizing  natural  causation,  is,  if  not  so 
far  from  complete  recognition  of  it,  yet  very  far. 

Conduct,  according  to  its  theory,  is  to  be  estimated  by 
observation  of  results.  When,  in  sufficiently  numerous 
cases,  it  has  been  found  that  behavior  of  this  kind 
works  evil,  while  behavior  of  that  kind  works  good, 
these  kinds  of  behavior  are  to  be  judged  as  wrong  and 
right  respectively.  Now,  though  it  seems  that  the 
origin  of  moral  rules  in  natural  causes  is  thus  asserted 
by  implication,  it  is  but  partially  asserted.  The  impli- 
cation is  simply  that  we  are  to  ascertain  by  induction 
that  such  and  such  mischiefs  or  benefits  do  go  along  with 
such  and  such  acts ;  and  are  then  to  infer  that  the  like 
relations  will  hold  in  future.  But  acceptance  of  these 
generalizations  and  the  inferences  from  them  does  not 
amount  to  recognition  of  causation  in  the  full  sense  of 
the  word.  So  long  as  only  sovie  relation  between  cause 
and  effect  in  conduct  is  recognized,  and  not  the  relation, 
a  completely  scientific  form  of  knowledge  has  not  been 


64 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


reached.  At  present,  utilitarians  pay  no  attention  to 
this  distinction.  Even  when  it  is  pointed  out,  they 
disregard  the  fact  that  empirical  utilitarianism  is  but  a 
transitional  form  to  be  passed  through  on  the  way  to 
rational  utilitarianism. 

In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Mill,  written  some  sixteen  years 
ago,  repudiating  the  title  anti-utilitarian,  which  he  had 
applied  to  me  (a  letter  subsequently  published  in  Mr. 
Bain's  work  on  Mental  and  Moral  Science')^  I  endeav- 
ored to  make  clear  the  difference  above  indicated ;  and 
I  must  here  quote  certain  passages  from  that  letter. 

The  view  for  which  I  contend  is,  that  Morahty,  properly  so-called 
—  the  science  of  right  conduct —  has  for  its  object  to  determine  how 
and  ivhy  certain  modes  of  conduct  are  detrimental,  and  certain  other 
modes  beneficial.  These  good  and  bad  results  cannot  be  accidental, 
but  must  be  necessary  consequences  of  the  constitution  of  things;  and 
I  conceive  it  to  be  the  business  of  Moral  Science  to  deduce,  from  the 
laws  of  life  and  the  conditions  of  existence,  what  kinds  of  action 
necessarily  tend  to  produce  happiness,  and  what  kinds  to  produce  un- 
happiness.  Having  done  this,  its  deductions  are  to  be  recognized  as 
laws  of  conduct;  and  are  to  be  conformed  to,  irrespective  of  a  direct 
estimation  of  happiness  or  misery. 

Perhaps  an  analogy  will  most  clearly  show  my  meaning.  During 
its  early  stages,  planetary  Astronomy  consisted  of  nothing  more  than 
accumulated  observations  respecting  the  positions  and  motions  of  the 
sun  and  planets;  from  which  accumulated  observations  it  came  by  and 
by  to  be  empirically  predicted,  with  an  approach  to  truth,  that  certain 
of  the  heavenly  bodies  would  have  certain  positions  at  certain  times. 
But  the  modern  science  of  planetary  Astronomy  consists  of  deductions 
from  the  law  of  gravitation — deductions  showing  why  the  celestial 
bodies  necessarily  occupy  certain  places  at  certain  times.  Now,  the 
kind  of  relation  which  thus  exists  between  ancient  and  modern  As- 
tronomy is  analogous  to  the  kind  of  relation  which,  I  conceive,  exists 
between  the  Expediency-Morality  and  Moral  Science,  properly  so-called. 
And  the  objection  which  I  have  to  the  current  Utilitarianism  is,  that  it 
recognizes  no  more  developed  form  of  Morality  —  does  not  see  that  it 
has  reached  but  the  initial  stage  of  Moral  Science. 


WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT. 


65 


Doubtless  if  utilitarians  are  asked  whether  it  can  be 
by  mere  chance  that  this  kind  of  action  works  evil  and 
that  works  good,  they  will  answer  —  No:  they  will 
admit  that  such  sequences  are  parts  of  a  necessary 
order  among  phenomena.  But  though  this  truth  is 
beyond  question ;  and  though,  if  there  are  causal  rela- 
tions between  acts  and  their  results,  rules  of  conduct 
can  become  scientific  only  when  they  are  deduced  from 
these  causal  relations  ;  there  continues  to  be  entire  sat- 
isfaction with  that  form  of  utilitarianism  in  whicli  these 
causal  relations  are  practically  ignored.  It  is  supposed 
that  in  future,  as  now,  utility  is  to  be  determined  only 
by  observation  of  results :  and  that  there  is  no  possi- 
bility of  knowing,  by  deduction  from  fundamental  prin- 
ciples, what  conduct  must  be  detrimental  and  what 
conduct  must  be  beneficial. 

§  22.  To  make  more  specific  that  conception  of  ethi 
cal  science  here  indicated,  let  me  present  it  under  a 
concrete  aspect,  beginning  with  a  simple  illustration 
and  complicatuig  this  illustration  by  successive  steps. 

If,  by  tying  its  main  arterj^,  we  stop  most  of  the 
blood  going  to  a  limb,  then,  for  as  long  as  the  limb  per- 
forms its  function,  those  parts  which  are  called  into 
play  must  be  wasted  faster  than  they  are  repaired: 
Avhence  eventual  disablement.  The  relation  between 
due  receipt  of  nutritive  matters  tlirough  its  arteries, 
and  due  discharge  of  its  duties  by  the  limb,  is  a  part  of 
tlie  physical  order.  If,  instead  of  cutting  off  the  sup- 
ply to  a  particular  limb,  we  bleed  the  patient  largeh', 
so  drafting  away  the  materials  needed  for  repairing  not 
one  limb  but  all  limbs,  and  not  limbs  only  but  viscera, 
there  results  both  a  muscular  debility  and  an  enfeeble- 


66 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


nient  of  the  vital  functions.  Here,  again,  cause  and 
effect  are  necessarily  related.  The  mischief  that  results 
from  great  depletion,  results  apart  from  any  divine  com- 
mand, or  political  enactment,  or  moral  intuition.  Now 
advance  a  step.  Suppose  the  man  to  be  prevented 
from  taking  in  enough  of  the  solid  and  liquid  food  con- 
taining those  substances  continually  abstracted  from  his 
blood  in  repairing  his  tissues :  suppose  he  has  cancer  of 
the  oesophagus,  and  cannot  swallow  —  what  happens? 
By  this  indirect  depletion,  as  by  direct  depletion,  he  is 
inevitably  made  incapable  of  performing  the  actions  of 
one  in  health.  In  this  case,  as  in  the  other  cases,  the  con- 
nection between  cause  and  effect  is  one  that  cannot  be 
established,  or  altered,  by  any  authority  external  to  the 
phenomena  themselves.  Again,  let  us  say  that  instead 
of  being  stopped  after  passing  his  mouth,  that  which 
he  would  swallow  is  stopped  before  reaching  his  mouth ; 
so  that  day  after  day  the  man  is  required  to  waste  his 
tissues  in  getting  food,  and  day  after  day  the  food  he 
has  got  to  meet  this  waste,  he  is  forcibly  prevented  from 
eating.  As  before,  the  progress  toward  death  by  star- 
vation is  inevitable  —  the  connection  between  acts  and 
effects  is  independent  of  any  alleged  theological  or 
political  authority.  And  similarly  if,  being  forced  by 
the  whip  to  labor,  no  adequate  return  in  food  is  supplied 
to  him,  there  are  equally  certain  evils,  equally  independ- 
ent of  sacred  or  secular  enactment. 

Pass  now  to  those  actions  more  commonly  thought 
of  as  the  occasions  for  rules  of  conduct.  Let  us  assume 
the  man  to  be  continually  robbed  of  that  which  was 
given  him  in  exchange  for  his  labor,  and  b)^  which  he 
was  to  make  up  for  nervo-muscular  expenditure  and 
renew  his  powers.    No  less  than  before  is  the  con- 


WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT. 


67 


nection  between  conduct  and  consequence  rooted  in 
the  constitution  of  things;  unchangeable  by  State- 
made  law,  and  not  needing  establishment  by  empirical 
generalization.  If  the  action  by  which  the  man  is 
affected  is  a  stage  further  away  from  the  results,  or 
produces  results  of  a  less  decisive  kind,  still  we  see  the 
same  basis  for  morality  in  the  physical  order.  Imagine 
that  payment  for  his  services  is  made  partly  in  bad 
coin ;  or  that  it  is  delayed  beyond  tlie  date  agreed 
upon ;  or  that  what  he  buys  to  eat  is  adulterated  with 
innutritive  matter.  Manifestly,  by  any  of  these  deeds 
which  we  condemn  as  unjust,  and  which  are  punished 
by  law,  there  is,  as  before,  an  interference  with  the 
normal  adjustment  of  physiological  repair  to  physio- 
logical waste.  Nor  is  it  otherwise  when  we  pass  to 
kinds  of  conduct  still  more  remotely  operative.  If  he 
is  hindered  from  enforcing  his  claim,  if  class  predomi- 
nance prevents  him  from  proceeding,  or  if  a  bribed 
judge  gives  a  verdict  contrary  to  evidence,  or  if  a  wit- 
ness swears  falsely,  have  not  these  deeds,  though  they 
affect  him  more  indirectly,  the  same  original  cause  for 
their  wrongness  ? 

Even  with  actions  which  work  diffused  and  indefinite 
mischiefs  it  is  the  same.  Suppose  that  the  man,  instead 
of  being  dealt  with  fraudulently,  is  calumniated.  There 
is,  as  before,  a  hinderance  to  the  carrjdng  on  of  life- 
sustaining  activities ;  for  the  loss  of  character  detri- 
mentally affects  his  business.  Nor  is  this  all.  The 
mental  depression  caused  partially  incapacitates  him 
for  energetic  activity,  and  perhaps  brings  on  ill-health. 
So  that  maliciously  or  carelessly  propagating  false  state- 
ments tends  both  to  diminish  his  life  and  to  diminish 
his  ability  to  maintain  life.    Hence  its  flagitiousness. 


68 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


Moreover,  if  we  trace  to  their  ultimate  ramifications 
the  effects  wrought  by  any  of  these  acts  which  morality 
called  intuitive  reprobates  —  if  we  ask  what  results  not 
to  the  individual  himself  only,  but  also  to  his  belong- 
ings —  if  we  observe  how  impoverishment  hinders  the 
rearing  of  his  children,  by  entailing  under-feeding  or 
inadequate  clothing,  resulting  perhaps  in  the  death  of 
some  and  the  constitutional  injury  of  others ;  we  see 
that  by  the  necessary  connections  of  things  these  acts, 
besides  tending  primarily  to  lower  the  life  of  the  indi- 
vidual aggressed  upon,  tend  secondarily  to  lower  the 
lives  of  all  his  family,  and  thirdly  to  lower  the  life 
of  society  at  large ;  which  is  damaged  by  whatever 
damages  its  units. 

A  more  distinct  meaning  will  now  be  seen  in  the 
statement  that  the  utilitarianism  which  recognizes  only 
the  principles  of  conduct  reached  by  induction,  is  but 
preparatory  to  the  utilitarianism  which  deduces  these 
principles  from  the  processes  of  life  as  carried  on  under 
established  conditions  of  existence. 

§  23.  Thus,  then,  is  justified  the  allegation  made  at 
the  outset,  that,  irrespective  of  their  distinctive  charac- 
ters and  their  special  tendencies,  all  the  current  methods 
of  ethics  have  one  general  defect  —  they  neglect  ulti- 
mate causal  connections.  Of  course  I  do  not  mean  that 
they  wholly  ignore  the  natural  consequences  of  actions ; 
but  I  mean  that  they  recognize  them  only  incidentally. 
They  do  not  erect  into  a  method  the  ascertaining  of 
]iecessary  relations  between  causes  and  effects,  and 
deducing  rales  of  conduct  from  formulated  statement 
of  them. 

Every  science  begins  by  accumulating  observations, 


WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT, 


69 


and  presently  generalizes  these  empirically ;  but  only 
when  it  reaches  the  stage  at  which  its  empirical  gen- 
eralizations are  included  in  a  rational  generalization, 
does  it  become  developed  science.  Astronomy  has 
already  passed  through  its  successive  stages :  first  col- 
lections of  facts  ;  then  inductions  from  them  ;  and  lastly 
deductive  interpretations  of  these,  as  corollaries  from 
a  universal  principle  of  action  among  masses  in  space. 
Accounts  of  structures  and  tabulations  of  strata,  grouped 
and  compared,  have  led  gradually  to  the  assigning  of 
various  classes  of  geological  changes  to  igneous  and 
aqueous  actions;  and  it  is  now  tacitly  admitted  that 
Geology  becomes  a  science  proper,  only  as  fast  as  such 
changes  are  explained  in  terms  of  those  natural  pro- 
cesses which  have  arisen  in  the  cooling  and  solidifying 
earth,  exposed  to  the  sun's  heat  and  the  action  of  the 
moon  upon  its  ocean.  The  science  of  life  has  been,  and 
is  still,  exhibiting  a  like  series  of  steps ;  the  evolution 
of  organic  forms  at  large  is  being  affiliated  on  physical 
actions  in  operations  from  the  beginning ;  and  the  vital 
phenomena  each  organism  presents  are  coming  to  be 
understood  as  connected  sets  of  changes,  in  parts  formed 
of  matters  that  are  affected  by  certain  forces  and  dis- 
engage other  forces.  So  is  it  with  mind.  Early  ideas 
concerning  thought  and  feeling  ignored  everything  like 
cause,  save  in  recognizing  those  effects  of  habits  which 
were  forced  on  men's  attention  and  expressed  in  prov- 
erbs ;  but  there  are  growing  up  interpretations  of 
thought  and  feeling  as  correlates  of  the  actions  and 
reactions  of  a  nervous  structure,  that  is  influenced  by 
outer  changes  and  works  in  the  body  adapted  changes  : 
the  implication  being  that  Psychology  becomes  a  science 
as  fast  as  these  relations  of  phenomena  are  explained 


70 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


as  consequences  of  ultimate  principles.  Sociology,  too, 
represented  down  to  recent  times  only  by  stray  ideas 
about  social  organization,  scattered  through  the  masses 
of  worthless  gossip  furnished  us  by  historians,  is  coming 
to  be  recognized  by  some  as  also  a  science ;  and  such 
adumbrations  of  it  as  have  from  time  to  time  appeared 
in  the  shape  of  empirical  generalizations,  are  now  begin- 
ning to  assume  the  character  of  generalizations  made 
coherent  by  derivation  from  causes  lying  in  human 
nature  placed  under  given  conditions.  Clearly  then, 
Ethics,  which  is  a  science  dealing  with  the  conduct  of 
associated  human  beings,  regarded  under  one  of  its 
aspects,  has  to  undergo  a  like  transformation ;  and,  at 
present  undeveloped,  can  be  considered  a  developed 
science  only  when  it  has  undergone  this  transformation. 

A  preparation  in  the  simpler  sciences  is  pre-supposed. 
Ethics  has  a  physical  aspect ;  since  it  treats  of  human 
activities  which,  in  common  with  all  expenditures  or 
energy,  conform  to  the  law  of  the  persistence  of  energy : 
moral  principles  must  conform  to  physical  necessities. 
It  has  a  biological  aspect;  since  it  concerns  certain 
effects,  inner  and  outer,  individual  and  social,  of  the 
vital  changes  going  on  in  the  highest  type  of  animal. 
It  has  a  psychological  aspect ;  for  its  subject  matter  is 
an  aggregate  of  actions  that  are  prompted  by  feelings 
and  guided  by  intelligence.  And  it  has  a  sociological 
aspect ;  for  these  actions,  some  of  them  directly  and  all 
of  them  indirectly,  affect  associated  beings. 

What  is  the  implication?  Belonging  under  one 
aspect  to  each  of  these  sciences  —  physical,  biological, 
psychological,  sociological  —  it  can  find  its  ultimate 
interpretations  only  in  tliose  fundamental  truths  which 
are  common  to  all  of  them.    Already  we  have  con- 


WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT. 


71 


eluded  ill  a  general  way  that  conduct  at  large,  includ- 
ing the  conduct  Ethics  deals  with,  is  to  be  fully  under- 
stood only  as  an  aspect  of  evolving  life ;  and  now  we 
are  brouglit  to  this  conclusion  in  a  more  special  way. 

§  24.  Here,  then,  we  have  to  enter  on  the  considera- 
tion of  moral  phenomena  as  phenomena  of  evolution  ; 
being  forced  to  do  this  by  finding  that  they  form  a 
part  of  tlie  aggregate  of  phenomena  which  evolution 
has  wrought  out.  If  the  entire  visible  universe  has 
been  evolved  —  if  the  solar  system  as  a  whole,  the 
earth  as  a  part  of  it,  the  life  in  general  which  the  earth 
bears,  as  well  as  that  of  each  individual  organism  —  if 
the  mental  phenomena  displayed  by  all  creatures,  up 
to  the  highest,  in  common  with  the  phenomena  pre- 
sented by  aggregates  of  these  highest  —  if  one  and  all 
conform  to  the  laws  of  evolution ;  tlien  the  necessary 
implication  is  that  those  phenomena  of  conduct  in 
these  highest  creatures  with  which  Morality  is  con- 
cerned, also  conform. 

The  preceding  volumes  have  prepared  the  way  for 
dealing  with  morals  as  thus  conceived.  Utilizing  the 
conclusions  thc}^  contain,  let  us  now  observe  what  data 
are  furnished  by  these.  We  will  take  in  succession  — 
the  physical  view,  the  biological  view,  the  psychologic 
cal  view,  and  the  sociological  view. 


72 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  PHYSICAL  VIEW. 

§  25.  Every  moment  we  pass  instantly  from  men's 
perceived  actions  to  the  motives  implied  by  them  ;  and 
so  are  led  to  formulate  these  actions  in  mental  terms 
rather  than  in  bodily  terms.  Thoughts  and  feelings 
are  referred  to  when  we  speak  of  any  one's  deeds  with 
praise  or  blame  ;  not  those  outer  manifestations  which 
reveal  the  thoughts  and  feelings.  Hence  we  become 
oblivious  of  the  truth  that  conduct  as  actually  experi- 
enced consists  of  changes  recognized  by  touch,  sight, 
and  hearing. 

This  habit  of  contemplating  only  the  psychical  face 
of  conduct  is  so  confirmed  that  an  effort  is  required  to 
contemplate  only  the  physical  face.  Undeniable  as  it 
is  that  another's  behavior  to  us  is  made  up  of  move- 
ments of  his  body  and  limbs,  of  his  facial  muscles,  and 
of  his  vocal  apparatus,  it  yet  seems  paradoxical  to  say 
that  these  are  the  only  elements  of  conduct  really 
known  by  us,  while  the  elements  of  conduct  which  we 
exclusively  think  of  as  constituting  it  are  not  known, 
but  inferred. 

Here,  however,  ignoring  for  the  time  being  the 
inferred  elements  in  conduct,  we  have  to  deal  with  the 
perceived  elements  —  we  have  to  observe  its  traits  con- 
sidered as  a  set  of  combined  motions.    Taking  the 


THE  PHYSICAL  VIEW, 


73 


evolution  point  of  view,  and  remembering  that  while 
an  aggregate  evolves,  not  only  the  matter  composing 
it,  but  also  the  motion  of  that  matter,  passes  from  an 
indefinite  incoherent  homogeneity  to  a  definite  coherent 
heterogeneity,  we  have  now  to  ask  whether  conduct  as 
it  rises  to  its  higher  forms,  displays  in  increasing  degrees 
these  characters ;  and  whether  it  does  not  display  them 
in  the  greatest  degree  when  it  reaches  that  highest  form 
which  we  call  moral. 

§  26.  It  will  be  convenient  to  deal  first  with  tlie  trait 
of  increasing  coherence.  The  conduct  of  lowly  organ- 
ized creatures  is  broadly  contrasted  with  the  conduct  of 
highly  organized  creatures  in  having  its  successive  por- 
tions feebly  connected.  The  random  movements  which 
an  animalcule  makes  have  severally  no  reference  to 
movements  made  a  moment  before ;  nor  do  they  affect 
in  specific  ways  the  movements  made  immediately  after. 
To-day's  wanderings  of  a  fish  in  search  of  food,  though 
perhaps  showing  by  their  adjustments  to  catching  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  prey  at  different  liours,  a  slightly  deter- 
mined order,  are  unrelated  to  the  wanderings  of  yester- 
day and  to-morrow.  But  such  more  developed  creatures 
as  birds,  show  us  in  the  building  of  nests,  the  sitting  on 
eggs,  the  rearing  of  chicks,  and  the  aiding  of  them  after 
they  fly,  sets  of  motions  which  form  a  dependent  series, 
extending  over  a  considerable  period.  And  on  observ- 
ing the  complexity  of  the  acts  performed  in  fetching 
and  fixing  the  fibres  of  the  nest,  or  in  catching  and 
bringing  to  the  young  each  portion  of  food,  we  discover 
in  the  combined  motions,  lateral  cohesion  as  well  as 
longitudinal  cohesion. 

Man,  even  in  his  lowest  state,  displaj^s  in  his  con- 


74 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


duct  far  more  coherent  combinations  of  motions.  By 
the  elaborate  manipulations  gone  through  in  making 
weapons  that  are  to  serve  for  the  chase  next  year,  or  in 
building  canoes  and  wigwams  for  permanent  uses  —  by 
acts  of  acroTcssion  and  defence  which  are  connected 
with  injuries  long  since  received  or  committed,  the 
savage  exhibits  an  aggregate  of  motions  which,  in  some 
of  its  parts,  holds  together  over  great  periods.  More- 
over, if  we  consider  the  many  movements  implied  by 
the  transactions  of  each  day,  in  the  wood,  on  the  water, 
in  the  camp,  in  the  family,  we  see  that  this  coherent 
aggregate  of  movements  is  composed  of  many  minor 
aggregates  that  are  severally  coherent  within  themselves 
and  with  one  another. 

In  civilized  man  this  trait  of  developed  conduct 
becomes  more  conspicuous  still.  Be  his  business  what 
it  may,  its  processes  involve  relatively  numerous 
dependent  motions ;  and  day  by  day  it  is  so  carried  on 
as  to  show  connections  between  present  motions  and 
motions  long  gone  by,  as  well  as  motions  anticipated  in 
the  distant  future.  Besides  the  many  doings,  related 
to  one  another,  which  the  farmer  goes  through  in  look- 
ing after  his  cattle,  directing  his  laborers,  keeping  an 
eye  on  his  dairy,  buying  his  implements,  selling  his 
produce,  etc.,  the  business  of  getting  his  lease  involves 
numerous  combined  movements  on  which  the  move- 
ments of  subsequent  years  depend;  and  in  manuring 
his  fields  with  a  view  to  larger  returns,  or  putting  down 
drains  with  the  like  motive,  he  is  performing  acts  Avhich 
are  parts  of  a  coherent  combination  relatively  extensive. 
That  the  like  holds  of  the  shop-keeper,  manufacturer, 
banker,  is  manifest ;  and  this  increased  coherence  of 
conduct  among  the  civilized  will  strike  us  even  more 


THE  PHYSICAL  VIEW, 


75 


when  we  remember  how  its  parts  are  often  coiitinued  in 
a  connected  arrangement  through  life,  for  the  purpose 
of  making  a  fortune,  founding  a  family,  gaining  a  seat 
in  Parliament. 

Now  mark  that  a  greater  coherence  among  its  com- 
ponent motions  broadlj^  distinguishes  the  conduct  we 
call  moral  from  the  conduct  we  call  immoral.  The 
application  of  the  word  dissolute  to  the  last,  and  of  the 
word  self -restrained  to  the  first,  implies  this  —  implies 
that  conduct  of  the  lower  kind,  constituted  of  disorderly- 
acts,  has  its  parts  relatively  loose  in  their  relations  with 
one  another ;  while  conduct  of  the  higher  kind,  habit- 
ually following  a  fixed  order,  so  gains  a  characteristic 
unity  and  coherence.  In  proportion  as  the  conduct  is 
what  we  call  moral,  it  exhibits  comparatively  settled 
connections  between  antecedents  and  consequents ;  for 
the  doing  right  implies  that  under  given  conditions  the 
combined  motions  constituting  conduct  will  follow  in  a 
way  that  can  be  specified.  Contrariwise,  in  the  con- 
duct of  one  whose  principles  are  not  high,  the  sequences 
of  motions  are  doubtful.  He  may  paj^  the  money  or  he 
may  not ;  he  may  keep  his  appointment  or  he  may  fail ; 
he  may  tell  the  truth  or  he  may  lie.  The  words  trust- 
worthiness and  untrustworthiness,  as  used  to  character- 
ize the  two  respectively,  sufficiently  imply  that  the 
actions  of  the  one  can  be  foreknown  while  those  of  the 
other  cannot;  and  this  implies  that  the  successive 
movements  composing  the  one  bear  more  constant 
relations  to  one  another  than  do  those  composing  the 
other  —  are  more  coherent. 

§  27.  Indefiniteness  accompanies  incoherence  in  con- 
duct that  is  little  evolved :  and  throughout  the  ascend- 


76 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


ing  stages  of  evolving  conduct  there  is  an  increasingly 
definite  co-ordination  of  the  motions  constituting  it. 

Such  changes  of  form  as  the  rudest  protozoa  show 
us,  are  utterly  vague  —  admit  of  no  precise  description  ; 
and  though  in  higher  kinds  the  movements  of  the  parts 
are  more  definable,  yet  the  movement  of  the  whole  in 
respect  of  direction  is  indeterminate ;  there  is  no  ad- 
justment of  it  to  this  or  the  other  point  in  space.  In 
such  coelenterate  animals  as  polypes  we  see  the  parts 
moving  in  ways  which  lack  precision ;  and  in  one  of 
the  locomotive  forms,  as  a  medusa,  the  course  taken, 
otherwise  at  random,  can  be  described  only  as  one 
which  carries  it  toward  the  light,  where  degrees  of 
light  and  darkness  are  present.  Among  annulose  crea- 
tures the  contrast  between  the  track  of  a  worm,  turn- 
ing this  way  or  that  at  hazard,  and  the  definite  course 
taken  by  a  bee  in  its  flight  from  flower  to  flower  or 
back  to  the  hive,  shows  us  the  same  thing ;  the  bee's 
acts  in  building  cells  and  feeding  larvae  further  ex- 
hibiting precision  in  the  simultaneous  movements  as 
well  as  in  the  successive  movements.  Thougli  the 
motions  made  by  a  fish  in  pursuing  its  prey  have  con- 
siderable definiteness,  yet  they  are  of  a  simple  kind, 
and  are  in  this  respect  contrasted  with  the  many 
definite  motions  of  body,  head,  and  limbs  gone  tln^ough 
by  a  carnivorous  mammal  in  the  course  of  waylaying, 
running  down,  and  seizing  a  herbivore ;  and  further, 
the  fish  shows  us  none  of  those  definitely  adjusted  sets 
of  motions  which  in  the  mammal  subserve  the  rearing 
of  young. 

Much  greater  definiteness,  if  not  in  the  combined 
movements  forming  single  acts,  still  in  the  adjustments 
of  many  combined  acts  to  various  purposes,  charac- 


THE  PHYSICAL  VIEW. 


77 


terizes  human  conduct,  even  in  its  lowest  stages.  In 
making  and  using  weapons  and  in  the  manoeuvrings 
of  savage  warfare,  numerous  movements,  all  precise  in 
their  adaptations  to  proximate  ends,  are  arranged  for 
the  achievement  of  remote  ends,  with  a  precision  not 
paralleled  among  lower  creatures.  The  lives  of  civil- 
ized men  exhibit  this  trait  far  more  conspicuously. 
Each  industrial  art  exemplifies  the  effects  of  move- 
ments which  are  severally  definite ;  and  which  are 
definitely  arranged  in  simultaneous  and  successive 
order.  Business  transactions  of  every  kind  are  charac- 
terized by  exact  relations  between  the  sets  of  motions 
constituting  acts,  and  the  purposes  fulfilled,  in  time, 
place,  and  quantity.  Further,  the  daily  routine  of 
each  person  shows  us  in  its  periods  and  amounts  of 
activity,  of  rest,  of  relaxation,  a  measured  arrangement 
which  is  not  shown  us  by  the  doings  of  the  wandering 
savage,  who  has  no  fixed  times  for  hunting,  sleeping, 
feeding,  or  any  one  kind  of  action. 

Moral  conduct  differs  from  immoral  conduct  in  the 
same  manner  and  in  a  like  degree.  The  conscientious 
man  is  exact  in  all  his  transactions.  He  supplies  a 
precise  weight  for  a  specified  sum ;  he  gives  a  definite 
quality  in  fulfilment  of  understanding;  he  pays  the 
full  amount  he  bargained  to  do.  In  times  as  well  as 
in  quantities,  his  acts  answer  completely  to  anticipa- 
tions. If  he  has  made  a  business  contract,  he  is  to  the 
day;  if  an  appointment,  he  is  to  the  minute.  Similarly 
in  respect  of  truth ;  his  statements  correspond  accu- 
rately with  the  facts.  It  is  thus  too  in  his  family  life. 
He  maintains  marital  relations  that  are  definite  in  con- 
trast with  the  relations  that  result  from  breach  of  the 
marriage  contract ;  and  as  a  father,  fitting  his  behavior 


78 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


with  care  to  the  nature  of  each  child  and  to  the  occa- 
sion, he  avoids  the  too  much  and  the  too  little  of 
praise  or  blame,  reward  or  penalty.  Nor  is  it  otherwise 
in  his  miscellaneous  acts.  To  say  that  he  deals  equi- 
tably with  those  he  employs,  whether  they  behave  w^ell 
or  ill,  is  to  say  that  he  adjusts  his  acts  to  their  deserts ; 
and  to  say  that  he  is  judicious  in  his  charities,  is  to  say 
that  he  portions  out  his  aid  with  discrimination  instead 
of  distributing  it  indiscriminately  to  good  and  bad,  as 
do  those  who  have  no  adequate  sense  of  their  social 
responsibilities. 

That  progress  toward  rectitude  of  conduct  is  prog- 
ress toward  duly  proportioned  conduct,  and  that  duly 
proportioned  conduct  is  relatively  definite,  we  may  see 
from  another  point  of  view.  One  of  the  traits  of  con- 
duct we  call  immoral,  is  excess ;  while  moderation 
habitually  characterizes  moral  conduct.  Now  excesses 
imply  extreme  divergences  of  actions  from  some 
medium,  while  maintenance  of  the  medium  is  implied 
by  moderation ;  whence  it  follows  that  actions  of  the 
last  kind  can  be  defined  more  nearly  than  those  of  tlie 
first.  Clearly  conduct  which,  being  unrestrained,  runs 
into  great  and  incalculable  oscillations,  therein  differs 
from  restrained  conduct  of  which,  hj  implication,  the 
oscillations  fall  within  narrower  limits.  And  falling 
within  narrower  limits  necessitates  relative  definiteness 
of  movements. 

§  28.  That  throughout  the  ascending  forms  of  life, 
along  with  increasing  heterogeneity  of  structure  and 
function,  there  goes  increasing  heterogeneity  of  con- 
duct —  increasing  diversity  in  the  sets  of  external 
motions  and  combined  sets  of  sucli  motions  —  need  not 


THE  PHYSICAL  VIEW. 


79 


be  shown  in  detail.  Nor  need  it  be  jsliown  that  be- 
coming relatively  great  in  the  motions  constituting  the 
conduct  of  the  uncivilized  man,  this  heterogeneity  has 
become  still  greater  in  those  which  the  civilized  man 
goes  tin'ough.  We  may  pass  at  once  to  that  further 
degree  of  the  like  contrast  which  Ave  see  on  ascending 
from  tlie  conduct  of  the  immoral  to  that  of  the  moral. 

Instead  of  recognizing  this  contrast,  most  readers 
will  be  inclined  to  identify  a  moral  life  with  a  life  little 
varied  in  its  activities.  But  here  we  come  upon  a 
defect  in  the  current  conception  of  morality.  This 
comparative  uniformity  in  the  aggregate  of  motions, 
which  goes  along  with  morality  as  commonly  con- 
ceived, is  not  only  not  moral,  but  is  the  reverse  of 
moral.  The  better  a  man  fulfils  every  requirement  of 
life,  alike  as  regards  his  own  body  and  mind,  as  regards 
the  bodies  and  minds  of  those  dependent  on  him,  and 
as  regards  the  bodies  and  minds  of  his  fellow-citizens, 
the  more  varied  do  his  activities  become.  The  more 
fully  he  does  all  these  things,  the  more  heterogeneous 
must  be  his  movements. 

One  who  satisfies  personal  needs  only,  goes  through, 
other  things  equal,  less  multiform  processes  than  one 
who  also  administers  to  the  needs  of  wife  and  children. 
Supposing  there  are  no  other  differences,  the  addition 
of  family  relations  necessarily  renders  the  actions  of 
the  man  who  fulfils  the  duties  of  husband  and  parent, 
more  heterogeneous  than  those  of  the  man  who  has  no 
such  duties  to  fulfil,  or,  having  tliem,  does  not  fulfil 
them ;  and  to  say  that  his  actions  are  more  heteroge- 
neous is  to  say  that  there  is  a  greater  heterogeneity  in 
the  combined  motions  he  goes  through.  The  like  holds 
of  social  obligations.    These,  in  proportion  as  a  citizen 


80 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


duly  perforins  tlieni,  complicate  his  movements  con- 
siderably. If  he  is  helpful  to  inferiors  dependent  on 
him,  if  he  takes  a  part  in  political  agitation,  if  he  aids 
in  diffusing  knowledge,  he,  in  each  of  these  ways,  adds 
to  his  kinds  of  activity  —  makes  his  sets  of  movements 
more  multiform ;  so  differing  from  the  man  who  is  the 
slave  of  one  desire  or  group  of  desires. 

Though  it  is  unusual  to  consider  as  having  a  moral 
aspect,  those  activities  which  culture  involves,  yet  to 
the  few  who  hold  that  due  exercise  of  all  the  higher 
faculties,  intellectual  and  aesthetic,  must  be  included  in 
the  conception  of  complete  life,  here  identified  with 
the  ideally  moral  life,  it  will  be  manifest  that  a  further 
heterogeneity  is  implied  by  them.  For  each  of  such 
activities,  constituted  by  that  play  of  these  faculties 
which  is  eventually  added  to  their  life-subserving  uses, 
adds  to  the  multiformity  of  the  aggregated  motions. 

Briefly,  then,  if  the  conduct  is  the  best  possible  on 
every  occasion,  it  follows  that  as  the  occasions  are  end- 
lessly varied  the  acts  will  be  endlessly  varied  to  suit — 
the  heterogeneity  in  the  combinations  of  moti(  ns  will 
be  extreme. 

§  29.  Evolution  in  conduct  considered  under  its 
moral  aspect,  is,  like  all  other  evolution,  toward  equi- 
librium. I  do  not  mean  that  it  is  toward  the  equilib- 
rium reached  at  death,  though  this  is,  of  course,  the 
final  state  which  the  evolution  of  the  highest  man  has 
in  common  with  all  lower  evolution  ;  but  I  mean  that  il 
is  toward  a  moving  equilibrium. 

We  have  seen  that  maintaining  life,  expressed  in 
pliysical  terms,  is  maintaining  a  balanced  combination 
of  internal  actions  in  face  of  external  forces  tending  to 


THE  PHYSICAL  VIEW, 


81 


overthrow  it;  and  we  have  seen  that  advance  toward 
a  higher  life  has  been  an  acquirement  of  ability  to 
maintain  the  balance  for  a  longer  period,  by  the  suc- 
cessive additions  of  organic  appliances  which  by  their 
actions  counteract  more  and  more  fully  the  disturbing 
forces.  Here,  then,  we  are  led  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  life  called  moral  is  one  in  which  this  maintenance 
of  the  moving  equilibrium  reaches  completeness,  or 
approaches  most  nearly  to  completeness. 

This  truth  is  clearly  disclosed  on  observing  how 
those  physiological  rhythms  which  vaguely  show  them- 
selves when  organization  begins,  become  more  regular, 
as  well  as  more  various  in  their  kinds,  as  organization 
advances.  Periodicity  is  but  feebly  marked  in  the 
actions,  inner  and  outer,  of  the  rudest  types.  Where 
life  is  low  there  is  passive  dependence  on  the  accidents 
of  the  environment;  and  this  entails  great  irregulari- 
ties in  the  vital  processes.  The  taking  in  of  food  by 
a  polj^pe  is  at  intervals  now  short,  now  very  long,  as  cir- 
cumstances determine ;  and  the  utilization  of  it  is  by 
a  slow  dispersion  of  the  absorbed  part  through  the 
tissues,  aided  only  by  the  irregular  movements  of  the 
creature's  body ;  while  such  aeration  as  is  effected  is 
similarly  without  a  trace  of  rhythm.  Much  higher  up 
we  still  find  very  imperfect  periodicities ;  as  in  the 
inferior  moUusks,  which,  though  possessed  of  vascular 
systems,  have  no  proper  circulation,  but  merelj^  a  slow 
movement  of  the  crude  blood,  now  in  one  direction 
through  the  vessels,  and  then,  after  a  pause,  in  the 
opposite  direction.  Only  with  well-developed  struc- 
tures do  there  come  a  rhythmical  pulse  and  a  rhythm 
of  the  respiratory  actions.  And  then  in  birds  and 
mammals,  along  with  great  rapidity  and  regularity  in 


82 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


these  essential  rhythms,  and  along  with  a  consequently 
great  vital  activity  and  therefore  great  expenditure, 
comparative  regularity  in  the  rhythm  of  the  alimentary 
actions  is  establislied,  as  well  as  in  the  rhythm  of 
activity  and  rest ;  since  the  rapid  waste  to  which  rapid 
pulsation  and  respiration  are  instrumental,  necessitates 
tolerably  regular  supplies  of  nutriment,  as  well  as 
recurring  intervals  of  sleep  during  which  repair  may 
overtake  waste.  And  from  these  stages  the  moving 
equilibrium,  characterized  by  such  interdependent 
rhythms,  is  continually  made  better  by  the  counteract- 
ing of  more  and  more  of  those  actions  which  tend  to 
perturb  it. 

So  is  it  as  we  ascend  from  savage  to  civilized  and 
from  the  lowest  among  the  civilized  to  the  highest. 
The  rhythm  of  external  actions  required  to  maintain 
the  rhythm  of  internal  actions  becomes  at  once  more 
complicated  and  more  complete,  making  them  into  a 
better  moving  equilibrium.  The  irregularities  which 
their  conditions  of  existence  entail  on  primitive  men, 
continually  cause  wide  deviations  from  the  mean  state 
of  the  moving  equilibrium  —  wide  oscillations ;  which 
imply  imperfection  of  it  for  the  time  being,  and  bring 
about  its  premature  overthrow.  In  such  civilized  men 
as  we  call  ill  conducted,  frequent  perturbations  of  the 
moving  equilibrium  are  caused  by  those  excesses  char- 
acterizing a  career  in  which  tlie  periodicities  are  much 
broken ;  and  a  common  result  is  that  the  rhythm  of 
tlie  internal  actions  being  often  deranged,  the  moving 
equilibrium,  rendered  by  so  much  imperfect,  is  gener- 
ally  shortened  in  duration.  While  one  in  whom  the 
internal  rhythms  are  best  maintained  is  one  by  whom 
the  external  actions  required  to  fulfil  all  needs  and 


THE  PHYSICAL  VIEW. 


83 


duties,  severally  performed  on  the  recurring  occasions, 
conduce  to  a  moving  equilibrium  that  is  at  once  involved 
and  prolonged. 

Of  course  the  implication  is  that  the  man  who  thus 
reaches  the  limit  of  evolution,  exists  in  a  society  con- 
gruous with  his  nature,  is  a  man  among  men  similarly 
constituted,  who  are  severally  in  harmony  with  that 
social  environment  which  they  have  formed.  This  is, 
indeed,  the  only  possibility.  For  the  production  of  the 
highest  type  of  man  can  go  on  only  pari  passu  with 
the  production  of  the  highest  type  of  society.  The  im- 
plied conditions  are  those  before  described  as  accom- 
panying the  most  evolved  conduct  —  conditions  under 
which  each  can  fulfil  all  his  needs  and  rear  the  due 
number  of  progeny,  not  only  without  hindering  others 
from  doing  the  like,  but  while  aiding  them  in  doing 
the  like.  And  evidently,  considered  under  its  physical 
aspect,  the  conduct  of  the  individuals  so  constituted, 
and  associated  with  like  individuals,  is  one  in  which  all 
the  actions,  that  is  the  combined  motions  of  all  kinds, 
have  become  such  as  duly  to  meet  every  daily  process, 
every  ordinary  occurrence,  and  every  contingency  in 
his  environment.  Complete  life  in  a  complete  society 
is  but  another  name  for  complete  equilibrium  between 
the  co-ordinated  activities  of  each  social  unit  and  those 
of  the  aggregate  of  units. 

§  30.  Even  to  readers  of  preceding  volumes,  and  still 
more  to  other  readers,  there  will  seem  a  strangeness,  or 
even  an  absurdity,  in  this  presentation  of  moral  conduct 
in  physical  terms.  It  has  been  needful  to  make  it,  how- 
ever. If  that  re-distribution  of  matter  and  motion  con- 
stituting evolution  goes  on  in  all  aggregates,  its  laws 


84 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


must  be  fulfilled  in  tlie  most  developed  being  as  in  every 
other  thing;  and  his  actions,  when  decomposed  into 
motions,  must  exemplify  its  laws.  This  we  find  that 
they  do.  There  is  an  entire  correspondence  between 
moral  evolution  and  evolution  as  physically  defined. 

Conduct,  as  actually  known  to  us  in  perception,  and 
not  as  interpreted  into  the  accompanying  feelings  and 
ideas,  consists  of  combined  motions.  On  ascending 
througli  tlie  various  grades  of  animate  creatures,  we 
find  these  combined  motions  characterized  by  increas- 
ing coherence,  increasing  definiteness  considered  singly 
and  in  their  co-ordinated  groups,  and  increasing  hetero- 
geneity ;  and  in  advancing  from  lower  to  higher  types  of 
man,  as  well  as  in  advancing  from  the  less  moral  to  the 
more  moral  type  of  man,  these  traits  of  evolving  con- 
duct become  more  marked  still.  Further,  we  see  that 
the  increasing  coherence,  definiteness,  and  heterogeneity, 
of  the  combined  motions,  are  instrumental  to  the  better 
maintenance  of  a  moving  equilibrium.  Where  tlie  evo- 
lution is  small  this  is  very  imperfect  and  soon  cut  short; 
with  advancing  evolution,  bringing  greater  power  and 
intelligence,  it  becomes  more  steady  and  longer  con- 
tinued in  the  face  of  adverse  actions  ;  in  the  human 
race  at  large  it  is  comparatively  regular  and  enduring ; 
and  its  regularity  and  enduringness  are  greatest  in  the 
highest. 


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86 


CHAPTER  VL 

THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 

§  31.  The  truth  that  the  ideally  moral  man  is  one  in 
whom  the  moving  equilibrium  is  perfect,  or  approaches 
nearest  to  perfection,  becomes,  when  translated  into 
physiological  language,  the  truth  that  he  is  one  in  whom 
the  functions  of  all  kinds  are  duly  fulfilled.  Each 
function  has  some  relation,  direct  or  indirect,  to  the 
needs  of  life  :  tlie  fact  of  its  existence  as  a  result 
evolution,  being  itself  a  proof  that  it  has  been  entailed, 
immediately  or  remotely,  by  the  adjustment  of  inner 
actions  to  outer  actions.  Consequentlj^,  non-fulfilment 
of  it  in  normal  proportion  is  non-fulfilment  of  a  requisite 
to  complete  life.  If  there  is  defective  discharge  of  the 
function,  the  organism  experiences  some  detrimental 
result  caused  by  the  inadequacy.  If  the  discharge  is 
in  excess,  there  is  entailed  a  reaction  upon  the  other 
functions,  which  in  some  way  diminishes  their  effi- 
ciencies. 

It  is  true  that  during  full  vigor,  while  the  momentum 
of  the  organic  actions  is  great,  the  disorder  caused  by 
moderate  excess  or  defect  of  any  one  function,  soon 
disappears  —  the  balance  is  re-established.  But  it  is 
none  the  less  true  that  always  some  disorder  results 
from  excess  or  defect,  that  it  influences  every  function, 
bodily  and  mental,  and  that  it  constitutes  a  lowering 
of  the  life  for  the  time  being. 


86 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


Beyond  the  temporary  falling  short  of  complete  life 
implied  by  undue  or  inadequate  discharge  of  a  function 
there  is  entailed,  as  an  ultimate  result,  decreased  length 
of  life.  If  some  function  is  habitually  performed  in 
excess  of  the  requirement,  or  in  defect  of  the  require- 
ment ;  and  if,  as  a  consequence,  there  is  an  often- 
repeated  perturbation  of  the  functions  at  large,  there 
results  some  chronic  derangement  in  the  balance  of  the 
functions.  Necessarily  reacting  on  the  structures,  and 
registering  in  them  its  accumulated  effects,  this  de- 
rangement works  a  general  deterioration ;  and  when 
the  vital  energies  begin  to  decline,  the  moving  equi- 
librium, further  from  perfection  than  it  would  else  have 
been,  is  sooner  overthrown :  death  is  more  or  less  pre- 
mature. 

Hence  the  moral  man  is  one  whose  functions — many 
and  varied  in  their  kinds,  as  we  have  seen  —  are  all  dis- 
charged in  degrees  duly  adjusted  to  the  conditions  of 
existence. 

§  32.  Strange  as  the  conclusion  looks,  it  is  never- 
theless a  conclusion  to  be  here  drawn,  that  the  pe^ 
formauQe  of  every  function  is,  in  a  sense,  a  moral 
obligation. 

It  is  usually  thought  that  morality  requires  us  only 
to  restrain  such  vital  activities  as,  in  our  present  state, 
are  often  pushed  to  excess,  or  such  as  conflict  with 
average  welfare,  special  or  general ;  but  it  also  requires 
us  to  carry  on  these  vital  activities  up  to  their  normal 
limits.  All  the  animal  functions,  in  common  with  all 
the  higher  functions,  have,  as  thus  understood,  their 
imperativeness.  While  recognizing  the  fact  that  in 
our  state  of  transition,  characterized  by  very  imperfect 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


87 


adaptation  of  constitution  of  conditions,  moral  obliga- 
tions of  supreme  kinds  often  necessitate  conduct  which 
is  physically  injurious  ;  we  must  also  recognize  tlie  fact 
that,  considered  apart  from  other  effects,  it  is  immoral 
so  to  treat  the  body  as  in  any  way  to  diminish  the  ful- 
ness or  vigor  of  its  vitality. 

Hence  results  one  test  of  actions.  There  may  in 
every  case  be  put  the  questions :  Does  the  action  tend 
to  maintenance  of  complete  life  for  the  time  being ;  and 
does  it  tend  to  prolongation  of  life  to  its  full  extent  ? 
To  answer  yes  or  no  to  either  of  these  questions,  is 
implicitly  to  class  the  action  as  right  or  wrong  in  respect 
of  its  immediate  bearings,  whatever  it  may  be  in  respect 
of  its  remote  bearings. 

The  seeming  paradoxicalness  of  this  statement  results 
from  the  tendency,  so  difficult  of  avoidance,  to  judge  a 
conclusion  which  presupposes  an  ideal  humanity,  by  its 
applicability  to  humanity  as  now  existing.  The  fore- 
going conclusion  refers  to  that  highest  conduct  in  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  the  evolution  of  conduct  terminates  — 
that  conduct  in  which  the  making  of  all  adjustments  of 
acts  to  ends  subserving  complete  individual  life,  to- 
gether with  all  those  subserving  maintenance  of  off- 
spring and  preparation  of  them  for  maturity,  not  only 
consist  with  the  making  of  like  adjustments  by  others, 
but  furthers  it.  And  this  conception  of  conduct  in  its 
ultimate  form  implies  the  conception  of  a  nature  having 
such  conduct  for  its  spontaneous  outcome  —  the  product 
of  its  normal  activities.  So,  understanding  the  matter, 
it  becomes  manifest  that  under  such  conditions  any  fall- 
ing short  of  function,  as  well  as  any  excess  of  function, 
implies  deviation  from  the  best  conduct  or  from  per- 
fectly moral  conduct 


88 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


§  33.  Thus  far  in  treating  of  conduct  from  the  biologi 
cal  point  of  view,  we  have  considered  its  constituent 
actions  under  their  physiological  aspects  only ;  leaving 
out  of  sight  their  psychological  aspects.  We  have 
recognized  the  bodily  changes,  and  have  ignored  the 
accompanying  mental  changes.  And  at  first  sight  it 
seems  needful  for  us  here  to  do  this ;  since  taking 
account  of  states  of  consciousness  apparently  implies 
an  inclusion  of  the  psychological  view  in  the  biological 
view. 

This  is  not  so,  however.  As  was  pointed  out  in  the 
Principles  of  Psycliology^  §§  52,  63,  we  enter  upon 
psychology  proper  only  when  we  begin  to  treat  of 
mental  states  and  their  relations  considered  as  referring 
to  external  agents  and  their  relations.  While  we  con- 
cern ourselves  exclusively  with  modes  of  mind  as  cor- 
relatives of  nervous  changes,  we  are  treating  of  what 
was  there  distinguished  as  aestho-physiology.  We  pass 
to  psychology  only  when  we  consider  the  correspond- 
ence between  the  connections  among  subjective  states 
and  the  connections  among  objective  actions.  Here, 
then,  without  transgressing  the  limits  of  our  immediate 
topic,  we  may  deal  with  feelings  and  functions  in  their 
mutual  dependencies. 

We  cannot  omit  doing  this ;  because  the  psychical 
changes  which  accompany  many  of  the  physical  changes 
in  the  organism  are  biological  factors  in  two  ways. 
Those  feelings,  classed  as  sensations,  which,  directly 
initiated  in  the  bodily  framework,  go  along  with  cer- 
tain states  of  tlie  vital  organs  and  more  conspicuously 
with  certain  states  of  tlie  external  organs,  now  serve 
mainly  as  guides  to  tlio  performance  of  functions,  but 
partly  as  stimuli,  and  now  serve  mainly  as  stimuli,  but 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


89 


in  a  smaller  degree  as  guides.  Visual  sensations  which, 
as  co-ordinated,  enable  us  to  direct  our  movements,  also, 
if  vivid,  raise  the  rate  of  respiration ;  while  sensations 
of  cold  and  heat,  greatly  depressing  or  raising  the  vital 
actions,  serve  also  for  purposes  of  discrimination.  So, 
too,  the  feelings  classed  as  emotions,  which  are  not 
localizable  in  the  bodily  framework,  act  in  more  general 
ways,  alike  as  guides  and  stimuli  —  having  influences 
over  the  performance  of  functions  more  potent  even 
than  have  most  sensations.  Fear,  at  the  same  time  that 
it  urges  flight  and  evolves  the  forces  spent  in  it,  also 
affects  the  heart  and  the  alimentary  canal ;  while  joy, 
prompting  persistence  in  the  actions  bringing  it,  simul- 
taneously exalts  the  visceral  processes. 

Hence,  in  treating  of  conduct  under  its  biological 
aspect,  we  are  compelled  to  consider  that  interaction 
of  feelings  and  functions  which  is  essential  to  animal 
life  in  all  its  more  developed  forms. 

§  34.  In  the  Principles  of  Psychology^  §  124,  it  was 
shown  that  necessarily,  throughout  the  animate  world 
at  large,  pains  are  the  correlatives  of  actions  injurious 
to  the  organism,  while  pleasures  are  the  correlatives  of 
actions  conducive  to  its  welfare ; "  since  "it  is  an  in- 
inevitable  deduction  from  the  hypothesis  of  Evolution, 
that  races  of  sentient  creatures  could  have  come  into 
existence  under  no  other  conditions."  The  argument 
was  as  follows :  — 

If  we  substitute  for  the  word  Pleasure  the  equivalent  phrase  —  a 
feeling  which  we  seek  to  bring  into  consciousness  and  retain  there, 
and  if  we  substitute  for  the  word  Pain  the  equivalent  phrase  —  a  feel- 
ing which  we  seek  to  get  out  of  consciousness  and  to  keep  out;  we 
see  at  once  that  if  the  states  of  consciousness  which  a  creature  en- 
deavors to  maintain  are  the  correlatives  of  injurious  actions,  and  if 


90 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


the  states  of  consciousness  which  it  endeavors  to  expel  are  the  cor- 
relatives of  beneficial  actions,  it  must  quickly  disappear  through 
persistence  in  the  injurious,  and  avoidance  of  the  beneficial.  In  other 
words,  those  races  of  beings  only  can  liave  survived  in  which,  on  the 
average,  agreeable  or  desired  feelings  went  along  with  activities 
conducive  to  the  maintenance  of  life,  while  disagreeable  and  habitu- 
ally avoided  feelings  went  along  with  activities  directly  or  indirectly 
destructive  of  life;  and  there  must  ever  have  been,  other  things  equal, 
the  most  numerous  and  long-continued  survivals  among  races  in 
which  these  adjustments  of  feelings  to  actions  were  the  best,  tending 
ever  to  bring  about  perfect  adjustment. 

Fit  connections  between  acts  and  results  must  estab- 
lish themselves  in  living  things,  even  before  conscious- 
ness arises;  and  after  the  rise  of  consciousness  these 
connections  can  change  in  no  other  way  than  to  become 
better  established.  At  the  very  outset,  life  is  main- 
tained by  persistence  in  acts  which  conduce  to  it,  and 
desistance  from  acts  which  impede  it;  and  whenever 
sentiency  makes  its  appearance  as  an  accompaniment, 
its  forms  must  be  such  that  in  the  one  case  the  pro- 
duced feeling  is  of  a  kind  that  will  be  sought  —  pleas- 
ure ;  and  in  the  other  case  is  of  a  kind  that  will  be 
shunned  —  pain.  Observe  the  necessity  of  these  rela- 
tions as  exhibited  in  the  concrete. 

A  plant  which  envelops  a  buried  bone  with  a  plexus 
or  rootlets,  or  a  potato  which  directs  its  blanched  shoots 
toward  a  grating  through  which  light  comes  into  the 
cellar,  shows  us  that  tlie  changes  which  outer  agents 
themselves  set  up  in  its  tissues  are  changes  which  aid 
the  utilization  of  these  agents.  If  we  ask  what  would 
happen  if  a  plant's  roots  grew  not  toward  the  place 
where  there  was  moisture,  but  away  from  it,  or  if  its 
leaves,  enabled  by  light  to  assimilate,  nevertheless  bent 
themselves  toward  the  darkness,  we  see  that  death 
would  result  in  the  absence  of  the  existing  adjustments. 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


91 


This  general  relation  is  still  better  shown  in  an  insectiv- 
orous plant,  such  as  the  Dionoea  muscipula  which  keeps 
its  trap  closed  round  animal  matter,  but  not  round  other 
matter.  Here  it  is  manifest  that  the  stimulus  arising 
from  the  first  part  of  the  absorbed  substance  itself  sets 
up  those  actions  by  Avhich  the  mass  of  the  substance  is 
utilized  for  the  plant's  benefit. 

When  we  pass  from  vegetal  organisms  to  unconscious 
animal  organisms,  we  see  a  like  connection  between 
proclivity  and  advantage.  On  observing  how  the  ten- 
tacles of  a  polype  attach  themselves  to,  and  begin  to 
close  round,  a  living  creature,  or  some  animal  sub- 
stance, wliile  they  are  indifferent  to  the  touch  of  other 
substance,  we  are  similarly  shown  that  diffusion  of  some 
of  the  nutritive  juices  into  the  tentacles,  which  is  an 
incipient  assimilation,  causes  the  motions  effecting  pre- 
hension. And  it  is  obvious  that  life  would  cease  were 
those  relations  reversed. 

Nor  is  it  otherwise  with  this  fundamental  connection 
between  contact  with  food  and  taking  in  of  food,  among 
conscious  creatures,  up  to  the  very  highest.  Tasting  a 
substance  implies  the  passage  of  its  molecules  through 
the  mucous  membrane  of  the  tongue  and  palate ;  and 
this  absorption,  when  it  occurs  wdth  a  substance  serving 
for  food,  is  but  a  commencement  of  the  absorption 
carried  on  throughout  the  alimentary  canal.  Moreover, 
the  sensation  accompanying  this  absorption,  when  it  is 
of  the  kind  produced  by  food,  initiates  at  the  place 
where  it  is  strongest,  in  front  of  the  pharnyx,  an  auto- 
matic act  of  swallowing,  in  a  manner  rudelj^  analogous 
to  tliat  in  which  the  stimulus  of  absorption  in  a  polype's 
tentacles  initiates  prehension. 

If  from  these  processes  and  relations  that  imply 


92 


THE  LATA  OF  ETHICS. 


contact  between  a  creature's  surface  and  the  substance 
it  takes  in,  we  turn  to  those  set  up  by  diffused  particles 
of  the  substance,  constituting  to  conscious  creatures  its 
odor,  we  meet  a  kindred  general  truth.  Just  as,  after 
contact,  some  molecules  of  a  mass  of  food  are  absorbed 
by  the  part  touched,  and  excite  the  act  of  prehension, 
so  are  absorbed  such  of  its  molecules  as,  spreading 
through  the  water,  reach  the  organism ;  and,  being 
absorbed  by  it,  excite  those  actions  by  which  contact 
with  the  mass  is  effected.  If  the  physical  stimulation 
caused  by  the  dispersed  particles  is  not  accompanied 
b}^  consciousness,  still  the  motor  changes  set  up  must 
conduce  to  survival  of  the  organism,  if  they  are  such 
as  end  in  contact;  and  there  must  be  relative  innutri- 
tion and  mortality  of  organisms  in  which  the  produced 
contractions  do  not  bring  about  this  result.  Nor  can 
it  be  questioned  that  whenever  and  wherever  the  physi- 
cal stimulation  has  a  concomitant  sentiency,  this  must 
be  such  as  consists  with,  and  conduces  to,  movement 
toward  the  nutritive  matter:  it  must  be  not  a  repulsive 
but  an  attractive  sentiency.  And  this  which  holds  with 
the  lowest  consciousness,  must  hold  throughout  as  we 
see  it  do  in  all  such  superior  creatures  as  are  drawn  to 
their  food  by  odor. 

Besides  those  movements  which  cause  locomotion, 
those  wliich  effect  seizure  must  no  less  certainly  become 
thus  adjusted.  The  molecular  changes  caused  by  ab- 
sorption of  nutritive  matter  from  organic  sub^^tance  in 
contact,  or  from  adjacent  organic  substance,  initiate 
motions  wliicli  are  indefinite  where  the  organization  is 
low,  and  wliich  become  more  definite  with  the  advance 
of  organization.  At  the  outset,  while  the  undifferen- 
tiated protoplasm  is  everywhere  absorbent  and  every- 


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93 


where  contractile,  the  changes  of  form  initiated  by  the 
physical  stimulation  of  adjacent  nutritive  matter  are 
vague,  and  ineffectually  adapted  to  utilization  of  it; 
but  gradually,  along  with  the  specialization  into  parts 
that  are  contractile  and  parts  that  are  absorbent,  these 
motions  become  better  adapted ;  for  necessarily  indi- 
viduals in  which  they  are  least  adapted  disappear  faster 
than  those  in  which  they  are  most  adapted.  Recogniz- 
ing this  necessity  we  have  here  especiallj^  to  recognize 
a  further  necessity.  The  relation  between  these  stimu- 
lations and  adjusted  contractions  must  be  such  that 
increase  of  the  one  causes  increase  of  the  other ;  since 
the  directions  of  the  discharges  being  once  established, 
greater  stimulation  causes  greater  contraction,  and  the 
greater  contraction,  causing  closer  contact  with  the 
stimulating  agent,  causes  increase  of  stimulus  and  is 
thereby  itself  further  increased.  And  now  we  reach 
the  corollary  which  more  particularly  concerns  us. 
Clearly,  as  fast  as  an  accompanying  sentiency  arises,  this 
cannot  be  one  that  is  disagreeable,  prompting  desistance, 
but  must  be  one  that  is  agreeable,  prompting  persistence. 
The  pleasurable  sensation  must  be  itself  the  stimulus 
to  the  contraction  by  which  the  pleasurable  sensation 
is  maintained  and  increased ;  or  must  be  so  bound  up 
with  the  stimulus  that  the  two  increase  together.  And 
this  relation  which  we  see  is  directly  established  in  the 
case  of  a  fundamental  function,  must  be  indirectly 
established  with  all  other  functions  ;  since  non-estab- 
lishment of  it  in  any  particular  case  implies,  in  so  far, 
unfitness  to  the  conditions  of  existence. 

In  two  ways,  then,  it  is  demonstrable  that  there 
exists  a  primordial  connection  between  pleasure-giving 
acts  and  continuance  or  increase  of  life,  and,  by  impli- 


94 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


cation,  between  pain-giving  acts  and  decrease  or  loss  of 
life.  On  the  one  liand,  setting  out  with  the  lowest 
living  things,  we  see  that  the  beneficial  act  and  the  act 
which  there  is  a  tendency  to  perform,  are  originally 
two  sides  of  the  same ;  and  cannot  be  disconnected 
without  fatal  results.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  con- 
template developed  creatures  as  now  existing,  we  see 
that  each  individual  and  species  is  from  day  to  day 
kept  alive  by  pursuit  of  the  agreeable  and  avoidance  of 
the  disagreeable. 

Thus  approaching  the  facts  from  a  different  side,  anal- 
ysis brings  us  down  to  another  face  of  that  ultimate  truth 
disclosed  by  analysis  in  a  preceding  chapter.  We  found 
it  was  no  more  possible  to  frame  ethical  conceptions 
from  which  the  consciousness  of  pleasure,  of  some  kind, 
at  some  time,  to  some  being,  is  absent,  than  it  is  possi- 
ble to  frame  the  conception  of  an  object  from  which  the 
consciousness  of  space  is  absent.  And  now  we  see  that 
this  necessity  of  thought  originates  in  the  very  nature 
of  sentient  existence.  Sentient  existence  can  evolve 
only  on  condition  that  pleasure-giving  acts  are  life- 
sustaining  acts. 

§  35.  Notwithstanding  explanations  already  made, 
the  naked  enunciation  of  this  as  an  ultimate  truth, 
underlying  all  estimations  of  right  and  wrong,  will  in 
many,  if  not  in  most,  cause  astonishment.  Having  in 
view  certain  beneficial  results  that  are  preceded  by 
disagreeable  states  of  consciousness,  such  as  those  com- 
monly accompanying  labor;  and  having  in  view  the 
injurious  results  that  follow  the  receipt  of  certain  grati- 
fications, such  as  those  which  excess  in  drinking  pro- 
duces: the  majority  tacitly  or  avowedly  believe  that 


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95 


the  bearing  of  pains  is  on  the  whole  beneficial,  and  that 
the  receipt  of  pleasures  is  on  the  whole  detrimental. 
The  exceptions  so  fill  their  minds  as  to  exclude  the 
rule. 

When  asked  they  are  obliged  to  admit  that  the  pains 
accompanying  wounds,  bruises,  sprains,  are  the  con- 
comitants of  evils,  alike  to  the  sufferer  and  to  those 
around  him ;  and  that  the  anticipations  of  such  pains 
serve  as  deterrents  from  careless  or  dangerous  acts. 
They  cannot  deny  that  the  tortures  of  burning  or 
scalding,  and  the  miseries  which  intense  cold,  starva- 
tion, and  thirst  produce,  are  indissolubly  connected 
with  permanent  or  temporary  mischiefs,  tending  to  in- 
capacitate one  who  bears  them  for  doing  things  that 
should  be  done,  either  for  his  own  welfare  or  the  welfare 
of  others.  The  agony  of  incipient  suffocation  they  are 
compelled  to  recognize  as  a  safeguard  to  life,  and  must 
allow  that  avoidance  of  it  is  conducive  to  all  that  life 
can  bring  or  achieve.  Nor  will  they  refuse  to  own  that 
one  who  is  chained  in  a  cold,  damp  dungeon,  in  dark- 
ness and  silence,  is  injured  in  health  and  efficiency,  alike 
by  the  positive  pains  thus  inflicted  on  him  and  by  the 
accompanying  negative  pains  due  to  absence  of  light, 
of  freedom,  of  companionship. 

Conversely,  they  do  not  doubt  that  notwithstanding 
occasional  excesses,  the  pleasure  which  accompanies 
the  taking  of  food  goes  along  with  physical  benefit; 
and  that  the  benefit  is  the  greater,  the  keener  the 
satisfaction  of  appetite.  They  have  no  choice  but  to 
acknowledge  that  the  instincts  and  sentiments  which 
so  overpoweringly  prompt  marriage,  and  those  which 
find  their  gratification  in  the  fostering  of  offspring, 
work  out  an  immense  surplus  of  benefit  after  deduct- 


96 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


ing  all  evils.  Nor  dare  they  question  that  the  pleasure 
taken  in  accumulating  property  leaves  a  large  balance 
of  advantage,  private  and  public,  after  making  all 
drawbacks.  Yet  many  and  conspicuous  as  are  the 
cases  in  which  pleasures  and  pains,  sensational  and 
emotional,  serve  as  incentives  to  proper  acts  and  deter- 
rents from  improper  acts,  these  pass  unnoticed :  and 
notice  is  taken  only  of  those  cases  in  which  men  are 
directly  or  indirectly  misled  by  them.  The  well-work- 
ing in  essential  matters  is  ignored ;  and  the  ill-working 
in  unessential  matters  is  alone  recognized. 

Is  it  replied  that  the  more  intense  pains  and  pleas- 
ures, which  have  immediate  reference  to  bodily  needs, 
guide  us  rightly ;  while  the  weaker  pains  and  pleasures, 
not  innnediately  connected  with  the  maintenance  of 
life,  guide  us  wrongly?  Then  the  implication  is  that 
the  system  of  guidance  by  pleasures  and  pains,  which 
has  answered  with  all  types  of  creatures  below  the 
human,  fails  with  the  human.  Or  rather,  the  admis- 
sion being  that  with  manlcind  it  succeeds  in  so  far  as 
fulfilment  of  certain  imperative  wants  goes,  it  fails  in 
respect  of  wants  that  are  not  imperative.  Those  who 
think  this  are  required,  in  the  first  place,  to  show  us 
how  the  line  is  to  be  draAvn  between  the  two;  and 
then  to  show  us  why  the  system  which  succeeds  in  the 
lower  will  not  succeed  in  the  higher. 

§  36.  Doubtless,  however,  after  all  that  has  been 
said,  there  will  be  raised  afresh  the  same  difficulty  — 
there  will  be  instanced  the  mischievous  pleasures  and 
the  beneficent  pains.  Tlie  drunkard,  tlie  gambler,  the 
thief,  who  severally  pursue  gratifications,  will  be 
named  in  proof  that  the  pursuit  of  gratifications  mis- 


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97 


leads ;  while  the  self-sacrificing  relative,  the  worker 
who  perseveres  through  weariness,  the  honest  man  who 
stints  himself  to  pay  his  way,  will  be  named  in  proof 
that  disagreeable  modes  of  consciousness  accompany 
acts  that  are  really  beneficial.  But  after  recalling  the 
fact  pointed  out  in  §  20,  that  this  objection  does  not 
tell  against  guidance  by  pleasures  and  pains  at  large, 
since  it  merely  implies  that  special  and  proximate 
pleasures  and  pains  must  be  disregarded  out  of  consid- 
eration for  remote  and  diffused  pleasures  and  pains ; 
and,  after  admitting  that  in  mankind,  as  at  present 
constituted,  guidance  by  proximate  pleasures  and 
pains  fails  throughout  a  wide  range  of  cases  ;  I  go  on 
to  set  forth  the  interpretation  Biology  gives  of  these 
anomalies,  as  being  not  necessary  and  permanent,  but 
incidental  and  temporary. 

Already,  while  showing  that  among  inferior  crea- 
tures, pleasures  and  pains  have  all  along  guided  the 
conduct  by  which  life  has  been  evolved  and  main- 
tained, I  have  pointed  out  that  since  the  conditions 
of  existence  for  each  species  have  been  occasionally 
changing,  there  have  been  occasionally  arising  partial 
misadjustments  of  the  feelings  to  the  requirements, 
necessitating  readjustments.  This  general  cause  of 
derangement,  operating  on  all  sentient  beings,  has 
been  operating  on  human  beings  in  a  manner  unusuallj^ 
decided,  persistent,  and  involved.  It  needs  but  to  con- 
trast the  mode  of  life  followed  by  primitive  men,  wan- 
dering in  the  forests  and  living  on  wild  food,  with  the 
mode  of  life  followed  by  rustics,  artisans,  traders,  and 
professional  men  in  a  civilized  community,  to  see  that 
the  constitution,  bodily  and  mental,  well  adjusted  to 
the  one,  is  ill  adjusted  to  the  other.    It  needs  but  to 


98 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


observe  the  emotions  kept  awake  in  each  savage  tribe, 
chronically  hostile  to  neighboring  tribes,  and  then  to 
observe  the  emotions  which  peaceful  production  and 
exchange  bring  into  play,  to  see  that  the  two  are  not 
only  unlike,  but  opposed.  And  it  needs  but  to  note 
how,  during  social  evolution,  the  ideas  and  sentiments 
appropriate  to  the  militant  activities  carried  on  by  co- 
ercive co-operation  have  been  at  variance  with  the 
ideas  and  sentiments  appropriate  to  the  industrial  ac- 
tivities carried  on  by  voluntary  co-operation,  to  see 
that  there  has  ever  been  within  each  society,  and  still 
continues,  a  conflict  between  the  two  moral  natures 
adjusted  to  these  two  unlike  modes  of  life.  Mani- 
festly, then,  this  readjustment  of  constitution  to  con- 
ditions, involving  readjustment  of  pleasures  and  pains 
for  guidance,  which  all  creatures  from  time  to  time  un- 
dergo, has  been  in  the  human  race  during  civiliza- 
tion especially  difficult,  not  only  because  of  the  great- 
ness of  the  change  from  small  nomadic  groups  to  vast 
settled  societies,  and  from  predatory  habits  to  peaceful 
habits,  but  also  because  the  old  life  of  enmity  between 
societies  has  been  maintained  along  with  the  new  life 
of  amity  within  each  society.  While  there  co-exist 
two  ways  of  life  so  radically  opposed  as  the  militant 
and  the  industrial,  human  nature  cannot  become 
properly  adapted  to  either. 

That  hence  results  such  failure  of  guidance  by 
pleasures  and  pains  as  is  daily  exhibited,  we  discover 
on  observing  in  what  parts  of  conduct  the  failure  is 
most  conspicuous.  As  above  shown,  the  pleasurable 
and  painful  sensations  are  fairly  well  adjusted  to  the 
peremptory  physical  requirements  ;  the  benefits  of  con- 
forming to  the  sensations  which  prompt  us  in  respect 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


99 


of  nutrition,  respiration,  maintenance  of  temperature, 
etc.,  immensely  exceed  the  incidental  evils,  and  such 
misadjustments  as  occur  may  be  ascribed  to  the  change 
from  the  outdoor  life  of  the  primitive  man  to  the  indoor 
life  which  the  civilized  man  is  often  compelled  to  lead. 
It  is  the  emotional  pleasures  and  pains  which  are  in  so 
considerable  a  degree  out  of  adjustment  to  the  needs  of 
life  as  carried  on  in  society,  and  it  is  of  these  that  the 
readjustment  is  made  in  the  way  above  shown,  so  tardy 
because  so  difficult. 

From  the  biological  point  of  view,  then,  we  see  that 
the  connections  between  pleasure  and  beneficial  action 
and  between  pain  and  detrimental  action,  which  arose 
when  sentient  existence  began,  and  have  continued 
among  animate  creatures  up  to  man,  are  generally  dis- 
played in  him  also  throughout  the  lower  and  more  com- 
pletely organized  part  of  his  nature  ;  and  must  be  more 
and  more  fully  displayed  throughout  the  higher  part  of 
his  nature,  as  fast  as  his  adaptation  to  the  conditions 
of  social  life  increases. 

§  37.  Biology  has  a  further  judgment  to  pass  on  the 
relations  of  pleasures  and  pains  to  welfare.  Beyond 
the  connections  between  acts  beneficial  to  the  organism 
and  the  pleasures  accompanying  performance  of  them, 
and  between  acts  detrimental  to  the  organism  and  the 
pains  causing  desistance  from  them,  there  are  connec- 
tions between  pleasure  in  general  and  physiological 
exaltation,  and  between  pain  in  general  and  physio- 
logical depression.  Every  pleasure  increases  vitalitj' ; 
every  pain  decreases  vitality.  Every  pleasure  raises 
the  tide  of  life ;  every  pain  lowers  the  tide  of  life. 
Let  us  consider,  first,  the  pains. 


100 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


By  the  general  mischiefs  that  result  from  submission 
to  pains,  I  do  not  mean  those  arising  from  the  diffused 
effects  of  local  organic  lesions,  such  as  follow  an  aneu- 
rism caused  by  intense  effort  spite  of  protesting  sensa- 
tions, or  such  as  follow  the  varicose  veins  brought  on 
by  continued  disregard  of  fatigue  in  the  legs,  or  such 
as  follow  the  atrophy  set  up  in  muscles  that  are  per- 
sistently exerted  when  extremely  weary ;  but  I  mean 
the  general  mischiefs  caused  by  that  constitutional  dis- 
turbance which  pain  forthwith  sets  up.  These  are 
conspicuous  when  the  pains  are  acute,  whether  they  be 
sensational  or  emotional. 

Bodily  agony  long  borne  produces  death  by  exhaus- 
tion. More  frequently,  arresting  the  action  of  the 
heart  for  a  time,  it  causes  that  temporary  death  we  call 
fainting.  On  other  occasions  vomiting  is  a  conse- 
quence. And  where  such  manifest  derangements  do 
not  result,  we  still,  in  the  pallor  and  trembling,  trace 
the  general  prostration.  Beyond  the  actual  loss  of  life 
caused  by  subjection  to  intense  cold,  there  are  depres- 
sions of  vitality  less  marked  caused  by  cold  less  extreme 
—  temporary  enfeeblement  following  too  long  an  im- 
mersion in  icy  water ;  enervation  and  pining  away  con- 
sequent on  inadequate  clothing.  Similarly  is  it  with 
submission  to  great  heat:  we  have  lassitude  reaching 
occasionally  to  exhaustion ;  we  have,  in  weak  persons, 
fainting,  succeeded  by  temporary  debilitation ;  and  in 
steaming  tropical  jungles  Europeans  contract  fevers 
which,  when  not  fatal,  often  entail  life-long  incapacities. 
Consider,  again,  the  evils  that  follow  violent  exertion 
continued  in  spite  of  painful  feelings  —  now  a  fatigue 
which  destro3\s  appetite  or  arrests  digestion  if  food  is 
taken,  implying  failure  of  the  reparative  processes  when 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW, 


101 


they  are  most  needed;  and  now  a  prostration  of  the 
heart,  here  histing  for  a  time,  and  there,  where  the 
transgression  has  been  repeated  day  after  day,  made 
permanent :  reducing  the  rest  of  life  to  a  lower  level. 

No  less  conspicuous  are  the  depressing  effects  of 
emotional  pains.  There  are  occasional  cases  of  death 
from  grief;  and  in  other  cases  the  mental  suffering 
which  a  calamity  causes,  like  bodily  suffering,  shows 
its  effects  by  syncope.  Often  a  piece  of  bad  news  is 
succeeded  by  sickness  ;  and  continued  anxiety  will  pro- 
duce loss  of  appetite,  perpetual  indigestion,  and  dimin- 
ished strength.  Excessive  fear,  whether  aroused  by 
physical  or  moral  danger,  will,  in  like  manner,  arrest 
for  a  time  the  processes  of  nutrition ;  and,  not  unfre- 
quently,  in  pregnant  women  brings  on  miscarriage ; 
while,  in  less  extreme  cases,  the  cold  perspiration  and 
unsteady  hands  indicate  a  general  lowering  of  the  vital 
activities,  entailing  partial  incapacity  of  body  or  mind 
or  both.  How  greatly  emotional  pain  deranges  the 
visceral  actions,  is  shown  us  by  the  fact  that  incessant 
worry  is  not  unfrequently  followed  by  jaundice.  And 
here,  indeed,  the  relation  between  cause  and  effect  hap- 
pens to  have  been  proved  by  direct  experiment.  Mak- 
ing such  arrangements  that  the  bile-duct  of  a  dog 
delivered  its  product  outside  the  body,  Claude  Bernard 
observed  that  so  long  as  he  petted  the  dog  and  kept  him 
in  good  spirits,  secretion  w^ent  on  at  its  normal  rate  ; 
but  on  speaking  angrily,  and  for  a  time  so  treating  him 
as  to  produce  depression,  the  flow  of  bile  Avas  arrested. 

Should  it  be  said  that  evil  results  of  such  kinds  are 
proved  to  occur  only  when  the  pains,  bodily  or  mental, 
are  great,  the  reply  is  that  in  healthy  persons  the  injuri- 
ous perturbations  caused  by  small  pains,  though  not 


102 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


easily  traced,  are  still  produced ;  and  that  in  those 
whose  vital  powers  are  much  reduced  by  illness,  slight 
physical  irritations  and  trifling  moral  annoyances  often 
cause  relapses. 

Quite  opposite  are  the  constitutional  effects  of  pleas- 
ure. It  sometimes,  though  rarely,  happens  that  in 
feeble  persons  intense  pleasure  —  pleasure  that  is  almost 
pain  —  gives  a  nervous  shock  that  is  mischievous ;  but 
it  does  not  do  this  in  those  who  are  undebilitated  by 
voluntary  or  enforced  submission  to  actions  injurious 
to  the  organism.  In  the  normal  order,  pleasures,  great 
and  small,  are  stimulants  to  the  processes  by  which  life 
is  maintained. 

Among  the  sensations  may  be  instanced  those  pro- 
duced by  bright  light.  Sunshine  is  enlivening  in  com- 
parison with  gloom  —  even  a  gleam  excites  a  wave  of 
pleasure;  and  experiments  have  shown  that  sunshine 
raises  the  rate  of  respiration ;  raised  respiration  being 
an  index  of  raised  vital  activities  in  general.  A 
warmth  that  is  agreeable  in  degree  favors  the  heart's 
action,  and  furthers  the  various  functions  to  which  this 
is  instrumental.  Though  those  who  are  in  full  vigor 
and  fitly  clothed  can  maintain  their  temperature  in 
winter,  and  can  digest  additional  food  to  make  up  for 
the  loss  of  heat,  it  is  otherwise  with  the  feeble ;  and, 
as  vigor  declines,  the  beneficence  of  warmth  becomes 
conspicuous.  That  benefits  accompany  the  agreeable 
sensations  produced  by  fresh  air,  and  the  agreeable  sen- 
sations that  accompany  muscular  action  after  due  rest, 
and  the  agreeable  sensations  caused  by  rest  after  exer- 
tion, cannot  be  questioned.  Receipt  of  these  pleasures 
conduces  to  the  maintenance  of  the  body  in  fit  condi- 
tion for  all  the  purposes  of  life. 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


103 


More  manifest  still  are  the  physiological  benefits  of 
emotional  pleasures.  Every  power,  bodily  and  mental, 
is  increased  by  ''good  spirits,"  which  is  our  name  for 
a  general  emotional  satisfaction.  The  truth  that  the 
fundamental  vital  actions  —  those  of  nutrition  —  are 
furthered  by  laughter-moving  conversation,  or  rather 
by  the  pleasurable  feeling  causing  laughter,  is  one  of 
old  standing;  and  every  dyspeptic  knows  that  in  ex- 
hilarating company,  a  large  and  varied  dinner,  includ- 
ing not  very  digestible  things,  may  be  eaten  with 
impunity,  and,  indeed,  with  benefit,  while  a  small,  care- 
fully chosen  dinner  of  simple  things,  eaten  in  solitude, 
will  be  followed  by  indigestion.  This  striking  effect 
on  the  alimentary  system  is  accompanied  by  effects, 
equally  certain  though  less  manifest,  on  the  circulation 
and  the  respiration.  Again,  one  who,  released  from 
daily  labors  and  anxieties,  receives  delights  from  fine 
scenery  or  is  enlivened  by  the  novelties  he  sees  abroad, 
comes  back  showing  by  toned-up  face  and  vivacious 
manner,  the  greater  energy  with  which  he  is  prepared 
to  pursue  his  avocation.  Invalids  especially,  on  whose 
narrowed  margin  of  vitality  the  influence  of  conditions 
is  most  visible,  habitually  show  the  benefits  derived 
from  agreeable  states  of  feeling.  A  lively  social  circle, 
the  call  of  an  old  friend,  or  even  removal  to  a  brighter 
room,  will,  by  the  induced  cheerfulness,  much  improve 
the  physical  state.  In  brief,  as  every  medical  man 
knows,  there  is  no  such  tonic  as  happiness. 

These  diffused  physiological  effects  of  pleasures  and 
pains,  which  are  joined  with  the  local  or  special  phj'si- 
ological  effects,  are,  indeed,  obviously  inevitable.  We 
have  seen  (^Principles  of  Psychology^  §§  123-125)  that 
while  craving,  or  negative  pain,  accompanies  the  under- 


104 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


activity  of  an  organ,  and  while  positive  pain  accompanies 
its  over-activity,  pleasure  accompanies  its  normal  activ- 
ity. We  have  seen  that  by  evolution  no  other  relations 
could  be  established ;  since,  through  all  inferior  types 
of  creatures,  if  defect  or  excess  of  function  produced 
no  disagreeable  sentiency,  and  medium  function  no 
agreeable  sentiency,  there  would  be  nothing  to  insure  a 
proportioned  performance  of  function.  And  as  it  is 
one  of  the  laws  of  nervous  action,  that  each  stimulus 
beyond  a  direct  discharge  to  the  particular  organ  acted 
on,  indirectly  causes  a  general  discharge  throughout  the 
nervous  system  (Prm.  of  Psy.^  §§  21,  39),  it  results  that 
the  rest  of  the  organs,  all  influenced  as  they  are  by  the 
nervous  system,  participate  in  the  stimulation.  So  that 
beyond  the  aid,  more  slowly  shown,  which  the  organs 
yield  to  one  another  through  the  physiological  division 
of  labor,  there  is  the  aid,  more  quickly  shown,  which 
mutual  excitation  gives.  While  there  is  a  benefit  to  be 
presently  felt  by  the  whole  organism  from  tlie  due  per- 
formance of  each  function,  there  is  an  immediate  benefit 
from  the  exaltation  of  its  functions  at  large  caused  by 
the  accompanying  pleasure ;  and  from  pains,  whether 
of  excess  or  defect,  there  also  come  these  double  effects, 
immediate  and  remote. 

§  38.  Non-recognition  of  these  general  truths  vitiates 
moral  speculation  at  large.  From  the  estimates  of  right 
and  wrong  habitually  framed,  these  physiological  effects 
wrouglit  on  the  actor  by  liis  feelings  are  entirely  omitted. 
It  is  tacitly  assumed  that  pleasures  and  pains  liave  no 
reactions  on  the  body  of  the  recipient,  affecting  his 
fitness  for  the  duties  of  life.  The  only  reactions  recog- 
nized are  those  on  character;  respecting  wliicli  tlie  cur- 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW, 


105 


rent  supposition  is,  that  acceptance  of  pleasures  is 
detrimental  and  submission  to  pains  beneficial.  The 
notion,  remotely  descended  from  the  ghost-theory  of 
the  savage,  that  mind  and  body  are  independent,  has, 
among  its  various  implications,  this  belief  tliat  states  of 
consciousness  are  in  no  wise  related  to  bodily  states. 

You  have  had  your  gratification  —  it  is  past ;  and  you 
are  as  you  were  before,"  says  the  moralist  to  one.  And 
to  another,  he  says,  "You  have  borne  the  suffering  — 
it  is  over;  and  there  the  matter  ends."  Both  state- 
ments are  false.  Leaving  out  of  view  indirect  results, 
the  direct  results  are  that  the  one  has  moved  a  step 
away  from  death  and  the  other  has  moved  a  step  toward 
death. 

Leaving  out  of  view,  I  say,  the  indirect  results.  It 
is  these  indirect  results,  here  for  the  moment  left  out  of 
view,  which  the  moralist  has  exclusively  in  view,  being 
so  occupied  by  them  that  he  ignores  the  direct  results. 
The  gratification,  perhaps  purchased  at  undue  cost,  per- 
haps enjoyed  when  work  should  have  been  done,  perhaps 
snatched  from  the  rightful  claimant,  is  considered  only 
in  relation  to  remote  injurious  effects,  and  no  set-off  is 
made  for  immediate  beneficial  effects.  Conversely,  from 
positive  and  negative  pains,  borne  now  in  the  pursuit  of 
some  future  advantage,  now  in  discharge  of  responsi- 
bilities, now  in  performing  a  generous  act,  the  distant 
good  is  alone  dwelt  on,  and  the  proximate  evil  ignored. 
Consequences,  pleasurable  and  painful,  experienced  by 
the  actor  forthwith,  are  of  no  importance ;  and  they 
become  of  importance  only  when  anticipated  as  occur- 
ring hereafter  to  the  actor  or  to  other  persons.  And 
further,  future  evils  borne  by  the  actor  are  considered 
of  no  account  if  they  result  from  self-denial,  and  are 


106 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


emphasized  only  when  they  result  from  self-gratifica- 
tion. Obviously,  estimates  so  framed  are  erroneous; 
and  obviously,  the  pervading  judgments  of  conduct 
based  on  such  estimates  must  be  distorted.  Mark  the 
anomalies  of  opinion  produced. 

If,  as  the  sequence  of  a  malady  contracted  in  pursuit 
of  illegitimate  gratification,  an  attack  of  iritis  injures 
vision,  the  mischief  is  to  be  counted  among  those 
entailed  by  immoral  conduct ;  but  if,  regardless  of  pro- 
testing sensations,  the  eyes  are  used  in  study  too  soon 
after  ophthalmia,  and  there  follows  blindness  for  years 
or  for  life,  entailing  not  only  personal  unhappiness,  but 
a  burden  on  others,  moralists  are  silent.  The  broken 
leg  which  a  drunkard's  accident  causes  counts  among 
those  miseries  brought  on  self  and  family  by  intemper- 
ance, which  form  the  ground  for  reprobating  it ;  but  if 
anxiety  to  fulfil  duties  prompts  the  continued  use  of  a 
sprained  knee  spite  of  the  pain,  and  brings  on  a  chronic 
lameness  involving  lack  of  exercise,  consequent  ill- 
health,  inefficiency,  anxiety,  and  unhappiness,  it  is  sup- 
posed that  ethics  has  no  verdict  to  give  in  the  matter. 
A  student  who  is  plucked  because  he  has  spent  in 
amusement  the  time  and  money  that  should  have  gone 
in  study,  is  blamed  for  thus  making  parents  unhappy 
and  preparing  for  himself  a  miserable  future ;  but 
another  who,  thinking  exclusively  of  claims  on  him, 
reads  night  after  night  with  liot  or  aching  head,  and 
breaking  down,  cannot  take  his  degree,  but  returns 
home  shattered  in  health  and  unable  to  support  him- 
self, is  named  with  pity  only,  as  not  subject  to  any 
moral  judgment ;  or  rather,  the  moral  judgment  passed  is 
wholly  favorable. 

Thus  recognizing  the  evils  caused  by  some  kinds  of 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


107 


conduct  only,  men  at  large,  and  moralists  as  exponents 
of  their  beliefs,  ignore  the  suffering  and  death  daily 
caused  around  them  by  disregard  of  that  guidance 
which  has  established  itself  in  the  course  of  evolution. 
Led  by  the  tacit  assumption  common  to  Pagan  stoics 
and  Christian  ascetics,  tliat  we  are  so  diabolically  or- 
ganized that  pleasures  are  injurious  and  pains  benefi- 
cial, people  on  all  sides  yield  examples  of  lives  blasted 
by  persisting  in  actions  against  which  their  sensations 
rebel.  Here  is  one  who,  drenched  to  the  skin  and  sit- 
ting in  a  cold  wind,  pooh-hoohs  his  shiverings  and  gets 
rheumatic  fever,  with  subsequent  heart-disease,  which 
makes  worthless  the  short  life  remaining  to  him.  Here 
is  another  who,  disregarding  painful  feelings,  works 
too  soon  after  a  debilitating  illness,  and  establishes  dis- 
ordered health  that  lasts  for  the  rest  of  his  days,  and 
makes  him  useless  to  himself  and  others.  Now  the 
account  is  of  a  youth  Avho,  persisting  in  gymnastic 
feats  spite  of  scarcely  bearable  straining,  bursts  a 
blood-vessel,  and,  long  laid  on  the  shelf,  is  permanently 
damaged ;  while  now  it  is  of  a  man  in  middle  life  who, 
pushing  muscular  effort  to  painful  excess,  suddenly 
brings  on  hernia.  In  this  family  is  a  case  of  aphasia, 
spreading  paralysis  and  death,  caused  by  eating  too 
little  and  doing  too  much;  in  that,  softening  of  the 
brain  has  been  brought  on  by  ceaseless  mental  efforts 
against  which  the  feelings  hourly  protested;  and  in 
others,  less  serious  brain  affections  have  been  con- 
tracted by  over-study  continued  regardless  of  discom- 
fort and  the  cravings  for  fresh  air  and  exercise.^  Even 
without  accumulating  special  examples,  the  truth  is 

1  I  can  count  up  more  than  a  dozen  such  cases  among  those  per- 
sonaUy  weU  known  to  me. 


108 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


forced  on  us  by  the  visible  traits  of  classes.  Tlie  care- 
worn man  of  business  too  long  at  his  office,  the  cadav- 
erous barrister  poring  half  the  night  over  his  briefs, 
the  feeble  factory  hands  and  unhealthy  seamstresses 
passing  long  hours  in  bad  air,  the  anaemic,  flat-chested 
schoolgirls,  bending  over  many  lessons  and  forbidden 
boisterous  play,  no  less  than  Sheffield  grinders  who  die 
of  suffocating  dust,  and  peasants  crippled  with  rheu- 
matism due  to  exposure,  show  us  the  wide-spread  mis- 
eries caused  by  persevering  in  actions  repugnant  to  the 
sensations  and  neglecting  actions  which  the  sensations 
prompt.  Nay,  the  evidence  is  still  more  extensive  and 
conspicuous.  What  are  the  puny  malformed  children, 
seen  in  poverty-stricken  districts,  but  children  whose 
appetites  for  food  and  desires  for  warmth  have  not  been 
adequately  satisfied?  What  are  populations  stinted  in 
growth  and  prematurely  aged,  such  as  parts  of  France 
show  us,  but  populations  injured  by  work  in  excess  and 
food  in  defect:  the  one  implying  positive  pain,  the 
other  negative  pain  ?  What  is  the  implication  of  that 
greater  mortality  which  occurs  among  people  who  are 
weakened  by  privations,  unless  it  is  that  bodily  miseries 
conduce  to  fatal  illnesses  ?  Or,  once  more,  what  must 
we  infer  from  the  frightful  amount  of  disease  and  death 
suffered  by  armies  in  the  field,  fed  on  scanty  and  bad 
provisions,  lying  on  damp  ground,  exposed  to  extremes 
of  heat  and  cold,  inadequately  sheltered  from  rain,  and 
subject  to  exhausting  efforts ;  unless  it  be  the  terrible 
mischiefs  caused  by  continuously  subjecting  the  body 
to  treatment  which  the  feelings  protest  against? 

It  matters  not  to  the  argument,  whether  the  actions 
entailing  such  effects  are  voluntary  or  involuntary.  It 
matters  not  from  the  biological  point  of  view,  whether 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


109 


the  motives  prompting  them  are  high  or  low.  The 
vital  functions  accept  no  apologies  on  the  ground  tliat 
neglect  of  them  was  unavoidable,  or  that  the  reason 
for  neglect  was  noble.  The  direct  and  indirect  suffer- 
ings caused  by  non-conformity  to  the  laws  of  life  are 
the  same,  Avliatever  induces  the  non-conformity;  and 
cannot  be  omitted  in  any  rational  estimate  of  conduct. 
If  the  purpose  of  ethical  inquiry  is  to  establish  rules  of 
right  living  :  and  if  the  rules  of  right  living  are  those 
of  which  the  total  results,  individual  and  general,  direct 
and  indirect,  are  most  conducive  to  human  happiness  ; 
then  it  is  absurd  to  ignore  the  immediate  results  and 
recognize  only  the  remote  results. 

§  39.  Here  might  be  urged  the  necessity  for  prelud- 
ing the  study  of  moral  science  by  the  study  of  biologi- 
cal science.  Here  might  be  dwelt  on  the  error  men 
make  in  thinking  they  can  understand  those  special 
phenomena  of  human  life  with  which  Ethics  deals, 
while  paying  little  or  no  attention  to  the  general  phe- 
nomena of  human  life,  and  wliile  utterly  ignoring  the 
phenomena  of  life  at  large.  And,  doubtless,  there 
would  be  truth  in  the  inference  that  such  acquaintance 
with  the  world  of  living  things,  as  discloses  the  part 
which  pleasures  and  pains  have  played  in  organic  evo- 
lution, would  help  to  rectify  these  one-sided  concep- 
tions of  moralists.  It  cannot  be  held,  however,  that 
lack  of  this  knowledge  is  the  sole  cause,  or  the  main 
cause,  of  their  one-sidedness.  For  facts  of  the  kind 
above  instanced,  which,  duly  attended  to,  would  pre- 
vent such  distortions  of  moral  theory,  are  facts  which 
it  needs  no  biological  inquiries  to  learn,  but  which 
are  daily  thrust  before  the  eyes  of  all.    The  truth  is. 


110 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


rather,  that  the  general  consciousness  is  so  possessed 
by  sentiments  and  ideas  at  variance  with  the  conclu- 
sions necessitated  by  familiar  evidence,  that  the  evidence 
gets  no  attention.  These  adverse  sentiments  and  ideas 
have  several  roots. 

There  is  the  theological  root.  As  before  shown,  from 
the  worship  of  cannibal  ancestors  who  delighted  in  wit- 
nessing tortures,  there  resulted  the  primitive  conception 
of  deities  who  were  propitiated  by  the  bearing  of  pains, 
and,  consequently,  angered  by  the  receipt  of  pleasures. 
Through  the  religions  of  the  semi-civilized,  in  which 
this  conception  of  the  divine  nature  remains  conspicu- 
ous, it  has  persisted,  in  progressively  modified  forms, 
down  to  our  own  times ;  and  still  colors  the  beliefs, 
both  of  those  who  adhere  to  the  current  creed  and  of 
those  who  nominally  reject  it. 

There  is  another  root  in  the  primitive  and  still-sur- 
viving militancy.  While  social  antagonisms  continue 
to  generate  war,  which  consists  in  endeavors  to  inflict 
pain  and  death  while  submitting  to  the  risks  of  pain 
and  death,  and  which  necessarily  involves  great  priva- 
tions, it  is  needful  that  physical  suffering,  whether  con- 
sidered in  itself  or  in  the  evils  it  bequeaths,  should  be 
thought  little  of,  and  that  among  pleasures  recognized 
as  most  worthy  should  be  those  which  victory  brings. 

Nor  does  partially  developed  industrialism  fail  to  fur- 
nish a  root.  With  social  evolution,  which  implies  tran- 
sition from  the  life  of  wandering  hunters  to  the  life  of 
settled  peoples  engaged  in  labor,  and  which  therefore 
entails  activities  widely  unlike  those  to  which  the  abo- 
riginal constitution  is  adapted,  there  comes  an  under 
exercise  of  faculties  for  wliich  the  social  state  affords  no 
scope,  and  an  over-taxing  of  faculties  required  for  the 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW, 


111 


social  state ;  the  one  implying  denial  of  certain  pleas- 
ures, and  the  other  submission  to  certain  pains.  Hence, 
along  with  that  growth  of  population  which  makes  the 
struggle  for  existence  intense,  bearing  of  pains  and  sac- 
rifice of  pleasures  is  daily  necessitated. 

Now,  always  and  everywhere,  there  arises  among  men 
a  theory  conforming  to  their  practice.  The  savage 
nature,  originating  the  conception  of  a  savage  deity, 
evolves  a  theory  of  supernatural  control  sufficiently 
stringent  and  cruel  to  influence  his  conduct.  With  sub- 
mission to  despotic  government  severe  enough  in  its 
restraints  to  keep  in  order  barbarous  natures,  there 
grows  up  a  theory  of  divine  right  to  rule,  and  the  duty 
of  absolute  submission.  Where  war  is  made  the  busi- 
ness of  life  by  the  existence  of  warlike  neighbors,  vir- 
tues which  are  required  for  war  come  to  be  regarded  as 
supreme  virtues ;  while,  contrariwise,  when  industrial- 
ism has  grown  predominant,  the  violence  and  the  decep- 
tion which  warriors  glory  in  come  to  be  held  criminal. 
In  like  manner,  then,  there  arises  a  tolerable  adjustment 
of  the  actually  accepted  (not  the  nominally  accepted) 
theory  of  right  living,  to  living  as  it  is  daily  carried  on. 
If  the  life  is  one  that  necessitates  habitual  denial  of 
pleasures  and  bearing  of  pains,  there  grows  up  an  an- 
swering ethical  system  under  which  the  receipt  of  pleas- 
ures is  tacitly  disapproved  and  the  bearing  of  pains 
avowedly  approved.  The  mischiefs  entailed  by  pleas- 
ures in  excess  are  dwelt  on,  while  the  benefits  which 
normal  pleasures  bring  are  ignored ;  and  the  good  re- 
sults achieved  by  submission  to  pains  are  fully  set  forth, 
while  the  evils  are  overlooked. 

But  while  recognizing  the  desirableness  of,  and  indeed 
the  necessity  for,  systems  of  ethics  adapted,  like  reli- 


112 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


gious  systems  and  political  systems,  to  their  respective 
times  and  places,  we  have  here  to  regard  the  first  as, 
like  the  others,  transitional.  We  must  infer  that  like 
a  purer  creed  and  a  better  government,  a  truer  ethics 
belongs  to  a  more  advanced  social  state. 

Led,  d  jjriori^  to  conclude  that  distortions  must  exist, 
we  are  enabled  to  recognize  as  such  'the  distortions  we 
find :  answering  in  nature,  as  these  do,  to  expectation. 
And  there  is  forced  on  us  the  truth  that  a  scientific 
morality  arises  only  as  fast  as  the  one-sided  conceptions 
adapted  to  transitory  conditions  are  developed  into  both- 
sided  conceptions.  The  science  of  right  living  has  to 
take  account  of  all  consequences  in  so  far  as  they  affect 
happiness,  personally  or  socially,  directly  or  indirectly ; 
and  by  as  much  as  it  ignores  any  class  of  consequences, 
by  so  much  does  it  fail  to  be  science. 

§  40.  Like  the  physical  view,  then,  the  biological 
view  corresponds  with  the  view  gained  by  looking  at 
conduct  in  general  from  the  standpoint  of  Evolution. 

That  which  was  physically  defined  as  a  moving 
equilibrium,  we  define  biologically  as  a  balance  of 
functions.  The  implication  of  such  a  balance  is  that 
the  several  functions,  in  their  kinds,  amounts,  and  com- 
binations, are  adjusted  to  tlie  several  activities  which 
maintain  and  constitute  complete  life;  and  to  be  so 
adjusted  is  to  have  reached  the  goal  toward  which  the 
evolution  of  conduct  continually  tends. 

Passing  to  the  feelings  which  accompany  the  per- 
formance of  functions,  we  see  that  of  necessity  during 
the  evolution  of  organic  life,  pleasures  have  become 
the  concomitants  of  normal  amounts  of  functions,  while 
pains,  positive  and  negative,  have  become  the  concomi- 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


113 


tants  of  excesses  and  defects  of  functions.  And  though 
in  every  species  derangements  of  these  relations  are 
often  caused  by  changes  of  conditions,  they  ever  re- 
establish themselves :  disappearance  of  the  species  being 
the  alternative. 

Mankind,  inheriting  from  creatures  of  lower  kinds, 
such  adjustments  between  feelings  and  functions  as 
concern  fundamental  bodily  requirements ;  and  daily 
forced  by  peremptory  feelings  to  do  the  things  which 
maintain  life,  and  avoid  those  which  bring  immediate 
death ;  has  been  subject  to  a  change  of  conditions 
unusually  great  and  involved.  This  has  considerably 
deranged  the  guidance  by  sensations,  and  has  deranged 
in  a  much  greater  degree  the  guidance  by  emotions. 
The  result  is  that  in  many  cases  pleasures  are  not  con- 
nected with  actions  which  must  be  performed,  nor  pains 
with  actions  which  must  be  avoided,  but  contrariwise. 

Several  influences  have  conspired  to  make  men  ignore 
the  well-woi^king  of  these  relations  between  feelings  and 
functions,  and  to  observe  whatever  of  ill-working  is 
seen  in  them.  Hence,  while  the  evils  which  some 
pleasures  entail  are  dilated  upon,  the  benefits  habitually 
accompanying  receipt  of  pleasures  are  unnoticed ;  at  the 
same  time  that  the  benefits  achieved  through  certain 
pains  are  magnified,  while  the  immense  mischiefs  wliich 
pains  bring  are  made  little  of. 

The  ethical  theories  characterized  by  these  perver- 
sions are  products  of,  and  are  appropriate  to,  the  forms 
of  social  life  which  the  imperfectly  adapted  constitu- 
tions of  men  produce.  But  with  the  progress  of 
adaptation,  bringing  faculties  and  requirements  into 
harmony,  such  incongruities  of  experience,  and  conse- 
quent distortions  of  theory,  must  diminish ;  until,  along 


114 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


Avith  complete  adjustment  of  humanity  to  the  social 
state,  will  go  recognition  of  the  truths  that  actions  are 
completely  right  only  when,  besides  being  conducive 
to  future  happiness,  special  and  general,  they  are  im- 
mediately pleasurable,  and  that  painfulness,  not  only 
ultimate  but  proximate,  is  the  concomitant  of  actions 
which  are  wrong. 

So  that  from  the  biological  point  of  view,  ethical 
science  becomes  a  specification  of  the  conduct  of  asso- 
ciated men  who  are  severally  so  constituted  that  the 
various  self-preserving  activities,  the  activities  required 
for  rearing  offspring,  and  those  which  social  welfare 
demands,  are  fulfilled  in  the  spontaneous  exercise  of 
duly  proportioned  faculties,  each  yielding  when  in 
action  its  quantum  of  pleasure,  and  who  are,  by  con- 
sequence, so  constituted  that  excess  or  defect  in  any 
one  of  these  actions  brings  its  quantum  of  pain,  imme- 
diate and  remote. 

Note  to  §  34.  —  In  his  Physical  Ethics,  Mr.  Alfred  Barratt  has  ex- 
pressed a  view  which  here  calls  for  notice.  Postulating  Evolution 
and  its  general  laws,  he  refers  to  certain  passages  in  the  Principles  of 
Psychology  (1st  ed.,  Pt.  III.  ch.  viii.  pp.  395,  sqq. ;  cf.  Pt.  lY.  ch.  iv.) 
in  which  I  have  treated  of  the  relation  between  irritation  and  con- 
traction which  marks  the  dawn  of  sensitive  life;"  have  pointed  out 
that  the  primordial  tissue  must  be  differently  alfected  by  contact 
with  nutritive  and  with  innutritive  matters"  — the  two  being  for 
aquatic  creatures  respectively  tlie  soluble  and  the  insoluble;  and 
have  argued  that  the  contraction  by  which  a  protruded  part  of  a 
rhizopod  draws  in  a  fragment  of  assimilable  matter  'Ms  caused  by 
a  commencing  absorption  of  the  assimilable  matter."  Mr.  Barratt, 
holding  that  consciousness  ^'must  be  considered  as  an  invariable 
property  of  animal  life,  and  ultimately,  in  its  elements,  of  the  mate- 
rial universe  "  (p.  43),  regards  these  responses  of  animal  tissue  to 
stimuli,  as  implying  feeling  of  one  or  other  kind.  **Some  kinds  of 
impressed  force,"  he  says,  "are  followed  by  movements  of  retrac- 
tion and  withdrawal,  others  by  such  as  secure  a  continuance  of  the 


THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


115 


impression.  These  two  kinds  of  contraction  are  the  phenomena  and 
external  marks  of  pain  and  pleasure  respectively.  Hence  the  tissue 
acts  so  as  to  secure  pleasure  and  avoid  pain  by  a  law  as  truly  physical 
and  natural  as  that  whereby  a  needle  turns  to  the  pole,  or  a  tree  to 
the  light  "  (p.  52).  Not  without  questioning  that  the  raw  material  of 
consciousness  is  present  even  in  undifferentiated  protoplasm,  and 
everywhere  exists  potentially  in  that  Unknowable  Power  which, 
otherwise  conditioned,  is  manifested  in  physical  action  {Prin.  of  Psy., 
§§  272,  273),  1  demur  to  the  conclusion  that  it  at  first  exists  under  the 
forms  of  pleasure  and  pain.  These,  I  conceive,  arise,  as  the  more 
special  feelings  do,  by  a  compounding  of  the  ultimate  elements  of 
consciousness  {Prin.  of  Psy.,  §§  60,  61) :  being,  indeed,  general  aspects 
of  these  more  special  feelings  when  they  reach  certain  intensities. 
Considering  that  even  in  creatures  which  have  developed  nervous  sys- 
tems, a  great  part  of  the  vital  processes  are  carried  on  by  unconscious 
reflex  actions,  I  see  no  propriety  in  assuming  the  existence  of  what 
we  understand  by  consciousness  in  creatures  not  only  devoid  of  nerv- 
ous systems  but  devoid  of  structures  in  general. 

Note  to  §  37.  — More  than  once  in  the  Emotions  and  the  Will,  Dr. 
Bain  insists  on  the  connection  between  pleasure  and  exaltation  of 
vitality,  and  the  connection  between  pain  and  depression  of  vitality. 
As  above  shown,  I  concur  in  the  view  taken  by  him;  which  is,  in- 
deed, put  beyond  dispute  by  general  experience  as  well  as  by  the  more 
special  experience  of  medical  men. 

When,  however,  from  the  invigorating  and  relaxing  effects  of 
pleasure  and  pain  respectively,  Dr.  Bain  derives  the  original  tenden- 
cies to  persist  in  acts,  which  give  pleasure  and  to  desist  from  those 
which  give  pain,  I  find  myself  unable  to  go  with  him.  He  says: 
*'We  suppose  movements  spontaneously  begun,  and  accidentally 
causing  pleasure :  we  then  assume  that  with  the  pleasure  there  will 
be  an  increase  of  vital  energy,  in  which  increase  the  fortunate  move- 
ments wdll  share,  and  thereby  increase  the  pleasure.  Or,  on  the 
other  hand,  we  suppose  the  spontaneous  movements  to  give  pain, 
and  assume  that,  with  the  pain,  there  will  be  a  decrease  of  energy, 
extending  to  the  movements  that  cause  the  evil,  and  thereby  provid- 
ing a  remedy  "  (3d  ed.,  p.  315).  This  interpretation,  implying  that 
**the  fortunate  movements"  merely  share  in  the  effects  of  aug- 
mented vital  energy  caused  by  the  pleasure,  does  not  seem  to  me  con- 
gruous with  observation.  The  truth  appears  rather  to  be  that  though 
there  is  a  concomitant  general  increase  of  muscular  tone,  the  muscles 
specially  excited  are  those  which,  by  their  increased  contraction,  con- 
duce to  increased  pleasure.    Conversely,  the  implication  that  desist- 


116 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


ance  from  spontaneous  movements  ^vhich  cause  pain,  is  due  to  a 
general  muscular  relaxation  shared  in  by  the  muscles  causing  these 
particular  movements,  seems  to  me  at  variance  with  the  fact  that  the 
retractation  commonly  takes  the  form  not  of  a  passive  lapse  but  of 
an  active  withdrawal.  Further,  it  may  be  remarked  that  depressing 
as  pain  eventually  is  to  the  system  at  large,  we  cannot  say  that  it  at 
once  depresses  the  muscular  energies.  Not  simply,  as  Dr.  Bain  ad- 
mits, does  an  acute  smart  produce  spasmodic  movements,  but  pains 
of  all  kinds,  both  sensational  and  emotional,  stimulate  the  muscles 
{Essays,  1st  series,  p.  360,  1;  or  2d  ed.  vol.  i.  p.  211,  12).  Pain, 
however  (and  also  pleasure  when  very  intense),  simultaneously  has 
an  inhibitory  effect  on  all  the  reflex  actions;  and  as  the  vital  functions 
in  general  are  carried  on  by  reflex  actions,  this  inhibition,  increasing 
with  the  intensity  of  the  pain,  proportionately  depresses  the  vital 
functions.  Arrest  of  the  heart's  action  and  fainting  is  an  extreme 
result  of  this  inhibition;  and  the  viscera  at  large  feel  its  effects  in 
degrees  proportioned  to  the  degrees  of  pain.  Pain,  therefore,  while 
directly  causing  a  discharge  of  muscular  energy  as  pleasure  does, 
eventually  lowers  muscular  power  by  lowering  those  vital  processes 
on  which  the  supply  of  energy  depends.  Hence  we  cannot,  I  think, 
ascribe  the  prompt  desistance  from  muscular  movements  causing 
pain,  to  decrease  in  the  flow  of  energy  ;  for  this  decrease  is  felt  only 
after  an  interval.  Conversely,  we  cannot  ascribe  the  persistence  in 
a  muscular  act  which  yields  pleasure,  to  the  resulting  exaltation  of 
energy;  but  must,  as  indicated  in  §  34,  ascribe  it  to  the  establish- 
ment of  lines  of  discharge  between  the  place  of  pleasurable  stimula- 
tion and  those  contractile  structures  which  maintain  and  increase 
the  act  causing  the  stimulation  —  connections  allied  with  the  reflex, 
into  which  they  pass  by  insensible  gradations. 


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117 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW. 

§  41.  The  last  chapter,  in  so  far  as  it  dealt  with  feel- 
ings in  their  relations  to  conduct,  recognized  only  their 
physiological  aspects :  their  psychological  aspects  were 
passed  over.  In  this  chapter,  conversely,  we  are  not 
concerned  with  the  constitutional  connections  between 
feelings,  as  incentives  or  deterrents,  and  physical  bene- 
fits to  be  gained,  or  mischiefs  to  be  avoided ;  nor  with 
the  reactive  effects  of  feelings  on  the  state  of  the  organ- 
ism, as  fitting  or  unfitting  it  for  future  action.  Here 
we  have  to  consider  represented  pleasures  and  pains, 
sensational  and  emotional,  as  constituting  deliberate 
motives  —  as  forming  factors  in  the  conscious  adjust- 
ments of  acts  to  ends. 

§  42.  The  rudimentary  psychical  act,  not  yet  differ- 
entiated from  a  physical  act,  implies  an  excitation  and 
a  motion.  In  a  creature  of  low  type  the  touch  of  food 
excites  prehension.  In  a  somewhat  higher  creature 
the  odor  from  nutritive  matter  sets  up  motion  of  the 
body  toward  the  matter.  And  Avhere  rudimentary 
vision  exists,  sudden  obscuration  of  light,  implying  the 
passage  of  something  large,  causes  convulsive  muscular 
movements  which  mostly  carry  the  body  away  from 
the  source  of  danger.  In  each  of  these  cases  we  may 
distinguish  four  factors.    There  is  (a)  that  property  of 


118 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


the  external  object  which  primarily  affects  the  organ- 
ism—  the  taste,  smell,  or  opacity;  and  connected  with 
such  property  there  is  in  the  external  object  that  charac- 
ter (J)  which  renders  seizure  of  it,  or  escape  from  it, 
beneficial.  Within  the  organism  there  is  (^c)  the  im- 
pression or  sensation  which  the  property  (a)  produces, 
serving  as  stimulus ;  and  there  is  connected  with  it,  the 
motor  change  (c?)  by  which  seizure  or  escape  is  effected. 

Now  Psychology  is  chiefly  concerned  Avith  the  con- 
nection between  the  relation  a  6,  and  the  relation  c  c?, 
under  all  those  forms  which  they  assume  in  the  course 
of  evolution.  Each  of  the  factors,  and  each  of  the 
relations,  grows  more  involved  as  organization  advances. 
Instead  of  being  single,  the  identifying  attribute  a 
often  becomes,  in  the  environment  of  a  superior  animal, 
a  cluster  of  attributes;  such  as  the  size,  form,  colors, 
motions,  displayed  by  a  distant  creature  that  is  danger- 
ous. The  factor  5,  with  which  this  combination  of 
attributes  is  associated,  becomes  the  congeries  of  char- 
acters, powers,  habits,  which  constitute  it  an  enemy. 
Of  the  subjective  factors,  c  becomes  a  complicated  set  of 
visual  sensations  co-ordinated  with  one  another  and 
with  the  ideas  and  feelings  established  by  experience 
of  such  enemies,  and  constituting  the  motive  to  escape ; 
while  d  becomes  the  intricate  and  often  prolonged 
series  of  runs,  leaps,  doubles,  dives,  etc.,  made  in  elud- 
ing the  enemy. 

In  human  life  we  find  the  same  four  outer  and  inner 
factors,  still  more  multiform  and  entangled  in  their 
compositions  and  connections.  The  entire  assemblage 
of  physical  attributes  a,  presented  by  an  estate  that  is 
advertised  for  sale,  passes  enumeration ;  and  the  assem- 
blage of  various  utilities,  6,  going  along  with  these 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


119 


attributes,  is  also  beyond  brief  specification.  The  per- 
ceptions and  ideas,  likes  and  dislikes,  (?,  set  up  by  the 
aspect  of  the  estate,  and  which,  compounded  and  re- 
compounded,  eventually  form  the  motive  for  buying  it, 
make  a  whole  too  large  and  complex  for  description ; 
and  the  transactions,  legal,  pecuniary,  and  other,  gone 
through  in  making  the  purchase  and  taking  possession, 
are  scarcely  less  numerous  and  elaborate. 

Nor  must  we  overlook  the  fact  that  as  evolution 
progresses,  not  only  do  the  factors  increase  in  com- 
plexity, but  also  the  relations  among  them.  Originally, 
a  is  directly  and  simply  connected  with  5,  while  c  is 
directly  and  simply  connected  with  d.  But  eventually, 
the  connections  between  a  and  5,  and  between  c  and  c?, 
become  very  indirect  and  involved.  On  the  one  hand, 
as  the  first  illustration  shows  us,  sapidity  and  nutritive- 
ness  are  closely  bound  together  ;  as  are  also  the  stimu- 
lation caused  by  the  one,  and  the  contraction  which 
utilizes  the  other.  But,  as  we  see  in  the  last  illustra- 
tion, the  connection  between  the  visible  traits  of  an 
estate  and  those  characters  which  constitute  its  value, 
is  at  once  remote  and  complicated ;  while  the  transi- 
tion from  the  purchaser's  highly  composite  motive  to 
the  numerous  actions  of  sensory  and  motor  organs, 
severally  intricate,  which  effect  the  purchase,  is  through 
an  entangled  plexus  of  thoughts  and  feelings  constitut- 
ing his  decision. 

After  this  explanation  will  be  apprehended  a  truth 
otherwise  set  forth  in  the  Principles  of  Psychology. 
Mind  consists  of  feelings,  and  the  relations  among 
feelings.  By  composition  of  the  relations,  and  ideas 
of  relations,  intelligence  arises.  By  composition  of  the 
feelings,  and  ideas  of  feelings,  emotion  arises.  And, 


120 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


other  things  equal,  the  evolution  of  either  is  great  in 
proportion  as  the  composition  is  great.  One  of  the 
necessary  implications  is  that  cognition  becomes  higher 
in  proportion  as  it  is  remoter  from  reflex  action ;  while 
emotion  becomes  higher  in  proportion  as  it  is  remoter 
from  sensation. 

And  now  of  the  various  corollaries  from  this  broad 
view  of  psychological  evolution,  let  us  observe  those 
which  concern  the  motives  and  actions  that  are  classed 
as  moral  and  immoral. 

§  43.  The  mental  process  by  which,  in  any  case,  the 
adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  is  effected,  and  wliich,  under 
its  higher  forms,  becomes  the  subject-matter  of  ethical 
judgments,  is,  as  above  implied,  divisible  into  the  rise  of 
a  feeling  or  feelings  constituting  the  motive,  and  the 
thought  or  thoughts  through  which  the  motive  is 
shaped  and  finally  issues  in  action.  The  first  of  these 
elements,  originally  an  excitement,  becomes  a  simple 
sensation ;  then  a  compound  sensation ;  then  a  cluster 
of  partially  presentative  and  partially  representative 
sensations,  forming  an  incipient  emotion  ;  then  a  clus- 
ter of  exclusively  ideal  or  representative  sensations, 
forming  an  emotion  proper;  then  a  cluster  of  such  clus- 
ters, forming  a  compound  emotion ;  and  eventually  be- 
comes a  still  more  involved  emotion  composed  of  the 
ideal  forms  of  such  compound  emotions.  The  other 
element,  beginning  with  that  immediate  passage  of  a 
single  stimulus  into  a  single  motion,  called  reflex 
action,  presently  comes  to  be  a  set  of  associated  dis- 
charges of  stimuli  producing  associated  motions,  con- 
stituting instinct.  Step  by  step  arise  more  entangled 
combinations  of  stimuli,  somewhat  variable  in  their 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  121 
% 

n  odes  of  union,  leading  to  complex  motions  similarly 
variable  in  their  adjustments  ;  whence  occasional  hesi- 
tations in  the  sensori-motor  processes.  Presently  is 
reached  a  stage  at  which  the  combined  clusters  of  im- 
pressions, not  all  present  together,  issue  in  actions  not 
all  simultaneous :  implying  representation  of  results, 
or  thought.  Afterward  follow  stages  in  which  various 
thoughts  have  time  to  pass  before  the  composite  motives 
produce  the  appropriate  actions.  Until  at  last  arise 
those  long  deliberations  during  which  the  probabilities 
of  various  consequences  are  estimated,  and  the  prompt- 
ings of  the  correlative  feelings  balanced,  constituting 
calm  judgment.  That  under  either  of  its  aspects,  the 
later  forms  of  this  mental  process  are  the  higher,  ethi- 
cally considered  as  well  as  otherwise  considered,  will 
be  readily  seen. 

For,  from  the  first,  complication  of  sentiency  has 
accompanied  better  and  more  numerous  adjustments  of 
acts  to  ends ;  as  also  has  complication  of  movement, 
and  complication  of  the  co-ordinating  or  intellectual 
process  uniting  the  two.  Whence  it  follows  that  the 
acts  characterized  by  the  more  complex  motives  and 
the  more  involved  thoughts,  have  all  along  been  of 
higher  authority  for  guidance.  Some  examples  will 
make  this  clear. 

Here  is  an  aquatic  creature  guided  by  the  odor  of 
organic  matter  toward  things  serving  for  food;  but  a 
creature  which,  lacl^ing  any  other  guidance,  is  at  the 
mercy  of  larger  creatures  coming  near.  Here  is  an- 
other which,  also  guided  to  food  by  odor,  possesses 
rudimentary  vision ;  and  so  is  made  to  start  spasmod- 
ically away  from  a  moving  body  which  diffuses  this 
odor,  in  those  cases  where  it  is  large  enougli  to  produce 


122 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


sudden  obscuration  of  light  —  usually  an  enemy.  Evi- 
dently life  will  frequently  be  saved  by  conforming  to 
the  later  and  higher  stimulus,  instead  of  to  the  earlier 
and  lower. 

Observe  at  a  more  advanced  stage  a  parallel  conflict. 
This  is  a  beast  which  pursues  others  for  prey,  and, 
either  lacking  experience  or  prompted  by  raging  hun- 
ger, attacks  one  more  powerful  than  itself,  and  gets 
destroyed.  Conversely,  that  is  a  beast  which,  prompted 
by  a  hunger  equally  keen,  but  either  by  individual  ex- 
perience, or  effects  of  inherited  experience,  made  con- 
scious of  evil  by  the  aspect  of  one  more  powerful  than 
itself,  is  deterred  from  attacking,  and  saves  its  life  by 
subordinating  the  primary  motive,  consisting  of  craving 
sensations,  to  the  secondary  motive,  consisting  of  ideal 
feelings,  distinct  or  vague. 

Ascending  at  once  from  these  examples  of  conduct 
in  animals  to  examples  of  human  conduct,  we  shall  see 
that  the  contrasts  between  inferior  and  superior  have 
habitually  the  same  traits.  The  savage  of  lowest  type 
devours  all  the  food  captured  by  to-day's  chase,  and, 
hungry  on  the  morrow,  has  perhaps  for  days  to  bear 
the  pangs  of  starvation.  The  superior  savage,  con- 
ceiving more  vividly  the  entailed  sufferings  if  no  game 
is  to  be  found,  is  deterred  by  his  complex  feelings  from 
giving  way  entirely  to  his  simple  feeling.  Similarly 
are  the  two  contrasted  in  the  inertness  which  goes  along 
with  lack  of  forethought,  and  the  activity  which  due 
forethought  produces.  The  primitive  man,  idly  in- 
clined, and  ruled  by  the  sensations  of  the  moment, 
Avill  not  exert  himself  until  actual  pains  have  to  be 
escaped;  but  the  man  somewhat  advanced,  able  more 
distinctly  to  imagine  future  gratifications  and  suffer- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


123 


ings,  is  prompted  by  the  thought  of  these  to  overcome 
his  love  of  ease  :  decrease  of  misery  and  mortality  re- 
sulting from  this  predominance  of  the  representative 
feelings  over  the  presentative  feelings. 

Without  dwelling  on  the  fact  that  among  the  civil- 
ized, those  who  lead  the  life  of  the  senses  are  con- 
trasted in  the  same  way  with  those  whose  lives  are 
largely  occupied  with  pleasures  not  of  a  sensual  kind, 
let  me  point  out  that  there  are  analogous  contrasts 
between  guidance  by  the  less  complex  representative 
feelings,  or  lower  emotions,  and  guidance  by  the  more 
complex  representative  feelings,  or  higher  emotions. 
When  led  by  his  acquisitiveness  —  a  re-representative 
feeling  which,  acting  under  due  control,  conduces  to 
welfare  —  the  thief  takes  another  man's  property ;  his 
act  is  determined  by  certain  imagined  proximate  pleas- 
ures of  relatively  simple  kinds,  rather  than  b}^  less 
clearly  imagined  possible  pains  that  are  more  remote 
and  of  relatively  involved  kinds.  But  in  the  conscien- 
tious man,  there  is  an  adequate  restraining  motive,  still 
more  re-representative  in  its  nature,  including  not  only 
ideas  of  punishment,  and  not  only  ideas  of  lost  reputa- 
tion and  ruin,  but  including  ideas  of  the  claims  of  the 
person  owning  the  property,  and  of  the  pains  which 
loss  of  it  will  entail  on  him ;  all  joined  with  a  general 
aversion  to  acts  injurious  to  others,  which  arises  from 
the  inherited  effects  of  experience.  And  here  at  the 
end  we  see,  as  we  saw  at  the  beginning,  that  guidance 
by  the  more  complex  feeling,  on  the  average,  conduces 
to  welfare  more  than  does  guidance  by  the  simpler 
feeling. 

The  like  holds  with  the  intellectual  co-ordinations 
through  which  stimuli  issue  in  motions.    The  lowest 


124 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


actions,  called  reflex,  in  which  an  impression  made  on 
an  afferent  nerve  causes  by  discharge  through  an 
efferent  nerve  a  contraction,  shows  us  a  very  limited 
adjustment  of  acts  to  ends ;  the  impression  being 
simple,  and  the  resulting  motion  simple,  the  internal 
co-ordination  is  also  simple.  Evidently  when  there  are 
several  senses  which  can  be  together  affected  by  an 
outer  object;  and  when,  according  as  such  object  is 
discriminated  as  of  one  or  other  kind,  the  movements 
made  in  response  are  combined  in  one  or  other  way ; 
the  intermediate  co-ordinations  are  necessarily  more 
involved.  And  evidently  each  further  step  in  the 
evolution  of  intelligence,  always  instrumental  to  better 
self-preservation,  exhibits  this  same  general  trait.  The 
adjustments  by  which  the  more  involved  actions  are 
made  appropriate  to  the  more  involved  circumstances, 
imply  more  intricate,  and,  consequently,  more  deliber- 
ate and  conscious  co-ordinations ;  until,  when  we  come 
to  civilized  men,  who  in  their  daily  business,  taking 
into  account  many  data  and  conditions,  adjust  their  pro- 
ceedings to  various  consequences,  we  see  that  the  in- 
tellectual actions,  becoming  of  the  kind  we  call  judicial, 
are  at  once  very  elaborate  and  very  deliberate. 

Observe,  then,  what  follows  respecting  the  relativ^ 
authorities  of  motives.  Throughout  the  ascent  from 
low  creatures  up  to  man,  and  from  the  lowest  types  of 
man  up  to  the  highest,  self-preservation  has  been  in- 
creased by  the  subordination  of  simple  excitations  to 
compound  excitations  —  the  subjection  of  immediate 
sensations  to  the  ideas  of  sensations  to  come  —  the 
over-ruling  of  presentative  feelings  by  representative 
feelings,  and  of  representative  feelings  by  re-representa- 
tive feelings.    As  life  has  advanced,  the  accompanying 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  125 


seiitiency  has  become  increasingly  ideal;  and  among 
feelings  produced  by  the  compounding  of  ideas,  the 
highest,  and  those  whicli  have  evolved  latest,  are 
the  re-compounded  or  doubly  ideal.  Hence  it  follows 
that  as  guides,  the  feelings  have  authorities  proportion- 
ate to  the  degrees  in  which  they  are  removed  by  their 
complexity  and  their  ideality  from  simple  sensations 
and  appetites. 

A  further  implication  is  made  clear  by  studying  the 
intellectual  sides  of  these  mental  processes  by  which 
acts  are  adjusted  to  ends.  Where  they  are  low  and 
simple,  these  comprehend  the  guiding  only  of  imme- 
diate acts  by  immediate  stimuli  —  the  entire  transaction 
in  each  case,  lasting  but  a  moment,  refers  only  to  a 
proximate  result.  But  with  the  development  of  intel- 
ligence, and  the  growing  ideality  of  the  motives,  the 
ends  to  which  the  acts  are  adjusted  cease  to  be  exclu- 
sively immediate.  The  more  ideal  motives  concern 
ends  that  are  more  distant ;  and  with  approach  to  the 
highest  types,  present  ends  become  increasingly  sub- 
ordinate to  those  future  ends  which  the  ideal  motives 
have  for  their  objects.  Hence  there  arises  a  certain 
presumption  in  favor  of  a  motive  which  refers  to  a 
remote  good,  in  comparison  with  one  which  refers  to 
a  proximate  good. 

§  44.  In  the  last  chapter  I  hinted  that  besides  the 
several  influences  there  named  as  fostering  the  ascetic 
belief  that  doing  things  which  are  agreeable  is  detri- 
mental, while  bearing  disagreeable  things  is  beneficial, 
there  remained  to  be  named  an  influence  of  deeper 
origin.  This  is  shadowed  forth  in  the  foregoing  para- 
graphs. 


126 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


For  the  general  truth  that  guidance  by  such  simple 
pleasures  and  pains  as  result  from  fulfilling  or  denying 
bodily  desires,  is,  under  one  aspect,  inferior  to  guidance 
by  those  pleasures  and  pains  which  the  complex  ideal 
feelings  yield,  has  led  to  the  belief  that  the  promptings 
of  bodily  desires  should  be  disregarded.  Further,  the 
general  truth  that  pursuit  of  proximate  satisfactions  is, 
under  one  aspect,  inferior  to  pursuit  of  ultimate  satis- 
factions, has  led  to  the  belief  that  proximate  satisfac- 
tions must  not  be  valued. 

In  the  early  stages  of  every  science,  the  generaliza- 
tions reached  are  not  qualified  enough.  The  dis- 
criminating statements  of  the  truths  formulated,  rise 
afterward,  by  limitation  of  the  un  discriminating  state- 
ments. As  with  bodily  vision,  which  at  first  appreciates 
only  the  broadest  traits  of  objects,  and  so  leads  to  rude 
classings,  which  developed  vision,  impressible  by  minor 
differences,  has  to  correct,  so  with  mental  vision  in 
relation  to  general  truths,  it  happens  that  at  first  the 
inductions,  wrongly  made  all-embracing,  have  to  wait 
for  scepticism  and  critical  observation  to  restrict  them, 
by  taking  account  of  unnoticed  differences.  Hence, 
we  may  expect  to  find  the  current  ethical  conclusions 
too  sweeping.  Let  us  note  how,  in  three  ways,  these 
dominant  beliefs,  alike  of  professed  moralists  and  of 
people  at  large,  are  made  erroneous  by  lack  of  qualifi- 
cations. 

In  the  first  place,  the  authority  of  the  lower  feelings 
as  guides  is  by  no  means  always  inferior  to  the  author- 
ity of  the  higher  feelings,  but  is  often  superior.  Daily 
occur  occasions  on  which  sensations  must  be  obeyed 
rather  than  sentiments.  Let  any  one  think  of  sitting 
all  night  naked  in  a  snow-storm,  or  going  a  week  with- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


127 


out  food,  or  letting  his  head  be  held  under  water  for 
ten  minutes,  and  he  will  see  that  the  pleasures  and 
pains  directly  related  to  maintenance  of  life  may  not 
be  wholly  subordinated  to  the  pleasures  and  pains  in- 
directly  related  to  maintenance  of  life.  Though  in 
many  cases  guidance  by  the  simple  feelings  rather  than 
by  the  complex  feelings  is  injurious,  in  other  cases 
guidance  by  the  complex  feelings  rather  than  by  the 
simple  feelings  is  fatal ;  and  throughout  a  wide  range 
of  cases  their  relative  authorities  as  guides  are  indeter- 
minate. Grant  that  in  a  man  pursued,  the  pro  testing- 
feelings  accompanying  intense  and  prolonged  effort 
must,  to  preserve  life,  be  overruled  by  the  fear  of  his 
pursuers ;  it  may  yet  happen  that,  persisting  till  he 
drops,  the  resulting  exhaustion  causes  death,  though, 
the  pursuit  having  been  abandoned,  death  would  not 
otherwise  have  resulted.  Grant  that  a  widow  left  in 
poverty  must  deny  her  appetite  that  she  may  give 
enough  food  to  her  children  to  keep  them  alive  ;  yet 
the  denial  of  her  appetite  pushed  too  far  may  leave 
them  not  only  entirely  without  food  but  without  guard- 
ianship. Grant  that,  working  his  brain  unceasingly 
from  dawn  till  dark,  the  man  in  pecuniary  difficulties 
must  disregard  rebellious  bodily  sensations  in  obedience 
to  the  conscientious  desire  to  liquidate  the  claims  on 
him ;  yet  he  may  carry  this  subjection  of  simple  feel- 
ings to  complex  feelings  to  the  extent  of  shattering  his 
health,  and  failing  in  that  end  which,  with  less  of  this 
subjection,  he  might  have  achieved.  Clearly,  then,  the 
subordination  of  lower  feelings  must  be  a  conditional 
subordination.  The  supremacy  of  higher  feelings  must 
be  a  qualified  supremacy. 

In  another  way  does  the  generalization  ordinarily 


128 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


made  err  by  excess.  With  the  truth  that  life  is  high 
in  proportion  as  the  simple  presentative  feelings  are 
under  the  control  of  the  compound  representative  feel- 
ings, it  joins,  as  though  they  were  corollaries,  certain 
propositions  which  are  not  corollaries.  The  current 
conception  is,  not  that  the  lower  must  yield  to  the 
higher  when  the  two  conflict,  but  that  the  lower  must 
be  disregarded  even  when  there  is  no  conflict.  This 
tendency  which  the  growth  of  moral  ideas  has  gener- 
ated, to  condemn  obedience  to  inferior  feelings  when 
superior  feelings  protest,  has  begotten  a  tendency  to 
condemn  inferior  feelings  considered  intrinsically.  I 
really  think  she  does  things  because  she  likes  to  do 
them,"  once  said  to  me  one  lady  concerning  another: 
the  form  of  expression  and  the  manner  both  implying 
the  belief  not  only  that  such  behavior  is  wrong,  but 
also  that  every  one  must  recognize  it  as  wrong.  And 
there  prevails  widely  a  notion  of  this  kind.  In  prac- 
tice, indeed,  the  notion  is  very  generally  inoperative. 
Though  it  prompts  various  incidental  asceticisms,  as 
of  those  who  think  it  alike  manly  and  salutary  to  go 
without  a  great-coat  in  cold  weather,  or  to  persevere 
through  the  winter  in  taking  an  out-of-door  plunge, 
yet,  generally,  the  pleasurable  feelings  accompanying 
due  fulfilment  of  bodily  needs,  are  accepted :  accept- 
ance being,  indeed,  sufficiently  peremptory.  But  obliv- 
ious of  these  contradictions  in  their  practice,  men 
commonly  betray  a  vague  idea  that  there  is  something 
degrading,  or  injurious,  or  both,  in  doing  that  which  is 
agreeable   and  avoiding  that  which   is  disagreeable. 

Pleasant  but  wrong,"  is  a  2)hrase  frecj^ucntly  used  in  a 
way  implying  that  the  two  are  naturally  connected. 
As  above  hinted,  however  such  beliefs  result  from  a 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW,  129 


confused  apprehension  of  the  general  truth  that  the 
more  compound  and  representative  feelings  are,  on  the 
average,  of  higher  authority  than  the  simple  and  pre- 
sentative  feelings.  Apprehended  with  discrimination, 
this  truth  implies  that  the  authority  of  the  simple, 
ordinarily  less  than  that  of  the  compound  but  occa- 
sionally greater,  is  habitually  to  be  accepted  when  the 
compound  do  not  oppose. 

In  yet  a  third  way  is  this  principle  of  subordination 
misconceived.  One  of  the  contrasts  between  the  earlier 
evolved  feelings  and  the  later  evolved  feelings  is,  that 
they  refer  respectively  to  the  more  immediate  effects  of 
actions  and  to  the  more  remote  effects ;  and  speaking 
generally,  guidance  by  that  which  is  near  is  inferior  to 
guidance  by  that  which  is  distant.  Hence  has  resulted 
the  belief  that,  irrespective  of  their  kinds,  the  pleasures 
of  the  present  must  be  sacrificed  to  the  pleasures  of  the 
future.  We  see  this  in  the  maxim  often  impressed  on 
children  when  eating  their  meals,  that  they  should  re- 
serve the  nicest  morsel  till  the  last :  the  check  on  im- 
provident yielding  to  immediate  impulse,  being  here 
joined  with  the  tacit  teaching  that  the  same  gratifica- 
tion becomes  more  valuable  as  it  becomes  more  distant. 
Sucli  thinking  is  traceable  throughout  daily  conduct; 
by  no  means  indeed  in  all,  but  in  those  who  are  distin- 
guished as  prudent  and  well  regulated  in  their  conduct. 
Hurrying  over  his  breakfast  that  he  may  catch  the  train, 
snatching  a  sandwich  in  the  middle  of  the  day,  and  eat- 
ing a  late  dinner  when  he  is  so  worn  out  that  he  is  in- 
capacitated for  evening  recreation,  the  man  of  business 
pursues  a  life  in  which  not  only  the  satisfactions  of 
bodily  desires,  but  also  those  of  higher  tastes  and  feel- 
ings, are,  as  far  as  may  be,  disregarded,  that  distant  ends 


130 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


may  be  achieved ;  and  yet  if  you  ask  what  are  these 
distant  ends,  you  find  (in  cases  where  there  are  no  par- 
ental responsibilities)  that  they  are  included  under  the 
conception  of  more  comfortable  living  in  time  to  come. 
So  ingrained  is  this  belief  that  it  is  wrong  to  seek  im- 
mediate enjoyments  and  right  to  seek  remote  ones  only, 
that  you  may  hear  from  a  busy  man  who  has  been  on  a 
pleasure  excursion  a  kind  of  apology  for  his  conduct. 
He  deprecates  the  unfavorable  judgments  of  his  friends 
by  explaining  that  the  state  of  his  health  had  compelled 
him  to  take  a  holiday.  Nevertheless,  if  you  sound  him 
with  respect  to  his  future,  you  find  that  his  ambition  is 
by-and-b}^  to  retire  and  devote  himself  wholly  to  the 
relaxations  w^iich  he  is  now  somewhat  ashamed  of 
taking. 

The  general  truth  disclosed  by  the  study  of  evolving 
conduct,  sub-human  and  human,  that  for  the  better 
preservation  of  life  the  primitive,  simple,  presentative' 
feelings  must  be  controlled  by  the  later-evolved,  com- 
pound, and  representative  feelings,  has  thus  come,  in 
the  course  of  civilization,  to  be  recognized  by  men ;  but 
necessarily  at  first  in  too  indiscriminate  a  way.  The 
current  conception,  while  it  errs  by  implying  that  the 
authority  of  the  higher  over  the  lower  is  unlimited,  errs 
also  by  implying  that  the  rule  of  the  lower  must  be  re- 
sisted even  when  it  does  not  conflict  with  the  rule  of 
the  higher,  and  furtlier  errs  by  implying  that  a  gratifi- 
cation which  forms  a  proper  aim  if  it  is  remote,  forms 
an  improper  aim  if  it  is  proximate. 

§  45.  Without  explicitly  saying  so,  we  have  been 
here  tracing  the  genesis  of  the  moral  consciousness. 
For  unquestionably  tlie  essential  trait  in  the  moral 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW, 


131 


consciousness  is  the  control  of  some  feeling  or  feelings 
by  some  other  feeling  or  feelings. 

Among  the  higher  animals  we  may  see,  distinctly 
enough,  the  conflict  of  feelings  and  the  subjection  of 
simpler  to  more  compound ;  as  when  a  dog  is  restrained 
from  snatching  food  by  fear  of  the  penalties  wliich 
may  come  if  he  yields  to  his  appetite ;  or  as  when  he 
desists  from  scratching  at  a  hole  lest  he  should  lose  his 
master,  who  has  walked  on.  Here,  however,  though 
there  is  subordination,  there  is  not  conscious  subordina- 
tion —  there  is  no  introspection  revealing  the  fact  that 
one  feeling  has  yielded  to  another.  So  is  it  even  with 
human  beings  when  little  developed  mentally.  The 
pre-social  man,  wandering  about  in  families  and  ruled 
by  such  sensations  and  emotions  as  are  caused  by  the 
circumstances  of  the  moment,  though  occasionally  sub- 
ject to  conflicts  of  motives,  meets  with  comparatively 
few  cases  in  which  the  advantage  of  postponing  the 
immediate  to  the  remote  is  forced  on  his  attention ; 
nor  has  he  the  intelligence  requisite  for  analyzing  and 
generalizing  such  of  these  cases  as  occur.  Only  as 
social  evolution  renders  the  life  more  complex,  the 
restraints  many  and  strong,  the  evils  of  impulsive  con- 
duct marked,  and  the  comforts  to  be  gained  by  provid- 
ing for  the  future  tolerably  certain,  can  there  come 
experiences  numerous  enough  to  make  familiar  tlie 
benefit  of  subordinating  the  simpler  feelings  to  the 
more  complex  ones.  Only  then,  too,  does  there  arise 
a  sufficient  intellectual  power  to  make  an  induction 
from  these  experiences,  followed  by  a  sufficient  mass- 
ing of  individual  inductions  into  a  public  and  tradi- 
tional induction  impressed  on  each  generation  as  it 
grows  up. 


132 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


And  here  we  are  introduced  to  certain  facts  of  pro- 
found significance.  This  conscious  relinquishment  of 
immediate  and  special  good  to  gain  distant  and  general 
good,  while  it  is  a  cardinal  trait  of  the  self-restraint 
called  moral,  is  also  a  cardinal  trait  of  self-restraints 
other  than  those  called  moral,  —  the  restraints  that 
originate  from  fear  of  the  visible  ruler,  of  the  invisible 
ruler,  and  of  society  at  large.  Whenever  the  indi- 
vidual refrains  from  doing  that  which  the  passing 
desire  prompts,  lest  he  should  afterward  suffer  legal 
punishment,  or  divine  vengeance,  or  public  reproba- 
tion, or  all  of  them,  he  surrenders  the  near  and  definite 
pleasure  rather  than  risk  the  remote  and  greater, 
though  less  definite,  pains,  which  taking  it  may  bring 
on  him:  and,  conversely,  when  he  undergoes  some 
present  pain,  that  he  may  reap  some  probable  future 
pleasure,  political,  religious,  or  social.  But  though  all 
these  four  kinds  of  internal  control  have  the  common 
character  that  the  simpler  and  less  ideal  feelings  are 
consciously  overruled  by  the  more  complex  and  ideal 
feelings ;  and  though,  at  first,  they  are  practically 
co-extensive  and  undistinguished,  yet,  in  the  course  of 
social  evolution,  they  differentiate ;  and,  eventually, 
the  moral  control,  with  its  accompanying  conceptions 
and  sentiments,  emerges  as  independent.  Let  us  glance 
at  the  leading  aspects  of  the  process. 

While,  as  in  the  rudest  groups,  neither  political  nor 
religious  rule  exists,  the  leading  check  to  the  immediate 
satisfaction  of  each  desire  as  it  arises,  is  consciousness 
of  the  evils  which  the  anger  of  fellow-savages  may  en- 
tail, if  satisfaction  of  the  desire  is  obtained  at  their 
cost.  In  this  early  stage  the  imagined  pains  which  consti- 
tute the  governing  motive  are  those  apt  to  be  inflicted 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW, 


133 


by  beings  of  like  nature,  undistinguished  in  powei :  the 
political,  religious,  and  social  restraints  are  as  yet 
represented  onlj^  by  this  mutual  dread  of  vengeance. 

When  special  strength,  skill,  or  courage,  makes  one 
of  them  a  leader  in  battle,  he  necessarily  inspires 
greater  fear  than  any  other,  and  there  comes  to  be  a 
more  decided  check  on  such  satisfactions  of  the  desires 
as  will  injure  or  offend  him.  Gradually  as,  by  habitual 
warfare,  chieftainship  is  established,  the  evils  thought 
of  as  likely  to  arise  from  angering  the  chief,  not  only 
by  aggression  upon  him,  but  by  disobedience  to  him, 
become  distinguishable  both  from  the  smaller  evils 
which  other  personal  antagonisms  cause,  and  from  the 
more  diffused  evils  thought  of  as  arising  from  social 
reprobation.  That  is,  political  control  begins  to  differ- 
entiate from  the  more  indefinite  control  of  mutual 
dread. 

Meanwhile  there  has  been  developing  the  ghost 
theory.  In  all  but  the  rudest  groups  the  double  of  a 
deceased  man,  propitiated  at  death  and  afterward,  is 
conceived  as  able  to  injure  the  survivors.  Conse- 
quently, as  fast  as  the  ghost  theory  becomes  estab- 
lished and  definite,  there  grows  up  another  kind  of 
check  on  immediate  satisfaction  of  the  desires  —  a 
check  constituted  by  ideas  of  the  evils  which  ghosts 
may  inflict  if  offended ;  and  when  political  headship 
gets  settled,  and  the  ghosts  of  dead  chiefs,  thought  of 
as  more  powerful  and  relentless  than  other  ghosts,  are 
especially  dreaded,  there  begins  to  take  shape  the  form 
of  restraint  distinguished  as  religious. 

For  a  long  time  these  three  sets  of  restraints,  with 
their  correlative  sanctions,  tliough  becoming  separate 
in  consciousness,  remain  co-extensive,  and  do  so  because 


134 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


they  mostly  refer  to  one  end  —  success  in  war.  The 
duty  of  blood-revenge  is  insisted  on  even  while  yet 
nothing  to  be  called  social  organization  exists.  As 
the  chief  gains  predominance,  the  killing  of  enemies 
becomes  a  political  duty  ;  and  as  the  anger  of  the  dead 
chief  comes  to  be  dreaded,  the  killing  of  enemies 
becomes  a  religious  duty.  Loyalty  to  the  ruler  while 
he  lives  and  after  he  dies  is  increasingly  shown  by 
holding  life  at  his  disposal  for  purposes  of  war.  The 
earliest  enacted  punishments  are  those  for  insubordi- 
nation and  for  breaches  of  observances  which  express 
subordination  —  all  of  them  militant  in  origin.  While 
the  divine  injunctions,  originally  traditions  of  the  dead 
king's  will,  mainly  refer  to  the  destruction  of  peoples 
with  whom  he  was  at  enmity,  and  divine  anger  or 
approval  are  conceived  as  determined  by  the  degrees 
in  which  subjection  to  him  is  shown,  directly  by  wor- 
ship and  indirectly  by  fulfilling  these  injunctions.  The 
Fijian,  who  is  said  on  entering  the  other  world  to  com- 
mend himself  by  narrating  his  successes  in  battle,  and 
who,  when  alive,  is  described  as  sometimes  greatly  dis- 
tressed if  he  thinks  he  has  not  killed  enemies  enough 
to  please  his  gods,  shows  us  the  resulting  ideas  and 
feelings,  and  reminds  us  of  kindred  ideas  and  feelings 
betrayed  by  ancient  races. 

To  all  which  add  that  the  control  of  social  opinion, 
besides  being  directly  exercised,  as  in  the  earliest  stage, 
by  praise  of  the  brave  and  blame  of  the  cowardly,  comes 
to  be  indirectly  exercised  with  a  kindred  general  effect 
by  applause  of  loyalty  to  the  ruler  and  piety  to  the  god. 
So  that  the  three  differentiated  forms  of  control  which 
grow  up  along  with  militant  organization  and  action, 
while  enforcing  kindred  restraints  and  incentives,  also 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW, 


135 


enforce  one  another ;  and  their  separate  and  joint  disci- 
plines have  the  common  character  that  they  involve  tlie 
sacrifice  of  immediate  special  benefits  to  obtain  more 
distant  and  general  benefits. 

At  the  same  time  there  have  been  developing  under 
the  same  three  sanctions,  restraints  and  incentives  of 
another  order,  similarly  characterized  by  subordination 
of  the  proximate  to  the  remote.  Joint  aggressions 
upon  men  outside  the  society  cannot  prosper  if  there 
are  many  aggressions  of  man  on  man  within  the  soci- 
ety. War  implies  co-operation ;  and  co-operation  is 
prevented  by  antagonisms  among  those  who  are  to  co- 
operate. We  saw  that  in  the  primitive,  ungoverned 
group,  the  main  check  on  immediate  satisfaction  of  his 
desires  by  each  man,  is  the  fear  of  other  men's  venge- 
ance if  they  are  injured  by  taking  the  satisfaction ;  and 
through  early  stages  of  social  development  this  dread 
of  retaliation  continues  to  be  the  chief  motive  to  such 
forbearance  as  exists.  But  though  long  after  political 
authority  has  become  established  the  taking  of  personal 
satisfaction  for  injuries  persists,  the  growth  of  politi- 
cal authority  gradually  checks  it.  The  fact  that  suc- 
cess in  war  is  endangered  if  his  followers  fight  among 
themselves,  forces  itself  on  the  attention  of  the  ruler. 
He  has  a  strong  motive  for  restraining  quarrels,  and 
therefore  for  preventing  the  aggressions  which  cause 
quarrels  ;  and  as  his  power  becomes  greater  he  forbids  the 
aggressions  and  inflicts  punishments  for  disobedience. 
Presently,  political  restraints  of  this  class,  like  those  of 
the  preceding  class,  are  enforced  by  religious  restraints. 
The  sagacious  chief,  succeeding  in  war  partly  because 
he  thus  enforces  order  among  his  followers,  leaves 
behind  him  a  tradition  of  the  commands  he  habitually 


136 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


gave.  Dread  of  his  ghost  tends  to  produce  regard  foi 
these  commands ;  and  they  eventually  acquire  sacred- 
ness.  With  further  social  evolution  come,  in  like  man- 
ner, further  interdicts,  checking  aggressions  of  less 
serious  kinds ;  until  eventually  there  grows  up  a  body 
of  civil  laws.  And  then,  in  the  way  shown,  arise 
beliefs  concerning  the  divine  disapproval  of  these 
minor,  as  well  as  of  the  major,  civil  offences :  ending, 
occasionally,  in  a  set  of  religious  injunctions  harmoniz- 
ing with,  and  enforcing,  the  political  injunctions ;  while 
simultaneously  there  develops,  as-  before,  a  social  sanc- 
tion for  these  rules  of  internal  conduct,  strengthening 
the  political  and  religious  sanctions. 

But  now  observe  that  while  these  three  controls, 
political,  religious,  and  social,  severally  lead  men  to 
subordinate  proximate  satisfactions  to  remote  satisfac- 
tions ;  and  while  they  are  in  this  respect  like  the 
moral  control,  which  habitually  requires  the  subjection 
of  simple  presentative  feelings  to  complex  representa- 
tive feelings  and  postponement  of  present  to  future ; 
yet  they  do  not  constitute  the  moral  control,  but  are 
only  preparatory  to  it  —  are  controls  within  which  the 
moral  control  evolves.  The  command  of  the  political 
ruler  is  at  first  obeyed,  not  because  of  its  perceived 
rectitude,  but  simply  because  it  is  his  command,  which 
there  will  be  a  penalty  for  disobeying.  The  check  is 
not  a  mental  representation  of  the  evil  consequences 
which  the  forbidden  act  will,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
cause  :  but  it  is  a  mental  representation  of  the  factitious 
evil  consequences.  Down  to  our  own.  time  we  trace  in 
legal  plirases,  the  original  doctrine  that  tlie  aggression 
of  one  citizen  on  another  is  wrong,  and  will  be  pun< 
ished,  not  so  much  because  of  the  injur}^  done  him,  as 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  137 


because  of  the  implied  disregard  of  the  king's  will 
Similarly,  the  sinfulness  of  breaking  a  divine  injunction 
was  universally  at  one  time,  and  is  still  by  many,  held 
to  consist  in  the  disobedience  to  God,  rather  than  in  the 
deliberate  entailing  of  injury ;  and  even  now  it  is  a 
common  belief  that  acts  are  right  only  if  performed  in 
conscious  fulfilment  of  the  divine  will :  nay,  are  even 
wrong  if  otherwise  performed.  The  like  holds,  too, 
with  that  further  control  exercised  by  public  opinion. 
On  listening  to  the  remarks  made  respecting  conformity 
to  social  rules,  it  is  noticeable  that  breach  of  them  is 
condemned  not  so  much  because  of  any  essential  im- 
propriety as  because  the  world's  authority  is  ignored. 
How  imperfectly  the  truly  moral  control  is  even  now 
differentiated  from  these  controls  within  which  it  has 
been  evolving,  we  see  in  the  fact  that  the  systems  of 
morality  criticised  at  the  outset,  severally  identify  moral 
control  with  one  or  other  of  them.  For  moralists  of 
one  class  derive  moral  rules  from  the  commands  of  a 
supreme  political  power.  Those  of  another  class  recog- 
nize no  other  origin  for  them  than  the  revealed  divine 
will.  And  though  men  who  take  social  prescription  for 
their  guide  do  not  formulate  their  doctrine,  yet  the 
belief,  frequentty  betrayed,  that  conduct  which  society 
permits  is  not  blameworthy,  implies  that  there  are  those 
who  think  right  and  wrong  can  be  made  such  by  public 
opinion. 

Before  taking  a  further  step  we  must  put  together 
the  results  of  this  analysis.  The  essential  truths  to  be 
carried  with  us,  respecting  these  three  forms  of  exter- 
nal control  to  which  the  social  unit  is  subject,  are  these  : 
First,  that  they  have  evolved  with  the  evolution  of 
societj^,  as  means  to  social  self-preservation,  necessary 


138 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


under  the  conditions ;  and  that,  by  implication,  they 
are  in  the  main  congruous  with  one  another.  Second, 
that  the  correlative  internal  restraints  generated  in  the 
social  unit  are  representations  of  remote  results  which 
are  incidental  ratlier  than  necessary  —  a  legal  penalty, 
a  supernatural  punishment,  a  social  reprobation.  Third^ 
that  these  results,  simpler  and  more  directly  wrought 
b}^  personal  agencies,  can  be  more  vividly  conceived 
than  can  the  results  which,  in  the  course  of  things, 
actions  naturally  entail ;  and  the  conceptions  of  them 
are,  therefore,  more  potent  over  undeveloped  minds. 
Fourth,  that  as  with  the  restraints  thus  generated  is 
always  joined  the  thought  of  external  coercion,  there 
arises  the  notion  of  obligation ;  which  so  becomes 
habitually  associated  with  the  surrender  of  immediate 
special  benefits  for  the  sake  of  distant  and  general 
benefits.  Fifth,  that  the  moral  control  corresponds  in 
large  measure  with  the  three  controls  thus  originating, 
in  respect  of  its  injunctions ;  and  corresponds,  too,  in 
the  general  nature  of  the  mental  processes  producing 
conformity  to  those  injunctions ;  but  differs  in  their 
special  nature. 

§  46.  For  now  we  are  prepared  to  see  that  the 
restraints,  properly  distinguished  as  moral,  are  unlike 
these  restraints  out  of  which  they  evolve,  and  with 
which  they  are  long  confounded,  in  this  —  they  refer 
not  to  the  extrinsic  effects  of  actions,  but  to  their 
intrinsic  effects.  The  truly  moral  deterrent  from 
murder  is  not  constituted  by  a  representation  of  hang- 
ing as  a  consequence,  or  by  a  representation  of  tortures 
in  hell  as  a  consequence,  or  by  a  representation  of  the 
horror  and  hatred  excited  in  fellow-men ;  but  by  a 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


139 


representation  of  the  necessary  natural  results,  the 
infliction  of  death-agony  on  the  victim,  the  destruction 
of  all  his  possibilities  of  happiness,  the  entailed  suffer- 
ing to  his  belongings.  Neither  the  thought  of  impris- 
onment, nor  of  divine  anger,  nor  of  social  disgrace,  is 
that  which  constitutes  the  moral  check  on  theft ;  but 
the  thought  of  injury  to  the  person  robbed,  joined  with 
a  vague  consciousness  of  the  general  evils  caused  by 
disregard  of  proprietary  rights.  Those  who  reprobate 
the  adulterer  on  moral  grounds  have  their  minds  filled, 
not  with  ideas  of  an  action  for  damages,  or  of  future 
punishment  following  the  breach  of  a  commandment, 
or  of  loss  of  reputation:  but  they  are  occupied  with 
ideas  of  unhappiness  entailed  on  the  aggrieved  wife  or 
husband,  the  damaged  lives  of  children,  and  the  dif- 
fused mischiefs  which  go  along  with  disregard  of  the 
marriage  tie.  Conversely,  the  man  who  is  moved  by  a 
moral  feeling  to  help  another  in  difficulty,  does  not 
picture  to  himself  any  reward  here  or  hereafter;  but 
pictures  only  the  better  condition  he  is  trying  to  bring 
about.  One  who  is  morally  prompted  to  fight  against 
a  social  evil  has  neither  material  benefit  nor  popular 
applause  before  his  mind,  but  only  the  mischiefs  he 
seeks  to  remove  and  the  increased  well-being  which 
will  follow  their  removal.  Throughout,  then,  the 
moral  motive  differs  from  the  motives  it  is  associated 
with  in  this,  that  instead  of  being  constituted  by  repre- 
sentations of  incidental,  collateral,  non-necessary  con- 
sequences of  acts,  it  is  constituted  by  representations 
of  consequences  which  the  acts  naturally  produce. 
These  representations  are  not  all  distinct,  though 
some  of  such  are  usually  present;  but  they  form  an 
assemblage  of  indistinct  representations  accumulated 


140 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


by  experience  of  the  results  of  like  acts  in  the  life  of 
the  individual,  superposed  on  a  still  more  indistinct  but 
voluminous  consciousness  due  to  the  inherited  effects 
of  such  experiences  in  progenitors,  forming  a  feeling 
that  is  at  once  massive  and  vague. 

And  now  we  see  why  the  moral  feelings  and  cor- 
relative restraints  have  arisen  later  than  the  feelings 
and  restraints  that  originate  from  political,  religious, 
and  social  authorities,  and  have  so  slowly,  and  even  yet 
so  incompletely,  disentangled  themselves.  For  only 
by  these  lower  feelings  and  restraints  could  be  main- 
tained the  conditions  under  which  the  higher  feelings 
and  restraints  evolve.  It  is  thus  alike  with  the  self- 
regarding  feelings  and  with  the  other-regarding  feel- 
ings. The  pains  which  improvidence  will  bring,  and 
the  pleasures  to  be  gained  by  storing  up  things  for 
future  use,  and  by  laboring  to  get  such  things,  can  be 
habitually  contrasted  in  thought,  only  as  fast  as  settled 
social  arrangements  make  accumulation  possible  ;  and 
that  there  may  arise  such  settled  arrangements,  fear  of 
the  seen  ruler,  of  the  unseen  ruler,  and  of  public  opin- 
ion, must  come  into  play.  Only  after  political,  reli- 
gious, and  social  restraints  have  produced  a  stable 
community,  can  there  be  sufficient  experience  of  the 
pains,  positive  and  negative,  sensational  and  emotional, 
which  crimes  of  aggression  cause,  as  to  generate  that 
moral  aversion  to  them  constituted  by  consciousness  of 
their  intrinsically  evil  results.  And  more  manifest 
still  is  it  that  such  a  moral  sentiment  as  that  of  abstract 
equity,  which  is  offended  not  only  by  material  injuries 
done  to  men,  but  also  by  political  arrangements  that 
place  them  at  a  disadvantage,  can  evolve  only  after  the 
social  stage  reached  gives  familiar  experience,  both  of 


7 HE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


141 


the  pains  flowing  directly  from  injustices,  and  also  of 
those  flowing  indirectly  from  the  class  privileges  wliich 
make  injustices  easy. 

That  the  feelings  called  moral  have  the  nature  and 
origin  alleged,  is  further  shown  by  the  fact  that  we 
associate  the  name  with  them  in  proportion  to  the  degree 
in  which  they  have  these  characters  —  firstly,  of  being 
re-representative  ;  secondly,  of  being  concerned  with  in- 
direct rather  than  with  direct  effects,  and  generally 
with  remote  rather  than  immediate ;  and  thirdly,  of 
referring  to  effects  that  are  mostly  general  rather  than 
special.  Thus,  though  we  condemn  one  man  for  extrav- 
agance and  approve  the  economy  shown  by  another  man, 
we  do  not  class  their  acts  as  respectively  vicious  and  vir- 
tuous. These  words  are  too  strong;  the  present  and 
future  results  here  differ  too  little  in  concreteness 
and  ideality  to  make  the  words  fully  applicable.  Sup- 
pose, however,  that  the  extravagance  necessarily  brings 
distress  on  wife  and  children  —  brings  pains  diffused 
over  the  lives  of  others  as  well  as  of  self,  and  the  vicious- 
ness  of  the  extravagance  becomes  clear.  Suppose, 
further,  that  prompted  by  the  wish  to  relieve  his  family 
from  the  misery  he  has  brought  on  them,  tlie  spend- 
thrift forges  a  bill  or  commits  some  other  fraud.  Though, 
estimated  apart,  we  characterize  his  overruling  emotion 
as  moral,  and  make  allowance  for  him  in  consideration 
of  it,  yet  his  action,  taken  as  a  whole,  we  condemn  as 
immoral :  we  regard  as  of  superior  authority  the  feel- 
ings which  respond  to  men's  proprietary  claims  — 
feelings  which  are  re-representative  in  a  higher  degree 
and  refer  to  more  remote  diffused  consequences.  The 
difference,  habitually  recognized,  between  the  relative 
elevations  of  justice  and  generosity,  Avell  illustrates  this 


142 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


truth.  The  motive  causing  a  generous  act  has  reference 
to  effects  of  a  more  concrete,  special,  and  proximate 
kind  than  has  the  motive  to  do  justice,  which,  beyond 
the  proximate  effects,  usually  themselves  less  concrete 
than  those  that  generosity  contemplates,  includes  a 
consciousness  of  the  distant,  involved,  diffused  effects 
of  maintaining  equitable  relations.  And  justice  Ave 
hold  to  be  higher  generosity.  Comprehension  of  this 
long  argument  will  be  aided  by  here  quoting  a  further 
passage  from  the  before-named  letter  to  Mr.  Mill,  fol- 
lowing the  passage  already  quoted  from  it. 

To  make  any  position  fully  understood,  it  seems  needful  to  add 
that,  corresponding  to  the  fundamental  propositions  of  a  developed 
Moral  Science,  there  have  been,  and  still  are,  developing  in  the  race, 
certain  fundamental  moral  intuitions;  and  that,  though  these  moral 
intuitions  are  the  results  of  accumulated  experiences  of  Utility, 
gradually  organized  and  inherited,  they  have  come  to  be  quite  inde- 
pendent of  conscious  experience.  Just  in  the  same  way  that  I  be- 
lieve the  intuition  of  space,  possessed  by  any  living  individual,  to 
have  arisen  from  organized  and  consolidated  experiences  of  all  ante- 
cedent individuals  who  bequeathed  to  him  their  slowly  developed  nerv- 
ous organizations  —  just  as  I  believe  that  this  intuition,  requiring  only 
to  be  made  definite  and  complete  by  personal  experiences,  has  prac- 
tically become  a  form  of  thought,  apparently  quite  independent  of 
experience;  so  do  I  believe  that  the  experiences  of  utility  organized 
and  consolidated  through  all  past  generations  of  the  human  race, 
have  been  producing  corresponding  nervous  modifications,  which,  by 
continued  transmission  and  accumulation,  have  become  in  us  certain 
faculties  of  moral  intuition  —  certain  emotions  responding  to  right 
and  wrong  conduct,  which  have  no  apparent  basis  in  the  individual 
experiences  of  utility.  I  also  hold  that  just  as  the  space  intuition 
responds  to  the  exact  demonstrations  of  Geometry,  and  has  its  rough 
conclusions  interpreted  and  verified  by  them;  so  will  moral  intuitions 
respond  to  the  demonstrations  of  Moral  Science,  and  will  have  their 
rough  conclusions  interpreted  and  verified  by  them. 

To  this,  in  passing,  I  will  add  only  that  the  evolution- 
hypothesis  thus  enables  us  to  reconcile  opposed  moral 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


143 


theories,  as  it  enables  us  to  reconcile  opposed  theories 
of  knowledge.  For,  as  the  doctrine  of  innate  forms  of 
intellectual  intuition  falls  into  harmony  with  the  expe- 
riential doctrine,  when  we  recognize  the  production  of 
intellectual  faculties  by  inheritance  of  effects  wrought 
by  experience ;  so  the  doctrine  of  innate  powers  of 
moral  perception  becomes  congruous  with  the  utilita- 
rian doctrine,  when  it  is  seen  that  preferences  and 
aversions  are  rendered  organic  by  inheritance  of  the 
effects  of  pleasurable  and  painful  experiences  in  pro- 
genitors. 

§  47.  One  further  question  has  to  be  answered  — 
How  does  there  arise  the  feeling  of  moral  obligation  in 
general?  Whence  comes  the  sentiment  of  duty,  con- 
sidered as  distinct  from  the  several  sentiments  which 
prompt  temperance,  providence,  kindness,  justice,  truth- 
fulness, etc.  ?  The  answer  is  that  it  is  an  abstract 
sentiment  generated  in  a  manner  analogous  to  that  in 
which  abstract  ideas  are  generated. 

The  idea  of  each  color  had  originally  entire  concrete- 
ness  given  to  it  by  an  object  possessing  the  color ;  as 
some  of  the  unmodified  names,  such  as  orange  and 
violet,  show  us.  The  dissociation  of  each  color  from 
the  object  specially  associated  with  it  in  thought  at  the 
outset,  went  on  as  fast  as  the  color  came  to  be  associ- 
ated in  thought  with  objects  unlike  the  first,  and  unlike 
one  another.  Tlie  idea  of  orange  was  conceived  in  the 
abstract  more  fully  in  proportion  as  the  various  orange- 
colored  objects  remembered,  cancelled  one  another's 
diverse  attributes, .  and  left  outstanding  their  common 
attribute. 

So  is  it  if  we  ascend  a  stage  and  note  liow  there 


144 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


arises  the  abstract  idea  of  color  apart  from  particular 
colors.  Were  all  things  red,  the  conception  of  color 
in  the  abstract  could  not  exist.  Imagine  that  every 
object  was  either  red  or  green,  and  it  is  manifest  that 
the  mental  habit  would  be  to  think  of  one  or  other  of 
these  two  colors  in  connection  with  anything  named. 
But  multiply  the  colors  so  that  thought  rambles  unde- 
cidedly among  the  ideas  of  them  that  occur  along  with 
any  object  named,  and  there  results  the  notion  of  inde- 
terminate color  —  the  common  property  which  objects 
possess  of  affecting  us  by  light  from  their  surfaces,  as 
w^ell  as  by  their  forms.  For  evidently  the  notion  of 
this  common  property  is  that  which  remains  constant 
while  imagination  is  picturing  every  possible  variety 
of  color.  It  is  the  uniform  trait  in  all  colored  things  ; 
that  is  —  color  in  the  abstract. 

Words  referring  to  quantity  furnish  cases  of  more 
marked  dissociation  of  abstract  from  concrete.  Group- 
ing various  things  as  small  in  comparison  either  with 
those  of  their  kind  or  with  those  of  other  kinds,  and 
similarly  grouping  some  objects  as  comparatively  great, 
we  get  the  opposite  abstract  notions  of  smallness  and 
greatness.  Applied  as  these  are  to  innumerable  very 
diverse  things  —  not  objects  only,  but  forces,  times, 
numbers,  values  —  they  have  become  so  little  connected 
with  concretes,  that  their  abstract  meanings  are  very 
vague. 

Further,  we  must  note  that  an  abstract  idea  thus 
formed  often  acquires  an  illusive  independence  ;  as  we 
may  perceive  in  the  case  of  motion,  which,  dissociated 
in  thought  from  all  particular  bodies  and  velocities  and 
directions,  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  though  it  could 
be  conceived  apart  from  something  moving. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW, 


145 


Now  all  this  holds  of  the  subjective  as  well  as  of 
the  objective  ;  and  among  other  states  of  conscious- 
ness, holds  of  the  emotions  as  known  by  introspection. 
By  the  grouping  of  those  re-representative  feelings 
above  described,  which,  differing  among  themselves  in 
other  respects,  have  a  component  in  common,  and  by 
the  consequent  mutual  cancelling  of  their  diverse  com- 
ponents, this  common  component  is  made  relatively 
appreciable,  and  becomes  an  abstract  feeling.  Thus  is 
produced  the  sentiment  of  moral  obligation  or  duty. 
Let  us  observe  its  genesis. 

We  have  seen  that  during  the  progress  of  animate 
existence,  the  later-evolved,  more  compound  and  more 
representative  feelings,  serving  to  adjust  the  conduct 
to  more  distant  and  general  needs,  have  all  along  had 
an  authority  as  guides  superior  to  that  of  the  earlier 
and  simpler  feelings  —  excluding  cases  in  which  these 
last  are  intense.  This  superior  authority,  unrecogniza- 
ble by  lower  types  of  creatures  which  cannot  generalize, 
and  little  recognizable  by  primitive  men  who  have 
but  feeble  powers  of  generalization,  has  become  dis- 
tinctly recognized  as  civilization  and  accompanying 
mental  development  have  gone  on.  Accumulated  ex- 
periences have  produced  the  consciousness  that  guid- 
ance by  feelings  which  refer  to  remote  and  general 
results  is  usually  more  conducive  to  welfare  than  guid- 
ance by  feelings  to  be  immediately  gratified.  For  what 
is  the  common  character  of  the  feelings  that  prompt 
honesty,  truthfulness,  diligence,  providence,  etc.,  which 
men  habitually  find  to  be  better  prompters  tlian  the 
appetites  and  simple  impulses  ?  They  are  all  complex- 
re-representative  feelings,  occupied  with  the  future 
rather  than  the  present.    The  idea  of  authoritativeness 


146 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


has,  therefore,  come  to  be  connected  with  feelings  hav^ 
ing  these  traits :  the  implication  being  that  the  lower 
and  simpler  feelings  are  without  authority.  And  this 
idea  of  authoritativeness  is  one  element  in  the  abstract 
consciousness  of  diuij. 

But  there  is  another  element  —  the  element  of  coer- 
civeness.  This  originates  from  experience  of  those 
several  forms  of  restraint  that  have,  as  above  described, 
established  themselves  in  the  course  of  civilization  — 
the  political,  religious,  and  social.  To  the  effects  of 
punishments  inflicted  by  law  and  public  opinion  on 
conduct  of  certain  kinds,  Dr.  Bain  ascribes  the  feeling 
of  moral  obligation.  And  I  agree  with  him  to  the 
extent  of  thinking  that  by  them  is  generated  the  sense 
of  compulsion  which  the  consciousness  of  duty  includes, 
and  which  the  word  obligation  indicates.  The  exist- 
ence of  an  earlier  and  deeper  element,  generated  as 
above  described,  is,  however,  I  think,  implied  by  the 
fact  that  certain  of  the  higher  self-regarding  feel- 
ings, instigating  prudence  and  economy,  have  a  moral 
authority  in  opposition  to  the  simpler  self -regarding  feel- 
ings :  showing  that  apart  from  any  thought  of  factitious 
penalties  on  improvidence,  the  feeling  constituted  by 
representation  of  the  natural  penalties  has  acquired  an 
acknowledged  superiority.  But  accepting  in  the  main 
tlie  view  that  fears  of  the  political  and  social  penalties 
(to  which,  I  think,  the  religious  must  be  added)  have 
generated  that  sense  of  coerciveness  which  goes  along 
with  the  thought  of  postponing  present  to  future  and 
personal  desires  to  the  claims  of  others,  it  here  chiefly 
concerns  us  to  note  that  this  sense  of  coerciveness 
becomes  indirectly  connected  with  the  feelings  distin- 
guished as  moral.    For  since  the  political,  religious, 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW, 


147 


and  social  restraining  motives  are  mainly  formed  of 
represented  future  results;  and  since  the  moral  restrain- 
ing motive  is  mainly  formed  of  represented  future  re- 
sults ;  it  happens  tliat  the  representations,  having  much 
in  common,  and  being  often  aroused  at  the  same  time, 
the  fear  joined  with  three  sets  of  them  becomes,  by 
association,  joined  with  the  fourth.  Thinking  of  the 
extrinsic  effects  of  a  forbidden  act,  excites  a  dread 
which  continues  present  while  the  intrinsic  effects  of 
the  act  are  thought  of;  and  being  thus  linked  with 
these  intrinsic  effects  causes  a  vague  sense  of  moral 
compulsion.  Emerging  as  the  moral  motive  does  but 
slowly  from  amidst  the  political,  religious,  and  social 
motives,  it  long  participates  in  that  consciousness  of 
subordination  to  some  external  agency  which  is  joined 
with  them ;  and  only  as  it  becomes  distinct  and  pre- 
dominant, does  it  lose  this  associated  consciousness  — - 
only  then  does  the  feeling  of  obligation  fade. 

This  remark  implies  the  tacit  conclusion,  which  will 
be  to  most  very  startling,  that  the  sense  of  duty  or 
moral  obligation  is  transitory,  and  will  diminish  as  fast 
as  moralization  increases.  Startling  though  it  is,  this 
conclusion  may  be  satisfactorily  defended.  Even  now 
progress  toward  the  implied  ultimate  state  is  traceable. 
The  observation  is  not  infrequent  that  persistence  in 
performing  a  duty  ends  in  making  it  a  pleasure ;  and 
this  amounts  to  the  admission  that  while  at  first  the 
motive  contains  an  element  of  coercion,  at  last  tliis  ele- 
ment of  coercion  dies  out,  and  the  act  is  performed 
without  any  consciousness  of  being  obliged  to  perform 
it.  Tlie  contrast  between  the  youth  on  wliom  diligence 
is  enjoined,  and  the  man  of  business  so  absorbed  in 
affairs  that  he  cannot  be  induced  to  relax,  sliows  us  how 


148  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

the  doing  of  work,  originally  under  the  consciousness 
that  it  ought  to  be  done,  may  eventually  cease  to  have 
any  such  accompanying  consciousness.  Sometimes 
indeed,  the  relation  comes  to  be  reversed;  and  the 
man  of  business  persists  in  work  from  pure  love  of  it 
when  told  that  he  ought  not.  Nor  is  it  thus  with  self- 
regarding  feelings  only.  That  the  maintaining  and 
protecting  of  wife  by  husband  often  result  solely  from 
feelings  directly  gratified  by  these  actions,  without  any 
thought  of  must ;  and  that  the  fostering  of  children  by 
parents  is  in  many  cases  made  an  absorbing  occupation 
without  any  coercive  feeling  of  ought;  are  obvious 
truths  which  show  us  that  even  now,  with  some  of  the 
fundamental  other-regarding  duties,  the  sense  of  obli- 
gation has  retreated  into  the  background  of  the  mind. 
And  it  is  in  some  degree  so  with  other-regarding  duties 
of  a  higher  kind.  Conscientiousness  has  in  many  out- 
grown that  stage  in  which  the  sense  of  a  compelling 
power  is  joined  with  rectitude  of  action.  The  truly 
honest  man,  here  and  there  to  be  found,  is  not  only 
without  thought  of  legal,  religious,  or  social  compulsion, 
when  he  discharges  an  equitable  claim  on  him,  but  he 
is  without  thought  of  self-compulsion.  He  does  the 
right  thing  with  a  simple  feeling  of  satisfaction  in 
doing  it ;  and  is,  indeed,  impatient  if  anything  prevents 
him  from  having  the  satisfaction  of  doing  it. 

Evidently,  then,  with  complete  ada2)tation  to  the 
social  state,  that  element  in  the  moral  consciousness 
which  is  expressed  by  the  word  obligation  will  disap- 
pear. Tlie  higher  actions  required  for  the  harmonious 
carrying  on  of  life  will  be  as  much  matters  of  course  as 
are  those  lower  actions  which  the  simple  desires  prompt. 
In  their  proper  times  and  places  and  proportions,  the 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW,  149 


moral  sentiments  will  guide  men  just  as  spontaneously 
and  adequately  as  now  do  the  sensations.  And  though, 
joined  with  their  regular  influence  when  this  is  called 
for,  will  exist  latent  ideas  of  the  evils  which  nonconform- 
ity would  bring,  these  will  occupy  the  mind  no  more 
than  do  ideas  of  the  evils  of  starvation  at  the  time  when 
a  healthy  appetite  is  being  satisfied  by  a  meal. 

§  48.  This  elaborate  exposition,  which  the  extreme 
complexity  of  the  subject  has  necessitated,  may  have  its 
leading  ideas  restated  thus  : 

Symbolizing  by  a  and  5,  related  phenomena  in  the 
environment,  which  in  some  way  concern  the  welfare  of 
the  organism ;  and  symbolizing  by  c  and  6?,  the  impres- 
sions, simple  or  compound,  which  the  organism  receives 
from  the  one,  and  the  motions,  single  or  combined,  by 
which  its  acts  are  adapted  to  meet  the  other;  we  saw 
that  psychology  in  general  is  concerned  with  the  con- 
nection between  the  relation  a  h  and  the  relation  e  d. 
Further,  we  saw  that  by  implication  the  psychological 
aspect  of  Ethics  is  that  aspect  under  which  the  adjust- 
ment of  c  d  to  a  b  appears,  not  as  an  intellectual  co-or- 
dination simply,  but  as  a  co-ordination  in  which  pleas- 
ures and  pains  are  alike  factors  and  results. 

It  was  shown  that  throughout  Evolution,  motive  and 
act  become  more  complex,  as  the  adaptation  of  inner 
related  actions  to  outer  related  actions  extends  in  range 
and  variety.  Whence  followed  the  corollary  that  the 
later  evolved  feelings,  more  representative  and  re-repre- 
sentative in  their  constitution,  and  referring  to  remoter 
and  wider  needs,  have,  on  the  average,  an  authority  as 
guides  greater  than  have  the  earlier  and  simpler  feel- 
ings. 


150 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


After  thus  observing  that  even  an  inferior  creature 
ruled  by  a  hierarchy  of  feelings  so  constituted  that  gen- 
eral welfare  depends  on  a  certain  subordination  of  lower 
to  higher,  we  saw  that  in  man,  as  he  passes  into  the 
social  state,  there  arises  the  need  for  sundry  additional 
subordinations  of  lower  to  higher:  co-operation  being 
made  possible  only  by  them.  To  the  restraints  consti- 
tuted by  mental  representations  of  the  intrinsic  effects 
of  actions,  which,  in  their  simpler  forms,  have  been 
evolving  from  the  beginning,  are  added  the  restraints 
caused  by  mental  representations  of  extrinsic  effects, 
in  the  shape  of  political,  religious,  and  social  pen- 
alties. 

With  the  evolution  of  society,  made  possible  by  in- 
stitutions maintaining  order,  and  associating  in  men's 
minds  the  sense  of  obligation  with  prescribed  acts  and 
with  desistances  from  forbidden  acts,  there  arose  oppor- 
tunities for  seeing  the  bad  consequences  naturally  flow- 
ing from  the  conduct  interdicted  and  the  good  conse- 
quences from  the  conduct  required.  Hence  eventually 
grew  up  moral  aversions  and  approvals :  experience  of 
the  intrinsic  effects  necessarily  here  coming  later  than 
experience  of  the  extrinsic  effects,  and  therefore  pro- 
ducing its  results  later. 

The  thoughts  and  feelings  constituting  these  moral 
aversions  and  approvals,  being  all  along  closely  con- 
nected with  the  thoughts  and  feelings  constituting 
fears  of  political,  religious,  and  social  penalties,  neces- 
sarily came  to  participate  in  the  accompanying  sense 
of  obligation.  Tlie  coercive  element  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  duties  at  large,  evolved  by  converse  with  ex- 
ternal agencies  which  enforce  duties,  diffused  itself  by 
association  tlirough  that  consciousness  of  duty,  prop- 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEtV. 


151 


erly  called  moral,  which  is  occupied  with  intrinsic 
results  instead  of  extrinsic  results. 

But  this  self-compulsion,  which  at  a  relatively  high 
stage  becomes  more  and  more  a  substitute  for  com- 
pulsion from  without,  must  itself,  at  a  still  higher 
stage,  practically  disappear.  If  some  action  to  which 
the  special  motive  is  insufficient,  is  performed  in 
obedience  to  the  feeling  of  moral  obligation,  the  fact 
proves  that  the  special  faculty  concerned  is  not  yet 
equal  to  its  function  —  has  not  acquired  such  strength 
that  the  required  activity  has  become  its  normal  activ- 
ity, yielding  its  due  amount  of  pleasure.  With  com- 
plete evolution  then,  the  sense  of  obligation,  not 
ordinarily  present  in  consciousness,  will  be  awakened 
only  on  those  extraordinary  occasions  that  prompt 
breach  of  the  laws  otherwise  spontaneously  conformed 
to. 

And  this  brings  us  to  the  psychological  aspect  of  that 
conclusion  which,  in  the  last  chapter,  was  reached 
under  its  biological  aspect.  The  pleasures  and  pains 
which  the  moral  sentiments  originate  will,  like  bodily 
pleasures  and  pains,  become  incentives  and  deterrents 
so  adjusted  in  their  strengths  to  the  needs  that  the 
moral  conduct  will  be  the  natural  conduct. 


152 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  VIIL 

THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 

§  49.  Not  for  the  human  race  only,  but  for  every 
race,  there  are  laws  of  right  living.  Given  its  envi- 
ronment and  its  structure,  and  there  is  for  each  kind 
of  creature  a  set  of  actions  adapted  in  their  kinds, 
amounts,  and  combinations,  to  secure  the  highest  con- 
servation its  nature  permits.  The  animal,  like  the 
man,  has  needs  for  food,  warmth,  activity,  rest,  and  so 
forth,  which  must  be  fulfilled  in  certain  relative  de- 
grees to  make  its  life  whole.  Maintenance  of  its  race 
implies  satisfaction  of  special  desires,  sexual  and  philo- 
progenitive, in  due  proportions.  Hence  there  is  a  sup- 
posable  formula  for  the  activities  of  each  species,  which, 
could  it  be  drawn  out,  would  constitute  a  system  of 
morality  for  that  species.  But  such  a  system  of  morality 
would  have  little  or  no  reference  to  the  welfare  of 
others  than  self  and  offspring.  Indifferent  to  individu- 
als of  its  own  kind,  as  an  inferior  creature  is,  and  habitu- 
ally hostile  to  individuals  of  other  kinds,  the  formula 
for  its  life  could  take  no  cognizance  of  the  lives  of 
those  with  which  it  came  in  contact ;  or,  rather,  such 
formula  would  imply  that  maintenance  of  its  life  was 
at  variance  with  maintenance  of  their  lives. 

But  on  ascending  from  beings  of  lower  kinds  to  the 
highest  kind  of  being,  man ;  or,  more  strictly,  on  ascend- 
ing from  man  in  his  pre-social  stage  to  man  in  his  social 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW, 


153 


stage,  the  formula  has  to  include  an  additional  factor. 
Though  not  peculiar  to  human  life  under  its  developed 
form,  the  presence  of  this  factor  is  still,  in  the  highest 
degree,  characteristic  of  it.  Though  there  are  inferior 
species  displaying  considerable  degrees  of  sociality,  and 
though  the  formulas  for  their  complete  lives  would  have 
to  take  account  of  the  relations  arising  from  union,  yet 
our  own  species  is,  on  the  whole,  to  be  distinguished  as 
having  a  formula  for  complete  life  which  specially  rec- 
ognizes the  relations  of  each  individual  to  others,  in 
presence  of  whom,  and  in  co-operation  with  whom,  he 
has  to  live. 

This  additional  factor  in  the  problem  of  complete 
living  is,  indeed,  so  important  that  the  necessitated 
modifications  of  conduct  have  come  to  form  a  chief 
part  of  the  code  of  conduct.  Because  the  inherited 
desires  which  directly  refer  to  the  maintenance  of 
individual  life  are  fairly  adjusted  to  the  requirements, 
there  has  been  no  need  to  insist  on  that  conformity 
to  them  which  furthers  self-conservation.  Conversely, 
because  these  desires  prompt  activities  that  often  con- 
flict with  the  activities  of  others ;  and  because  the  senti- 
ments responding  to  others'  claims  are  relatively  weak, 
moral  codes  emphasize  those  restraints  on  conduct 
which  the  presence  of  fellow-men  entails. 

From  the  sociological  point  of  view,  then,  Ethics 
becomes  nothing  else  than  a  definite  account  of  the 
forms  of  conduct  that  are  fitted  to  the  associated  state, 
in  such  wise  that  the  lives  of  each  and  all  may  be  the 
greatest  possible,  alike  in  length  and  breadth. 

§  50.  But  here  we  are  met  by  a  fact  which  forbids 
us  thus  to  put  in  the  foreground  the  welfares  of  citi- 


154 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


zens,  individually  considered,  and  requires  us  to  put  in 
the  foreground  the  welfare  of  the  society  as  a  whole. 
The  life  of  the  social  organism  must,  as  an  end,  rank 
above  the  lives  of  its  units.  These  two  ends  are  not 
harmonious  at  the  outset ;  and,  though  the  tendency  is 
toward  harmonization  of  them,  they  are  still  partially 
conflicting. 

As  fast  as  the  social  state  establishes  itself,  the 
preservation  of  the  society  becomes  a  means  of  pre- 
serving its  units.  Living  together  arose  because,  on 
the  average,  it  proved  more  advantageous  to  each  than 
living  apart;  and  this  implies  that  maintenance  of 
combination  is  maintenance  of  the  conditions  to  more 
satisfactory  living  than  the  combined  persons  would 
otherwise  have.  Hence,  social  self-preservation  be- 
comes a  proximate  aim  taking  precedence  of  the 
ultimate  aim,  individual  self-preservation. 

This  subordination  of  personal  to  social  welfare  is, 
however,  contingent:  it  depends  on  the  presence  of 
antagonistic  societies.  So  long  as  the  existence  of  a 
communitj^  is  endangered  by  the  actions  of  communi- 
ties around,  it  must  remain  true  that  the  interests  of 
individuals  must  be  sacrificed  to  the  interests  of  the 
community,  as  far  as  is  needful  for  the  community's 
salvation.  But  if  this  is  manifest,  it  is,  by  implication, 
manifest,  that  when  social  antagonisms  cease,  this  need 
for  sacrifice  of  private  claims  to  public  claims  ceases 
also ;  or  rather,  there  cease  to  be  any  public  claims  at 
variance  with  private  claims.  All  along,  furtherance 
of  individual  lives  has  been  the  ultimate  end ;  and,  if 
this  ultimate  end  has  been  postponed  to  the  proximate 
end  of  preserving  the  community's  life,  it  has  been  so 
only  because  this  proximate  end  was  instrumental  to 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


155 


the  ultimate  end.  When  the  aggregate  is  no  longer  in 
danger,  the  final  object  of  pursuit,  the  welfare  of  the 
units,  no  longer  needing  to  be  postponed,  becomes  the 
immediate  object  of  pursuit. 

Consequently,  unlike  sets  of  conclusions  respecting 
human  conduct  emerge,  according  as  we  are  concerned 
with  a  state  of  habitual  or  occasional  war,  or  are  con- 
cerned with  a  state  of  permanent  and  general  peace. 
Let  us  glance  at  these  alternative  states  and  the 
alternative  implications. 

§  51.  At  present  the  individual  man  has  to  carry  on 
his  life  with  due  regard  to  the  lives  of  others  belong- 
ing to  the  same  society ;  while  he  is  sometimes  called 
on  to  be  regardless  of  the  lives  of  those  belonging  to 
other  societies.  The  same  mental  constitution,  having 
to  fulfil  both  these  requirements,  is  necessarily  incon- 
gruous; and  the  correlative  conduct,  adjusted  first  to 
the  one  need  and  then  to  the  other,  cannot  be  brought 
within  any  consistent  ethical  system. 

Hate  and  destroj^  your  fellow-man,  is  now  the  com- 
mand; and  then  the  command  is,  Love  and  aid  your 
fellow-man.  Use  every  means  to  deceive,  says  the  one 
code  of  conduct ;  while  the  other  code  says.  Be  truth- 
ful in  word  and  deed.  Seize  what  property  you  can, 
and  burn  all  you  cannot  take  away,  are  injunctions 
which  the  religion  of  enmity  countenances ;  while  by 
the  religion  of  amity,  theft  and  arson  are  condemned 
as  crimes.  And  as  conduct  has  to  be  made  up  of  parts 
thus  at  variance  with  one  another,  the  theory  of  con- 
duct remains  confused. 

There  co-exists  a  kindred  irreconcilability  between 
the  sentiments  answering  to  the  forms  of  co-operation 


156 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


required  for  militancy  and  industrialism  respectively. 
While  social  antagonisms  are  habitual,  and  while,  for 
efficient  action  against  other  societies,  there  needs  great 
subordination  to  men  who  command,  the  virtue  of 
loyalty  and  the  duty  of  implicit  obedience  have  to  be 
insisted  on;  disregard  of  the  ruler's  will  is  punished 
with  death.  But  when  war  ceases  to  be  chronic, 
and  growing  industrialism  habituates  men  to  maintain- 
ing their  own  claims  while  respecting  the  claims  of 
others,  loyalty  becomes  less  profound,  the  authority  of 
the  ruler  is  questioned  or  denied  in  respect  of  various 
private  actions  and  beliefs.  State  dictation  is  in  many 
directions  successfully  defied,  and  the  political  inde- 
pendence of  the  citizen  comes  to  be  regarded  as  a 
claim  which  it  is  virtuous  to  maintain  and  vicious  to 
yield  up.  Necessarily,  during  the  transition,  these 
opposite  sentiments  are  incongruously  mingled. 

So  is  it,  too,  with  domestic  institutions  under  the 
two  regimes.  While  the  first  is  dominant,  ownership 
of  a  slave  is  honorable,  and  in  the  slave  submission  is 
praiseworthy;  but  as  the  last  grows  dominant,  slave- 
owning  becomes  a  crime,  and  servile  obedience  excites 
contempt.  Nor  is  it  otherwise  in  the  family.  The 
subjection  of  women  to  men,  complete  while  war  is 
habitual,  but  qualified  as  fast  as  peaceful  occupations 
replace  it,  comes  eventually  to  be  thought  wrong,  and 
equality  before  the  law  is  asserted.  At  the  same  time 
the  opinion  concerning  paternal  power  changes.  The 
once  unquestioned  right  of  the  father  to  take  his 
children's  lives  is  denied,  and  the  duty  of  absolute  sub- 
mission to  him,  long  insisted  on,  is  changed  into  the 
duty  of  obedience  within  reasonable  limits. 

Were  the  ratio  between  the  life  of  antagonism  with 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


157 


alien  societies,  and  the  life  of  peaceful  co-operation 
within  each  society,  a  constant  ratio,  some  permanent 
compromise  between  the  conflicting  rules  of  conduct 
appropriate  to  the  two  lives  might  be  reached.  But 
since  this  ratio  is  a  variable  one,  the  compromise  can 
never  be  more  than  temporary.  Ever  the  tendencj^  is 
toward  congruity  between  beliefs  and  requirements. 
Either  the  social  arrangements  are  gradually  changed 
until  they  come  into  harmony  with  prevailing  ideas 
and  sentiments ;  or,  if  surrounding  conditions  prevent 
change  in  the  social  arrangements,  the  necessitated 
habits  of  life  modify  the  prevailing  ideas  and  senti- 
ments to  the  requisite  extent.  Hence,  for  each  kind 
and  degree  of  social  evolution  determined  by  external 
conflict  and  internal  friendship,  there  is  an  appropriate 
compromise  between  the  moral  code  of  enmity  and 
the  moral  code  of  amity ;  not,  indeed,  a  definable, 
consistent  compromise,  but  a  compromise  fairly  well 
understood. 

This  compromise,  vague,  ambiguous,  illogical  though 
it  may  be,  is  nevertheless  for  the  time  being  authori- 
tative. For  if,  as  above  shown,  the  welfare  of  the 
society  must  take  precedence  of  the  welfares  of  its 
component  individuals,  during  those  stages  in  which 
the  individuals  have  to  preserve  themselves  by  preserv- 
ing their  society,  then  such  temporary  compromise 
between  the  two  codes  of  conduct  as  duly  regards 
external  defence,  while  favoring  internal  co-operation 
to  the  greatest  extent  practicable,  subserves  the  main- 
tenance of  life  in  the  highest  degree ;  and  thus  gains 
the  ultimate  sanction.  So  that  the  perplexed  and 
inconsistent  moralities  of  which  each  society  and  each 
age  shows  us  a  more  or  less  different  one,  are  severally 


158 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


justified  as  being  approximately  the  best  under  the 
circumstances. 

But  such  moralities  are,  by  their  definitions,  shown 
to  belong  to  incomplete  conduct ;  not  to  conduct  that 
is  fully  evolved.  We  saw  that  the  adjustments  of  acts 
to  ends  which,  while  constituting  tlie  external  manifes- 
tations of  life,  conduce  to  the  continuance  of  life,  have 
been  rising  to  a  certain  ideal  form  now  approached  by 
the  civilized  man.  But  this  form  is  not  reached  so  long 
as  there  continue  aggressions  of  one  society  upon 
another.  Whether  the  hinderances  to  complete  living 
result  from  the  trespasses  of  fellow-citizens,  or  from  the 
trespasses  of  aliens,  matters  not ;  if  they  occur  there 
does  not  yet  exist  the  state  defined.  The  limit  to  the 
evolution  of  conduct  is  arrived  at  by  members  of  each 
society  only  when,  being  arrived  at  by  members  of  other 
societies  also,  the  causes  of  international  antagonism  end 
simultaneously  with  the  causes  of  antagonism  between 
individuals. 

And  now  having  from  the  sociological  point  of  view 
recognized  the  need  for,  and  authority  of,  these  chan- 
ging systems  of  ethics,  proper  to  changing  ratios  between 
warlike  activities  and  peaceful  activities,  we  have,  from 
the  same  point  of  view,  to  consider  the  system  of  ethics 
proper  to  the  state  in  which  peaceful  activities  are 
undisturbed. 

§  62.  If,  excluding  all  thought  of  danger  or  hinder- 
ances from  causes  external  to  a  society,  we  set  ourselves 
to  specify  those  conditions  under  which  the  life  of  each 
person,  and  therefore  of  the  aggregate,  may  be  the 
greatest  possible,  we  come  upon  certain  simple  ones 
which,  as  here  stated,  assume  the  form  of  truisms. 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


159 


For,  as  we  have  seen,  the  definition  of  that  highest 
life  accompanying  completely  evolved  conduct,  itself 
excludes  all  acts  of  aggression  —  not  only  murder, 
assault,  robbery,  and  the  major  offences  generally,  but 
minor  offences,  such  as  libel,  injury  to  property,  and  so 
forth.  While  directly  deducting  from  individual  life, 
these  indirectly  cause  perturbations  of  social  life. 
Trespasses  against  others  rouse  antagonisms  in  them ; 
and  if  these  are  numerous,  the  group  loses  coherence. 
Hence,  whether  the  integrity  of  the  group  itself  is 
considered  as  the  end,  or  whether  the  end  considered  is 
the  benefit  ultimately  secured  to  its  units  by  maintain- 
ing its  integrity,  or  whether  the  immediate  benefit  of 
its  units  taken  separately  is  considered  the  end,  the 
implication  is  the  same :  such  acts  are  at  variance  with 
achievement  of  the  end.  That  these  inferences  are 
self-evident  and  trite  (as  indeed  the  first  inferences 
drawn  from  the  data  of  every  science  that  reaches  the 
deductive  stage  naturally  are),  must  not  make  us  pass 
liglitly  over  the  all-important  fact  that,  from  the  socio- 
logical point  of  view,  the  leading  moral  laws  are  seen 
to  follow  as  corollaries  from  the  definition  of  complete 
life  carried  on  under  social  conditions. 

Respect  for  these  primary  moral  laws  is  not  enough, 
however.  Associated  men  pursuing  their  several  lives 
without  injuring  one  another  but  without  helping  one 
another,  reap  no  advantages  from  association  beyond 
those  of  companionship.  If,  while  there  is  no  co- 
operation for  defensive  purposes  (which  is  here  ex- 
cluded by  the  hypothesis)  there  is  also  no  co-operation 
for  satisfying  wants,  the  social  state  loses  its  raison 
d'etre  —  almost,  if  not  entirely.  There  are,  indeed, 
people  who  live  in  a  condition  little  removed  from 


160 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


tliis  :  as  the  Esquimaux.  But  though  these,  exhibiting 
none  of  the  co-operation  necessitated  by  war,  which  is 
unknown  to  them,  lead  lives  such  that  each  family  is 
substantially  independent  of  others,  occasional  co-opera- 
tion occurs.  And,  indeed,  that  families  should  live  in 
company  without  ever  yielding  mutual  aid,  is  scarcely 
conceivable. 

Nevertheless,  whether  actually  existing  or  only 
approached,  we  must  here  recognize  as  hypothetically 
possible  a  state  in  which  these  primary  moral  laws  are 
conformed  to ;  for  the  purpose  of  observing,  in  their 
uncomplicated  forms,  what  are  the  negative  conditions 
to  harmonious  social  life.  Whether  the  members  of  a 
social  group  do  or  do  not  co-operate,  certain  limitations 
to  their  individual  activities  are  necessitated  by  their 
association ;  and,  after  recognizing  these  as  arising  in 
the  absence  of  co-operation,  we  shall  be  the  better  pre- 
pared to  understand  how  conformity  to  them  is  effected 
when  co-operation  begins. 

§  53.  For,  whether  men  live  together  in  quite  inde- 
pendent ways,  careful  only  to  avoid  aggressing ;  or 
whether,  advancing  from  passive  association  to  active 
association,  they  co-operate,  their  conduct  must  be  such 
that  the  achievement  of  ends  by  each  shall  at  least  not 
be  hindered.  And  it  becomes  obvious  that  when  they 
co-operate  there  must  not  only  be  no  resulting  hinder- 
ance,  but  there  must  be  facilitation ;  since,  in  the 
absence  of  facilitation,  there  can  be  no  motive  to  co- 
operate. What  shape,  then,  must  the  mutual  restraints 
take  when  co-operation  begins  ?  or  rather  —  What,  in 
addition  to  the  primary  mutual  restraints  already  speci- 
fied, are  tliose  sc^condary  mutual  restraints  required  to 
make  co-operation  possible? 


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161 


One  who,  living  in  an  isolated  way,  expends  effort  in 
pursuit  of  an  end,  gets  compensation  for  the  effort  by 
securing  the  end,  and  so  achieves  satisfaction.  If  he 
expends  the  effort  without  achieving  the  end,  there 
results  dissatisfaction.  The  satisfaction  and  the  dis- 
satisfaction are  measures  of  success  and  failure  in  life- 
sustaining  acts;  since  that  which  is  achieved  by  effort 
is  something  which  directly  or  indirectly  furthers  life, 
and  so  pays  for  the  cost  of  the  effort ;  while  if  the  effort 
fails  there  is  nothing  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  it,  and  so 
much  life  is  wasted.  What  must  result  from  this  when 
men's  efforts  are  joined  ?  The  reply  will  be  made  clearer 
if  we  take  the  successive  forms  of  co-operation  in  the 
order  of  ascending  complexity.  We  may  distinguish 
as  homogeneous  co-operation  (1)  that  in  which  like 
efforts  are  joined  for  like  ends  that  are  simultaneously 
enjoyed.  As  co-operation  that  is  not  completely  homo- 
geneous we  may  distinguish  (2)  that  in  which  like 
efforts  are  joined  for  like  ends  that  are  not  simultane- 
ously enjoyed.  A  co-operation  of  which  the  hetero- 
geneity is  more  distinct  is  (3)  that  in  which  unlike 
efforts  are  joined  for  like  ends.  And  lastly  comes  the 
decidedly  heterogeneous  co-operation  (4),  that  in  which 
unlike  efforts  are  joined  for  unlike  ends. 

The  simplest  and  earliest  of  these  in  which  men's 
powers,  similar  in  kind  and  degree,  are  united  in  pursuit 
of  a  benefit  which,  when  obtained,  they  all  participate 
in,  is  most  familiarly  exemplified  in  the  catching  of 
game  by  primitive  men :  this  simplest  and  earliest  form 
of  industrial  co-operation  being  also  that  which  is  least 
differentiated  from  militant  co-operation ;  for  the  co- 
operators  are  the  same,  and  the  processes,  both  destruc- 
tive of  life,  are  carried  on  in  analogous  ways.  The 


162 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


condition  under  which  such  co-operation  may  be  sue 
cessfuUy  carried  on  is  that  the  co-operators  shall  share 
alike  in  the  produce.  Each  thus  being  enabled  to 
repay  himself  in  food  for  the  expended  effort,  and 
being  further  enabled  to  achieve  other  such  desired 
ends  as  maintenance  of  family,  obtains  satisfaction : 
there  is  no  aggression  of  one  on  another,  and  the  co- 
operation is  harmonious.  Of  course  the  divided  prod- 
uce can  be  but  roughly  proportioned  to  the  several 
efforts  joined  in  obtaining  it,  but  there  is  actually 
among  savages,  as  we  see  that  for  harmonious  co-opera- 
tion there  must  be,  a  recognition  of  the  principle  that 
efforts  when  combined  shall  severally  bring  equivalent 
benefits,  as  they  would  do  if  they  were  separate.  More- 
over, beyond  the  taking  equal  shares  in  return  for 
labors  that  are  approximately  equal,  there  is  generally 
an  attempt  at  proportioning  benefit  to  achievement,  by 
assigning  something  extra,  in  the  shape  of  the  best  part 
of  the  troph}",  to  the  actual  slayer  of  the  game.  And 
obviously,  if  there  is  a  wide  departure  from  this  system 
of  sharing  benefits  when  there  has  been  a  sharing  of 
efforts,  the  co-operation  will  cease.  Individual  hunters 
will  prefer  to  do  the  best  they  can  for  themselves  sepa- 
rately. 

Passing  from  this  simplest  case  of  co-operation  to  a 
case  not  quite  so  simple  —  a  case  in  which  the  homo- 
geneity is  incomplete  —  let  us  ask  how  a  member  of 
the  group  may  be  led  without  dissatisfaction  to  expend 
effort  in  achieving  a  benefit  which,  when  achieved,  is 
enjoyed  exclusively  by  another?  Clearly  he  may  do 
this  on  condition  that  the  other  shall  afterward  expend 
a  like  effort,  the  beneficial  result  of  which  sliall  be 
similarly  rendered  up  by  him  in  return.     This  ex- 


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163 


change  of  equivalents  of  effort  is  the  form  which  social 
co-operation  takes  while  yet  there  is  little  or  no  divis- 
ion of  labor,  save  that  between  the  sexes.  For  exam- 
ple, the  Boclo  and  Dliimals  ''mutually  assist  each 
other  for  the  nonce,  as  well  in  constructing  their 
houses  as  in  clearing  their  plots  for  cultivation."  And 
this  principle  —  I  will  help  you  if  you  will  help  me  — 
common  in  simple  communities  where  the  occupations 
are  alike  in  kind,  and  occasionally  acted  upon  in  more 
advanced  communities,  is  one  under  which  the  relation 
between  effort  and  benefit,  no  longer  directly  main- 
tained, is  maintained  indirectly.  For,  whereas  when 
men's  activities  are  carried  on  separately,  or  are  joined 
in  the  way  exemplified  above,  effort  is  immediately 
paid  for  by  benefit,  in  this  form  of  co-operation  the 
benefit  achieved  by  effort  is  exchanged  for  a  like  bene- 
fit to  be  afterward  received  when  asked  for.  And  in 
this  case  as  in  the  preceding  case,  co-operation  can  be 
maintained  only  by  fulfilment  of  the  tacit  agreements. 
For  if  they  are  habitually  not  fulfilled,  there  will 
commonly  be  refusal  to  give  aid  when  asked ;  and  each 
man  Avill  be  left  to  do  the  best  he  can  by  himself.  All 
those  advantages  to  be  gained  by  union  of  efforts  in 
doing  things  that  are  beyond  the  powers  of  the  single 
individual,  Avill  be  unachievable.  At  the  outset,  then, 
fulfilment  of  contracts  that  are  implied,  if  not  expressed, 
becomes  a  condition  to  social  co-operation,  and  there- 
fore to  social  development. 

From  these  simple  forms  of  co-operation  in  which 
the  labors  men  carry  on  are  of  like  Ivinds,  let  us  turn 
to  the  more  complex  forms  in  whicli  they  carry  on 
labors  of  unlike  kinds.  Where  men  mutually  aid  in 
building  huts  or  felling  trees,  the  number  of  days' 


164 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


work  now  given  by  one  to  another  is  readily  balanced 
by  an  equal  number  of  days'  work  afterward  given  by 
the  other  to  him.  And  no  estimation  of  the  relative 
values  of  the  labors  being  required,  a  definite  under- 
standing is  little  needed.  But  when  division  of  labor 
arises  —  when  there  come  transactions  between  one 
who  makes  weapons  and  another  who  dresses  skins  for 
clothing,  or  between  a  grower  of  roots  and  a  catcher  of 
fish  —  neither  the  relative  amounts  nor  the  relative 
qualities  of  their  labors  admit  of  easy  measure ;  and 
with  the  multiplication  of  businesses,  implying  numer- 
ous kinds  of  skill  and  power,  there  ceases  to  be 
anything  like  manifest  equivalence  between  either  the 
bodily  and  mental  efforts  set  against  one  another,  or 
between  their  products.  Hence  the  arrangement  can- 
not now  be  taken  for  granted,  as  while  the  things 
exchanged  are  like  in  kind :  it  has  to  be  stated.  If  A 
allows  B  to  appropriate  a  product  of  his  special  skill, 
on  condition  that  he  is  allowed  to  appropriate  a  differ- 
ent product  of  B's  special  skill,  it  results  that  as 
equivalence  of  the  two  products  cannot  be  determined 
by  direct  comparison  of  their  quantities  and  qualities, 
there  must  be  a  distinct  understanding  as  to  how  much 
of  the  one  may  be  taken  in  consideration  of  so  much  of 
the  other. 

Only  under  voluntary  agreement,  then,  no  longer 
tacit  and  vague,  but  overt  and  definite,  can  co-opera- 
tion be  harmoniously  carried  on  when  division  of  labor 
becomes  established.  And  as  in  the  simplest  co-opera- 
tion, where  like  efforts  are  joined  to  secure  a  common 
good,  the  dissatisfaction  caused  in  those  who,  having 
expended  their  labors,  do  not  get  their  shares  of  the 
good,  prompts  them  to  cease  co-operating;  as  in  the 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


165 


more  advanced  co-operation,  achieved  by  exchanging 
equal  labors  of  like  kind  expended  at  diiferent  times, 
aversion  to  co-operate  is  generated  if  the  expected 
equivalent  of  labor  is  not  rendered;  so  in  this  devel- 
oped co-operation,  the  failure  of  either  to  surrender  to 
the  other  that  which  was  avowedly  recognized  as  of 
like  value  with  the  labor  or  product  given,  tends  to 
prevent  co-operation  by  exciting  discontent  with  its 
results.  And  evidently,  while  antagonisms  thus  caused 
impede  the  lives  of  the  units,  the  life  of  the  aggregate 
is  endangered  by  diminished  cohesion. 

§  54.  Beyond  these  comparatively  direct  mischiefs, 
special  and  general,  there  have  to  be  noted  indirect 
mischiefs.  As  already  implied  by  the  reasoning  in  the 
last  paragraph,  not  only  social  integration  but  also  social 
differentiation  is  hindered  by  breach  of  contract. 

In  Part  II.  of  the  Principles  of  Sociology^  it  was 
shown  that  the  fundamental  principles  of  organization 
are  the  same  for  an  individual  organism  and  for  a  social 
organism ;  because  both  consist  of  mutually  dependent 
parts.  In  the  one  case  as  in  the  other,  the  assumption 
of  unlike  activities  by  the  component  members  is  pos- 
sible only  on  condition  that  they  severally  benefit  in 
due  degrees  by  one  another's  activities.  That  we  may 
the  better  see  what  are  the  implications  in  respect  of 
social  structures,  let  us  first  note  the  implications  in 
respect  of  individual  structures. 

The  welfare  of  a  living  body  implies  an  approximate 
equilibrium  between  waste  and  repair.  If  the  activities 
involve  an  expenditure  not  made  good  by  nu.trition, 
dwindling  follows.  If  the  tissues  are  enabled  to  take  up 
from  the  blood  enriched  by  food,  fit  substances  enough 


166 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


to  replace  those  used  up  in  efforts  made,  the  weight 
may  be  maintained.  And  if  the  gain  exceeds  the  loss, 
growth  results. 

That  which  is  true  of  the  whole  in  its  relations  to 
the  external  world,  is  no  less  true  of  the  parts  in  their 
relations  to  one  another.  Each  organ,  like  the  entire 
organism,  is  wasted  by  performing  its  function,  and 
has  to  restore  itself  from  the  materials  brought  to  it. 
If  the  quantity  of  materials  furnished  by  the  joint 
agency  of  the  other  organs  is  deficient,  the  particular 
organ  dwindles.  If  they  are  sufficient,  it  can  maintain 
its  integrity.  If  they  are  in  excess,  it  is  enabled  to 
increase.  To  say  that  this  arrangement  constitutes  the 
physiological  contract,  is  to  use  a  metaphor  which, 
though  not  true  in  aspect,  is  true  in  essence.  For  the 
relations  of  structures  are  actually  such  that,  by  the 
help  of  a  central  regulative  system,  each  organ  is  sup- 
plied with  blood  in  proportion  to  the  work  it  does. 
As  was  pointed  out  (^Principles  of  Sociology^  §  254) 
well-developed  animals  are  so  constituted  that  each 
muscle  or  viscus,  when  called  into  action,  sends  to  the 
vaso-motor  centres,  through  certain  nerve-fibres,  an  im- 
pulse caused  by  its  action ;  whereupon,  through  other 
nerve-fibres,  there  comes  an  impulse  causing  dilatation 
of  its  blood-vessels.  That  is  to  say,  all  other  parts  of 
the  organism,  when  they  jointly  require  it  to  labor, 
forthwith  begin  to  pay  it  in  blood.  During  the  ordi- 
nary state  of  physiological  equilibrium,  the  loss  and  the 
gain  balance,  and  the  organ  does  not  sensibly  change. 
If  the  amount  of  its  function  is  increased  within  such 
moderate  limits  that  the  local  blood-vessels  can  bring 
adequately-increased  supplies,  the  organ  grows :  beyond 
replacing  its  losses  by  its  gains,  it  makes  a  profit  on  its 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


167 


extra  transactions ;  so  being  enabled  by  extra  structures 
to  meet  extra  demands.  But  if  the  demands  made  on 
it  become  so  great  that  the  supply  of  materials  cannot 
keep  pace  with  the  expenditure,  either  because  the 
local  blood-vessels  are  not  large  enough,  or  for  any 
other  reason,  then  the  organ  begins  to  decrease  from 
excess  of  waste  over  repair :  there  sets  in  what  is  known 
as  atrophy.  Now,  since  each  of  the  organs  has  thus  to 
be  paid  in  nutriment  for  its  services  by  the  rest,  it  fol- 
lows that  the  due  balancing  of  their  respective  claims 
and  payments  is  requisite,  directly  for  the  welfare  of 
each  organ,  and  indirectly  for  the  welfare  of  the  organ- 
ism. For,  in  a  whole  formed  of  mutually  dependent 
parts,  anything  which  prevents  due  performance  of  its 
duty  by  one  part  reacts  injuriously  on  all  the  parts. 

With  change  of  terms  these  statements  and  infer- 
ences hold  of  a  society.  That  social  division  of  labor 
which  parallels  in  so  many  other  respects  the  physio- 
logical division  of  labor,  parallels  it  in  this  respect  also. 
As  was  shown  at  large  in  the  Principles  of  Sociology^ 
Part  II.,  each  order  of  functionaries  and  each  group  of 
producers,  severally  performing  some  action  or  making 
some  article  not  for  direct  satisfaction  of  their  own 
needs  but  for  satisfaction  of  the  needs  of  fellow-citizens 
in  general,  otherwise  occupied,  can  continue  to  do  this 
only  so  long  as  the  expenditures  of  efforts  and  returns 
of  profit  are  approximately  equivalent.  Social  organs, 
like  individual  organs,  remain  stationary  if  there  come 
to  them  normal  proportions  of  the  commodities  pro- 
duced by  the  society  as  a  whole.  If,  because  the 
demands  made  on  an  industry  or  profession  are  un- 
usually great,  those  engaged  in  it  make  excessive 
profits,  more  citizens  flock  to  it,  and  the  social  struc- 


168 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHIPS. 


ture  coiistituted  by  its  members  grows ;  while  decrease 
of  the  demands,  and  therefore  of  the  profits,  either 
leads  its  members  to  choose  other  careers  or  stops  the 
accessions  needful  to  replace  those  who  die,  and  the 
structure  dwindles.  Thus  is  maintained  that  propor- 
tion among  the  powers  of  the  component  parts  which  is 
most  conducive  to  the  welfare  of  the  whole. 

And  now  mark  that  the  primary  condition  to  achieve- 
ment of  this  result  is  fulfilment  of  contract.  If  from 
the  members  of  any  part  payment  is  frequently  with- 
held, or  falls  short  of  the  promised  amount,  then, 
through  ruin  of  some,  and  abandonment  of  the  occupa- 
tion by  others,  the  part  diminishes ;  and  if  it  was 
before  not  more  tlian  competent  to  its  duty,  it  now 
becomes  incompetent,  and  the  society  suffers.  Or  if 
social  needs  throw  on  some  part  great  increase  of 
function,  and  the  members  of  it  are  enabled  to  get  for 
their  services  unusually  high  prices ;  fulfilment  of  the 
agreements  to  give  them  these  high  prices,  is  the  only 
way  of  drawing  to  the  part  such  additional  number  of 
members  as  will  make  it  equal  to  the  augmented  de- 
mands. For  citizens  will  not  come  to  it  if  they  find 
the  high  prices  agreed  uj^on  are  not  paid. 

Briefly  then,  the  universal  basis  of  co-operation  is 
the  proportioning  of  benefits  received  to  services  ren- 
dered. Without  this  there  can  be  no  physiological 
division  of  labor;  without  this  there  can  be  no  socio- 
logical division  of  labor.  And  since  division  of  labor, 
physiological  or  sociological,  profits  the  whole  and  each 
part;  it  results  that  on  maintenance  of  the  arrange- 
ments necessary  to  it,  depend  both  special  and  general 
welfare.  In  a  society  such  arrangements  are  maintained 
only  if  l)argains,  overt  or  tacit,  are  carried  out.  So 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


169 


that  beyond  the  primary  requirement  to  harmonious 
co-existence  in  a  society,  that  its  units  shall  not  directly 
aggress  on  one  another;  there  comes  this  secondary 
requirement,  that  they  shall  not  indirectly  aggress  by 
breaking  agreements. 

§  55.  But  now  we  have  to  recognize  the  fact  that 
complete  fulfilment  of  these  conditions,  original  and 
derived,  is  not  enough.  Social  co-operation  may  be 
such  that  no  one  is  impeded  in  the  obtainment  of  the 
normal  return  for  effort,  but  contrariwise  is  aided  by 
equitable  exchange  of  services ;  and  yet  much  may 
remain  to  be  achieved.  There  is  a  theoretically  possi- 
ble form  of  society,  purely  industrial  in  its  activities, 
which,  though  approaching  nearer  to  the  moral  ideal 
in  its  code  of  conduct  than  any  society  not  purely 
industrial,  does  not  fully  reach  it. 

For  while  industrialism  requires  the  life  of  each 
citizen  to  be  such  that  it  may  be  carried  on  without 
direct  or  indirect  aggressions  on  other  citizens,  it  does 
not  require  his  life  to  be  such  that  it  shall  directly 
further  the  lives  of  other  citizens.  It  is  not  a  neces- 
sary implication  of  industrialism,  as  thus  far  defined, 
that  each,  beyond  the  benefits  given  and  received  by 
exchange  of  services,  shall  give  and  receive  other 
benefits.  A  society  is  conceivable  formed  of  men 
leading  perfectly  inoffensive  lives,  scrupulously  fulfill- 
ing their  contracts,  and  efficiently  rearing  their  off- 
spring, Avho  yet,  yielding  to  one  another  no  advantages 
beyond  those  agreed  upon,  fall  short  of  that  highest 
degree  of  life  which  the  gratuitous  rendering  of  serv- 
ices makes  possible.  Daily  experiences  prove  that 
every  one  would  suffer  many  evils  and  lose  many  goods 


170 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


did  none  give  him  unpaid  assistance.  The  life  of  each 
would  be  more  or  less  damaged  had  he  to  meet  all 
contingencies  single-handed.  Further,  if  no  one  did 
for  his  fellows  anything  more  than  was  required  by 
strict  performance  of  contract,  private  interests  would 
suffer  from  the  absence  of  attention  to  public  interests. 
The  limit  of  evolution  of  conduct  is  consequently  not 
reached,  until,  beyond  avoidance  of  direct  and  indirect 
injuries  to  others,  there  are  spontaneous  efforts  to 
further  the  welfare  of  others. 

It  may  be  shown  that  the  form  of  nature  which  thus 
to  justice  adds  beneficence,  is  one  which  adaption  to 
the  social  state  produces.  The  social  man  has  not 
reached  that  harmonization  of  constitution  with  condi- 
tions forming  the  limit  of  evolution,  so  long  as  there 
remains  space  for  the  growth  of  faculties  which,  by 
their  exercise,  bring  positive  benefit  to  others  and  sat- 
isfaction to  self.  If  the  presence  of  fellow-men,  while 
putting  certain  limits  to  each  man's  sphere  of  activity, 
opens  certain  other  spheres  of  activity  in  which  feelings, 
while  achieving  their  gratifications,  do  not  diminish,  but 
add  to  the  gratifications  of  others,  then  such  spheres 
will  inevitably  be  occupied.  Recognition  of  this  truth 
does  not,  however,  call  on  us  to  qualify  greatly  that 
conception  of  the  industrial  state  above  set  forth,  since 
sympathy  is  the  root  of  both  justice  and  beneficence. 

§  56.  Thus  the  sociological  view  of  Ethics  supple- 
ments the  pliysical,  the  biological,  and  the  psychologi- 
cal views,  by  disclosing  those  conditions  under  which 
only  associated  activities  can  be  so  carried  on,  that  the 
complete  living  of  each  consists  with,  and  conduces  to, 
the  complete  living  of  all. 


THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW, 


171 


At  first  the  welfare  of  social  groups,  habitually  in 
antagonism  with  other  such  groups,  takes  precedence 
of  individual  welfare ;  and  the  rules  of  conduct  which 
are  authoritative  for  the  time  being,  involve  incom- 
pleteness of  individual  life  that  the  general  life  may  be 
maintained.  At  the  same  time  the  rules  have  to  en- 
force the  claims  of  individual  life  as  far  as  may  be, 
since  on  the  welfare  of  the  units  the  welfare  of  the 
aggregate  largely  depends. 

In  proportion  as  societies  endanger  one  another  less, 
the  need  for  subordinating  individual  lives  to  the  gen- 
eral life,  decreases ;  and  with  approach  to  a  peaceful 
state,  the  general  life,  having  from  the  beginning  had 
furtherance  of  individual  lives  as  its  ultimate  purpose, 
comes  to  have  this  as  its  proximate  purpose. 

During  the  transitional  stages  there  are  necessitated 
successive  compromises  between  the  moral  code  which 
asserts  the  claims  of  the  society  versus  those  of  the 
individual,  and  the  moral  code  which  asserts  the  claims 
of  the  individual  versus  those  of  the  society.  And 
evidently  each  such  compromise,  though  for  the  time 
being  authoritative,  admits  of  no  consistent  or  definite 
expression. 

But  gradually  as  war  declines  —  gradually  as  the 
compulsory  co-operation  needful  in  dealing  with  ex- 
ternal enemies  becomes  unnecessary,  and  leaves  behind 
the  voluntary  co-operation  which  effectually  achieves 
internal  sustentation,  there  grows  increasingly  clear  the 
code  of  conduct  which  voluntary  co-operation  implies. 
And  this  final  permanent  code  alone  admits  of  being 
definitely  formulated,  and  so  constituting  ethics  as  a 
science  in  contrast  with  empirical  ethics. 

The  leading  traits  of  a  code,  under  which  complete 


1T2 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


living  through  voluntary  co-operation  is  secured,  may- 
be simply  stated.  The  fundamental  requirement  is 
that  the  life-sustaining  actions  of  each  shall  severally 
bring  him  the  amounts  and  kinds  of  advantage  natu- 
rally achieved  by  them,  and  this  implies  firstly  that  he 
shall  suffer  no  direct  aggressions  on  his  person  or  prop- 
erty, and,  secondly,  that  he  shall  suffer  no  indirect 
aggressions  by  breach  of  contract.  Observance  of  these 
negative  conditions  to  voluntary  co-operation  having 
facilitated  life  to  the  greatest  extent  by  exchange  of 
services  under  agreement,  life  is  to  be  further  facilitated 
by  exchange  of  services  beyond  agreement :  the  highest 
life  being  reached  only  when,  besides  helping  to  com- 
plete one  another's  lives  by  specified  reciprocities  of  aid, 
men  otherwise  help  to  complete  one  another's  lives. 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS.  173 


CHAPTER  IX. 

CKITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS. 

§  57.  Comparisons  of  the  foregoing  chapters,  with 
one  another,  suggest  sundry  questions  which  must  be 
answered  partially,  if  not  completely,  before  anything 
can  be  done  toward  reducing  ethical  principles  from 
abstract  forms  to  concrete  forms. 

We  have  seen  that  to  admit  the  desirableness  of 
conscious  existence  is  to  admit  that  conduct  should  be 
such  as  will  produce  a  consciousness  which  is  desira- 
ble —  a  consciousness  which  is  as  much  pleasurable  and 
as  little  painful  as  may  be.  We  have  also  seen  that 
this  necessary  implication  corresponds  with  the  d  priori 
inference,  that  the  evolution  of  life  has  been  made 
possible  only  by  the  establishment  of  connections  be- 
tween pleasures  and  beneficial  actions,  and  between 
pains  and  detrimental  actions.  But  the  general  conclu- 
sion reached  in  both  of  these  Avays,  though  it  covers 
the  area  within  which  our  special  conclusions  must  fall, 
does  not  help  us  to  reach  those  special  conclusions. 

Were  pleasures  all  of  one  kind,  differing  only  in 
degree  ;  were  pains  all  of  one  kind,  differing  only  in  de- 
gree ;  and  could  pleasures  be  measured  against  pains 
with  definite  results,  the  problems  of  conduct  would  be 
greatly  simplified.  Were  the  pleasures  and  pains  serv- 
ing as  incentives  and  deterrents,  simultaneously  present 
to  consciousness  with  like  vividness,  or  were  thej'  all 


174 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


immediately  impending,  or  were  they  all  equidistant  in 
time ;  the  problems  would  be  further  simplified.  And 
they  would  be  still  further  simplified  if  the  pleasures 
and  pains  were  exclusively  those  of  the  actor.  But 
both  the  desirable  and  the  undesirable  feelings  are  of 
various  kinds,  making  quantitative  comparisons  diffi" 
cult;  some  are  present  and  some  are  future,  increasing 
the  difficulty  of  quantitative  comparison ;  some  are  en- 
tailed on  self  and  some  are  entailed  on  others  ;  again 
increasing  the  difficulty.  So  that  the  guidance  yielded 
by  the  primary  principle  reached  is  of  little  service  un- 
less supplemented  by  the  guidance  of  secondary  prin- 
ciples. 

Already,  in  recognizing  the  needful  subordination  of 
presentative  feelings  to  representative  feelings,  and  the 
implied  postponement  of  present  to  future  throughout  a 
wide  range  of  cases,  some  approach  toward  a  secondary 
principle  of  guidance  has  been  made.  Already,  too,  in 
recognizing  the  limitations  which  men's  associated  state 
puts  to  their  actions,  with  the  implied  need  for  restrain- 
ing feelings  of  some  kinds  by  feelings  of  other  kinds, 
we  have  come  in  sight  of  another  secondary  principle 
of  guidance.  Still,  there  remains  much  to  be  decided 
respecting  the  relative  claims  of  these  guiding  princi- 
ples, general  and  special. 

Some  elucidation  of  the  questions  involved  will  be 
obtained  by  here  discussing  certain  views  and  argu- 
ments set  forth  by  past  and  present  moralists. 

§  58.  Using  the  name  hedonism  for  that  ethical 
theory  which  makes  liappiness  the  end  of  action,  and 
distinguishing  hedonism  into  the  two  kinds,  egoistic  and 
univeisalistic,  according  as  tlic  happiness  sought  is  that 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS, 


175 


of  the  actor  himself,  or  is  that  of  all,  Mr.  Sidgwick 
alleges  its  implied  belief  to  be  that  pleasures  and  pains 
are  commensurable.  In  his  criticism  on  (empirical) 
egoistic  hedonism  he  says : 

*^The  fundamental  assumption  of  Hedonism,  clearly  stated,  is  that 
all  feelings  considered  merely  as  feelings  can  be  arranged  in  a  certain 
scale  of  desirability,  so  that  the  desirability  of  pleasantness  of  each 
bears  a  definite  ratio  to  that  of  all  the  others."  — Methods  of  Ethics, 
2d  ed.,  p.  115. 

And  asserting  this  to  be  its  assumption  he  proceeds  to 
point  out  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  hedonistic  cal- 
culation ;  apparently  for  the  purpose  of  implying  that 
these  difficulties  tell  against  the  hedonistic  theory. 

Now,  though  it  may  be  shown  that  by  naming  the 
intensity,  the  duration,  the  certainty,  and  the  proximity, 
of  a  pleasure  or  a  pain,  as  traits  entering  into  the  esti- 
mation of  its  relative  value,  Bentham  has  committed 
himself  to  the  specified  assumption ;  and  though  it  is, 
perhaps,  reasonably  taken  for  granted  that  hedonism,  as 
represented  by  him,  is  identical  with  hedonism  at  large  ; 
yet  it  seems  to  me  that  the  hedonist,  empirical  or  other, 
is  not  necessarily  committed  to  this  assumption.  That 
the  greatest  surplus  of  pleasures  over  pains  ought  to  be 
the  end  of  action,  is  a  belief  which  he  may  still  consist- 
ently hold  after  admitting  that  the  valuations  of  pleas- 
ures and  pains  are  commonly  vague  and  often  erroneous. 
He  may  say  that  though  indefinite  things  do  not  admit 
of  definite  measurements,  yet  approximately  true  esti- 
mates of  their  relative  values  may  be  made  when  they 
differ  considerably  ;  and  he  may  further  saj^,  that  even 
when  their  relative  values  are  not  determinable,  it  re- 
mains true  that  the  most  valuable  should  be  chosen. 
Let  us  listen  to  him. 


176 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


A  debtor  who  cannot  pay  me  offers  to  compound 
for  his  debt  by  making  over  one  of  sundry  things  he 
possesses  —  a  diamond  ornament,  a  silver  vase,  a  picture, 
a  carriage.  Other  questions  being  set  aside,  I  assert  it 
to  be  my  pecuniary  interest  to  choose  the  most  valua- 
ble of  these,  but  I  cannot  say  which  is  the  most  valu- 
able. Does  the  proposition  that  it  is  my  pecuniary 
interest  to  choose  the  most  valuable,  therefore,  become 
doubtful  ?  Must  I  not  choose  as  Avell  as  I  can,  and  if 
I  choose  wrongly  must  I  give  up  my  ground  of  choice  ? 
Must  I  infer  that  in  matters  of  business  I  may  not  act 
on  the  principle  that,  other  things  equal,  the  more 
profitable  transaction  is  to  be  preferred,  because,  in. 
many  cases,  I  cannot  say  which  is  the  more  profitable, 
and  have  often  chosen  the  less  profitable  ?  Because  I 
believe  that  of  many  dangerous  courses  I  ought  to 
take  the  least  dangerous,  do  I  make  '  the  fundamental 
assumption '  that  courses  can  be  arranged  according  to 
a  scale  of  dangerousness,  and  must  I  abandon  my  belief 
if  I  cannot  so  arrange  them  ?  If  I  am  not  by  consist- 
ency bound  to  do  this,  then  I  am  no  more  by  consistency 
bound  to  give  up  the  principle  that  the  greatest  surplus 
of  pleasures  over  pains  should  be  the  end  of  action, 
because  the  '  commensurability  of  pleasures  and  pains  ' 
cannot  be  asserted." 

At  the  close  of  his  chapters  on  empirical  hedonism, 
Mr.  Sidgwick  himself  says  he  does  "  not  think  that  the 
common  experience  of  mankind,  impartially  examined, 
really  sustains  the  view  that  Egoistic  Hedonism  is 
necessarily  suicidal ;  "  adding,  however,  that  the  "  un- 
certainty of  hedonistic  calculation  cannot  be  denied  to 
have  great  weight."  l)ut  here  the  fundamental  assump- 
tion of  hedonism,  that  liappiiicss  is  the  end  of  action,  is 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS. 


177 


still  supposed  to  involve  tlie  assumption  that  feelings 
can  be  arranged  in  a  certain  scale  of  desirability." 
This  we  have  seen  it  does  not:  its  fundamental  assump- 
tion is  in  no  degree  invalidated  by  proof  that  such 
arrangement  of  them  is  impracticable. 

To  Mr.  Sidgwick's  argument  there  is  the  further 
objection,  no  less  serious,  that  to  whatever  degree  it 
tells  against  egoistic  hedonism,  it  tells  in  a  greater 
degree  against  universalistic  hedonism,  or  utilitarianism. 
He  admits  that  it  tells  as  much;  saying  ''whatever 
weight  is  to  be  attached  to  the  objections  brought 
against  this  assumption  [the  commensurability  of  pleas- 
ures and  pains]  must  of  course  tell  against  the  present 
method."  Not  only  does  it  tell,  but  it  tells  in  a  double 
way.  I  do  not  mean  merely  that,  as  he  points  out,  the 
assumption  becomes  greatly  complicated  if  we  take  all 
sentient  beings  into  account,  and  if  we  include  pos- 
terity along  with  existing  individuals.  I  mean  that, 
taking  as  the  end  to  be  achieved  the  greatest  happiness 
of  the  existing  individuals  forming  a  single  community, 
the  set  of  difficulties  standing  in  the  way  of  egoistic 
hedonism,  is  compounded  with  another  set  of  difficul- 
ties no  less  great,  when  we  pass  from  it  to  universalistic 
hedonism.  For  if  the  dictates  of  universalistic  hedon- 
ism are  to  be  fulfilled,  it  must  be  under  the  guidance  of 
individual  judgments,  or  of  corporate  judgments,  or  of 
both.  Now  any  one  of  such  judgments  issuing  from  a 
single  mind,  or  from  any  aggregate  of  minds,  necessa- 
rily embodies  conclusions  respecting  the  happiness  of 
other  persons  ;  few  of  them  known,  and  the  great  mass 
never  seen.  All  these  persons  have  natures  differing  in 
countless  ways  and  degrees  from  the  natures  of  those 
who  form  the  judgments ;  and  the  happinesses  of  which 


178 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


they  are  severally  capable  differ  from  one  another,  and 
differ  from  the  happinesses  of  those  who  form  the  judg- 
ments. Consequently,  if  against  the  method  of  egoistic 
hedonism  there  is  the  objection  that  a  man's  owi  pleas- 
ures and  pains,  unlike  in  their  kinds,  intensities,  and 
times  of  occurrence,  are  incommensurable  ;  then  against 
the  method  of  universalistic  hedonism  it  may  be  urged 
that  to  the  incommensurability  of  each  judge's  own 
pleasures  and  pains  (which  he  must  use  as  standards) 
has  now  to  be  added  the  much  more  decided  incommen- 
surability of  the  pleasures  and  pains  which  he  conceives 
to  be  experienced  by  innumerable  other  persons,  all 
differently  constituted  from  himself  and  from  one 
another. 

Nay  more  —  there  is  a  triple  set  of  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  universalistic  hedonism.  To  the  double  inde- 
terminateness  of  the  end  has  to  be  added  the  indeter- 
minateness  of  the  means.  If  hedonism,  egoistic  or 
universalistic,  is  to  pass  from  dead  theory  into  living 
practice,  acts  of  one  or  other  kind  must  be  decided  on 
to  achieve  proposed  objects ;  and  in  estimating  the  two 
methods  we  have  to  consider  how  far  the  fitness  of  the 
acts  respectively  required  can  be  judged.  If,  in  pur- 
suing his  own  ends,  the  individual  is  liable  to  be  led  by 
erroneous  ojDinions  to  adjust  his  acts  wrongly,  much 
more  liable  is  he  to  be  led  by  erroneous  opinions  to 
adjust  wrongly  more  complex  acts  to  the  more  complex 
ends  constituted  by  other  men's  welfares.  It  is  so  if 
he  operates  singly  to  benefit  a  few  others ;  and  it  is 
still  more  so  if  he  co-operates  with  many  to  benefit  all. 
Making  general  happiness  the  immediate  object  of  pur- 
suit, implies  numerous  and  complicated  instrumentali- 
ties officered  by  tliousands  of  unseen  and  unlike  per- 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS, 


179 


sons,  and  working  on  millions  of  other  persons  unseen 
and  unlike.  Even  the  few  factors  in  this  immense 
aggregate  of  appliances  and  processes  which  are  known, 
are  very  imperfectly  known,  and  the  great  mass  of  them 
are  unknown.  So  that  even  supposing  valuation  of 
pleasures  and  pains  for  the  community  at  large  is  more 
practicable  than,  or  even  as  practicable  as,  valuation  of 
his  own  pleasures  and  pains  by  the  individual ;  yet  the 
ruling  of  conduct  with  a  view  to  the  one  end  is  far 
more  difficult  than  the  ruling  of  it  with  a  view  to  the 
other.  Hence,  if  the  method  of  egoistic  hedonism  is 
unsatisfactory,  far  more  unsatisfactory  for  the  same  and 
kindred  reasons,  is  the  method  of  universalistic  hedon- 
ism, or  utilitarianism. 

And  here  we  come  in  sight  of  the  conclusion  which 
it  has  been  the  purpose  of  the  foregoing  criticism  to 
bring  into  view.  The  objection  made  to  the  hedonistic 
method  contains  a  truth,  but  includes  with  it  an  un- 
truth. For,  while  the  proposition  that  happiness, 
whether  individual  or  general,  is  the  end  of  action,  is 
not  invalidated  by  proof  that  it  cannot  under  either 
form  be  estimated  by  measurement  of  its  components; 
yet  it  may  be  admitted  that  guidance  in  the  pursuit  of 
happiness  by  a  mere  balancing  of  pleasures  and  pains, 
is,  if  partially  practicable  throughout  a  certain  range 
of  conduct,  futile  throughout  a  much  wider  range.  It 
is  quite  consistent  to  assert  that  happiness  is  the  ulti- 
mate aim  of  action,  and  at  the  same  time  to  deny  that 
it  can  be  reached  by  making  it  the  immediate  aim.  I 
go  with  Mr.  Sidgwick  as  far  as  the  conclusion  that  "  we 
must  at  least  admit  the  desirability  of  confirming  or 
correcting  the  results  of  such  comparisons  [of  pleasures 
and  pains]  by  any  other  method  upon  which  we  may 


180 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


find  reason  to  rely ; "  and  then  I  go  further,  and  say 
that  throughout  a  large  part  of  conduct,  guidance  by 
such  comparisons  is  to  be  entirely  set  aside  and  replaced 
by  other  guidance. 

§  59.  The  antithesis  here  insisted  upon  between  the 
hedonistic  end  considered  in  the  abstract,  and  the 
method  which  current  hedonism,  whether  egoistic  or 
universalistic,  associates  with  that  end ;  and  the  joining 
acceptance  of  the  one  with  rejection  of  the  other,  com- 
mits us  to  an  overt  discussion  of  the  two  cardinal  ele- 
ments of  ethical  theory.  I  may  conveniently  initiate 
this  discussion  by  criticising  another  of  Mr.  Sidgwick's 
criticisms  on  the  method  of  hedonism. 

Though  we  can  give  no  account  of  those  simple 
pleasures  which  the  senses  yield,  because  they  are  un- 
decomposable,  yet  we  distinctly  know  their  characters 
as  states  of  consciousness.  Conversely,  the  complex 
pleasures  formed  by  compounding  and  re-compounding 
the  ideas  of  simple  pleasures,  though  theoretically  re- 
solvable into  their  components,  are  not  easy  to  resolve  ; 
and  in  proportion  as  they  are  heterogeneous  in  compo- 
sition, the  difficulty  of  framing  intelligible  conceptions 
of  them  increases.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  the 
pleasures  which  accompany  our  sports.  Treating  of 
these,  along  with  the  pleasures  of  pursuit  in  general, 
for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  "  in  order  to  get  them 
one  must  forget  them,"  Mr.  Sidgwick  remarks  :  — 

A  man  who  maintains  throughout  an  epicurean  mood,  fixing  his 
aim  on  his  own  pleasure,  does  not  catcli  the  full  spirit  of  the  chase; 
liis  eagerness  never  gets  just  the  sharpness  of  edge  which  imparts  to 
the  pleasure  its  highest  zest  and  flavor.  Here  comes  into  view  what 
we  may  call  the  fimdaniental  paradox  of  Hedonism,  that  tlie  impulse 
toward  pleasure,  if  too  predominant,  defeats  its  own  aim.    This  effect 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS,  181 


is  not  visible,  or  at  any  rate  is  scarcely  visible,  in  the  case  of  passive 
sensual  pleasures.  But  of  our  active  enjoyments  generally,  whether 
the  activities  on  which  they  attend  are  classed  as  '  bodily '  or  as  *  in- 
tellectual' (as  well  as  of  many  emotional  pleasures),  it  may  certainly 
be  said  that  we  cannot  attain  them,  at  least  in  their  best  form,  so  long 
as  we  concentrate  our  aim  on  them."  —  Methods  of  Ethics,  2d  ed.. 
p.  41. 

Now  I  think  we  shall  not  regard  this  truth  as  para- 
doxical after  we  have  duly  analyzed  the  pleasure  of 
pursuit.  The  chief  components  of  this  pleasure  are : 
First,  a  renewed  consciousness  of  persona-1  efficiency 
(made  vivid  by  actual  success  and  partially  excited  by 
impending  success),  which  consciousness  of  personal 
efficiency,  connected  in  experience  with  achieved  ends 
of  every  kind,  arouses  a  vague  but  massive  conscious- 
ness of  resulting  gratifications  ;  and  second,  a  represen- 
tation of  the  applause  which  recognition  of  this  effi- 
ciency by  others  has  before  brought,  and  will  again 
bring.  Games  of  skill  show  us  this  clearly.  Consid- 
ered as  an  end  in  itself,  the  good  cannon  which  a  billiard 
player  makes  yields  no  pleasure.  Whence  then  does 
the  pleasure  of  making  it  arise  ?  Partly  from  the  fresh 
proof  of  capability  which  the  plaj^er  gives  to  himself, 
and  partly  from  the  imagined  admiration  of  those  who 
witness  the  proof  of  his  capability :  the  last  being  the 
chief,  since  he  soon  tires  of  making  cannons  in  the  ab- 
sence of  witnesses.  When  from  games  which,  yielding 
the  pleasures  of  success,  yield  no  pleasure  derived  from 
the  end  considered  intrinsically,  we  pass  to  sports  in 
which  the  end  has  intrinsic  value  as  a  source  of  pleas- 
ure, we  see  substantially  the  same  thing.  Though  the 
bird  which  the  sportsman  brings  down  is  useful  as  food, 
yet  his  satisfaction  arises  mainly  from  having  made  a 
good  shot,  and  from  having  added  to  the  bag  Avhich  will 


182 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


presently  bring  praise  of  his  skill.  The  gratification  of 
self-esteem  he  immediately  experiences ;  and  the  gratis 
fication  of  receiving  applause  he  experiences,  if  not 
immediately  and  in  full  degree,  yet  by  representation ; 
for  the  ideal  pleasure  is  nothing  else  than  a  faint  revival 
of  the  real  pleasure.  These  two  kinds  of  agreeable  ex- 
citement present  in  the  sports]nan  during  the  chase  con- 
stitute the  mass  of  the  desires  stimulating  him  to  con- 
tinue it ;  for  all  desires  are  nascent  forms  of  the  feelings 
to  be  obtained  by  the  efforts  they  prompt.  And  though 
while  seeking  more  birds  these  representative  feelings 
are  not  so  vividly  excited  as  by  success  just  achieved, 
yet  they  are  excited  by  imaginations  of  further  suc- 
cesses ;  and  so  make  enjoyable  the  activities  constitut- 
ing the  pursuit.  Recognizing,  then,  the  truth  that  the 
pleasures  of  pursuit  are  much  more  those  derived  from 
the  efficient  use  of  means  than  those  derived  from  the 
end  itself,  we  see  that  ''the  fundamental  paradox  of 
hedonism  "  disappears. 

These  remarks  concerning  end  and  means,  and  the 
pleasure  accompanying  use  of  the  means  as  added  to 
the  pleasure  derived  from  the  end,  I  have  made  for  the 
purpose  of  drawing  attention  to  a  fact  of  profound 
significance.  During  evolution  there  has  been  a  super- 
posing of  new  and  more  complex  sets  of  means  upon 
older  and  simpler  sets  of  means,  and  a  superposing  of 
the  f)leasures  accompanying  the  uses  of  these  succes- 
sive sets  of  means,  with  the  result  that  each  of  these 
pleasures  has  itself  eventually  become  an  end.  We 
begin  with  a  simple  animal  which,  Avithout  ancillary 
appliances,  swallows  such  food  as  accident  brings  in 
its  Avay ;  and  so,  as  we  may  assume,  stills  some  kind  of 
craving.    Here  we  have  the  primary  end  of  nutrition 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS,  183 


with  its  accompanying  satisfaction,  in  their  simple 
forms.  We  pass  to  higher  types  having  jaws  for  seiz- 
ing and  biting — jaws  which  thus,  by  tlieir  actions, 
facilitate  achievement  of  the  primary  end.  On  observ- 
ing animals  furnished  with  these  organs,  we  get  evi- 
dence that  the  use  of  them  becomes  in  itself  pleasurable 
irrespective  of  the  end :  instance  a  squirrel  which, 
apart  from  food  to  be  so  obtained,  delights  in  nibbling 
everything  it  gets  hold  of.  Turning  from  jaws  to 
limbs  we  see  that  these,  serving  some  creatures  for 
pursuit  and  others  for  escape,  similarly  yield  gratifica- 
tion by  their  exercise ;  as  in  lambs  which  skip  and 
horses  which  prance.  How  the  combined  use  of  limbs 
and  jaws,  originally  subserving  the  satisfaction  of  ap- 
petite, grows  to  be  in  itself  pleasurable,  is  daily  illus- 
trated in  the  playing  of  dogs.  For  that  throwing 
down  and  worrying  which,  when  prey  is  caught,  pre- 
cedes eating,  is,  in  their  mimic  fights,  carried  by  each 
as  far  as  he  dares.  Coming  to  means  still  more  remote 
from  the  end,  namely,  those  by  which  creatures  chased 
are  caught,  we  are  again  shown  by  dogs  that  when  no 
creature  is  caught  there  is  still  a  gratification  in  the 
act  of  catching.  The  eagerness  wdth  which  a  dog 
runs  after  stones,  or  dances  and  barks  in  anticipation 
of  jumping  into  the  water  after  a  stick,  proves  that 
apart  from  the  satisfaction  of  appetite,  and  apart  even 
from  the  satisfaction  of  killing  prey,  there  is  a  satis- 
faction in  the  successful  pursuit  of  a  moving  object. 
Throughout,  then,  we  see  that  the  pleasure  attendant 
on  the  use  of  means  to  achieve  an  end,  itself  becomes 
an  end. 

Now  if  we  contemplate  these  as  phenomena  of  con- 
duct in  general,  some  facts  worthy  of  note  may  be 


184 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


discerned  —  facts  which,  if  we  appreciate  their  signifi- 
cance, will  aid  us  in  developing  our  ethical  conceptions. 

One  of  them  is  that  among  the  successive  sets  of 
means,  the  later  are  the  more  remote  from  the  primary 
end;  are,  as  co-ordinating  earlier  and  simpler  means, 
the  more  complex  ;  and  are  accompanied  by  feelings 
which  are  more  representative. 

Another  fact  is  that  each  set  of  means,  with  its 
accompanying  satisfactions,  eventually  becomes  in  its 
turn  dependent  on  one  originating  later  than  itself. 
Before  the  gullet  swallows,  the  jaws  must  lay  hold; 
before  the  jaws  tear  out  and  bring  within  the  grasp  of 
the  gullet  a  piece  fit  for  swallowing,  there  must  be 
that  co-operation  of  limbs  and  senses  required  for  kill- 
ing the  prey :  before  this  co-operation  can  take  place, 
there  needs  the  much  longer  co-operation  constituting 
the  chase ;  and  even  before  this  there  must  be  persisted 
activities  of  limbs,  eyes,  and  nose  in  seeking  prey. 
The  pleasure  attending  each  set  of  acts,  while  making 
possible  the  pleasure  attending  the  set  of  acts  which 
follows,  is  joined  with  a  representation  of  this  subse- 
quent set  of  acts  and  its  pleasure,  and  of  the  others 
which  succeed  in  order ;  so  that  along  with  the  feelings 
accompanying  the  search  for  prey,  are  partially  aroused 
the  feelings  accompanying  the  actual  chase,  the  actual 
destruction,  the  actual  devouring,  and  the  eventual 
satisfaction  of  appetite. 

A  third  fact  is  that  the  use  of  each  set  of  means  in 
due  order,  constitutes  an  obligation.  Maintenance  of 
its  life  being  regarded  as  an  end  of  its  conduct,  the 
creature  is  obliged  to  use  in  succession  the  means  of 
finding  i)rey,  the  means  of  catching  prey,  the  means 
of  killing  prey,  the  means  of  devouring  prey. 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS,  185 


Lastly,  it  follows  that  though  the  assuaging  of 
hunger,  directly  associated  with  sustentation,  remains 
to  the  last  the  ultimate  end ;  yet  the  successful  use  of 
each  set  of  means  in  its  turn  is  the  proximate  end  — 
the  end  which  takes  temporary  precedence  in  authori- 
tativeness. 

§  60.  The  relations  between  means  and  ends  thus 
traced  throughout  the  earlier  stages  of  evolving  con- 
duct, are  traceable  throughout  later  stages  ;  and  hold 
true  of  human  conduct,  up  even  to  its  highest  forms. 
As  fast  as,  for  the  better  maintenance  of  life,  the 
simpler  sets  of  means  and  the  pleasures  accompanying 
the  uses  of  them,  come  to  be  supplemented  by  the 
more  complex  sets  of  means  and  their  pleasures,  these 
begin  to  take  precedence  in  time  and  in  imperativeness. 
To  use  effectually  each  more  complex  set  of  means 
becomes  the  proximate  end,  and  the  accompanying 
feeling  becomes  the  immediate  gratification  sought; 
though  there  may  be,  and  habitually  is,  an  associated 
consciousness  of  the  remoter  ends  and  remoter  gratifi- 
cations to  be  obtained.  An  example  will  make  clear 
the  parallelism. 

Absorbed  in  his  business  the  trader,  if  asked  w4iat  is 
his  main  end,  will  say  —  making  money.  He  readily 
grants  that  achievement  of  this  end  is  desired  by  liim 
in  furtherance  of  ends  beyond  it.  He  knows  that  in 
directly  seeking  money  he  is  indirectly  seeking  food, 
clothes,  house-room,  and  the  comforts  of  life  for  self 
and  family.  But  while  admitting  that  money  is  but  a 
means  to  these  ends,  he  urges  that  the  money-getting 
actions  precede,  in  order  of  time  and  obligation,  the 
various  actions  and  concomitant  pleasures  subserved  by 


186 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


them ;  and  he  testifies  to  tlie  fact  that  making  money 
has  become  itself  an  end,  and  success  in  it  a  source  of 
satisfaction,  apart  from  these  more  distant  ends. 

Again,  on  observing  more  closely  the  trader's  pro- 
ceedings, we  find  that  though  to  the  end  of  living 
comfortably  he  gets  money,  and  though  to  the  end  of 
getting  money  he  buys  and  sells  at  a  profit,  which  so 
becomes  a  means  more  immediately  pursued,  yet  he  is 
chiefly  occupied  with  means  still  more  remote  from 
ultimate  ends,  and  in  relation  to  which  even  the  selling 
at  a  profit  becomes  an  end.  For  leaving  to  subordinates 
the  actual  measuring  out  of  goods  and  receiving  of  pro- 
ceeds, he  busies  himself  mainly  with  his  general  affairs 
—  inquiries  concerning  markets,  judgments  of  future 
prices,  calculations,  negotiations,  correspondence:  the 
anxiety  from  hour  to  hour  being  to  do  well  each  one 
of  these  things  indirectly  conducive  to  the  making  of 
profits.  And  these  ends  precede  in  time  and  obligation 
the  effecting  of  profitable  sales,  just  as  the  effecting  of 
profitable  sales  precedes  the  end  of  money-making,  and 
just  as  the  end  of  money-making  precedes  the  end  of 
satisfactory  living. 

His  book-keeping  best  exemplifies  the  principle  at 
large.  Entries  to  the  debtor  or  creditor  sides  are  being 
made  all  through  the  day ;  the  items  are  classified 
and  arranged  in  such  a  way  that  at  a  moment's  notice 
the  state  of  each  account  may  be  ascertained ;  and  then, 
from  time  to  time,  the  books  are  balanced,  and  it  is 
required  that  the  result  shall  come  right  to  a  penny: 
satisfaction  following  proved  correctness,  and  annoy- 
ance being  caused  by  error.  If  you  ask  why  all  this 
elaborate  process,  so  remote  from  the  actual  getting  of 
money,  and  still  more  remote  from  the  enjoyments  of 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS.  187 


life,  the  answer  is  that  keeping  accounts  correctly  is 
fulfilling  a  condition  to  the  end  of  money-making,  and 
becomes  in  itself  a  proximate  end  —  a  duty  to  be  dis- 
charged, that  there  may  be  discharged  the  duty  of 
getting  an  income,  that  there  may  be  discharged  the 
duty  of  maintaining  self,  wife,  and  children. 

Approaching  as  we  here  do  to  moral  obligation,  are 
we  not  shown  its  relations  to  conduct  at  large?  Is  it 
not  clear  that  observance  of  moral  principles  is  fulfil- 
ment of  certain  general  conditions  to  the  successful 
carrying  on  of  special  activities  ?  That  the  trader  may 
prosper,  he  must  not  only  keep  his  books  correctly,  but 
must  pay  those  he  employs  according  to  agreement, 
and  must  meet  his  engagements  with  creditors.  May 
we  not  say,  then,  that  conformity  to  the  second  and 
third  of  these  requirements  is,  like  conformity  to  the 
first,  an  indirect  means  to  effectual  use  of  the  more 
direct  means  of  achieving  welfare  ?  May  we  not  say, 
too,  that  as  the  use  of  each  more  indirect  means  in  due 
order  becomes  itself  an  end,  and  a  source  of  gratifica- 
tion ;  so,  eventually,  becomes  the  use  of  this  most 
indirect  means?  And  may  we  not  infer  that  though 
conformity  to  moral  requirements  precedes  in  impera- 
tiveness conformity  to  other  requirements  ;  yet  that  tliis 
imperativeness  arises  from  the  fact  that  fulfilment  of 
the  other  requirements,  by  self  or  others,  or  both,  is 
thus  furthered  ? 

§  61.  This  question  brings  us  round  to  another  side 
of  the  issue  before  raised.  When  alleging  that  empir- 
ical utilitarianism  is  but  introductory  to  rational  utilita- 
rianism, I  pointed  out  that  the  last  does  not  take  welfare 
for  its  immediate  object  of  pursuit,  but  takes  for  its 


188 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


immediate  object  of  pursuit  conformity  to  certain  prin- 
ciples which,  in  the  nature  of  things,  casually  deter- 
mine welfare.  And  now  we  see  that  this  amounts  to 
recognition  of  that  law,  traceable  throughout  the  evo- 
lution of  conduct  in  general,  that  each  later  and  higher 
order  of  means  takes  precedence  in  time  and  authorita- 
tiveness  of  each  earlier  and  lower  order  of  means. 
The  contrast  between  the  ethical  methods  thus  distin- 
guished, made  tolerably  clear  by  the  above  illustrations, 
will  be  made  still  clearer  by  contemplating  the  two  as 
put  in  opposition  by  the  leading  exponent  of  empirical 
utilitarianism.  Treating  of  legislative  aims,  Bentham 
writes :  — 

But  justice,  what  is  it  that  we  are  to  understand  by  justice;  and 
why  not  happiness  but  justice  ?  Wliat  liappiness  is,  every  man 
knows,  because,  what  pleasure  is,  every  man  knows,  and  what  pain 
is,  every  man  knows.  But  wliat  justice  is  —  this  is  what  on  every 
occasion  is  the  subject-matter  of  dispute.  Be  tlie  meaning  of  the 
word  justice  what  it  will,  what  regard  is  it  entitled  to  otherwise  than 
as  a  means  of  happiness  ?  "  ^ 

Let  us  first  consider  the  assertion  here  made  respect- 
ing the  relative  intelligibilities  of  these  two  ends,  and 
let  us  afterward  consider  what  is  implied  by  the  choice 
of  happiness  instead  of  justice. 

Bentham's  positive  assertion  that,  ''what  happiness 
is,  every  man  knows,  because,  what  pleasure  is,  every 
man  knows,"  is  met  by  counter-assertions  equally 
positive.  ''  Who  can  tell,"  asks  Plato,  ''  what  pleasure 
really  is,  or  know  it  in  its  essence,  except  the  philoso- 
pher, who  alone  is  conversant  with  realities  ?  "  ^  Aris- 
totle, too,  after  commenting  on  the  different  opinions 

1  Constitvtional  Code,  chap,  xvi.,  Supreme  Legislative  —  Section  vi., 
Omnicompetcnce. 

2  Jiepubiic,  Bk.  IX. 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS,  189 


held  by  the  vulgar,  by  the  political,  by  the  contempla- 
tive, says  of  happiness,  that  "  to  some  it  seems  to  be 
virtue,  to  others  prudence,  and  to  others  a  kind  of 
wisdom;  to  some  again,  these,  or  some  one  of  these, 
with  pleasure,  or  at  least,  not  without  pleasure ;  others 
again  include  external  prosperity."  ^  And  Aristotle, 
like  Plato,  comes  to  the  remarkable  conclusion  that  the 
pleasures  of  the  intellect,  reached  by  the  contemplative 
life,  constitute  the  highest  happiness  !  ^ 

How  disagreements  concerning  the  nature  of  happi- 
ness and  the  relative  values  of  pleasures,  thus  exhibited 
in  ancient  times,  continue  down  to  modern  times,  is 
shown  in  Mr.  Sidgwick's  discussion  of  egoistic  hedon- 
ism, above  commented  upon.  Further,  as  was  pointed 
out  before,  the  indefiniteness  attending  the  estimations 
of  pleasures  and  pains,  which  stands  in  the  way  of 
egoistic  hedonism  as  ordinarily  conceived,  is  immense- 
ly increased  on  passing  to  universalistic  hedonism 
as  ordinarily  conceived ;  since  its  theory  implies  that 
the  imagined  pleasures  and  pains  of  others  are  to 
be  estimated  by  the  help  of  these  pleasures  and  pains 
of  self  already  so  difficult  to  estimate.  And  that  any 
one  after  observing  the  various  pursuits  into  which 
some  eagerly  enter,  but  which  others  shun,  and  after 
listening  to  the  different  opinions  concerning  the  lik- 
ableness  of  this  or  that  occupation  or  amusement, 
expressed  at  every  table,  should  assert  that  the  nature 
of  happiness  can  be  fully  agreed  upon,  so  as  to  render 
it  a  fit  end  for  direct  legislative  action,  is  surprising. 

The  accompanying  proposition  that  justice  is  unin- 
telligible as  an  end  is  no  less  surprising.  Though 

1  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Bk.  I.  chap.  viii. 

2  Bk.  X.  chap.  7. 


190 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


primitive  men  have  no  words  for  either  happiness  or 
justice,  yet  even  among  them  an  approach  to  the  con- 
ception of  justice  is  traceable.  The  law  of  retaliation, 
requiring  that  a  death  inflicted  by  one  tribe  on  another, 
shall  be  balanced  by  the  death  either  of  the  murderer 
or  some  member  of  his  tribe,  shows  us  in  a  vague  shape 
that  notion  of  equalness  of  treatment  which  forms  an 
essential  element  in  it. 

When  we  come  to  early  races  who  have  given  their 
thoughts  and  feelings  literary  form,  we  find  this  con- 
ception of  justice,  as  involving  equalness  of  action,  be- 
coming distinct.  Among  the  Jews,  David  expressed 
in  words  this  association  of  ideas  when,  praying  to  God 
to  ''hear  the  right,"  he  said,  ''Let  my  sentence  come 
forth  from  thy  presence;  let  thine  eyes  behold  the 
things  that  are  equal ;  "  as  also,  among  early  Chris- 
tians, did  Paul  when  to  the  Colossians  he  wrote, 
"  Masters,  give  unto  your  servants  that  which  is  just 
and  equal."  Commenting  on  the  different  meanings 
of  justice,  Aristotle  concludes  that  "the  just  will, 
therefore,  be  the  lawful  and  the  equal,  and  the  unjust 
the  unlawful  and  the  unequal.  But  since  the  unjust 
man  is  also  one  who  takes  more  than  his  share,"  etc. 
And  that  justice  was  similarly  conceived  by  the  Romans 
they  proved  by  including  under  it  such  meanings  as 
exact,  proportionate,  impartial,  severally  implying  fair- 
ness of  division,  and  still  better  by  identification  of  it 
with  equity,  wliich  is  a  derivative  of  cequus :  the  word 
cequus  itself  having  for  one  of  its  meanings  just  or 
impartial. 

This  coincidence  of  view  among  ancient  peoples  re- 
specting the  nature  of  justice,  has  extended  to  modern 
peoples ;  who  by  a  general  agreement  in  certain  cardi- 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS. 


191 


nal  principles  which  their  systems  of  law  embody,  for- 
bidding direct  aggressions,  which  are  forms  of  unequal 
actions,  and  forbidding  indirect  aggressions  by  breaches 
of  contract,  which  are  other  forms  of  unequal  actions, 
one  and  all  show  us  the  identification  of  justice  w^ith 
equalness.  Bentham,  then,  is  wrong  when  he  says  — 
"But  what  justice  is — this  is  what  on  every  occasion 
is  the  subject-matter  of  dispute."  He  is  more  wrong, 
indeed,  than  has  thus  far  appeared.  For,  in  the  first 
place,  he  misrepresents  utterly  by  ignoring  the  fact  that 
in  ninety-nine  out  of  every  hundred  daily  transactions 
between  men,  no  dispute  about  justice  arises ;  but  the 
business  done  is  recognized  on  both  sides  as  justly 
done.  And  in  the  second  place,  if,  with  respect  to  the 
hundredth  transaction  there  is  a  dispute,  the  subject 
matter  of  it  is  not  "  what  justice  is,"  for  it  is  admitted 
to  be  equity  or  equalness ;  but  the  subject  matter  of 
dispute  always  is  what,  under  these  particular  circum- 
stances, constitutes  equalness  ?  —  a  widely  different 
question. 

It  is  not  then  self-evident,  as  Bentham  alleges,  that 
happiness  is  an  intelligible  end  while  justice  is  not ;  but 
contrariwise  examination  makes  evident  the  greater 
intelligibility  of  justice  as  an  end.  And  analysis  shows 
why  it  is  more  intelligible.  For  justice,  or  equity,  or 
equalness,  is  concerned  exclusively  with  quantity  under 
stated  conditions  ;  whereas  happiness  is  concerned  with 
both  quantity  and  quality  under  conditions  7iot  stated. 
When,  as  in  case  of  theft,  a  benefit  is  taken  while  no 
equivalent  benefit  is  yielded  —  when,  as  in  case  of 
adulterated  goods  bought  or  base  coin  jjaid,  that  which 
is  agreed  to  be  given  in  exchange  as  of  equal  value  is 
not  given,  but  something  of  less  value  —  when,  as  in 


192 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


case  of  broken  contract,  the  obligation  on  one  side  has 
been  discharged  while  there  has  been  no  discharge^  or 
incomplete  discharge,  of  the  obligation  on  the  other ; 
we  see  that,  the  circujnstances  being  specified.^  the  injus- 
tice complained  of  refers  to  the  relative  amounts  of 
actions,  or  products,  or  benefits,  the  natures  of  which 
are  recognized  only  so  far  as  is  needful  for  saying 
whether  as  much  has  been  given,  or  done,  or  allowed, 
by  each  concerned,  as  was  implied  by  tacit  or  overt 
understanding  to  be  an  equivalent.  But  when  the  end 
proposed  is  happiness,  the  circumstances  remaining  un- 
specified^ the  problem  is  that  of  estimating  both  quanti- 
ties and  qualities,  unhelped  by  any  such  definite  measures 
as  acts  of  exchange  imply,  or  as  contracts  imply,  or  as 
are  implied  by  the  differences  between  the  doings  of 
one  aggressing  and  one  aggressed  upon.  The  mere  fact 
that  Bentham  himself  includes  as  elements  in  the  esti- 
mation of  each  pleasure  or  pain,  its  intensity,  duration, 
certainty,  and  proximity,  suffices  to  show  how  difficult 
is  this  problem.  And  when  it  is  remembered  that  all 
pleasures  and  pains,  not  felt  in  particular  cases  only 
but  in  the  aggregate  of  cases,  and  severally  regarded 
under  these  four  aspects,  have  to  be  compared  with  one 
another  and  their  relative  values  determined,  simply  by 
introspection ;  it  will  be  manifest  both  that  the  problem 
is  complicated  by  the  addition  of  indefinite  judgments 
of  qualities  to  indefinite  measures  of  quantities,  and 
that  it  is  further  complicated  by  the  multitudinousness 
of  these  vague  estimations  to  be  gone  through  and 
summed  up. 

But  now  passing  over  this  assertion  of  Bentham  that 
happiness  is  a  more  intelligible  end  than  justice,  which 
we  find  to  be  the  reverse  of  truth,  let  us  note  the  sev- 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS.  193 


eral  implications  of  the  doctrine  that  the  supreme  legis- 
lative body  ought  to  make  the  greatest  happiness  of  the 
greatest  number  its  immediate  aim. 

It  implies,  in  the  first  place,  that  happiness  may  be 
compassed  by  methods  framed  directly  for  the  purpose, 
without  any  previous  inquiry  respecting  the  conditions 
that  must  be  fulfilled;  and  this  presupposes  a  belief 
that  there  are  no  such  conditions.  For  if  there  are 
any  conditions  without  fulfilment  of  which  happiness 
cannot  be  compassed,  then  the  first  step  must  be  to 
ascertain  these  conditions  with  a  view  to  fulfilling 
them  ;  and  to  admit  this  is  to  admit  that  not  happiness 
itself  must  be  the  immediate  end,  but  fulfilment  of 
the  conditions  to  its  attainment  must  be  the  immediate 
end.  The  alternatives  are  simple :  Either  the  achieve- 
ment of  happiness  is  not  conditional,  in  which  case  one 
mode  of  action  is  as  good  as  another;  or  it  is  condi- 
tional, in  which  case  the  required  mode  of  action  must 
be  the  direct  aim,  and  not  the  happiness  to  be  achieved 
by  it. 

Assuming  it  conceded,  as  it  Avill  be,  that  there  exist 
conditions  which  must  be  fulfilled  before  happiness  can 
be  attained,  let  us  next  ask  what  is  implied  by  propos- 
ing modes  of  so  controlling  conduct  as  to  further  happi- 
ness, without  previously  inquiring  whether  any  such 
modes  are  already  known?  The  implication  is  that 
human  intelligence  throughout  the  past,  operating  on 
experiences,  has  failed  to  discover  any  such  modes ; 
whereas  present  human  intelligence  may  be  expected 
forthwith  to  discover  them.  Unless  this  be  asserted, 
it  must  be  admitted  that  certain  conditions  to  the 
achievement  of  happiness  have  already  been  partially, 
if  not  wholly,  ascertained;  and  if  so,  our  first  busi- 


194 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


ness  should  be  to  look  for  them.  Having  found  them, 
our  rational  course  is  to  bring  existing  intelligence  to 
bear  on  these  products  of  past  intelligence,  with  the 
expectation  that  it  will  verify  the  substance  of  them 
while  possibly  correcting  the  form.  But  to  suppose 
that  no  regulative  principles  for  the  conduct  of  asso- 
ciated human  beings  have  thus  far  been  established, 
and  that  they  are  now  to  be  established  de  novo^  is  to 
suppose  that  man  as  he  is  differs  from  man  as  he  was  in 
an  incredible  degree. 

Beyond  ignoring  the  probability,  or  rather  the  cer- 
tainty, that  past  experience,  generalized  by  past  intelli- 
gence, must  by  this  time  have  disclosed  partially,  if 
not  wholly,  some  of  the  essential  conditions  to  the 
achievement  of  happiness,  Bentham's  proposition  ig- 
nores the  formulated  knowledge  of  them  actually  exist- 
ing. For  whence  come  the  conception  of  justice  and  the 
answering  sentiment?  He  will  scarcely  say  that  they 
are  meaningless,  although  his  proposition  implies  as 
much ;  and  if  he  admits  that  they  have  meanings,  he 
must  choose  between  two  alternatives  either  of  which 
is  fatal  to  his  hypothesis.  Are  they  supernaturally 
caused  modes  of  thinking  and  feeling,  tending  to 
make  men  fulfil  the  conditions  to  happiness?  If  so, 
their  authority  is  peremptory.  Are  they  modes  of 
thinking  and  feeling  naturally  caused  in  men  by  ex- 
perience of  these  conditions?  If  so,  their  authority 
is  no  less  peremptory.  Not  only,  then,  does  Bentham 
fail  to  infer  that  certain  principles  of  guidance  must 
by  this  time  have  been  ascertained,  but  he  refuses  to 
recognize  these  principles  as  actually  reached  and 
present  to  him. 

And  then  after  all,  he  tacitly  admits  that  which  lie 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS,  195 


overtly  denies,  by  saying  tliat  — Be  the  meaning  of 
the  word  justice  what  it  will,  what  regard  is  it  entitled 
to  otherwise  than  as  a  means  of  happiness  ?  "  For,  if 
justice  is  a  means  having  happiness  as  its  end,  then 
justice  must  take  precedence  of  happiness,  as  every 
other  means  takes  precedence  of  every  other  end. 
Bentham's  own  elaborate  polity  is  a  means  having 
happiness  as  its  end,  as  justice  is,  by  his  own  admis- 
sion, a  means  having  happiness  as  an  end.  If,  then, 
we  may  properly  skip  justice,  and  go  directly  to  the 
end  happiness,  we  may  properly  skip  Bentham's  polity, 
and  go  directly  to  the  end  happiness.  In  short,  we 
are  led  to  the  remarkable  conclusion  that  in  all  cases 
we  must  contemplate  exclusively  the  end,  and  must 
disregard  the  means. 

§  62.  This  relation  of  ends  to  means,  underlying  all 
ethical  speculation,  will  be  further  elucidated  if  we  join 
with  some  of  the  above  conclusions,  certain  conclusions 
drawn  in  the  last  chapter.  We  shall  see  that  while 
greatest  happiness  may  vary  widely  in  societies  which, 
though  ideally  constituted,  are  subject  to  unlike  physi- 
cal circumstances,  certain  fundamental  conditions  to 
the  achievement  of  this  greatest  happiness,  are  common 
to  all  such  societies. 

Given  a  people  inhabiting  a  tract  which  makes 
nomadic  habits  necessary,  and  the  happiness  of  each  in- 
dividual will  be  greatest  when  his  nature  is  so  moulded 
to  the  requirements  of  his  life,  that  all  his  faculties 
find  their  due  activities  in  daily  driving  and  tending 
cattle,  milking,  migrating,  and  so  forth.  The  members 
of  a  community  otherwise  similar,  which  is  perma- 
nently settled,  will  severally  achieve   their  greatest 


196 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


happiness  when  their  natures  have  become  such  that  a 
fixed  habitat,  and  the  occupations  necessitated  by  it, 
supply  the  spheres  in  which  each  instinct  and  emotion 
is  exercised  and  brings  the  concomitant  pleasure.  The 
citizens  of  a  large  nation,  industrially  organized,  have 
reached  their  possible  ideal  of  happiness,  when  the 
producing,  distributing,  and  other  activities,  are  such 
in  their  kinds  and  amounts,  that  each  citizen  finds  in 
them  a  place  for  all  his  energies  and  aptitudes,  v/hile 
he  obtains  the  means  of  satisfying  all  his  desires. 
Once  more  we  may  recognize  as  not  only  possible  but 
probable,  the  eventual  existence  of  a  community,  also 
industrial,  the  members  of  which,  having  natures 
similarly  responding  to  these  requirements,  are  also 
characterized  by  dominant  aesthetic  faculties,  and 
achieve  complete  happiness  only  when  a  large  part  of 
life  is  filled  with  aesthetic  activities.  Evidently  these 
different  types  of  men,  with  their  different  standards 
of  happiness,  each  finding  the  possibility  of  that  happi- 
ness in  his  own  society,  would  not  find  it  if  transferred 
to  any  of  the  other  societies.  Evidently,  though 
they  might  have  in  common  such  kinds  of  happi- 
ness as  accompany  the  satisfaction  of  vital  needs, 
they  Avould  not  have  in  common  sundry  other  kinds  of 
happiness. 

But  now  mark  that  while,  to  achieve  greatest  happi- 
ness in  each  of  such  societies,  the  special  conditions  to 
be  fulfilled  must  differ  from  those  to  be  fulfilled  in  the 
other  societies,  certain  general  conditions  must  be  ful- 
filled in  all  the  societies.  Harmonious  co-operation, 
by  which  alone  in  any  of  them  the  greatest  happiness 
can  be  attained,  is,  as  we  saw,  made  possible  only  by 
respect  for  one  another's  claims :  there  must  be  neither 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS. 


197 


those  direct  aggressions  wliicli  we  class  as  crimes  against 
person  and  property,  nor  must  there  be  those  indirect 
aggressions  constituted  by  breaches  of  contracts.  So 
that  maintenance  of  equitable  relations  between  men  is 
the  condition  to  attainment  of  greatest  happiness  in  all 
societies,  however  much  the  greatest  happiness  attain- 
able in  each  may  differ  in  nature,  or  amount,  or  both. 

And  here  a  physical  analogy  may  fitly  be  used  to 
give  the  greatest  definiteness  to  this  cardinal  truth. 
A  mass  of  matter,  of  whatever  kind,  maintains  its  state 
of  internal  equilibrium,  so  long  as  its  component  parti- 
cles severally  stand  toward  their  neighbors  in  equi- 
distant positions.  Accepting  the  conclusions  of  mod- 
ern physicists,  which  imply  that  each  molecule  moves 
rhythmically,  then  a  balanced  state  implies  that  each 
performs  its  movements  within  a  space  bounded  by  the 
like  spaces  required  for  the  movements  of  those  around. 
If  the  molecules  have  been  so  aggregated  that  the 
oscillations  of  some  are  more  restrained  than  the  oscil- 
lations of  others,  there  is  a  proportionate  instability. 
If  the  number  of  them  thus  unduly  restrained  is  con- 
siderable, the  instability  is  such  that  the  cohesion  in 
some  part  is  liable  to  fail,  and  a  crack  results.  If  the 
excesses  of  restraint  are  great  and  multitudinous,  a 
trifling  disturbance  causes  the  mass  to  break  up  into 
small  fragments.  To  which  add  that  the  recognized 
remedy  for  this  unstable  state  is  an  exposure  to  such 
physical  condition  (ordinaril}^  high  temperature)  as 
enables  the  molecules  so  to  change  their  relative  posi- 
tions that  their  mutual  restraints  become  equal  on  all 
sides.  And  ]iow  observe  that  this  holds,  whatever  be 
the  natures  of  the  molecules.  They  may  be  simple ; 
they  may  be  compound  ;  they  may  be  composed  of  this 


198 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


or  that  matter,  in  this  or  that  Avay.  In  other  words,  the 
special  activities  of  each  molecule,  constituted  by  the 
relative  movements  of  its  units,  may  be  various  in  their 
kinds  and  degrees  ;  and  yet,  be  they  what  they  may, 
it  remains  true  that  to  preserve  internal  equilibrium 
throughout  the  mass  of  molecules,  the  mutual  limita- 
tions of  their  activities  must  be  everywhere  alike. 

And  this  is  the  above-described  prerequisite  to  social 
equilibrium,  whatever  the  special  natures  of  the  associ- 
ated persons.  Assuming  that  within  each  society  such 
persons  are  of  the  same  type,  needing  for  the  fulfilment 
of  their  several  lives  kindred  activities,  and  though 
these  activities  may  be  of  one  kind  in  one  society  and 
of  another  kind  in  another,  so  admitting  of  indefinite 
variation,  this  condition  to  social  equilibrium  does  not 
admit  of  variation.  It  must  be  fulfilled  before  complete 
life,  that  is  greatest  happiness,  can  be  attained  in  any 
society ;  be  the  particular  quality  of  that  life,  or  that 
happiness,  what  it  may.^ 

§  63.  After  thus  observing  how  means  and  ends  in 
conduct  stand  to  one  another,  and  how  there  emerge 
certain  conclusions  respecting  their  relative  claims,  we 
may  see  a  way  to  reconcile  sundry  conflicting  ethical 
theories.  These  severally  embody  portions  of  the  truth  ; 
and  simply  require  combining  in  proper  order  to  em- 
body the  whole  truth. 

The  theological  theory  contains  a  part.  If  for  the 
divine  will,  supposed  to  be  supernaturally  revealed,  we 
substitute  the  naturally  revealed  end  toward  which  the 
Power  manifested  throughout  Evolution  works ;  then, 

1  This  universal  requirement  it  was  which  I  had  in  view  when  choos- 
ing for  my  lirst  work,  i)ublished  in  1850,  the  title  Social  Sialics, 


CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS.  199 


since  Evolution  has  been,  and  is  still,  working  toward 
the  highest  life,  it  follows  that  conforming  to  those 
principles  by  wliich  the  highest  life  is  achieved,  is 
furthering  that  end.  The  doctrine  that  perfection  or 
excellence  of  nature  should  be  the  object  of  pursuit,  is 
in  one  sense  true ;  for  it  tacitly  recognizes  that  ideal 
form  of  being  which  the  highest  life  implies,  and  to 
which  Evolution  tends.  There  is  a  truth,  also,  in  the 
doctrine  that  virtue  must  be  the  aim ;  for  this  is 
another  form  of  the  doctrine  that  the  aim  must  be  to 
fulfil  the  conditions  to  achievement  of  the  highest  life. 
That  the  intuitions  of  a  moral  faculty  should  guide  or 
conduct,  is  a  proposition  in  which  a  truth  is  contained ; 
for  these  intuitions  are  the  slowly  organized  results  of 
experiences  received  by  the  race  while  living  in  pres- 
ence of  these  conditions.  And  that  happiness  is  the 
supreme  end  is  beyond  question  true  ;  for  this  is  the 
concomitant  of  that  highest  life  which  every  theory  of 
moral  guidance  has  distinctly  or  vaguely  in  view. 

So  understanding  their  relative  positions,  those  ethi- 
cal systems  which  make  virtue,  right,  obligation,  the 
cardinal  aims,  are  seen  to  be  complementary  to  those 
ethical  systems  which  make  welfare,  pleasure,  happi- 
ness, the  cardinal  aims.  Though  the  moral  sentiments 
generated  in  civilized  men  by  daily  contact  with  social 
conditions  and  gradual  adaptation  to  them,  are  indis- 
pensable as  incentives  and  deterrents ;  and  though  the 
intuitions  corresponding  to  these  sentiments  have,  in 
virtue  of  their  origin,  a  general  authority  to  be  rever- 
ently recognized ;  yet  the  sympathies  and  antipathies 
hence  originating,  together  w^th  the  intellectual  exj)res- 
sions  of  them,  are,  in  their  primitive  forms,  necessarily 
vague.     To  make  guidance  by  them  adequate  to  all 


200 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


requirements,  their  dictates  have  to  be  interpreted  and 
made  definite  by  science ;  to  which  end  there  must  be 
analysis  of  those  conditions  to  complete  living  which 
they  respond  to,  and  from  converse  with  which  they 
have  arisen.  And  such  analysis  necessitates  the  recog- 
nition of  happiness  for  each  and  all,  as  the  end  to  be 
achieved  by  fulfilment  of  these  conditions. 

Hence,  recognizing  in  due  degrees  all  the  various 
ethical  theories,  conduct  in  its  highest  form  will  take 
as  guides  innate  perceptions  of  right  duly  enlightened 
and  made  precise  by  an  analytic  intelligence,  while  con- 
scious that  these  guides  are  proximately  supreme  solely 
because  they  lead  to  the  ultimate  supreme  end,  happi- 
ness special  and  general. 


RELATIVITY  OF  PAINS  AND  PLEASURES,  201 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  RELATIVITY  OF  PAINS  AND  PLEASURES. 

§  64.  A  TRUTH  of  cardinal  importance  as  a  datum  of 
Ethics,  which  was  incidentally  referred  to  in  the  last 
chapter,  must  here  be  set  forth  at  full  length.  I  mean 
the  truth  that  not  only  men  of  different  races,  but  also 
different  men  of  the  same  race,  and  even  the  same  men 
at  different  periods  of  life,  have  different  standards  of 
happiness.  Though  there  is  some  recognition  of  this 
by  moralists,  the  recognition  is  inadequate,  and  the  far- 
reaching  conclusions  to  be  drawn  when  the  relativity  of 
happiness  is  fully  recognized,  are  scarcely  suspected. 

It  is  a  belief  universal  in  early  life  —  a  belief  which 
in  most  people  is  but  partially  corrected  in  later  life, 
and  in  very  few  wholly  dissipated  —  that  there  is  some- 
thing intrinsic  in  the  pleasantness  of  certain  things, 
while  other  things  are  intrinsically  unpleasant.  The 
error  is  analogous  to,  and  closely  allied  with,  the  error 
crude  realism  makes.  Just  as  to  the  uncultured  mind  it 
appears  self-evident  that  the  sweetness  of  sugar  is  in- 
herent in  sugar,  that  sound  as  Ave  perceive  it  is  sound 
as  it  exists  in  the  external  world,  and  that  the  warmth 
from  a  fire  is  in  itself  what  it  seems ;  so  does  it  appear 
self-evident  that  the  sweetness  of  sugar  is  necessarily 
grateful,  that  there  is  in  a  beautiful  sound  something 
that  must  be  beautiful  to  all  creatures,  and  that  the 
agreeable  feeling  produced  by  warmth  is  a  feeling  which 
every  other  consciousness  must  find  agreeable. 


202 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


But  as  criticism  proves  the  one  set  of  conclusions  to 
be  wrong,  so  does  it  prove  to  be  wrong  the  other  set. 
Not  only  are  the  qualities  of  external  things  as  intel- 
lectually apprehended  by  us,  relative  to  our  own  organ- 
isms ;  but  the  pleasurableness  or  painfulness  of  the 
feelings  which  we  associate  with  such  qualities,  are 
also  relative  to  our  own  organisms.  They  are  so  in  a 
double  sense  —  they  are  relative  to  its  structures,  and 
they  are  relative  to  the  states  of  its  structures. 

That  we  may  not  rest  in  a  mere  nominal  acceptance 
of  these  general  truths,  but  may  so  appreciate  them  as 
to  see  their  full  bearings  on  ethical  theory,  we  must 
here  glance  at  them  as  exemplified  hj  animate  creatures 
at  large.  For  after  contemplating  the  wide  divergences 
of  sentiency  accompanying  the  wide  divergences  of 
organization  which  evolution  in  general  has  brought 
about,  we  shall  be  enabled  the  better  to  see  the  diver- 
gences of  sentiency  to  be  expected  from  the  further 
evolution  of  humanity. 

§  65.  Because  they  can  be  most  quickly  disposed  of, 
let  us  first  deal  with  pains ;  a  further  reason  for  first 
dealing  with  pains  being  that  we  may  thus  forthwith 
recognize,  and  then  leave  out  of  consideration,  those 
sentient  states,  the  qualities  of  which  may  be  regarded 
as  absolute  rather  than  relative. 

The  painfulness  of  the  feelings  produced  by  forces 
which  tend  to  destroy  organic  structures,  wholly  or  in 
part,  is  of  course  common  to  all  creatures  capable  of 
feeling.  We  saw  it  to  be  inevitable  that  during  evolu- 
tion there  must  everywhere  be  established  such  con- 
nections between  external  actions  and  the  modes  of 
consciousness  they  cause,  that  tlie  injurious  ones  are 


RELATIVITY  OF  PAINS  AND  PLEASURES.  203 


accompanied  by  disagreeable  feelings,  and  the  beneficial 
ones  by  agreeable  feelings.  Consequently,  pressures 
or  strains  which  tear  or  bruise,  and  heats  which  burn 
or  scald,  being  in  all  cases  partially  or  wholly  destruc- 
tive, are  in  all  cases  painful. 

But  even  here  the  relativity  of  the  feelings  may  in 
one  sense  be  asserted.  For  the  effect  of  a  force  of 
given  quantity  or  intensity  varies  partly  with  the  size 
and  partly  with  the  structure  of  the  creature  exposed 
to  it.  The  weight  Avhich  is  scarcely  felt  by  a  large 
animal  crushes  a  small  one ;  the  blow  which  breaks 
the  limb  of  a  mouse  produces  little  effect  on  a  horse  ; 
the  weapon  which  lacerates  a  horse  leaves  a  rhinoceros 
uninjured.  And  with  these  differences  of  injuriousness 
doubtless  go  differences  of  feeling.  Merely  glancing 
at  the  illustrations  of  this  truth  furnished  by  sentient 
beings  in  general,  let  us  consider  the  illustrations  man- 
kind furnish. 

Comparisons  of  robust  laboring  men  with  women  or 
children  show  us  that  degrees  of  mechanical  stress 
which  the  first  bear  with  impunity,  produce  on  the 
others  injuries  and  accompanying  pains.  The  blister- 
ing of  a  tender  skin  by  an  amount  of  friction  which 
does  not  even  redden  a  coarse  one,  or  the  bursting  of 
superficial  blood-vessels,  and  consequent  discoloration, 
caused  in  a  person  of  lax  tissues  by  a  blow  which 
leaves  in  well-toned  tissues  no  trace,  will  sufficiently 
exemplify  this  contrast. 

Not  only,  however,  are  the  pains  due  to  violent 
incident  forces,  relative  to  the  characters  or  constitu- 
tional qualities  of  the  parts  directly  affected,  but  they 
are  relative  in  equally  marked  ways,  or  even  in  more 
marked  ways,  to  the  characters  of  the  nervous  struc- 


204 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


tures.  The  common  assumption  is  that  equal  bodily 
injuries  excite  equal  pains.  But  this  is  a  mistake. 
Pulling  out  a  tooth,  or  cutting  off  a  limb,  gives  to  dif- 
ferent persons  widely  different  amounts  of  suffering; 
not  the  endurance  only,  but  the  feeling  to  be  endured, 
varies  greatly ;  and  the  variation  largely  depends  on 
the  degree  of  nervous  development.  This  is  well 
shown  by  the  great  insensibility  of  idiots  —  blows,  cuts, 
and  extremes  of  heat  and  cold,  being  borne  by  them 
with  indifference.^  The  relation  thus  shown  in  the 
most  marked  manner  where  the  development  of  the 
central  nervous  system  is  abnormally  low,  is  shown  in  a 
less  marked  manner  where  the  development  of  the 
central  nervous  system  is  normally  low ;  namely,  among 
inferior  races  of  men.  Many  travellers  have  com- 
mented on  the  strange  callousness  shown  by  savages 
who  have  been  mangled  in  battle  or  by  accident ;  and 
surgeons  in  India  say  that  wounds  and  operations  are 
better  borne  by  natives  than  by  Europeans.  Further, 
there  comes  the  converse  fact  that  among  the  higher 
types  of  men,  larger  brained  and  more  sensitive  to  pain 
than  the  lower,  the  most  sensitive  are  those  whose  nerv- 
ous developments,  as  shown  by  their  mental  powers, 
are  the  highest;  part  of  the  evidence  being  the  rela- 
tive intolerance  of  disagreeable  sensations  common 
among  men  of  genius,^  and  the  general  irritability  char- 
acteristic of  them. 

That  pain  is  relative  not  to  structures  only,  but  to 
tlieir  states  as  well,  is  also  manifest  —  more  manifest 
indeed.    The  sensibility  of  an  external  part  depends 

1  On  Idiocy  and  IrnbecUity,  by  William  W.  Ireland,  M.D.,  pp.  255,  250 

2  For  instances  see  Fortnightly  Review,  Vol.  XXIV.  {New  Series), 
p.  712. 


RELATIVITY  OF  PAINS  AND  PLEASURES.  205 


on  its  temperature.  Cool  it  below  a  certain  point,  and 
it  becomes,  as  we  say,  numb ;  and  if  by  ether  spray  it 
is  made  very  cold,  it  may  be  cut  without  any  feeling 
being  produced.  Conversely,  heat  the  part  so  that  its 
blood-vessels  dilate,  and  the  pain  which  any  injury  or 
irritation  causes  is  greater  than  usual.  How  largely 
the  production  of  pain  depends  on  the  condition  of  the 
part  affected,  we  see  in  the  extreme  tenderness  of  an 
inflamed  surface  —  a  tenderness  such  that  a  slight  touch 
causes  shrinking,  and  such  that  rays  from  the  fire  which 
ordinaril}^  would  be  indifferent  become  intolerable. 

Similarly  with  the  special  senses.  A  light  which 
eyes  that  are  in  good  order  bear  without  disagreeable 
feeling,  cannot  be  borne  by  inflamed  eyes.  And  be- 
yond the  local  state,  the  state  of  the  system  as  a  whole, 
and  the  state  of  the  nervous  centres,  are  both  factors. 
Those  enfeebled  by  illness  are  distressed  by  noises  which 
those  in  health  bear  with  equanimity ;  and  men  with 
overwrought  brains  are  irritated  in  unusual  degrees  by 
annoyances,  both  physical  and  moral. 

Further,  the  temporary  condition  known  as  exhaustion 
enters  into  the  relation.  Limbs  overworn  by  prolonged 
exertion,  cannot  without  aching  perform  acts  which 
would  at  other  times  cause  no  appreciable  feeling.  After 
reading  continuously  for  very  many  hours,  even  strong 
eyes  begin  to  smart.  And  noises  that  can  be  listened 
to  for  a  short  time  with  indifference,  become,  if  there 
is  no  cessation,  causes  of  suffering. 

So  that  though  there  is  absoluteness  in  the  relation 
between  positive  pains  and  actions  that  are  positively 
injurious,  in  so  far  that  wherever  there  is  sentiency  it 
exists;  yet  even  here  partial  relativity  may  be  asserted. 
For  there  is  no  fixed  relation  between  the  acting  force 


206 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


and  the  produced  feeling.  The  amount  of  feeling 
varies  with  the  size  of  the  organism,  with  the  character 
of  its  outer  structures,  with  the  character  of  its  nervous 
system ;  and  also  with  the  temporary  states  of  the  part 
affected,  of  the  body  at  large,  and  of  the  nervous 
centres. 

§  66.  The  relativity  of  pleasures  is  far  more  con- 
spicuous ;  and  the  illustrations  of  it  furnished  by  the 
sentient  world  at  large  are  innumerable. 

It  needs  but  to  glance  round  at  the  various  things 
which  different  creatures  are  prompted  by  their  desires 
to  eat  and  are  gratified  in  eating  —  flesh  for  predaceous 
animals,  grass  for  the  herbivora,  worms  for  the  mole, 
flies  for  the  swallow,  seeds  for  the  finch,  honey  for  the 
bee,  a  decaying  carcass  for  the  maggot  —  to  be  reminded 
that  the  tastes  for  foods  are  relative  to  the  structures 
of  the  creatures.  And  this  truth,  made  conspicuous  by 
a  survey  of  animals  in  general,  is  forced  on  our  atten- 
tion even  by  a  survey  of  different  races  of  men.  Here 
human  flesh  is  abhorred,  and  there  regarded  as  the 
greatest  delicacy ;  in  this  country  roots  are  allowed  to 
putrefy  before  they  are  eaten,  and  in  that  the  taint  of 
decay  produces  disgust :  the  whale's  blubber  which  one 
race  devours  with  avidity,  will  in  another  by  its  very 
odor  produce  nausea.  Nay,  without  looking  abroad  we 
may,  in  the  common  saying  that  "one  man's  meat  is 
another  man's  poison,"  see  the  general  admission  that 
members  of  the  same  society  so  far  differ,  that  a  taste 
which  is  to  these  pleasurable  is  to  those  displeasurable. 
So  is  it  with  the  other  senses.  Assaf(»tida,  which  by  us 
is  singled  out  as  typical  of  the  disgusting  in  odor, 
ranks  among  the  Esthonians  as  a  favorite  ])erfume,  and 


RELATIVITY  OF  PAINS  AND  PLEASURES.  207 


even  those  around  us  vary  so  far  in  their  likings  that 
the  scents  of  flowers  grateful  to  some  are  repugnant  to 
others.  Analogous  differences,  in  the  preferences  for 
colors,  we  daily  hear  expressed.  And  in  a  greater  or 
less  degree  the  like  holds  with  all  sensations  down  even 
to  those  of  touch :  the  feeling  yielded  by  velvet,  which 
is  to  most  agreeable,  setting  the  teeth  on  edge  in  some. 

It  needs  but  to  name  appetite  and  satiety  to  suggest 
multitudinous  facts  showiug  that  pleasures  are  relative 
not  only  to  the  organic  structures  but  also  to  their 
states.  The  food  which  yields  keen  gratification  when 
there  is  great  hunger  ceases  to  be  grateful  when  hunger 
is  satisfied,  and  if  then  forced  on  the  eater  is  rejected 
with  aversion.  So,  too,  a  particular  kind  of  food,  seem- 
ing when  first  tasted  so  delicious  that  daily  repetition 
would  be  a  source  of  endless  enjoyment,  becomes,  in  a 
few  days,  not  only  unenjoyable  but  repugnant.  Bril- 
liant colors  which,  falling  on  unaccustomed  eyes,  give 
delight,  pall  on  the  sense  if  long  looked  at,  and  there 
is  relief  in  getting  away  from  the  impressions  they 
yield.  Sounds  sweet  in  themselves  and  sweet  in  their 
combinations,  which  yield  to  nnfatigued  ears  intense 
pleasure,  become,  at  the  end  of  a  long  concert,  not  only 
wearisome,  but,  if  there  is  no  escape  from  them,  causes 
of  irritation.  The  like  holds  down  even  to  such  simple  ^ 
sensations  as  those  of  heat  and  cold.  The  fire  so  de- 
lightful on  a  winter's  day  is,  in  hot  weather,  oppressive ; 
and  pleasure  is  then  taken  in  the  cold  water  from 
which,  in  winter,  there  would  be  shrinking.  Indeed, 
experiences  lasting  over  but  a  few  moments  suftice  to 
show  how  relative  to  the  states  of  the  structures  are 
pleasurable  sensations  of  these  kinds ;  for  it  is  observ- 
able, that  on  dipping  the  cold  hand  into  hot  water,  the 


208 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


agreeable  feeling  gradually  diminishes  as  the  hand 
warms. 

These  few  instances  will  carry  home  the  truth,  mani- 
fest enough  to  all  who  observe,  that  the  receipt  of  each 
agreeable  sensation  depends  primarily  on  the  existence 
of  a  structure  which  is  called  into  play ;  and,  second- 
arily, on  the  condition  of  that  structure,  as  fitting  it  or 
unfitting  it  for  activity. 

§  67.  The  truth  that  emotional  pleasures  are  made 
possible,  partly  by  the  existence  of  correlative  struc- 
tures and  partly  by  the  states  of  those  structures,  is 
equally  undeniable. 

Observe  the  animal  which,  leading  a  life  demanding 
solitary  habits,  has  an  adapted  organization,  and  it 
gives  no  sign  of  need  for  the  presence  of  its  kind. 
Observe,  conversely,  a  gregarious  animal  separated 
from  the  herd,  and  you  see  marks  of  unhappiness 
while  the  separation  continues,  and  equally  distinct 
marks  of  joy  on  joining  its  companions.  In  the  one 
case  there  is  no  nervous  structure  which  finds  its 
sphere  of  action  in  the  gregarious  state,  and  in  the 
other  case  such  a  structure  exists.  As  was  implied  by 
instances  cited  in  the  last  chapter  for  another  purpose, 
animals  leading  lives  involving  particular  kinds  of 
activities,  have  become  so  constituted  that  pursuance 
of  those  activities,  exercising  the  correlative  structures, 
yields  the  associated  pleasures.  Beasts  of  prey  con- 
fined in  dens,  show  us  by  their  pacings  from  side  to 
side  the  endeavor  to  obtain,  as  well  as  tliey  can,  the 
satisfactions  that  accompany  roaming  about  in  their 
natural  habitats ;  and  that  gratification  in  the  expendi- 
ture of  their  locomotive  energies,  shown  us  by  porpoises 


RELATIVITY  OF  PAINS  AND  PLEASURES.  209 


playing  round  a  vessel,  is  shown  us  by  the  similarly 
unceasing  excursions  from  end  to  end  of  its  cell  which 
a  captured  porpoise  makes.  The  perpetual  hoppings 
of  the  canary  from  bar  to  bar  of  its  cage,  and  the 
ceaseless  use  of  claws  and  bill  in  climbing  about  its 
perch  by  the  parrot,  are  other  activities  which,  sever- 
ally related  to  the  needs  of  the  species,  have  severally 
themselves  become  sources  of  agreeable  feelings.  Still 
more  clearly  are  we  shown  by  the  efforts  which  a  caged 
beaver  makes  to  build  with  such  sticks  and  pieces 
of  wood  as  are  at  hand,  how  dominant  in  its  nature 
has  become  the  building  instinct,  and  how,  apart  from 
any  advantage  gained,  it  gets  gratification  by  repeating, 
as  well  as  it  can,  the  processes  of  construction  it 
is  organized  to  carry  on.  The  cat  which,  lacking  some- 
thing to  tear  with  her  claws,  pulls  at  the  mat  with 
them ;  the  confined  giraffe  which,  in  default  of  branches 
to  lay  hold  of,  wears  out  the  upper  angles  of  the  doors 
to  its  house  by  continually  grasping  them  with  its 
prehensile  tongue ;  the  rhinoceros  which,  having  no 
enemy  to  fight,  ploughs  up  the  ground  with  his  horn  — 
all  yield  us  analogous  evidence.  Clearly,  these  various 
actions  performed  by  these  various  creatures  are  not 
intrinsically  pleasurable,  for  they  differ  more  or  less 
in  each  species  and  are  often  utterly  unlike.  The 
pleasurableness  is  simply  in  the  exercise  of  nervo-mus- 
cular  structures  adapted  to  the  performance  of  the 
actions. 

Though  races  of  men  are  contrasted  with  one  an- 
other so  much  less  than  genera  and  orders  of  animals 
are,  yet,  as  we  saw  in  the  last  chapter,  along  with 
visible  differences  there  go  invisible  differences,  with 
accompanying  likings  for   different   modes    of  life. 


210 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


Among  some,  as  the  Mantras,  the  love  of  unrestrained 
action  and  the  disregard  of  companionship,  are  such 
that  they  separate  if  they  quarrel,  and  hence  live  scat- 
tered; while  among  others,  as  the  Damaras,  there  is 
little  tendency  to  resist,  but  instead,  an  admiration  for 
any  one  Avho  assumes  power  over  them.  Already  when 
exemplifying  the  indefiniteness  of  happiness  as  an  end 
of  action,  I  have  referred  to  the  unlike  ideals  of  life 
pursued  by  the  nomadic  and  the  settled,  the  warlike 
and  the  peaceful  —  unlike  ideals  which  imply  unlike- 
nesses  of  nervous  structures  caused  by  the  inherited 
effects  of  unlike  habits  accumulating  tlirough  genera- 
tions. These  contrasts,  various  in  their  kinds  and 
degrees  among  the  various  types  of  mankind,  every  one 
can  supplement  by  analogous  contrasts  observable 
among  those  around.  The  occupations  some  delight  in 
are  to  those  otherwise  constituted  intolerable ;  and 
men's  hobbies,  severally  appearing  to  themselves  quite 
natural,  often  appear  to  their  friends  ludicrous  and 
almost  insane :  facts  which  alone  might  make  us  see 
that  the  pleasurableness  of  actions  of  this  or  that  kind, 
is  due  not  to  anything  in  the  natures  of  the  actions,  but 
to  the  existence  of  faculties  which  find  exercise  in 
them. 

It  must  be  added  that  each  pleasurable  emotion,  like 
each  pleasurable  sensation,  is  relative  not  only  to  a 
certain  structure  but  also  to  the  state  of  that  structure. 
The  parts  called  into  action  must  have  had  proper 
rest  —  must  be  in  a  condition  fit  for  action;  not  in  the 
condition  ^  which  prolonged  action  produces.  Be  the 
order  of  emotion  what  it  may,  an  unbroken  continuity 
in  the  receipt  of  it  eventually  brings  satiety.  The 
pleasurable  consciousness  becomes  less  and  less  vivid, 


RELATIVITY  OF  PAINS  AND  PLEASURES.  211 


and  there  arises  the  need  for  a  temporary  cessation  dur- 
ing which  the  parts  tliat  have  been  active  may  recover 
their  fitness  for  activity,  and  during  which  also  tlie 
activities  of  other  parts  and  receipt  of  the  accompany- 
ing emotions  may  find  due  place. 

§  68.  I  have  insisted  on  these  general  truths  with 
perhaps  needless  iteration,  to  prepare  the  reader  for 
more  fully  recognizing  a  corollary  tliat  is  practically 
ignored.  Abundant  and  clear  as  is  the  evidence,  and 
forced  though  it  is  daily  on  every  one's  attention,  the 
conclusions  respecting  life  and  conduct  which  should 
be  drawn,  are  not  drawn  ;  and  so  much  at  variance  are 
these  conclusions  with  current  beliefs,  that  enunciation 
of  them  causes  a  stare  of  incredulity.  Pervaded  as  all 
past  thinking  has  been,  and  as  most  present  thinking 
is,  by  the  assumption  that  the  nature  of  every  creature 
has  been  specially  created  for  it,  and  that  human 
nature,  also  specially  created,  is,  like  other  natures, 
fixed  —  pervaded  too  as  this  thinking  has  been,  and  is, 
by  the  allied  assumption  that  the  agreeableness  of  cer- 
tain actions  depends  on  their  essential  qualities,  while 
other  actions  are  by  their  essential  qualities  made  dis- 
agreeable ;  it  is  difficult  to  obtain  a  hearing  for  the 
doctrine  that  the  kinds  of  action  which  are  now  pleas- 
urable will,  under  conditions  requiring  the  change^ 
cease  to  be  pleasurable,  while  other  kinds  of  action 
will  become  pleasurable.  Even  those  who  accept  the 
doctrine  of  Evolution  mostly  hear  with  scepticism,  or 
at  best  with  nominal  faith,  the  inferences  to  be 
drawn  from  it  respecting  the  humanity  of  the  future. 

And  yet  as  shown  in  myriads  of  instances  indicated 
by  the  few  above  given,  those  natural  processes  which 


212 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


have  produced  multitudinous  forms  of  structure  adapted 
to  multitudinous  forms  of  activity,  have  simultaneously 
made  these  forms  of  activity  pleasurable.  And  the 
inevitable  implication  is  that  within  the  limits  imposed 
by  physical  laws,  there  will  be  evolved,  in  adaptation 
to  an}^  new  sets  of  conditions  that  may  be  established, 
appropriate  structures  of  which  the  functions  will  yield 
their  respective  gratifications. 

When  we  have  got  rid  of  the  tendency  to  think  that 
certain  modes  of  activity  are  necessarily  pleasurable 
because  they  give  us  pleasure,  and  that  other  modes 
which  do  not  please  us  are  necessarily  unpleasing ;  we 
shall  see  that  the  remoulding  of  human  nature  into  fit- 
ness for  the  requirements  of  social  life,  must  event- 
ually make  all  needful  activities  pleasurable,  while  it 
makes  displeasurable  all  activities  at  variance  with 
these  requirements.  When  we  have  come  fully  to  rec- 
ognize the  truth  that  there  is  nothing  intrinsically  more 
gratifying  in  the  efforts  by  which  wild  animals  are 
caught,  than  in  the  efforts  expended  in  rearing  plants, 
and  that  the  combined  actions  of  muscles  and  senses  in 
rowing  a  boat  are  not  by  their  essential  natures  more 
productive  of  agreeable  feeling  than  those  gone  through 
in  reaping  corn,  but  that  everything  depends  on  the  co- 
operating emotions,  which  at  present  are  more  in  accord- 
ance with  the  one  than  with  the  other;  we  shall  infer 
tliat  along  with  decrease  of  those  emotions  for  which 
tlie  social  state  affords  little  or  no  scope,  and  increase  of 
those  which  it  persistently  exercises,  the  things  now 
done  witli  dislike  from  a  sense  of  obligation  will  be 
done  with  immediate  liking,  and  the  things  desisted 
from  as  a  matter  of  duty  will  be  desisted  from  because 
they  are  repugnant. 


RELATIVITY  OF  PAINS  AND  PLEASURES.  213 


This  conclusion,  alien  to  popular  beliefs  and  in 
ethical  speculation  habitually  ignored,  or  at  most  recog- 
nized but  partially  and  occasionally,  will  be  thought 
by  the  majority  so  improbable  that  I  must  give  further 
justification  of  it :  enforcing  the  d  priori  argument  by 
an  d  posteriori  one.  Small  as  is  the  attention  given  to 
the  fact,  yet  is  the  fact  conspicuous  that  the  corollary 
above  drawn  from  the  doctrine  of  Evolution  at  large, 
coincides  with  the  corollary  which  past  and  present 
changes  in  human  nature  force  upon  us.  The  leading 
contrasts  of  character  between  savage  and  civilized,  are 
just  those  contrasts  to  be  expected  from  the  process  of 
adaptation. 

The  life  of  the  primitive  man  is  passed  mainly  in  the 
pursuit  of  beasts,  birds,  and  fish,  which  yields  him  a 
gratifying  excitement ;  but  though  to  the  civilized  man 
the  chase  gives  gratification,  this  is  neither  so  persistent 
nor  so  general.  There  are  among  us  keen  sportsmen, 
but  there  are  many  to  whom  shooting  and  fishing  soon 
become  wearisome,  and  there  are  not  a  few  to  whom 
they  are  altogether  indifferent  or  even  distasteful. 

Conversely,  the  power  of  continued  application,, 
which  in  the  primitive  man  is  very  small,  has  among 
ourselves  become  considerable.  It  is  true  that  most 
are  coerced  into  industry  by  necessity ;  but  there  are 
sprinkled  throughout  society  men  to  whom  active 
occupation  is  a  need  —  men  who  are  restless  when  away 
from  business  and  miserable  when  they  eventually  give 
it  up ;  men  to  whom  this  or  that  line  of  investigation 
is  so  attractive  that  they  devote  themselves  to  it  day 
after  day,  year  after  year;  men  who  are  so  deeply 
interested  in  public  affairs  that  they  pass  lives  of 
labor  in  achieving  political  ends  they  think  advan- 


214 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


tageous,  hardly  giving  themselves  the  rest  necessary  for 
health. 

Yet  again,  and  still  more  strikingly,  does  the  change 
become  manifest  when  we  compare  undeveloped  with 
developed  humanity  in  respect  of  the  conduct  prompted 
by  fellow  feeling.  Cruelty  rather  than  kindness  is 
characteristic  of  the  savage,  and  is  in  many  cases  a 
source  of  marked  gratification  to  him;  but  though 
among  the  civili'zed  are  some  in  whom  this  trait  of  the 
savage  survives,  yet  a  love  of  inflicting  pain  is  not 
general,  and  besides  numbers  who  show  benevolence, 
there  are  those  who  devote  their  whole  time  and  much 
of  their  money  to  philanthropic  ends,  without  thought 
of  reward  either  here  or  hereafter. 

Clearly  these  major,  along  with  many  minor,  changes 
of  nature,  conform  to  the  law  set  forth.  Activities 
appropriate  to  their  needs  which  give  pleasures  to  sav- 
ages have  ceased  to  be  pleasurable  to  many  of  the  civil- 
ized; while  the  civilized  have  acquired  capacities  for 
other  appropriate  activities  and  accompanying  pleasures 
which  savages  had  no  capacities  for. 

Now,  not  only  is  it  rational  to  infer  that  changes  like 
those  which  have  been  going  on  during  civilization,  will 
continue  to  go  on,  but  it  is  irrational  to  do  otherwise. 
Not  he  who  believes  that  adaptation  will  increase  is  ab- 
surd, but  he  who  doubts  that  it  will  increase  is  absurd. 
Lack  of  faith  in  such  further  evolution  of  humanity  as 
shall  harmonize  its  nature  with  its  conditions,  adds  but 
another  to  the  countless  illustrations  of  inadequate  con- 
sciousness of  causation.  One  who,  leaving  behind 
both  primitive  dogmas  and  primitive  ways  of  looking  at 
things,  has,  while  accepting  scientific  conclusions,  ac- 
quired those  habits  of  thought  which  science  generates, 


RELATIVITY  OF  PAINS  AND  PLEASURES,  215 


will  regard  the  conclusion  above  drawn  as  inevitable. 
He  will  find  it  impossible  to  believe  that  the  processes 
which  have  heretofore  so  moulded  all  beings  to  the  re- 
quirements of  their  lives  that  they  get  satisfactions  in 
fulfilling  them,  will  not  hereafter  continue  so  moulding 
them.  He  will  infer  that  the  type  of  nature  to  which 
the  highest  social  life  affords  a  sphere  such  that  every 
faculty  has  its  due  amount,  and  no  more  than  the  due 
amount,  of  function  and  accompanying  gratification,  is 
the  type  of  nature  toward  which  progress  cannot  cease 
till  it  is  reached.  Pleasure  being  producible  by  the 
exercise  of  any  structure  which  is  adjusted  to  its  special 
end,  he  will  see  the  necessary  implication  to  be,  that, 
supposing  it  consistent  with  maintenance  of  life,  there 
is  no  kind  of  activity  which  will  not  become  a  source  of 
pleasure  if  continued ;  and  that  therefore  pleasure  will 
eventually  accompany  every  mode  of  action  demanded 
by  social  conditions. 

This  corollary  I  here  emphasize  because  it  will  pres- 
ently play  an  important  part  in  the  argument. 


216 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  XL 

EGOISM  VERSUS  ALTRUISM. 

§  69.  If  insistence  on  them  tends  to  unsettle  estab- 
lished systems  of  belief,  self-evident  truths  are  by 
most  people  silently  passed  over;  or  else  there  is  a 
tacit  refusal  to  draw  from  them  the  most  obvious 
infereiices. 

Of  self-evident  truths  so  dealt  with,  the  one  which 
here  concerns  us  is  that  a  creature  must  live  before  it 
can  act.  From  this  it  is  a  corollary  that  the  acts  by 
which  each  maintains  his  own  life  must,  speaking  gen- 
erally, precede  in  imperativeness  all  other  acts  of  which 
he  is  capable.  For  if  it  be  asserted  that  these  other 
acts  must  precede  in  imperativeness  the  acts  which 
maintain  life  ;  and  if  this,  accepted  as  a  general  law  of 
conduct,  is  conformed  to  by  all,  then  by  postponing  the 
acts  which  maintain  life  to  the  other  acts  which  make 
life  possible,  all  must  lose  their  lives.  That  is  to  say. 
Ethics  has  to  recognize  the  truth,  recognized  in  unethi- 
cal thought,  that  egoism  comes  before  altruism.  The 
acts  required  for  continued  self-preservation,  including 
the  enjoyment  of  benefits  achieved  by  such  acts,  are 
the  first  requisites  to  universal  welfare.  Unless  each 
duly  cares  for  himself,  his  care  for  all  others  is  ended 
by  death ;  and  if  each  thus  dies,  tlierc  remain  no 
others  to  be  cared  for. 

This  ijermanent  supremacy  of  egoism  over  altruism, 


EGOISM  VERSUS  ALTRUISM. 


217 


made  manifest  by  contemplating  existing  life,  is  fur- 
ther made  manifest  by  contemplating  life  in  course  of 
evolution. 

§  70.  Those  who  have  followed  with  assent  the 
recent  course  of  thought,  do  not  need  telling  that 
throughout  past  eras,  the  life,  vast  in  amount  and 
varied  in  kind,  which  has  overspread  the  earth,  has 
progressed  in  subordination  to  the  law  that  every 
individual  shall  gain  by  whatever  aptitude  it  has  for 
fulfilling  the  conditions  to  its  existence.  The  uniform 
principle  has  been  that  better  adaptation  shall  bring 
greater  benefit;  which  greater  benefit,  while  increas- 
ing the  prosperity  of  the  better  adapted,  shall  increase 
also  its  ability  to  leave  offspring  inheriting  more  or 
less  its  better  adaptation.  And,  by  implication,  the 
uniform  principle  has  been  that  the  ill-adapted,  disad- 
vantaged in  the  struggle  for  existence,  shall  bear  the 
consequent  evils ;  either  disappearing  when  its  imper- 
fections are  extreme,  or  else  rearing  fewer  offspring, 
which,  inheriting  its  imperfections,  tend  to  dwindle 
away  in  posterity. 

It  has  been  thus  with  innate  superiorities ;  it  has 
been  thus  also  with  acquired  ones.  All  along  the  law 
has  been  that  increased  function  brings  increased 
power ;  and  that  therefore  such  extra  activities  as  aid 
welfare  in  any  member  of  a  race,  produce  in  its  struc- 
tures greater  ability  to.  carry  on  such  extra  activities ; 
the  derived  advantages  being  enjoyed  b}^  it  to  the 
heightening  and  lengthening  of  its  life.  Conversely, 
as  lessened  function  ends  in  lessened  structure,  the 
dwindling  of  unused  faculties  has  ever  entailed  loss 
of  power  to  achieve  the  correlative  ends  ;  the  result  of 


218 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


inadequate  fulfilment  of  the  ends  being  diminished 
ability  to  maintain  life.  And  by  inheritance,  such 
functionally  produced  modifications  have  respectively 
furthered  or  hindered  survival  in  posterity. 

As  already  said,  the  law  that  each  creature  shall 
take  the  benefits  and  the  evils  of  its  nature,  be  they 
those  derived  from  ancestry  or  those  due  to  self- 
produced  modifications,  has  been  the  law  under  which 
life  has  evolved  thus  far ;  and  it  must  continue  to  be 
the  law,  however  much  further  life  may  evolve.  What- 
ever qualifications  this  natural  course  of  action  may 
now  or  hereafter  undergo,  are  qualifications  that  can- 
not, without  fatal  results,  essentially  change  it.  Any 
arrangements  which  in  a  considerable  degree  prevent 
superiority  from  profiting  by  the  rewards  of  superiority, 
or  shield  inferiority  from  the  evils  it  entails  —  any 
arrangements  which  tend  to  make  it  as  well  to  be  infe- 
rior as  to  be  superior,  are  arrangements  diametrically 
opposed  to  the  progress  of  organization  and  the  reaching 
of  a  higher  life. 

But  to  say  that  each  individual  shall  reap  the  bene- 
fits brought  to  him  by  his  own  powers,  inherited  and 
acquired,  is  to  enunciate  egoism  as  an  ultimate  prin- 
ciple of  conduct.  It  is  to  say  that  egoistic  claims  must 
take  precedence  of  altruistic  claims. 

§  71.  Under  its  biological  aspect  this  proposition  can- 
not be  contested  by  those  who  agree  in  the  doctrine  of 
Evolution ;  but  probably  they  will  not  at  once  allow 
that  admission  of  it  under  its  ethical  aspect  is  equally 
unavoidable.  While,  as  respects  development  of  life, 
the  Avell-working  of  the  universal  principle  described 
is  sufficiently  manifest;  the  well-working  of  it  as  re- 


EGOISM  VERSUS  ALTRUISM. 


219 


spects  increase  of  happiness  may  not  be  seen  at  once. 
But  the  two  cannot  be  disjoined. 

Incapacity  of  every  kind  and  of  whatever  degree 
causes  unhappiness  directly  and  indirectly  —  directly 
by  the  pain  consequent  on  the  overtaxing  of  inade- 
quate faculty,  and  indirectly  by  the  non-fulfilment,  or 
imperfect  fulfilment,  of  certain  conditions  to  welfare. 
Conversely,  capacity  of  every  kind  sufficient  for  the 
requirement  conduces  to  happiness  immediately  and 
remotely  —  immediately  by  the  pleasure  accompanying 
the  normal  exercise  of  each  power  that  is  up  to  its 
work,  and  remotely  by  the  pleasures  which  are  fur- 
thered by  the  ends  achieved.  A  creature  that  is  weak 
or  slow  of  foot,  and  so  gets  food  only  by  exhausting 
efforts,  or  escapes  enemies  with  difficulty,  suffers  the 
pains  of  over-strained  powers,  of  unsatisfied  appetites, 
of  distressed  emotions ;  while  the  strong  and  swift 
creature  of  the  same  species  delights  in  its  efficient 
activities,  gains  more  fully  the  satisfactions  yielded  by 
food  as  well  as  the  renewed  vivacity  this  gives,  and 
has  to  bear  fewer  and  smaller  pains  in  defending  itself 
against  foes  or  escaping  from  them.  Similarly  with 
duller  and  keener  senses,  or  higher  and  lower  degrees 
of  sagacity.  The  mentally  inferior  individual  of  any 
race  suffers  negative  and  positive  miseries ;  while  the 
mentally  superior  individual  receives  negative  and  posi- 
tive gratifications.  Inevitably  then,  this  law  in  con- 
formity with  w^hich  each  member  of  a  species  takes 
the  consequences  of  its  own  nature ;  and  in  virtue  of 
which  the  progeny  of  each  member,  participating  in  its 
nature,  also  talces  such  consequences ;  is  one  that  tends 
ever  to  raise  the  aggregate  happiness  of  the  species,  by 
furthering  the  multiplication  of  the  happier,  and  hin- 
dering that  of  the  less  happy. 


220 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


All  this  is  true  of  human  beings  as  of  other  beings. 
The  conclusion  forced  on  us  is  that  the  pursuit  of  indi- 
vidual happiness  within  those  limits  prescribed  by  social 
conditions  is  the  first  requisite  to  the  attainment  of  the 
greatest  general  happiness.  To  see  this  it  needs  but  to 
contrast  one  whose  self-regard  has  maintained  bodily 
w^ell-being  with  one  whose  regardlessness  of  self  has 
brought  its  natural  results  ;  and  then  to  ask  what  must 
be  the  contrast  between  two  societies  formed  of  two 
such  kinds  of  individuals. 

Bounding  out  of  bed  after  an  unbroken  sleep,  singing 
or  whistling  as  he  dresses,  coming  down  with  beaming 
face  ready  to  laugh  on  the  smallest  provocation,  the 
healthy  man  of  high  powers,  conscious  of  past  successes, 
and  by  his  energy,  quickness,  resource,  made  confident 
of  the  future,  enters  on  the  day's  business,  not  with 
repugnance,  but  with  gladness  ;  and  from  hour  to  hour 
experiencing  satisfactions  from  work  effectually  done, 
comes  home  with  an  abundant  surplus  of  energy  remain- 
ing for  hours  of  relaxation.  Far  otherwise  is  it  with 
one  who  is  enfeebled  by  great  neglect  of  self.  Already 
deficient,  his  energies  are  made  more  deficient  by  con- 
stant endeavors  to  execute  tasks  that  prove  beyond 
his  strength,  and  by  the  resulting  discouragement. 
Besides  the  depressing  consciousness  of  the  immediate 
future,  there  is  the  depressing  consciousness  of  the 
remoter  future,  with  its  probability  of  accumulated 
difficulties  and  diminished  ability  to  meet  them.  Hours 
of  leisure  which,  rightly  passed,  bring  pleasures  that 
raise  the  tide  of  life  and  renew  the  powers  of  work, 
cannot  be  utilized:  there  is  not  vigor  enough  for 
enjoyments  involving  action,  and  lack  of  spirits  pre- 
vents passive  enjoyments  from  being  entered  upon  with 


EGOISM  VERSUS  ALTRUISM. 


221 


zest.  In  brief,  life  becomes  a  burden.  Now,  if,  as 
must  be  admitted,  in  a  community  composed  of  indi- 
viduals like  the  first,  the  happiness  will  be  relatively 
great,  while  in  one  composed  of  individuals  like  the 
last,  there  will  be  relatively  little  happiness,  or  rather 
much  misery ;  it  must  be  admitted  that  conduct  caus- 
ing the  one  result  is  good,  and  conduct  causing  the 
other  is  bad. 

But  diminutions  of  general  happiness  are  produced 
by  inadequate  egoism  in  several  other  ways.  These  we 
will  successively  glance  at. 

§  72.  If  there  were  no  proofs  of  heredity  —  if  it  were 
the  rule  that  the  strong  are  usually  begotten  by  the 
weak,  while  the  weak  usually  descend  from  the  strong, 
that  vivacious  children  form  the  families  of  melancholy 
parents,  while  fathers  and  mothers  with  overflowing 
spirits  mostly  have  dull  progeny,  that  from  stolid  peas- 
ants there  ordinarily  come  sons  of  high  intelligence, 
while  the  sons  of  the  cultured  are  commonly  fit  for 
nothing  but  following  the  plough  —  if  there  were  no 
transmission  of  gout,  scrofula,  insanity,  and  did  the 
diseased  habitually  give  birth  to  the  healthy  and  the 
healthy  to  the  diseased,  writers  on  Ethics  might  be 
justified  in  ignoring  those  effects  of  conduct  which  are 
felt  by  posterity  through  the  natures  they  inherit. 

As  it  is,  however,  the  current  ideas  concerning  the 
relative  claims  of  egoism  and  altruism  are  vitiated 
by  the  omission  of  this  all-important  factor.  For,  if 
health,  strength,  and  capacity  are  usually  transmitted ; 
and  if  disease,  feebleness,  stupiditj^,  generally  reappear 
in  descendants ;  then  a  rational  altruism  requires  in- 
sistence on  that  egoism  which  is  shown  by  receipt  of 


222 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


the  satisfactions  accompanying  preservation  of  body 
and  mind  in  the  best  state.  The  necessary  implication 
is  that  blessings  are  provided  for  offspring  by  due  self- 
regard,  while  disregard  of  self  carried  too  far  provides 
curses.  When,  indeed,  we  remember  how  commonly  it 
is  remarked  that  high  health  and  overflowing  spirits 
render  any  lot  in  life  tolerable,  w^hile  chronic  ailments 
make  gloomy  a  life  most  favorably  circumstanced,  it 
becomes  amazing  that  both  the  world  at  large  and 
writers  who  make  conduct  their  study,  should  ignore 
the  terrible  evils  which  disregard  of  personal  well-being 
inflicts  on  the  unborn,  and  the  incalculable  good  laid 
up  for  the  unborn  by  attention  to  personal  well-being. 
Of  all  bequests  of  parents  to  children,  the  most  valua- 
ble is  a  sound  constitution.  Though  a  man's  body  is 
not  a  property  that  can  be  inherited,  yet  his  constitution 
may  fitly  be  compared  to  an  entailed  estate  ;  and  if  he 
rightly  understands  his  duty  to  posterity,  he  will  see 
that  he  is  bound  to  pass  on  that  estate  uninjured  if  not 
improved.  To  say  this  is  to  say  that  he  must  be  ego- 
istic to  the  extent  of  satisfying  all  those  desires  asso- 
ciated with  the  due  performance  of  functions.  Nay,  it 
is  to  say  more.  It  is  to  say  that  he  must  seek  in  due 
amounts  the  various  pleasures  which  life  offers.  For 
beyond  the  effect  these  have  in  raising  the  tide  of  life 
and  maintaining  constitutional  vigor,  there  is  the  effect 
they  have  in  preserving  and  increasing  a  capacity  for 
receiving  enjoyment.  Endowed  with  abundant  ener- 
gies and  various  tastes,  some  can  get  gratifications  of 
many  kinds  on  opportunities  hourly  occurring ;  while 
others  are  so  inert,  and  so  uninterested  in  things  around, 
that  they  cannot  even  take  the  trouble  to  amuse  them- 
selves.   And  unless  heredity  be  denied,  tlic  inference 


EGOISM  VERSUS  ALTRUISM, 


223 


must  be  that  due  acceptance  of  the  miscellaneous  pleas- 
ures life  offers,  conduces  to  the  capacity  for  enjoyment 
in  posterity ;  and  that  persistence  in  dull  monotonous 
lives  by  parents,  diminishes  the  ability  of  their  descend' 
ants  to  make  the  best  of  what  gratifications  fall  to  them. 

§  73.  Beyond  the  decrease  of  general  happiness  which 
results  in  this  indirect  way,  if  egoism  is  unduly  subor- 
dinated, there  is  a  decrease  of  general  happiness  w^hich 
results  in  a  direct  way.  He  who  carries  self-regard  far 
enough  to  keep  himself  in  good  health  and  high  spirits, 
in  the  first  place,  thereby  becomes  an  immediate  source 
of  happiness  to  those  around,  and,  in  the  second  place, 
maintains  the  ability  to  increase  their  happiness  by 
altruistic  actions.  But  one  whose  bodily  vigor  and 
mental  health  are  undermined  by  self-sacrifice  carried 
too  far,  in  the  first  place  becomes  to  those  around  a 
cause  of  depression,  and,  in  the  second  place,  renders 
himself  incapable,  or  less  capable,  of  actively  further- 
ing their  welfare. 

In  estimating  conduct  we  must  remember  that  there 
are  those  who  by  their  joyousness  beget  joy  in  others, 
and  that  there  are  those  who  by  their  melancholy  cast 
a  gloom  on  every  circle  they  enter.  And  we  must 
remember  that  by  display  of  overflowing  happiness  a 
man  of  the  one  kind  may  add  to  the  happiness  of  others 
more  than  by  positive  efforts  to  benefit  them,  and  that 
a  man  of  the  other  kind  may  decrease  their  happiness 
more  by  his  presence  than  he  increases  it  by  his  actions. 
Full  of  vivacity,  the  one  is  ever  welcome.  For  his  wife 
he  has  smiles  and  jocose  speeches ;  for  his  children, 
stores  of  fun  and  play;  for  his  friends,  pleasant  talk 
interspersed  with  the  sallies  of  wit  that  come  from 


224 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


buoyancy.  Contrariwise,  the  other  is  shunned.  The 
irritability  resulting  now  from  ailments,  now  from  fail- 
ures caused  by  feebleness,  his  family  has  daily  to  bear. 
Lacking  adequate  energy  for  joining  in  them,  he  has  at 
best  but  a  tepid  interest  in  the  amusements  of  his  chil- 
dren, and  he  is  called  a  wet  blanket  by  his  friends. 
Little  account  as  our  ethical  reasonings  take  note  of  it, 
yet  is  the  fact  obvious  that  since  happiness  and  misery 
are  infectious,  such  regard  for  self  as  conduces  to  health 
and  high  spirits  is  a  benefaction  to  others,  and  such  dis- 
regard of  self  as  brings  on  suffering,  bodily  or  mental, 
is  a  malefaction  to  others. 

The  duty  of  making  one's  self  agreeable  by  seeming 
to  be  pleased,  is,  indeed,  often  urged,  and  thus  to 
gratify  friends  is  applauded  so  long  as  self-sacrificing 
effort  is  implied.  But  though  display  of  real  happi- 
ness gratifies  friends  far  more  than  display  of  sham 
happiness,  and  has  no  drawback  in  the  shape  either  of 
hypocrisy  or  strain,  yet  it  is  not  thought  a  duty  to 
fulfil  the  conditions  which  favor  the  displaj^  of  real 
happiness.  Nevertheless,  if  quantity  of  happiness 
produced  is  to  be  the  measure,  the  last  is  more  impera- 
tive than  the  first. 

And  then,  as  above  indicated,  beyond  this  primary 
series  of  effects  produced  on  others,  there  is  a  second- 
ary series  of  effects.  The  adequately  egoistic  indi- 
vidual retains  those  powers  which  make  altruistic 
activities  possible.  The  individual  who  is  inadequately 
egoistic  loses  more  or  less  of  his  ability  to  be  altruistic. 
The  truth  of  the  one  proposition  is  self-evident,  and 
the  truth  of  the  other  is  daily  forced  on  us  by  examples. 
Note  a  few  of  them. 

Here  is  a  mother,  who,  brought  up  in  the  insane 


EGOISM  VERSUS  ALTRUISM. 


225 


fashion  usual  among  the  cultivated,  has  a  physique  not 
strong  enough  for  suckling  her  infant,  but  who,  know- 
ing: that  its  natural  food  is  the  best,  and  anxious  for  its 
welfare,  continues  to  give  it  milk  for  a  longer  time 
than  her  system  will  bear.  Eventually  the  accumulat- 
ing reaction  tells.  There  comes  exhaustion  running,  it 
may  be,  into  illness  caused  by  depletion ;  occasionally 
ending  in  death,  and  often  entailing  chronic  weakness. 
She  becomes,  perhaps  for  a  time,  perhaps  permanently, 
incapable  of  carrying  on  household  affairs ;  her  other 
children  suffer  from  the  loss  of  maternal  attention ; 
and  where  the  income  is  small,  payments  for  nurse  and 
doctor  tell  injuriouslj"  on  the  whole  family. 

Instance,  again,  what  not  infrequently  happens  with 
the  father.  Similarly  prompted  by  a  high  sense  of 
obligation,  and  misled  by  current  moral  theories  into 
the  notion  that  self-denial  may  rightly  be  carried  to 
any  extent,  he  daily  continues  his  office  work  for  long 
hours  regardless  of  hot  head  and  cold  feet ;  and  debars 
himself  from  social  pleasures,  for  which  he  thinks  he 
can  afford  neither  time  nor  money.  What  comes  of 
this  entirely  unegoistic  course  ?  Eventually  a  sudden 
collapse,  sleeplessness,  inability  to  work.  That  rest 
which  he  would  not  give  himself  when  his  sensations 
prompted,  he  has  now  to  take  in  long  measure.  The 
extra  earnings  laid  by  for  the  benefit  of  his  family  are 
quickly  swept  away  by  costly  journeys  in  aid  of  recov- 
ery, and  by  the  many  expenses  which  illness  entails. 
Instead  of  increased  ability  to  do  his  duty  by  his  off- 
spring, there  comes  now  inability.  Life-long  evils  on 
them  replace  hoped-for  goods. 

And  so  is  it,  too,  with  the  social  effects  of  inadequate 
egoism.    All  grades  furnish  examples  of  the  mischiefs, 


226 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


positive  and  negative,  inflicted  on  society  by  excessive 
neglect  of  self.  Now  the  case  is  that  of  a  laborer  who, 
conscientiously  continuing  his  work  under  a  broiling 
sun,  spite  of  violent  protest  from  his  feelings,  dies  of 
sunstroke ;  and  leaves  his  family  a  burden  to  the  par- 
ish. Now  the  case  is  that  of  a  clerk  whose  eyes  perma- 
nently fail  from  over-straining,  or  Avho,  daily  writing  for 
hours  after  his  fingers  are  painfully  cramped,  is  attacked 
with  "  scrivener's  palsy,"  and,  unable  to  write  at  all, 
sinks  with  aged  parents  into  poverty  which  friends  are 
called  on  to  mitigate.  And  now  the  case  is  that  of  a 
man  devoted  to  public  ends,  who,  shattering  his  health 
by  ceaseless  application,  fails  to  achieve  all  he  might 
have  achieved  by  a  more  reasonable  apportionment  of 
his  time  between  labor  on  behalf  of  others  and  minis- 
tration to  his  own  needs. 

§  74.  In  one  further  way  is  the  undue  subordination 
of  egoism  to  altruism  injurious.  Both  directlj^  and  in- 
directly unselfishness  pushed  to  excess  generates  self- 
ishness. 

Consider  first  the  immediate  effects.  That  one  man 
may  yield  up  to  another  a  gratification,  it  is  needful 
that  the  other  shall  accept  it :  and  where  the  gratifica- 
tion is  of  a  kind  to  which  their  respective  claims  are 
equal,  or  which  is  no  more  required  by  the  one  than  by 
the  other,  acceptance  implies  a  readiness  to  get  gratifi- 
cation at  another's  cost.  The  circumstances  and  needs 
of  the  two  being  alike,  the  transaction  involves  as 
much  culture  of  egoism  in  the  last  as  it  involves 
culture  of  altruism  in  the  first.  It  is  true  that  not  un- 
frequently,  difference  between  their  means  or  difference 
between  tlieir  appetites  for  a  pleasure  which  the  one 


EGOISM  VERSUS  ALTRUISM. 


227 


has  had  often  and  the  other  rarely,  divests  the  accept- 
ance of  this  character;  and  it  is  true  that  in  other 
cases  the  benefactor  manifestly  takes  so  much  pleasure 
in  giving  pleasure,  that  the  sacrifice  is  partial,  and  the 
reception  of  it  not  wholly  selfish.  But  to  see  the  effect 
above  indicated  we  must  exclude  such  inequalities,  and 
consider  what  happens  where  wants  are  approximately 
alike  and  where  the  sacrifices,  not  reciprocated  at  inter- 
vals, are  perpetually  on  one  side.  So  restricting  the 
inquiry,  all  can  name  instances  verifying  the  alleged 
result.  Every  one  can  remember  circles  in  which  the 
daily  surrender  of  benefits  by  the  generous  to  the 
greedy,  has  caused  increase  of  greediness,  until  there 
has  been  produced  an  unscrupulous  egoism  intolerable 
to  all  around.  There  are  obvious  social  effects  of 
kindred  nature.  Most  thinking  people  now  recognize 
the  demoralization  caused  by  indiscriminate  charity. 
They  see  how  in  the  mendicant  there  is,  besides 
destruction  of  the  normal  relation  between  labor  ex- 
pended and  benefit  obtained,  a  genesis  of  the  expecta- 
tion that  others  shall  minister  to  his  needs ;  showing 
itself  sometimes  in  the  venting  of  curses  on  those  who 
refuse. 

Next  consider  the  remote  results.  When  the  egoistic 
claims  are  so  much  subordinated  to  the  altruistic  as  to 
produce  physical  mischief,  the  tendency  is  toward  a 
relative  decrease  in  the  number  of  the  altruistic  and 
therefore  an  increased  predominance  of  the  egoistic. 
Pushed  to  extremes,  sacrifice  of  self  for  the  benefit  of 
others  leads  occasionally  to  death  before  the  ordinary 
period  of  marriage  ;  leads  sometimes  to  abstention  from 
marriage,  as  in  sisters  of  charity ;  leads  sometimes  to 
an  ill-health  or  a  loss  of  attractiveness  which  prevents 


228 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


marriage ;  leads  sometimes  to  non-acquirement  of  the 
pecuniary  means  needed  for  marriage  ;  and,  in  all  these 
cases,  therefore,  the  unusually  altruistic  leave  no  descend- 
ants. Where  the  postponement  of  personal  welfare  to  the 
welfare  of  others  has  not  been  carried  so  far  as  to  pre- 
vent marriage,  it  yet  not  unfrequently  occurs  that  the 
physical  degradation  resulting  from  years  of  self-neglect 
causes  infertility ;  so  that  again  the  most  altruistically 
natured  leave  no  like-natured  posterity.  And  then  in 
less  marked  and  more  numerous  cases,  the  resulting 
enfeeblement  shows  itself  by  the  production  of  rela- 
tively weak  offspring ;  of  whom  some  die  early,  while 
the  rest  are  less  likely  than  usual  to  transmit  the 
parental  type  to  future  generations.  Inevitably,  then, 
by  this  dying  'out  of  the  especially  unegoistic,  there  is 
prevented  that  desirable  mitigation  of  egoism  in  the 
average  nature  which  would  else  have  taken  place. 
Such  disregard  of  self  as  brings  down  bodily  vigor 
below  the  normal  level,  eventually  produces  in  the 
society  a  counterbalancing  excess  of  regard  for  self. 

§  75.  That  egoism  precedes  altruism  in  order  of  im- 
perativeness, is  thus  clearly  shown.  The  acts  which 
make  continued  life  possible,  must,  on  the  average,  be 
more  peremptory  than  all  those  other  acts  which  life 
makes  possible,  including  the  acts  wliich  benefit  others. 
Turning  from  life  as  existing  to  life  as  evolving,  we  are 
equally  shown  this.  Sentient  beings  have  progressed 
from  low  to  high  types,  under  the  law  that  tlie  superior 
shall  profit  by  their  superiority  and  the  inferior  shall 
suffer  from  their  inferiority.  Conformity  to  this  law 
has  been,  and  is  still,  needful,  not  only  for  the  continu- 
ance of  life  but  for  the  increase  of  happiness :  since  the 


EGOISM  VERSUS  ALTRUISM. 


229 


superior  are  those  having  faculties  better  adjusted  to 
the  requirements  —  faculties,  therefore,  which  bring  in 
their  exercise  greater  pleasure  and  less  pain. 

More  special  considerations  join  these  more  general 
ones  in  showing  us  this  truth.  Such  egoism  as  pre- 
serves a  vivacious  mind  in  a  vigorous  body  furthers  the 
happiness  of  descendants,  whose  inherited  constitutions 
make  the  labors  of  life  easy  and  its  pleasures  keen ; 
while,  conversely,  unhappiness  is  entailed  on  posterity 
by  those  who  bequeath  them  constitutions  injured  by 
self-neglect.  Again,  the  individual  whose  well-con- 
served life  shows  itself  in  overflowing  spirits,  becomes, 
by  his  mere  existence,  a  source  of  pleasure  to  all 
around ;  while  the  depression  which  commonly  accom- 
panies ill-health  diffuses  itself  through  family  and 
among  friends.  A  further  contrast  is  that  whereas  one 
who  has  been  duly  regardful  of  self  retains  the  power 
of  being  helpful  to  others,  there  results  from  self-abne- 
gation in  excess,  not  only  an  inability  to  help  others  but 
the  infliction  of  positive  burdens  on  them.  Lastly,  we 
come  upon  the  truth  that  undue  altruism  increases  ego- 
ism, both  directly  in  contemporaries,  and  indirectly  in 
posterity. 

And  now  observe  that  though  the  general  conclusion 
enforced  by  these  special  conclusions  is  at  variance  with 
nominally  accepted  beliefs,  it  is  not  at  variance  with 
actually  accepted  beliefs.  While  opposed  to  the  doc- 
trine which  men  are  taught  should  be  acted  upon,  it  is 
in  harmony  with  the  doctrine  which  they  do  act  upon 
and  dimly  see  must  be  acted  upon.  For,  omitting  such 
abnormalities  of  conduct  as  are  instanced  above,  every 
one,  alike  by  deed  and  word,  implies  that  in  the  busi- 
ness of  life  personal  w^elfare  is  the  primary  considera- 


230 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


tion.  The  laborer  looking  for  wages  in  return  for  work 
done,  no  less  than  the  merchant  who  sells  goods  at  a 
profit,  the  doctor  who  expects  fees  for  advice,  the  priest 
who  calls  the  scene  of  his  ministrations  "a  living,"  as- 
sumes as  beyond  question  the  truth  that  selfishness,  car- 
ried to  the  extent  of  enforcing  his  claims  and  enjoying 
the  returns  his  efforts  bring,  is  not  only  legitimate  but 
essential.  Even  persons  who  avow  a  contrary  convic- 
tion prove  by  their  acts  that  it  is  inoperative.  Those 
who  repeat  with  emphasis  the  maxim,  "  Love  your 
neighbor  as  yourself,"  do  not  render  up  what  they  pos- 
sess so  as  to  satisfy  the  desires  of  all  as  much  as  they 
satisfy  their  own  desires.  Nor  do  those  whose  extreme 
maxim  is,  "Live  for  others,"  differ  appreciably  from 
people  around  in  their  regards  for  personal  welfare,  or 
fail  to  appropriate  their  shares  of  life's  pleasures.  In 
short,  that  which  is  above  set  forth  as  the  belief  to 
which  scientific  ethics  leads  us,  is  that  which  men  do 
really  believe,  as  distinguished  from  that  which  they 
believe  they  believe. 

Finally,  it  may  be  remarked  that  a  rational  egoism, 
so  far  from  implying  a  more  egoistic  human  nature,  is 
consistent  with  a  human  nature  that  is  less  egoistic. 
For  excesses  in  one  direction  do  not  prevent  excesses 
in  the  opposite  direction  ;  but  rather,  extreme  deviations 
from  the  mean  on  one  side  lead  to  extreme  deviations 
on  the  other  side.  A  society  in  which  the  most  exalted 
principles  of  self-sacrifice  for  the  benefit  of  neighbors 
are  enunciated,  may  be  a  society  in  which  unscrupulous 
sacrifice  of  alien  fellow-creatures  is  not  only  tolerated 
but  applauded.  Along  with  professed  anxiety  to  spread 
these  exalted  principles  among  heathens,  there  may 
go  the  deliberate  fastening  of  a  quarrel  upon  them 


EGOISM  VERSUS  ALTRUISM. 


231 


with  a  view  to  annexing  their  territory.  Men  who 
every  Sunday  have  listened  approvingly  to  injunctions 
carrying  the  regard  for  other  men  to  an  impracticable 
extent,  may  yet  hire  themselves  out  to  slay,  at  the 
word  of  command,  any  people  in  any  part  of  the  world, 
utterly  indifferent  to  the  right  or  wrong  of  the  matter 
fought  about.  And  as  in  these  cases  transcendent 
altruism  in  theory  co-exists  with  brutal  egoism  in  prac- 
tice, so  conversely,  a  more  qualified  altruism  may  have 
for  its  concomitant  a  greatly  moderated  egoism.  For 
asserting  the  due  claims  of  self,  is,  by  implication, 
drawing  a  limit  beyond  which  the  claims  are  undue ; 
and  is,  by  consequence,  bringing  into  greater  clearness 
the  claims  of  others. 


232 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  XIL 

ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM. 

§  76.  If  we  define  altruism  as  being  all  action  which, 
in  the  normal  course  of  things,  benefits  others  instead 
of  benefiting  self,  then,  from  the  dawn  of  life,  altruism 
has  been  no  less  essential  than  egoism.  Though, 
primarily,  it  is  dependent  on  egoism,  yet,  secondarily, 
egoism  is  dependent  on  it. 

Under  altruism,  in  this  comprehensive  sense,  I  take 
in  the  acts  by  which  offspring  are  preserved  and  the 
species  maintained.  Moreover,  among  these  acts  must 
be  included  not  such  only  as  are  accompanied  by  con- 
sciousness, but  also  such  as  conduce  to  the  welfare  of 
offspring  without  mental  representation  of  the  welfare 
—  acts  of  automatic  altruism  as  we  may  call  them. 
Nor  must  there  be  left  out  those  lowest  altruistic  acts 
which  subserve  race-maintenance  without  implying  even 
automatic  nervous  processes  —  acts  not  in  the  remotest 
sense  psychical,  but  in  a  literal  sense  physical.  What- 
ever action,  unconscious  or  conscious,  involves  expen- 
diture of  individual  life  to  the  end  of  increasing  life 
in  other  individuals,  is  unquestionably  altruistic  in  a 
sense,  if  not  in  the  usual  sense ;  and  it  is  here  needful 
to  understand  it  in  this  sense,  that  we  may  see  how 
conscious  altruism*  grows  out  of  unconscious  altruism. 

The  simplest  beings  habituall}^  multiply  by  spon- 
taneous fission.    Physical  altruism  of  the  lowest  kind, 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM. 


233 


differentiating  from  physical  egoism,  may,  in  this  case, 
be  considered  as  not  yet  independent  of  it.  For  since 
the  two  halves  which,  before  fission,  constituted  the 
individual,  do  not  on  dividing  disappear,  we  must  say 
that  though  the  individuality  of  the  parent  infusorium 
or  other  protozoon  is  lost  in  ceasing  to  be  single,  yet 
the  old  individual  continues  to  exist  in  each  of  the  new 
individuals.  When,  however,  as  happens  generally 
with  these  smallest  animals,  an  interval  of  quiescence 
ends  in  the  breaking  up  of  the  whole  body  into  minute 
parts,  each  of  which  is  the  germ  of  a  young  one,  we 
see  the  parent  entirely  sacrificed  in  forming  progeny. 

Here  might  be  described  how  among  creatures  of 
higher  grades,  by  fission  or  gemmation,  parents  be- 
queath parts  of  their  bodies,  more  or  less  organized, 
to  form  offspring  at  the  cost  of  their  own  individuali- 
ties. Numerous  examples  might  also  be  given  of  the 
ways  in  which  the  development  of  ova  is  carried  to 
the  extent  of  making  the  parental  body  little  more 
than  a  receptacle  for  them :  the  implication  being  that 
the  accumulations  of  nutriment  which  parental  activi- 
ties have  laid  up,  are  disposed  of  for  the  benefit  of 
posterity.  And  then  might  be  dwelt  on  the  multi- 
tudinous cases  where,  as  generally  throughout  the 
insect-world,  maturity  having  been  reached  and  a  new 
generation  provided  for,  life  ends :  death  follows  the 
sacrifices  made  for  progeny. 

But  leaving  these  lower  types  in  which  the  altruism 
is  physical  only,  or  in  which  it  is  physical  and  auto- 
matically psychical  only,  let  us  ascend  to  those  in 
which  it  is  also,  to  a  considerable  degree,  conscious. 
Though,  in  birds  and  mammals,  such  parental  activities, 
as  are  guided  by  instinct,  are  accompanied  by  either 


234 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


no  representations  or  but  vague  representations  of  the 
benefits  which  the  young  receive,  yet  there  are  also  in 
them  actions  which  we  may  class  as  altruistic  in  the 
higher  sense.  The  agitation  which  creatures  of  these 
classes  show  when  their  young  are  in  danger,  joined 
often  with  efforts  on  their  behalf,  as  well  as  grief  dis- 
played after  loss  of  their  young,  make  it  manifest 
that  in  them  parental  altruism  has  a  concomitant  of 
emotion. 

Those  who  understand  by  altruism  only  the  conscious 
sacrifice  of  self  to  others  among  human  beings,  will 
think  it  strange,  or  even  absurd,  to  extend  its  meaning 
so  widely.  But  the  justification  for  doing  this  is 
greater  than  has  thus  far  appeared.  I  do  not  mean 
merely  that  in  the  course  of  evolution,  there  has  been 
a  progress  through  infinitesimal  gradations  from  purely 
physical  and  unconscious  sacrifices  of  the  individual 
for  the  welfare  of  the  species,  up  to  sacrifices  consciously 
made.  I  mean  that  from  first  to  last  the  sacrifices  are, 
when  reduced  to  their  lowest  terms,  of  the  same  essen- 
tial nature :  to  the  last,  as  at  first,  there  is  involved  a 
loss  of  bodily  substance.  When  a  part  of  the  parental 
body  is  detached  in  the  shape  of  gemmule,  or  egg,  or 
foetus,  the  material  sacrifice  is  conspicuous :  and  when 
the  mother  yields  milk  by  absorbing  which  the  young 
one  grows,  it  cannot  be  questioned  that  there  is  also  a 
material  sacrifice.  But  though  a  material  sacrifice  is  not 
manifest  when  the  young  are  benefited  by  activities  on 
their  behalf ;  yet,  as  no  effort  can  be  made  without  an 
equivalent  waste  of  tissue,  and  as  the  bodily  loss  is  pro- 
portionate to  the  expenditure  that  takes  place  without 
reimbursement  in  food  consumed,  it  follows  that  efforts 
made  in  fostering  offspring  do  really  represent  a  part  of 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM. 


235 


the  parental  substance  ;  which  is  now  given  indirectly 
instead  of  directly. 

Self-sacrifice,  then,  is  no  less  primordial  than  self- 
preservation.  Being  in  its  simple  physical  form  abso- 
lutely necessary  for  the  continuance  of  life  from  the 
beginning;  and  being  extended  under  its  automatic 
form,  as  indispensable  to  maintenance  of  race  in  types 
considerably  advanced;  and  being  developed  to  its 
semi-conscious  and  conscious  forms,  along  with  the 
continued  and  complicated  attendance  by  which  the 
offspring  of  superior  creatures  are  brought  to  maturity, 
altruism  has  been  evolving  simultaneously  with  egoism. 
As  was  j)ointed  out  in  an  early  chapter,  the  same  supe- 
riorities which  have  enabled  the  individual  to  preserve 
itself  better,  have  enabled  it  better  to  preserve  the 
individuals  derived  from  it ;  and  each  higher  species, 
using  its  improved  faculties  primarily  for  egoistic 
benefit,  has  spread  in  proportion  as  it  has  used  them 
secondarily  for  altruistic  benefit. 

The  imperativeness  of  altruism  as  thus  understood, 
is,  indeed,  no  less  than  the  imperativeness  of  egoism 
was  shown  to  be  in  the  last  chapter.  For  while,  on  the 
one  hand,  a  falling  short  of  normal  egoistic  acts  entails 
enfeeblement  or  loss  of  life,  and  therefore  loss  of  ability 
to  perform  altruistic  acts,  on  the  other  hand,  such  defect 
of  altruistic  acts  as  causes  death  of  offspring  or  inade- 
quate development  of  them,  involves  disappearance 
from  future  generations  of  the  nature  that  is  not  altru- 
istic enough  —  so  decreasing  the  average  egoism.  In 
short,  every  species  is  continually  purifying  itself  from 
the  unduly  egoistic  individuals,  while  there  are  being 
lost  to  it  the  unduly  altruistic  individuals. 


236 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


§  77.  As  there  has  been  an  advance  by  degrees  from 
unconscious  parental  altruism  to  conscious  parental 
altruism  of  the  highest  kind,  so  has  there  been  an 
advance  by  degrees  from  the  altruism  of  the  family  to 
social  altruism. 

A  fact  to  be  first  noted  is  that  only  where  altruistic 
relations  in  the  domestic  group  have  reached  highly 
developed  forms,  do  there  arise  conditions  making  pos- 
sible full  development  of  altruistic  relations  in  the 
political  group.  Tribes  in  which  promiscuity  prevails, 
or  in  which  the  marital  relations  are  transitory,  and 
tribes  in  which  polyandry  entails  in  another  way  indefi- 
nite relationships,  are  incapable  of  much  organization. 
Nor  do  peoples  who  are  habitually  polygamous  show 
themselves  able  to  take  on  those  high  forms  of  social 
co-operation  which  demand  due  subordination  of  self 
to  others.  Only  where  monogamic  marriage  has  be- 
come general  and  eventually  universal  —  only  where 
there  have  consequently  been  established  the  closest 
ties  of  blood  —  only  where  family  altruism  has  been 
most  fostered,  has  social  altruism  become  conspicuous. 
It  needs  but  to  recall  the  compound  forms  of  the  Aryan 
family,  as  described  by  Sir  Henry  Maine  and  others, 
to  see  that  family  feeling,  first  extending  itself  to  the 
gens  and  the  tribe,  and  afterward  to  the  society  formed 
of  related  tribes,  prepared  the  way  for  fellow  feeling 
among  citizens  not  of  the  same  stock. 

Recognizing  this  natural  transition,  we  are  here 
chiefly  concerned  to  observe  that  throughout  the  latter 
stages  of  the  progress,  as  throughout  the  former,  in- 
crease of  egoistic  satisfactions  has  depended  on  growth 
of  regard  for  the  satisfactions  of  others.  On  contem- 
plating a  line  of  successive  parents  and  offspring,  we 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM. 


237 


see  that  each,  enabled  while  young  to  live  by  the  sacri- 
fices predecessors  make  for  it,  itself  makes,  when  adult, 
equivalent  sacrifices  for  successors,  and  that,  in  default 
of  this  general  balancing  of  benefits  received  by  bene- 
fits given,  the  line  dies  out.  Similarly,  it  is  manifest 
that  in  a  society  each  generation  of  members,  indebted 
for  such  benefits  as  social  organization  yields  them  to 
prieceding  generations,  who  have  by  their  sacrifices 
elaborated  this  organization,  ai'e  called  on  to  make  for 
succeeding  generations  such  kindred  sacrifices  as  shall 
at  least  maintain  this  organization,  if  they  do  not  im- 
prove it:  the  alternative  being  decay  and  eventual 
dissolution  of  the  society,  implying  gradual  decrease 
in  the  egoistic  satisfactions  of  its  members. 

And  now  we  are  prepared  to  consider  the  several 
ways  in  which,  under  social  conditions,  personal  wel- 
fare depends  on  due  regard  for  the  welfare  of  others. 
Already  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  have  been  fore- 
shadowed. As  in  the  chapter  on  the  biological  view 
were  implied  the  inferences  definitely  set  forth  in  the 
last  chapter,  so  in  the  chapter  on  the  sociological  view 
Avere  implied  the  inferences  to  be  definitely  set  forth 
here.  Sundry  of  these  are  trite  enough,  but  they  must, 
nevertheless,  be  specified,  since  the  statement  would  be 
incomplete  without  them. 

§  78.  First  to  be  dealt  with  comes  that  negative 
altruism  implied  by  such  curbing  of  the  egoistic  impulses 
as  prevents  direct  aggression. 

As  before  shown,  if  men  instead  of  living  separately 
are  to  unite  for  defence  or  for  other  purposes,  they 
must  severally  reap  more  good  than  evil  from  the 
union.    On  the  average,  each  must  lose  less  from  the 


238 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


antagonisms  of  those  with  whom  he  is  associated  than 
he  gains  by  the  association.  At  the  outset,  therefore, 
that  increase  of  egoistic  satisfactions  which  the  social 
state  brings,  can  be  purchased  only  by  altruism  suffi- 
cient to  cause  some  recognition  of  others'  claims:  if 
not  a  voluntary  recognition,  still  a  compulsory  recog- 
nition. 

While  the  recognition  is  but  of  that  lowest  kind  due 
to  dread  of  retaliation,  or  of  prescribed  punishment, 
the  egoistic  gain  from  association  is  small,  and  it  be- 
comes considerable  only  as  the  recognition  becomes 
voluntary  —  that  is,  more  altruistic.  Where,  as  among 
some  of  the  wild  Australians,  there  exists  no  limit  to 
the  right  of  the  strongest,  and  the  men  fight  to  get 
possession  of  women  while  the  wives  of  one  man  fight 
among  themselves  about  him,  the  pursuit  of  egoistic 
satisfactions  is  greatly  impeded.  Besides  the  bodily 
pain  occasionally  given  to  each  by  conflict,  and  the 
more  or  less  of  subsequent  inability  to  achieve  personal 
ends,  there  is  the  waste  of  energy  entailed  in  maintain- 
ing readiness  for  self-defence,  and  there  is  the  accompa- 
nying occupation  of  consciousness  by  emotions  that  are 
on  the  average  of  cases  disagreeable.  Moreover,  the 
primary  end  of  safety,  in  presence  of  external  foes,  is 
ill-attained  in  proportion  as  there  are  internal  animosi- 
ties, such  furtherance  of  satisfactions  as  industrial  co- 
operation brings  cannot  be  had,  and  there  is  little 
motive  to  labor  for  extra  benefits  when  the  products  of 
labor  are  insecure.  And  from  this  early  stage  to  com- 
paratively late  stages  we  may  trace  in  the  wearing  of 
arms,  in  the  carrying  on  of  family  feuds,  and  in  the 
taking  of  daily  precautions  for  safety,  the  ways  in 
which  the  egoistic  satisfactions  of  each  are  diminished 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM. 


239 


by  deficiency  of  that  altruism  which  checks  overt  injury 
of  others. 

The  private  interests  of  the  individual  are  on  the 
average  better  subserved,  not  only  in  proportion  as  he 
himself  refrains  from  direct  aggression,  but  also,  on 
the  average,  in  proportion  as  he  succeeds  in  diminish- 
ing the  aggressions  of  his  fellows  on  one  another.  The 
prevalence  of  antagonism  among  those  around,  impedes 
the  activities  carried  on  by  each  in  pursuit  of  satisfac- 
tions; and  by  causing  disorder  makes  the  beneficial 
results  of  activities  more  doubtful.  Hence,  each  profits 
egoistically  from  the  growth  of  an  altruism  which 
leads  each  to  aid  in  preventing  or  diminishing  others' 
violence. 

The  like  holds  when  we  pass  to  that  altruism  which 
restrains  the  undue  egoism  displayed  in  breaches  of 
contract.  General  acceptance  of  the  maxim  that  hon- 
esty is  the  best  policy,  implies  general  experience  that 
gratification  of  the  self-regarding  feelings  is  eventually 
furthered  by  such  checking  of  them  as  maintains  equi- 
table dealings.  And  here,  as  before,  each  is  personally 
interested  in  securing  good  treatment  of  his  fellows  by 
one  another.  For  in  countless  ways  evils  are  entailed 
on  each  by  the  prevalence  of  fraudulent  transactions. 
As  every  one  knows,  the  larger  the  number  of  a  shop- 
keeper's bills  left  unpaid  by  some  customers,  the  higher 
must  be  the  prices  which  other  customers  pay.  The 
more  manufacturers  lose  by  defective  raw  materials  or 
by  carelessness  of  workmen,  the  more  must  they  charge 
for  their  fabrics  to  buyers.  The  less  trustworthy  people 
are,  the  higher  rises  the  rate  of  interest,  the  larger  be- 
comes the  amount  of  capital  hoarded,  the  greater  are 
the  impediments  to  industry.    The  further  traders  and 


240 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


people  in  general  go  beyond  their  means,  and  hypothe- 
cate the  property  of  others  in  speculation,  the  more 
serious  are  those  commercial  panics  which  bring  dis- 
asters on  multitudes  and  injuriously  affect  all. 

This  introduces  us  to  yet  a  third  way  in  which  such 
personal  welfare  as  results  from  the  proportioning  of 
benefits  gained  to  labors  given,  depends  on  the  making 
of  certain  sacrifices  for  social  welfare.  The  man  who, 
expending  his  energies  wholly  on  private  affairs,  re- 
fuses to  take  trouble  about  public  affairs,  pluming  him- 
self on  his  wisdom  in  minding  his  own  business,  is 
blind  to  the  fact  that  his  own  business  is  made  possible 
only  by  maintenance  of  a  healthy  social  state,  and  that 
he  loses  all  round  hj  defective  governmental  arrange- 
ments. Where  there  are  many  like-minded  with  him- 
self —  where,  as  a  consequence,  offices  come  to  be  filled 
by  political  adventurers  and  opinion  is  swa3^ed  by  dema- 
gogues—  where  bribery  vitiates  the  administration  of 
the  law  and  makes  fraudulent  State  transactions  habit- 
ual, heavy  penalties  fall  on  the  community  at  large,  and, 
among  others,  on  those  who  have  thus  done  everything 
for  self  and  nothing  for  society.  Their  investments 
are  insecure ;  recovery  of  their  debts  is  difficult,  and 
even  their  lives  are  less  safe  than  they  would  otherwise 
have  been. 

So  that  on  such  altruistic  actions  as  are  implied, 
firstly  in  being  just,  secondly  in  seeing  justice  done 
between  others,  and  thirdly,  in  upholding  and  improving 
the  agencies  by  which  justice  is  administered,  depend, 
in  large  measure,  the  egoistic  satisfactions  of  each. 

§  79.  But  the  identification  of  personal  advantage 
with  the  advantage  of  fellow-citizens  is  much  wider 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM.  241 

than  this.  In  various  other  ways  the  well-being  of 
each  rises  and  falls  with  the  well-being  of  all. 

A  weak  man,  left  to  provide  for  his  own  wants, 
suffers  by  getting  smaller  amounts  of  food  and  other 
necessaries  than  he  might  get  were  he  stronger.  In  a 
community  formed  of  weak  men,  who  divide  their 
labors  and  exchange  the  products,  all  suffer  evils  from 
the  weakness  of  their  fellows.  The  quantity  of  each 
kind  of  product  is  made  deficient  by  the  deficiency  of 
laboring  power ;  and  the  share  each  gets  for  such  share 
of  his  own  product  as  he  can  afford  to  give,  is  relatively 
small.  Just  as  the  maintenance  of  paupers,  hospital 
patients,  inmates  of  asylums,  and  others  who  consume 
but  do  not  produce,  leaves  to  be  divided  among  pro- 
ducers  a  smaller  stock  of  commodities  than  would 
exist  were  there  no  incapables;  so  must  there  be  left  a 
smaller  stock  of  commodities  to  be  divided,  the  greater 
the  number  of  ineflficient  producers,  or  the  greater  the 
average  deficiency  of  producing  power.  Hence,  what- 
ever decreases  the  strength  of  men  in  general  restricts 
the  gratifications  of  each  by  making  the  means  to  them 
dearer. 

More  directly,  and  more  obviously,  does  the  bodily 
well-being  of  his  fellows  concern  him ;  for  their  bodily 
ill-being,  when  it  takes  certain  shapes,  is  apt  to  bring 
similar  bodily  ill-being  on  him.  If  he  is  not  himself 
attacked  by  cholera,  or  small-pox,  or  typhus,  when  it 
invades  his  neighborhood,  he  often  suffers  a  penalty 
through  his  belongings.  Under  conditions  spreading 
it,  his  wife  catches  diphtheria,  or  his  servant  is  laid  up 
with  scarlet  fever,  or  his  children  take  now  this  and 
now  that  infectious  disorder.  Add  together  the  imme- 
diate and  remote  evils  brought  on  him  year  after  year 


242 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


by  epidemics,  and  it  becomes  manifest  that  his  egoistic 
satisfactions  are  greatly  furthered  by  such  altruistic 
activities  as  render  disease  less  prevalent. 

With  the  mental,  as  well  as  with  the  bodily,  states 
of  fellow-citizens,  his  enjoyments  are  in  multitudinous 
ways  bound  up.  Stupidity,  like  weakness,  raises  the 
cost  of  commodities.  Where  farming  is  unimproved, 
the  prices  of  food  are  higher  than  they  would  else  be ; 
where  antiquated  routine  maintains  itself  in  trade,  the 
needless  expense  of  distribution  weighs  on  all ;  where 
there  is  no  inventiveness,  every  one  loses  the  benefits 
which  improved  appliances  diffuse.  Other  than  eco- 
nomic evils  come  from  the  average  unintelligence  — 
periodically  through  the  manias  and  panics  that  arise 
because  traders  rush  in  herds  all  to  buy  or  all  to 
sell ;  and  habitually  through  the  mal-administration  of 
justice,  which  people  and  rulers  alike  disregard  while 
pursuing  this  or  that  legislative  will-o'-the-wisp.  Closer 
and  clearer  is  the  dependence  of  his  personal  satisfac- 
tions on  others'  mental  states,  which  each  experiences 
in  his  household.  Unpunctuality  and  want  of  system 
are  perpetual  sources  of  annoyance.  The  unskilfulness 
of  the  cook  causes  frequent  vexation  and  occasional  in- 
digestion. Lack  of  forethought  in  the  housemaid  leads 
to  a  fall  over  a  bucket  in  a  dark  passage.  And  inatten- 
tion to  a  message,  or  forgetfulness  in  delivering  it, 
entails  failure  in  an  important  engagement.  Each, 
therefore,  benefits  egoistically  by  such  altruism  as  aids 
in  raising  the  average  intelligence.  I  do  not  mean 
such  altruism  as  taxes  rate-payers  that  children's  minds 
may  be  filled  with  dates,  and  names,  and  gossip  about 
kings,  and  narratives  of  battles,  and  other  useless  in- 
formation, no  amount  of  which  will  make  them  capable 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM. 


243 


workers  or  good  citizens ;  but  I  mean  such  altruism 
as  helps  to  spread  a  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  things 
and  to  cultivate  the  power  of  applying  that  knowledge. 

Yet  again,  each  has  a  private  interest  in  public 
morals,  and  profits  by  improving  them.  Not  in  large 
ways  only,  by  aggressions  and  breaches  of  contract,  by 
adulterations  and  short  measures,  does  each  suffer  from 
the  general  unconscientiousness  ;  but  in  more  numerous 
small  ways.  Now  it  is  through  the  untruthfulness  of 
one  who  gives  a  good  character  to  a  bad  servant ;  now 
it  is  by  the  recklessness  of  a  laundress  who,  using 
bleaching  agents  to  save  trouble  in  washing,  destroys 
his  linen ;  now  it  is  by  the  acted  falsehood  of  railway 
passengers  who,  by  dispersed  coats,  make  him  believe 
that  all  the  seats  in  a  compartment  are  taken  when 
they  are  not.  Yesterday  the  illness  of  his  child,  due  to 
foul  gases,  led  to  the  discovery  of  a  drain  that  had 
become  choked  because  it  was  ill-made  by  a  dishonest 
builder  under  supervision  of  a  careless  or  bribed  sur- 
veyor. To-day  workmen  employed  to  rectify  it  bring 
on  him  cost  and  inconvenience  by  dawdling ;  and  their 
low  standard  of  work,  determined  by  the  unionist  prin- 
ciple that  the  better  workers  must  not  discredit  the 
worse  by  exceeding  them  in  efficiency,  he  may  trace  to 
the  immoral  belief  that  the  unworthy  should  fare  as 
well  as  the  worthy.  To-morrow  it  turns  out  that  busi- 
ness for  the  plumber  has  been  provided  by  damage 
which  the  bricklayers  have  done. 

Thus  the  improvement  of  others,  physically,  intellect- 
ually, and  morally,  personally  concerns  each ;  since 
their  imperfections  tell  in  raising  the  cost  of  all  the 
commodities  he  buys,  in  increasing  the  taxes  and  rates 
he  pays,  and  in  the  losses  of  time,  trouble,  and  money, 


244 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


daily  brought  on  by  others'  carelessness,  stupidity,  or 
unconscientiousness. 

§  80.  Very  obvious  are  certain  more  immediate  con- 
nections between  personal  welfare  and  ministration  to 
the  welfare  of  those  around.  The  evils  suffered  by 
those  whose  behavior  is  unsympathetic,  and  the  benefits 
to  self  which  unselfish  conduct  brings,  show  these. 

That  any  one  should  have  formulated  his  experience 
by  saying  that  the  conditions  to  success  are  a  hard 
heart  and  a  sound  digestion,  is  marvellous  considering 
the  many  proofs  that  success,  even  of  a  material  kind, 
greatly  depending  as  it  does  on  the  good  offices  of 
others,  is  furthered  by  wliatever  creates  good- will  in 
others.  The  contrast  between  the  prosperity  of  those 
who,  to  but  moderate  abilities  join  natures  which  beget 
friendships  by  their  kindliness,  and  the  adversity  of  those 
who,  though  possessed  of  superior  faculties  and  greater 
acquirements,  arouse  dislikes  by  their  hardness  or  in- 
difference, should  force  upon  all  the  truth  that  egoistic 
enjoyments  are  aided  by  altruistic  actions. 

This  increase  of  personal  benefit  achieved  by  bene- 
fiting others  is  but  partially  achieved  where  a  selfish 
motive  prompts  the  seemingly  unselfish  act ;  it  is 
fully  achieved  only  where  the  act  is  really  unselfish. 
Though  services  rendered  with  the  view  of  some  time 
profiting  by  reciprocated  services,  answer  to  a  certain 
extent ;  yet,  ordinarily,  they  answer  only  to  the  extent 
of  bringing  equivalents  of  reciprocated  services.  Those 
which  bring  more  than  equivalents  are  those  not 
prompted  by  any  thoughts  of  equivalents.  For  obvi- 
ously it  is  the  spontaneous  outflow  of  good  nature,  not 
in  the  larger  acts  of  life  only  but  in  all  its  details. 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM.  245 


which  generates  in  those  around  the  attachments 
prompting  unstinted  benevolence. 

Besides  furthering  prosperity,  other-regarding  actions 
conduce  to  self-regarding  gratifications  by  generating  a 
genial  environment.  With  the  sympathetic  being 
every  one  feels  more  sympathy  than  with  others.  All 
conduct  themselves  with  more  than  usual  amiability  to 
a  person  who  hourly  discloses  a  lovable  nature.  Such 
a  one  is  practically  surrounded  by  a  world  of  better 
people  than  one  who  is  less  attractive.  If  we  contrast 
the  state  of  a  man  possessing  all  the  material  means  to 
happiness,  but  isolated  by  his  absolute  egoism,  with  the 
state  of  an  altruistic  man  relatively  poor  in  means  but 
rich  in  friends,  we  may  see  that  various  gratifications, 
not  to  be  purchased  by  money,  come  in  abundance  to 
the  last  and  are  inaccessible  to  the  first. 

While,  then,  there  is  one  kind  of  other-regarding 
action,  furthering  the  prosperity  of  fellow-citizens  at 
large,  which  admits  of  being  deliberately  pursued  from 
motives  that  are  remotely  self-regarding  —  the  convic- 
tion being  that  personal  well-being  depends  in  large 
measure  on  the  well-being  of  society  —  there  is  an  addi- 
tional kind  of  other-regarding  action  having  in  it  no 
element  of  conscious  self-regard,  which  nevertheless 
conduces  greatly  to  egoistic  satisfactions. 

§  81.  Yet  other  modes  exist  in  which  egoism  unquali- 
fied by  altruism  habitually  fails.  It  diminishes  the 
totality  of  egoistic  pleasure  by  diminishing  in  several 
directions  the  capacity  for  pleasure. 

Self-gratifications,  considered  separately,  or  in  the 
aggregate,  lose  their  intensities  by  that  too  great  per- 
sistence in  them  which  results  if  they  are  made  the 


246 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


exclusive  objects  of  pursuit.  The  law  that  function 
entails  waste,  and  that  faculties  yielding  pleasure  by 
their  action  cannot  act  incessantly  without  exhaustion 
and  accompanying  satiety,  has  the  implication  that 
intervals  during  which  altruistic  activities  absorb  the 
energies,  are  intervals  during  which  the  capacity  for 
egoistic  pleasure  is  recovering  its  full  degree.  The 
sensitiveness  to  purely  personal  enjoyments  is  main- 
tained at  a  higher  pitch  by  those  who  minister  to  the 
enjoyments  of  others  than  it  is  by  those  who  devote 
themselves  wholly  to  personal  enjoyments. 

This  which  is  manifest  even  while  the  tide  of  life  is 
high,  becomes  still  more  manifest  as  life  ebbs.  It  is  in 
maturity  and  old  age  that  we  especially  see  how,  as 
egoistic  pleasures  grow  faint,  altruistic  actions  come  in 
to  revive  them  in  new  forms.  The  contrast  between 
the  child's  delight  in  the  novelties  daily  revealed,  and 
the  indifference  which  comes  as  the  world  around  grows 
familiar,  until,  in  adult  life,  there  remain  comparatively 
few  things  that  are  greatly  enjoyed,  draws  from  all  the 
reflection  that  as  years  go  by  pleasures  pall.  And  to 
those  who  think,  it  becomes  clear  that  only  through 
sympathy  can  pleasures  be  indirectly  gained  from  things 
that  have  ceased  to  yield  pleasures  directly.  In  the 
gratifications  derived  by  parents  from  the  gratifications 
of  their  offspring,  this  is  conspicuously  shown.  Trite 
as  is  the  remark  that  men  live  afresh  in  their  children, 
it  is  needful  here  to  set  it  down  as  reminding  us  of  the 
way  in  which,  as  the  egoistic  satisfactions  in  life  fade, 
altruism  renews  them  while  it  transfigures  them. 

We  are  thus  introduced  to  a  more  general  considera- 
tion—  the  egoistic  aspect  of  altruistic  pleasure.  Not, 
indeed,  that  this  is  the  place  for  discussing  the  ques- 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM. 


24T 


tion  whether  the  egoistic  element  can  be  excluded  from 
altruism,  nor  is  it  the  place  for  distinguishing  between 
the  altruism  which  is  pursued  with  a  foresight  of  the 
pleasurable  feeling  to  be  achieved  through  it,  and  the 
altruism  which,  though  it  achieves  this  pleasurable 
feeling,  does  not  make  pursuit  of  it  a  motive.  Here 
we  are  concerned  with  the  fact  that,  whether  know- 
ingly or  unknowingly  gained,  the  state  of  mind  accom- 
panying altruistic  action,  being  a  pleasurable  state,  is 
to  be  counted  in  the  sum  of  pleasures  which  the  indi- 
vidual can  receive,  and  in  this  sense  cannot  be  other 
than  egoistic.  That  we  must  so  regard  it  is  proved  on 
observing  that  this  pleasure,  like  pleasures  in  general, 
conduces  to  the  physical  prosperity  of  the  ego.  As 
every  other  agreeable  emotion  raises  the  tide  of  life,  so 
does  the  agreeable  emotion  which  accompanies  a  benevo- 
lent deed.  As  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  pain  caused 
by  the  sight  of  suffering  depresses  the  vital  functions  — 
sometimes  even  to  the  extent  of  arresting  the  heart's 
action,  as  in  one  who  faints  on  seeing  a  surgical  opera- 
tion, so  neither  can  it  be  denied  that  the  joy  felt  in 
witnessing  others'  joy  exalts  the  vital  functions.  Hence, 
however  much  we  may  hesitate  to  class  altruistic  pleas- 
ure as  a  higher  kind  of  egoistic  pleasure,  we  are  obliged 
to  recognize  the  fact  that  its  immediate  effects  in  aug- 
menting life  and  so  furthering  personal  well-being,  are 
like  those  of  pleasures  that  are  directly  egoistic.  And 
the  corollary  drawn  must  be  that  pure  egoism  is,  even 
in  its  immediate  results,  less  successfully  egoistic  than 
is  the  egoism  duly  qualified  by  altruism,  which,  besides 
achieving  additional  pleasures,  achieves  also,  through 
raised  vitality,  a  greater  capacity  for  pleasures  in 
general. 


248 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


That  the  range  of  aesthetic  gratifications  is  wider 
for  the  altruistic  nature  than  for  the  egoistic  nature,  is 
also  a  truth  not  to  be  overlooked.  The  joys  and  sorrows 
of  human  beings  form  a  chief  element  in  the  subject- 
matter  of  art;  and,  evidently,  the  pleasures  which  art 
gives  increase  as  the  fellow-feeling  with  these  joys  and 
sorrows  strengthens.  If  we  contrast  early  poetry,  occu- 
pied mainly  with  war  and  gratifying  the  savage  in- 
stincts by  descriptions  of  bloody  victories,  with  the 
poetry  of  modern  times,  in  which  the  sanguinary  forms 
but  a  small  part,  while  a  large  part,  dealing  with  the 
gentler  affections,  enlists  the  feelings  of  readers  on 
behalf  of  the  weak;  we  are  shown  that  with  the  de- 
velopment of  a  more  altruistic  nature  there  has  been 
opened  a  sphere  of  enjoyment  inaccessible  to  the  callous 
egoism  of  barbarous  times.  So,  too,  between  the  fiction 
of  the  past  and  the  fiction  of  the  present,  there  is 
the  difference  that  while  the  one  was  almost  exclu- 
sively occupied  with  the  doings  of  the  ruling  classes, 
and  found  its  plots  in  their  antagonisms  and  deeds  of 
violence,  the  other,  chiefly  taking  stories  of  peaceful 
life  for  its  subjects,  and  to  a  considerable  extent  the 
life  of  the  humbler  classes,  discloses  a  new  world  of 
interest  in  the  every-day  pleasures  and  pains  of  ordi 
nary  people.  A  like  contrast  exists  between  early  and 
late  forms  of  plastic  art.  When  not  representing  acts 
of  worship,  the  wall  sculptures  and  wall  paintings  of 
the  Assyrians  and  Egyptians,  or  the  decorations  of 
temples  among  the  Greeks,  represented  deeds  of  con- 
quest ;  whereas  in  modern  times,  while  the  works  which 
glorify  destructive  activities  are  less  numerous,  there 
are  an  increasing  number  of  Avorks  gratifying  to  the 
kindlier  sentiments  of  spectators.    To  sec  that  those 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM. 


249 


who  care  nothing  about  the  feelings  of  other  beings 
are,  by  implication,  shut  out  from  a  wide  range  of 
aesthetic  pleasures,  it  needs  but  to  ask  whether  men 
who  delight  in  dog-fights  may  be  expected  to  appreciate 
Beethoven's  Adelaida^  or  whether  Tennyson's  In  Memo- 
riam  would  greatly  move  a  gang  of  convicts. 

§  82.  From  the  dawn  of  life,  then,  egoism  has  been 
dependent  upon  altruism  as  altruism  has  been  depend- 
ent upon  egoism,  and  in  the  course  of  evolution  the 
reciprocal  services  of  the  two  have  been  increasing. 

The  physical  and  unconscious  self-sacrifice  of  parents 
to  form  offspring,  which  the  lowest  living  things  dis- 
play from  hour  to  hour,  shows  us  in  its  primitive  form 
the  altruism  which  makes  possible  the  egoism  of  indi- 
vidual life  and  growth.  As  we  ascend  to  higher  grades 
of  creatures,  this  parental  altruism  becomes  a  direct 
yielding  up  of  only  part  of  the  body,  joined  with  an 
increasing  contribution  from  the  remainder  in  the  shape 
of  tissue  wasted  in  efforts  made  on  behalf  of  progeny. 
This  indirect  sacrifice  of  substance,  replacing  more  and 
more  the  direct  sacrifice  as  parental  altruism  becomes 
higher,  continues  to  the  last  to  represent  also  altruism 
which  is  other  than  parental;  since  this,  too,  implies 
loss  of  substance  in  making  efforts  that  do  not  bring 
their  return  in  personal  aggrandizement. 

After  noting  how  among  mankind  parental  altruism 
and  family  altruism  pass  into  social  altruism,  we 
observed  that  a  society,  like  a  species,  survives  only  on 
condition  that  each  generation  of  its  members  shall  yield 
to  the  next,  benefits  equivalent  to  those  it  has  received 
from  the  last.  And  this  implies  that  care  for  the  family 
must  be  supplemented  by  care  for  the  society. 


250 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


Fulness  of  egoistic  satisfactions  in  the  associated 
state,  depending  primarily  on  maintenance  of  the 
normal  relation  between  efforts  expended  and  benefits 
obtained,  which  underlies  all  life,  implies  an  altruism 
which  both  prompts  equitable  conduct  and  prompts 
the  enforcing  of  equity.  The  well-being  of  each  is 
involved  w^ith  the  well-being  of  all  in  sundry  other 
ways.  Whatever  conduces  to  their  vigor  concerns 
him,  for  it  diminishes  the  cost  of  everything  he  buys. 
Whatever  conduces  to  their  freedom  from  disease  con- 
cerns him,  for  it  diminishes  his  own  liability  to  dis- 
ease. Whatever  raises  their  intelligence  concerns  him, 
for  inconveniences  are  daily  entailed  on  him  by  others' 
ignorance  or  folly.  Whatever  raises  their  moral  char- 
acter concerns  him,  for  at  every  turn  he  suffers  from 
the  average  unconscientiousness. 

Much  more  directly  do  his  egoistic  satisfactions 
depend  on  those  altruistic  activities  which  enlist  the 
sympathies  of  others.  By  alienating  those  around, 
selfishness  loses  the  unbought  aid  they  can  render ; 
shuts  out  a  wide  range  of  social  enjoyments,  and  fails 
to  receive  those  exaltations  of  pleasure  and  mitigations 
of  pain  which  come  from  men's  fellow-feeling  with 
those  they  like. 

Lastly,  undue  egoism  defeats  itself  by  bringing  on 
an  incapacity  for  happiness.  Purely  egoistic  gratifi- 
cations are  rendered  less  keen  by  satiety,  even  in  the 
earlier  part  of  life,  and  almost  disappear  in  the  later ; 
the  less  satiating  gratifications  of  altruism  are  missed 
throughout  life,  and  especially  in  that  latter  part  when 
they  largely  replace  egoistic  gratifications  ;  and  there 
is  a  lack  of  susceptibility  to  aesthetic  pleasures  of  the 
higher  orders. 


ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM.  251 


An  indication  must  be  added  of  the  truth,  scarcely 
at  all  recognized,  that  this  dependence  of  egoism  upon 
altruism  ranges  beyond  the  limits  of  each  society, 
and  tends  ever  toward  universality.  That  within  each 
society  it  becomes  greater  as  social  evolution,  imply- 
ing increase  of  mutual  dependence,  progresses,  needs 
not  be  shown ;  and  it  is  a  corollary  that  as  fast  as 
dependence  of  societies  on  one  another  is  increased 
by  commercial  intercourse,  the  internal  welfare  of  each 
becomes  a  matter  of  concern  to  the  others.  That  the 
impoverishment  of  any  country,  diminishing  both  its 
producing  and  consuming  powers,  tells  detrimentally 
on  the  people  of  countries  trading  with  it,  is  a  com- 
monplace of  political  economy.  Moreover,  we  have 
had,  of  late  years,  abundant  experience  of  the  indus- 
trial derangements  through  which  distress  is  brought 
on  nations  not  immediately  concerned,  by  wars  be- 
tween other  nations.  And  if  each  community  has  the 
egoistic  satisfactions  of  its  members  diminished  by 
aggressions  of  neighboring  communities  on  one  an- 
other, still  more  does  it  have  them  diminished  by  its 
own  aggressions.  One  who  marks  how,  in  various 
parts  of  the  world,  the  unscrupulous  greed  of  conquest, 
cloaked  by  pretences  of  spreading  the  blessings  of 
British  rule  and  British  religion,  is  now  reacting  to  the 
immense  detriment  of  the  industrial  classes  at  home, 
alike  by  increasing  expenditure  and  paralyzing  trade., 
may  see  that  these  industrial  classes,  absorbed  in  ques- 
tions about  capital  and  labor,  and  thinking  themselves 
unconcerned  in  our  doings  abroad,  are  suffering  from 
lack  of  that  wide-reaching  altruism  which  should 
insist  on  just  dealings  with  other  peoples,  civilized  or 
savage.     And  he  may  also  see  that   beyond  these 


252 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


immediate  evils,  they  will  for  a  generation  to  come 
suffer  the  evils  that  must  flow  from  resuscitating  the 
type  of  social  organization  which  aggressive  activities 
produce,  and  from  the  lowered  moral  tone  which  is 
its  accompaniment. 


TBIAL  AND  COMPROMISE. 


263 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

TRIAL  AND  COMPKOMISE. 

§  83.  In  the  foregoing  two  chapters  the  case  on 
behalf  of  Egoism  and  the  case  on  behalf  of  Altruism 
have  been  stated.  The  two  conflict ;  and  we  have  now 
to  consider  what  verdict  ought  to  be  given. 

If  the  opposed  statements  are  severally  valid,  or  even 
if  each  of  them  is  valid  in  part,  the  inference  must  be 
that  pure  egoism  and  pure  altruism  are  both  illegiti- 
mate. If  the  maxim,  "  Live  for  self  "  is  wrong,  so  also 
is  the  maxim,  "  Live  for  others."  Hence,  a  compromise 
is  the  only  possibility. 

This  conclusion,  though  already  seeming  unavoidable, 
I  do  not  here  set  down  as  proved.  The  purpose  of 
this  chapter  is  to  justify  it  in  full,  and  I  enunciate  it  at 
the  outset  because  the  arguments  used  will  be  better 
understood,  if  the  conclusion  to  which  they  converge 
is  in  the  reader's  view. 

How  shall  we  so  conduct  the  discussion  as  most 
clearly  to  bring  out  this  necessity  for  a  compromise? 
Perhaps  the  best  way  will  be  that  of  stating  one  of 
the  two  claims  in  its  extreme  form,  and  observing  the 
implied  absurdities.  To  deal  thus  with  the  principle  of 
pure  selfishness  would  be  to  waste  space.  Every  one 
sees  that  an  unchecked  satisfaction  of  personal  desires 
from  moment  to  moment,  in  absolute  disregard  of  all 


254 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


other  beings,  would  cause  universal  conflict  and 
social  dissolution.  The  principle  of  pure  unselfishness, 
less  obviously  mischievous,  may  therefore  better  be 
chosen. 

There  are  two  aspects  under  which  the  doctrine  that 
others'  happiness  is  the  true  ethical  aim  presents  itself. 
The  others  "  may  be  conceived  personally,  as  individ- 
uals with  whom  we  stand  in  direct  relations,  or  they 
may  be  conceived  impersonally,  as  constituting  the 
community.  In  so  far  as  the  self-abnegation  implied 
by  pure  altruism  is  concerned,  it  matters  not  in  which 
sense  "  others "  is  used.  But  criticism  will  be  facili- 
tated by  distinguishing  between  these  two  forms  of  it. 
We  will  take  the  last  form  first. 

§  84.  This  commits  us  to  an  examination  of  "the 
greatest  happiness  principle,"  as  enunciated  by  Ben- 
tham  and  his  followers.  The  doctrine  that  "  the  gen- 
eral happiness "  ought  to  be  the  object  of  pursuit,  is 
not,  indeed,  overtly  identified  with  pure  altruism.  But 
as,  if  general  happiness  is  the  proper  end  of  action,  the 
individual  actor  must  regard  his  own  share  of  it  simply 
as  a  unit  in  the  aggregate,  no  more  to  be  valued  by  him 
than  any  other  unit,  it  results  that  since  this  unit  is 
almost  infinitesimal  in  comparison  with  the  aggregate, 
his  action,  if  directed  exclusively  to  achievement  of 
general  happiness,  is,  if  not  absolutely  altruistic,  as 
nearly  so  as  may  be.  Hence,  the  theory  which  makes 
general  happiness  the  immediate  object  of  pursuit  may 
rightly  be  taken  as  one  form  of  the  pure  altruism  to  be 
here  criticised. 

Both  as  justifying  this  interpretation  and  as  furnish- 
ing a  definite  proposition  with  which  to  deal,  let  me  set 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE. 


out  by  quoting  a  passage  from  Mr.  Mill's  Utilitarian- 
ism :  — 

The  Greatest  Happiness  Principle,"  he  says,  is  a  mere  form  of 
words  without  rational  signification,  unless  one  person's  happiness, 
supposed  equal  in  degree  (with  the  proper  allowance  made  for  kind), 
is  counted  for  exactly  as  much  as  another's.  Those  conditions  being 
supplied,  Bentham's  dictum,  '  everybody  to  count  for  one,  nobody  for 
more  than  one,'  might  be  written  under  the  principle  of  utility  as  an 
explanatory  commentary  "  (p.  91). 

Now,  though  the  meaning  of  ''greatest  happiness," 
as  an  end,  is  here  to  a  certain  degree  defined,  the  need 
for  further  definition  is  felt  the  moment  we  attempt  to 
decide  on  ways  of  regulating  conduct  so  as  to  attain 
the  end.  The  first  question  which  arises  is,  must  we 
regard  this  "  greatest  happiness  principle "  as  a  prin- 
ciple of  guidance  for  the  community  in  its  corporate 
capacity,  or  as  a  principle  of  guidance  for  its  members 
separately  considered,  or  both?  If  the  reply  is  that 
the  principle  must  be  taken  as  a  guide  for  governmental 
action  rather  than  for  individual  action,  we  are  at  once 
met  by  the  inquiry,  what  is  to  be  the  guide  for  indi- 
vidual action  ?  If  individual  action  is  not  to  be  regu- 
lated solel)^  for  the  purpose  of  achieving  "  the  greatest 
happiness  of  the  greatest  number,"  some  other  principle 
of  regulation  for  individual  action  is  required,  and  ''the 
greatest  happiness  principle  "  fails  to  furnish  the  need- 
ful ethical  standard.  Should  it  be  rejoined  that  the 
individual  in  his  capacity  of  political  unit  is  to  take 
furtherance  of  general  happiness  as  his  end,  giving  his 
vote  or  otherwise  acting  on  the  legislature  with  a  view 
to  this  end,  and  that  in  so  far  guidance  is  supplied  to 
him,  there  comes  the  further  inquiry,  whence  is  to 
come  guidance  for  the  remainder  of  individual  conduct, 
constituting  by  far  the  greater  part  of  it?    If  this  pri- 


256 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


vate  part  of  individual  conduct  is  not  to  have  general 
happiness  as  its  direct  aim,  then  an  ethical  standard 
other  than  that  offered  has  still  to  be  found. 

Hence,  unless  pure  altruism  as  thus  formulated  con- 
fesses its  inadequacy,  it  must  justify  itself  as  a  sufficient 
rule  for  all  conduct,  individual  and  social.  We  will 
first  deal  with  it  as  the  alleged  right  principle  of  public 
policy ;  and  then  as  the  alleged  right  principle  of  pri= 
vate  action. 

§  85.  On  trying  to  understand  precisely  the  state- 
ment that  when  taking  general  happiness  as  an  end,  the 
rule  must  be  —  "  everybody  to  count  for  one,  nobody 
for  more  than  one,^'  there  arises  the  idea  of  distribution. 
We  can  form  no  idea  of  distribution,  without  thinking 
of  something  distributed,  and  recipients  of  this  some- 
thing. That  we  may  clearly  conceive  the  proposition, 
we  must  clearly  conceive  both  these  elements  of  it. 
Let  us  take  first  the  recipients. 

"  Everybody  to  count  for  one,  nobody  for  more  than 
one."  Does  this  mean  that,  in  respect  of  whatever  is 
proportioned  out,  each  is  to  have  the  same  share,  what- 
ever his  character,  whatever  his  conduct  ?  Shall  he  if 
passive  have  as  much  as  if  active  ?  Shall  he  if  useless 
have  as  much  as  if  useful?  Shall  he  if  criminal  have 
as  much  as  if  virtuous?  If  the  distribution  is  to  be 
made  without  reference  to  the  natures  and  deeds  of  the 
recipients,  then  it  must  be  shown  that  a  system  which 
equalizes,  as  far  as  it  can,  the  treatment  of  good  and 
bad,  will  be  beneficial.  If  the  distribution  is  not  to  be 
indiscriminate,  then  the  foimula  disappears.  The  some- 
thing distributed  must  be  apportioned  otherwise  than 
by  equal   division.     There    must  be  adjustment  of 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE. 


25T 


amounts  to  deserts;  and  we  are  left  in  the  dark  as  to 
the  mode  of  adjustment  —  we  have  to  find  other 
guidance. 

Let  us  next  ask  what  is  the  something  to  be  dis- 
tributed ?  The  first  idea  which  occurs  is  that  happiness 
itself  must  be  divided  out  among  all.  Taken  literally, 
the  notions  that  the  greatest  happiness  should  be  the 
end  sought,  and  that  in  apportioning  it  everybody  should 
count  for  one  and  nobody  for  more  than  one,  imply  that 
happiness  is  something  that  can  be  cut  up  into  parts 
and  handed  round.  This,  however,  is  an  impossible 
interpretation.  But  after  recognizing  the  impossibility 
of  it,  there  returns  the  question  —  What  is  it  in  respect 
of  which  everybody  is  to  count  for  one  and  nobody  for 
more  than  one? 

Shall  the  interpretation  be  that  the  concrete  means 
to  happiness  are  to  be  equally  divided?  Is  it  intended 
that  there  shall  be  distributed  to  all  in  equal  portions 
the  necessaries  of  life,  the  appliances  to  comfort,  the 
facilities  for  amusement  ?  As  a  conception  simply,  this 
is  more  defensible.  But  passing  over  the  question  of 
policy  —  passing  over  the  question  whether  greatest 
happiness  would  ultimately  be  secured  by  such  a  pro- 
cess (which  it  obviously  would  not),  it  turns  out  on 
examination  that  greatest  happiness  could  not  even 
proximately  be  so  secured.  Differences  of  age,  of 
growth,  of  constitutional  need,  differences  of  activity 
and  consequent  expenditure,  differences  of  desires  and 
tastes,  would  entail  the  inevitable  result  that  the  ma- 
terial aids  to  happiness  which  each  received  would  be 
more  or  less  unadapted  to  his  requirements.  Even  if 
purchasing  power  were  equally  divided,  the  greatest 
happiness  would  not  be  achieved  if  everybody  counted 


258 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


for  one  and  nobody  for  more  than  one ;  since,  as  the 
capacities  for  utilizing  the  purchased  means  to  happi- 
ness would  vary  both  with  the  constitution  and  the 
stage  of  life,  the  means  which  would  approximately 
suffice  to  satisfy  the  wants  of  one  would  be  extremely 
insufficient  to  satisfy  the  wants  of  another,  and  so  the 
greatest  total  of  happiness  would  not  be  obtained: 
means  might  be  unequally  apportioned  in  a  waj^  that 
would  produce  a  greater  total. 

But  now  if  happiness  itself  cannot  be  cut  up  and  dis- 
tributed equally,  and  if  equal  division  of  the  material 
aids  to  happiness  would  not  produce  greatest  happiness, 
what  is  the  thing  to  be  thus  apportioned  ?  What  is  it 
in  respect  of  which  everybody  is  to  count  for  one,  and 
nobody  for  more  than  one  ?  There  seems  but  a  single 
possibility.  There  remain  to  be  equally  distributed 
nothing  but  the  conditions  under  which  each  may  pur- 
sue happiness.  The  limitations  to  action  —  the  degrees 
of  freedom  and  restraint,  shall  be  alike  for  all.  Each 
shall  have  as  much  liberty  to  pursue  his  ends  as  con- 
sists with  maintaining  like  liberties  to  pursue  their  ends 
by  others ;  and  one  as  much  as  another  shall  have  the 
enjoyment  of  that  which  his  efforts,  carried  on  within 
these  limits,  obtain.  But  to  say  that  in  respect  of 
these  conditions  everybody  shall  count  for  one  and 
nobody  for  more  than  one,  is  simply  to  say  that  equity 
shall  be  enforced. 

Thus,  considered  as  a  principle  of  public  policy, 
Bentham's  principle,  when  analyzed,  transforms  itself 
into  the  principle  he  slights.  Not  general  happiness 
becomes  the  ethical  standard  by  which  legislative  action 
is  to  be  guided,  but  universal  justice.  And  so  the 
altruistic  theory  under  tliis  form  collapses. 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE, 


259 


§  86.  From  examining  the  doctrine  that  general  hap- 
piness should  be  the  end  of  public  action,  we  pass  now 
to  examine  the  doctrine  that  it  should  be  the  end  of 
private  action. 

It  is  contended  that  from  the  standpoint  of  pure 
r  reason,  the  happiness  of  others  has  no  less  a  claim  as 
an  object  of  pursuit  for  each  than  personal  happiness. 
'  Considered  as  parts  of  a  total,  happiness  felt  by  self 
and  like  happiness  felt  by  another,  are  of  equal  values ; 
and  hence  it  is  inferred  that,  rationally  estimated,  the 
obligation  to  expend  effort  for  others'  benefit,  is  as 
great  as  the  obligation  to  expend  effort  for  one's  own 
benefit.  Holding  that  the  utilitarian  system  of  morals, 
rightly  understood,  harmonizes  with  the  Christian 
maxim,  "Love  your  neighbor  as  yourself,"  Mr.  Mill 
says  that  ''as  between  his  own  happiness  and  that  of 
others,  utilitarianism  requires  him  to  be  as  strictly  im- 
partial as  a  disinterested  and  benevolent  spectator" 
(p.  24).  Let  us  consider  the  alternative  interpretations 
which  may  be  given  to  this  statement. 

Suppose,  first,  that  a  certain  quantum  of  happiness 
has  in  some  way  become  available,  without  the  special 
instrumentality  of  A,  B,  C,  or  D,  constituting  the 
group  concerned.  Then  the  proposition  is  that  each 
shall  be  ready  to  have  this  quantum  of  happiness  as 
much  enjoyed  by  one  or  more  of  the  others  as  by 
himself.  The  disinterested  and  benevolent  spectator 
would  clearly,  in  such  a  case,  rule  that  no  one  ought 
to  have  more  of  the  happiness  than  another.  But  here, 
assuming  as  we  do  that  the  quantum  of  happiness  has 
become  available  without  the  agency  of  any  among 
the  group,  simple  equity  dictates  as  much.  No  one 
having  in  any  way  established  a  claim  different  from 


260 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


the  claims  of  others,  their  claims  are  equal ;  and  due 
regard  for  justice  by  each  will  not  permit  him  to  monop- 
olize the  happiness. 

Now  suppose  a  different  case.  Suppose  that  the 
quantum  of  happiness  has  been  made  available  by  the 
efforts  of  one  member  of  the  group.  Suppose  that  A 
has  acquired  by  labor  some  material  aid  to  happiness. 
He  decides  to  act  as  the  disinterested  and  benevolent 
spectator  would  direct.  What  will  he  decide  ?  —  what 
would  the  spectator  direct  ?  Let  us  consider  the  possi- 
ble suppositions,  taking  first  the  least  reasonable. 

The  spectator  may  be  conceived  as  deciding  that  the 
labor  expended  by  A  in  acquiring  this  material  aid  to 
happiness,  originates  no  claim  to  special  use  of  it ;  but 
that  it  ought  to  be  given  to  B,  C,  or  D,  or  that  it  ought 
to  be  divided  equally  among  B,  C,  and  D,  or  that  it 
ought  to  be  divided  equally  among  all  members  of  the 
group,  including  A,  who  has  labored  for  it.  And  if 
the  spectator  is  conceived  as  deciding  thus  to-day,  he 
must  be  conceived  as  deciding  thus  day  after  day; 
with  the  result  that  one  of  the  group  expends  all  the 
effort,  getting  either  none  of  the  benefit  or  only  his 
numerical  share,  while  the  others  get  their  shares  of 
the  benefit  without  expending  any  efforts.  That  A 
might  conceive  the  disinterested  and  benevolent  spec- 
tator to  decide  in  this  way,  and  might  feel  bound  to 
act  in  conformity  with  the  imagined  decision,  is  a 
strong  supposition ;  and  probably  it  will  be  admitted 
that  such  kind  of  impartiality,  so  far  from  being  con- 
ducive to  the  general  happiness,  would  quickly  be  fatal 
to  every  one.  But  this  is  not  all.  Action  in  pursuance 
of  such  a  decision  would  in  reality  be  negatived  by 
the  very  principle  enunciated.    For  not  only  A,  but 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE. 


261 


also  B,  C,  and  D,  have  to  act  on  this  principle.  Each 
of  them  must  behave  as  he  conceives  an  impartial 
spectator  would  decide.  Does  B  conceive  the  impar- 
tial spectator  as  awarding  to  him,  B,  the  product  of 
A's  labor?  Then  the  assumption  is  that  B  conceives 
the  impartial  spectator  as  favoring  himself,  B,  more 
than  A  conceives  him  as  favoring  himself.  A;  which 
is  inconsistent  with  the  hypothesis.  Does  B,  in  con- 
ceiving the  impartial  spectator,  exclude  his  own  inter- 
ests as  completely  as  A  does?  Then  how  can  he 
decide  so  much  to  his  own  advantage,  so  partially,  as 
to  allow  him  to  take  from  A  an  equal  share  of  the 
benefit  gained  by  A's  labor,  toward  which  he  and  the 
rest  have  done  nothing  ? 

Passing  from  this  conceivable,  though  not  credible, 
decision  of  the  spectator,  here  noted  for  the  purpose  of 
observing  that  habitual  conformity  to  it  would  be  im- 
possible, there  remains  to  be  considered  the  decision 
which  a  spectator  reallj^  impartial  would  give.  He 
would  say  that  the  happiness,  or  material  aid  to  happi- 
ness, which  had  been  purchased  by  A's  labor,  Avas  to  be 
taken  bj^  A.  He  would  say  that  B,  C,  and  D  had  no 
claims  to  it,  but  only  to  such  happiness,  or  aids  to 
happiness,  as  their  respective  labors  had  purchased. 
Consequently,  A,  acting  as  the  imaginary  impartial 
spectator  would  direct,  is,  by  this  test,  justified  in 
appropriating  such  happiness  or  aid  to  happiness  as  his 
own  efforts  have  achieved. 

And  so  under  its  special  form  as  under  its  general 
form,  the  principle  is  true  only  in  so  far  as  it  embodies 
a  disguised  justice.  Analysis  again  brings  out  the 
result  that  making  general  happiness "  the  end  of 
action,  really  means  maintaining  what  we  call  equitable 


262 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


relations  among  individuals.  Decline  to  accept  in  its 
vague  form  ''the  greatest-happiness  principle,"  and 
insist  on  knowing  what  is  the  implied  conduct,  public 
or  private,  and  it  turns  out  that  the  principle  is  mean-= 
ingless,  save  as  indirectly  asserting  that  the  claims  of 
each  should  be  duly  regarded  by  all.  The  utilitarian 
altruism  becomes  a  duly  qualified  egoism. 

§  87.  Another  point  of  view  from  which  to  judge 
the  altruistic  theory  may  now  be  taken.  If,  assuming 
the  proper  object  of  pursuit  to  be  general  happiness, 
we  proceed  rationally,  we  must  ask  in  what  different 
ways  the  aggregate,  general  happiness,  may  be  com- 
posed ;  and  must  then  ask  what  composition  of  it  will 
yield  the  largest  sum. 

Suppose  that  each  citizen  pursues  his  own  happiness 
independently,  not  to  the  detriment  of  others,  but  with- 
out active  concern  for  others ;  then  their  united  happi- 
nesses constitute  a  certain  sum  —  a  certain  general  hap- 
piness. Now  suppose  that  each,  instead  of  making  his 
own  happiness  the  object  of  pursuit,  makes  the  happi- 
ness of  others  the  object  of  pursuit;  then,  again,  there 
results  a  certain  sum  of  happiness.  This  sum  must  be 
less  than,  or  equal  to,  or  greater  than,  the  first.  If  it 
is  admitted  that  this  sum  is  either  less  than  the  first, 
or  only  equal  to  it,  the  altruistic  course  of  action  is 
confessedly  either  worse  than,  or  no  better  than,  the 
egoistic.  The  assumption  must  be  that  the  sum  of 
happiness  obtained  is  greater.  Let  us  observe  what  is 
involved  in  this  assumj)tion. 

If  each  pursues  exclusively  the  happiness  of  others, 
and  if  each  is  also  a  recipient  of  haj)piness  (which  he 
must  be,  for  otherwise  no  aggregate  happiness  can  be 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE. 


263 


formed  out  of  their  individual  happinesses)  ;  then  the 
implication  is  that  each  gains  the  happiness  due  to 
altruistic  action  exclusively ;  and  that  in  each  this  is 
greater  in  amount  than  the  egoistic  happiness  obtain- 
able by  him,  if  he  devoted  himself  to  pursuit  of  it. 
Leaving  out  of  consideration  for  a  moment  these  rela- 
tive amounts  of  the  two,  let  us  note  the  conditions  to 
the  receipt  of  altruistic  happiness  by  each.  The  sym- 
pathetic nature  gets  pleasure  by  giving  pleasure ;  and 
the  proposition  is  that  if  the  general  happiness  is  the 
object  of  pursuit,  each  will  be  made  happy  by  witness- 
ing others'  happiness.  But  what  in  such  case  consti- 
tutes the  happiness  of  others  ?  These  others  are  also, 
by  the  hyioothesis,  pursuers  and  receivers  of  altruistic 
pleasure.  The  genesis  of  altruistic  pleasure  in  each  is 
to  depend  on  the  display  of  pleasures  by  others ;  w^hich 
is  again  to  depend  on  the  display  of  pleasures  by 
others ;  and  so  on  perpetually.  Where,  then,  is  the 
pleasure  to  begin  ?  Obviously  there  must  be  egoistic 
pleasure  somewhere  before  there  can  be  the  altru- 
istic pleasure  caused  by  sympathy  with  it.  Obviously, 
therefore,  each  must  be  egoistic  in  due  amount,  even 
if  only  with  the  view  of  giving  others  the  possibility 
of  being  altruistic.  So  far  from  the  sum  of  happiness 
being  made  greater  if  all  make  greatest  happiness  the 
exclusive  end,  the  sum  disappears  entirely. 

How  absurd  is  the  supposition  that  the  happiness  of 
all  can  be  achieved  without  each  pursuing  his  own  hap- 
piness, will  be  best  shown  by  a  physical  simile.  Sup- 
pose a  cluster  of  bodies,  each  of  which  generates  heat, 
and  each  of  which  is,  therefore,  while  a  radiator  of 
heat  to  those  around,  also  a  receiver  of  heat  from  theme 
Manifestly  each  will  have  a  certain  proper  heat  irre- 


264 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


spective  of  that  which  it  gains  from  the  rest ;  and  each 
will  have  a  certain  heat  gained  from  the  rest  irrespec- 
tive of  its  proper  heat.  What  will  happen  ?  So  long 
as  each  of  the  bodies  continues  to  be  a  generator  of 
heat,  each  continues  to  maintain  a  temperature  partly 
derived  from  itself  and  partly  derived  from  others. 
But  if  each  ceases  to  generate  heat  for  itself  and 
depends  on  the  heat  radiated  to  it  by  the  rest,  the  entire 
cluster  becomes  cold.  Well,  the  self-generated  heat 
stands  for  egoistic  pleasure ;  the  heat  radiated  and  re- 
ceived stands  for  sympathetic  pleasure ;  and  the  dis- 
appearance of  all  heat  if  each  ceases  to  be  an  originator 
of  it,  corresponds  to  the  disappearance  of  all  pleasure 
if  each  ceases  to  originate  it  egoistically. 

A  further  conclusion  may  be  drawn.  Besides  the 
implication  that  before  altruistic  pleasure  can  exist, 
egoistic  pleasure  must  exist,  and  that  if  the  rule  of 
conduct  is  to  be  the  same  for  all,  each  must  be  egoistic 
in  due  degree ;  there  is  the  implication  that,  to  achieve 
the  greatest  sum  of  happiness,  each  must  be  more 
egoistic  than  altruistic.  For,  speaking  generally,  sym- 
pathetic pleasures  must  ever  continue  less  intense  than 
the  pleasures  with  w^hich  there  is  sympathy.  Other 
things  equal,  ideal  feelings  cannot  be  as  vivid  as  real 
feelings.  It  is  true  that  those  having  strong  imagina- 
tions may,  especially  in  cases  where  the  affections  are 
engaged,  feel  the  moral  pain  if  not  the  physical  pain  of 
another,  as  keenly  as  the  actual  sufferer  of  it,  and  may 
participate  with  like  intensity  in  another's  pleasure  ; 
sometimes  even  mentally  representing  the  received 
pleasure  as  greater  tlian  it  really  is,  and  so  getting 
reflex  pleasure  greater  than  the  recipients'  direct  pleas- 
ure.   Sucli  cases,  however,  and  cases  in  v/liich,  even 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE, 


2G5 


apart  from  exaltation  of  sympathy  caused  by  attach- 
ment, there  is  a  body  of  feeling  sympathetically  aroused 
equal  in  amount  to  the  original  feeling,  if  not  greater, 
are  necessarily  exceptional.  For  in  such  cases  the  total 
consciousness  includes  many  other  elements  besides  the 
mentally-represented  pleasure  or  pain  —  notably  the 
luxury  of  pity  and  the  luxury  of  goodness ;  and  genesis 
of  these  can  occur  but  occasionally ;  they  could  not  be 
habitual  concomitants  of  sympathetic  pleasures  if  all 
pursued  these  from  moment  to  moment.  In  estimating 
the  possible  totality  of  sympathetic  pleasures,  we  must 
include  nothing  beyond  the  representations  of  the 
pleasures  others  experience.  And  unless  it  be  asserted 
that  we  can  have  others'  states  of  consciousness  per- 
petually reproduced  in  us  more  vividly  than  the  kindred 
states  of  consciousness  are  aroused  in  ourselves  by  their 
proper  personal  causes,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the 
totality  of  altruistic  pleasures  cannot  become  equal  to 
the  totality  of  egoistic  pleasures.  Hence,  beyond  the 
truth  that  before  there  can  be  altruistic  pleasures  there 
must  be  the  egoistic  pleasures  from  sympathy  with 
which  they  arise,  there  is  the  truth  that  to  obtain  the 
greatest  sum  of  altruistic  pleasures,  there  must  be  a 
greater  sum  of  egoistic  pleasures. 

§  88.  That  pure  altruism  is  suicidal  may  be  yet  other- 
wise demonstrated.  A  perfectly  moral  law  must  be  one 
which  becomes  perfectly  practicable  as  human  nature 
becomes  perfect.  If  its  practicableness  decreases  as 
human  nature  improves ;  and  if  an  ideal  human  nature 
necessitates  its  impracticability,  it  cannot  be  the  moral 
law  sought. 

Now  opportunities  for  practising  altruism  are  numer- 


238 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


ous  and  great  in  proportion  as  there  is  Aveakness,  oi 
incapacity,  or  imperfection.  If  we  passed  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  family,  in  which  a  sphere  for  self-sacrifi. 
cing  activities  must  be  preserved  as  long  as  offspring 
have  to  be  reared ;  and  if  we  ask  how  there  can  continue 
a  social  sphere  for  self-sacrificing  activities,  it  becomes 
obvious  that  the  continued  existence  of  serious  evils, 
caused  by  prevalent  defects  of  nature,  is  implied.  As 
fast  as  men  adapt  themselves  to  the  requirements  of 
social  life,  so  fast  will  the  demands  for  efforts  on  their 
behalf  diminish.  And  with  arrival  at  finished  adapta- 
tion, when  all  persons  are  at  once  completely  self-con- 
served and  completely  able  to  fulfil  the  obligations 
which  society  imposes  on  them,  those  occasions  for  post- 
ponement of  self  to  others,  which  pure  altruism  con- 
templates, disappear. 

Such  self-sacrifices  become,  indeed,  doubly  impracti- 
cable. Carrying  on  successfully  their  several  lives, 
men  not  only  cannot  yield  to  those  around  the  oppor- 
tunities for  giving  aid,  but  aid  cannot  ordinarily  be 
given  them  without  interfering  with  their  normal  ac- 
tivities, and  so  diminishing  their  pleasures.  Like  every 
inferior  creature,  led  by  its  innate  desires  spontaneously 
to  do  all  that  its  life  requires,  man,  when  completely 
moulded  to  the  social  state,  must  have  desires  so  ad- 
justed to  his  needs  that  he  fulfils  the  needs  in 
gratifying  the  desires.  And  if  his  desires  are  severally 
gratified  by  the  performance  of  required  acts,  none 
of  these  can  be  performed  for  him  without  balking 
his  desires.  Acceptance  from  others  of  the  results  of 
their  activities  can  take  place  only  on  condition  of 
relinquishing  the  pleasures  derived  from  his  own  activi- 
ties.    Diminution  rather  than  increase  of  happiness 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE, 


267 


would  result,  could  altruistic  action  in  such  case  be 
enforced. 

And  here,  indeed,  we  are  introduced  to  another  base- 
less assumption  which  the  theory  makes. 

§  89.  The  postulate  of  utilitarianism  as  formulated 
in  the  statements  above  quoted,  and  of  pure  altruism 
as  otherwise  expressed,  involves  the  belief  that  it  is 
possible  for  happiness,  or  the  means  to  happiness,  or 
the  conditions  to  happiness,  to  be  transferred.  With- 
out any  specified  limitation  the  proposition  taken  for 
granted  is,  that  happiness  in  general  admits  of  detach- 
ment from  one  and  attachment  to  another  —  that  sur- 
render to  any  extent  is  possible  by  one,  and  appropria- 
tion to  any  extent  is  possible  by  another.  But  a 
moment's  thought  shows  this  to  be  far  from  the  truth. 
On  the  one  hand,  surrender  carried  to  a  certain  point 
is  extremely  mischievous,  and  to  a  further  point  fatal ; 
and  on  the  other  hand,  much  of  the  happiness  each 
enjoys  is  self-generated  and  can  neither  be  given  nor 
received. 

To  assume  that  egoistic  pleasures  may  be  relinquished 
to  any  extent,  is  to  fall  into  one  of  those  many  errors 
of  ethical  speculation  which  result  from  ignoring  the 
truths  of  biology.  When  taking  the  biological  view  of 
ethics  we  saw  that  pleasures  accompany  normal  amounts 
of  functions,  while  pains  accompany  defects  or  excesses 
of  functions ;  further,  that  complete  life  depends  on 
complete  discharge  of  functions,  and  therefore  on  receipt 
of  the  correlative  pleasures.  Hence,  to  yield  up  normal 
pleasures  is  to  yield  up  so  much  life ;  and  there  arises 
the  question  —  To  w^hat  extent  may  this  be  done  ?  If 
he  is  to  continue  living,  the  individual  must  take  certain 


268 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


amounts  of  those  pleasures  which  go  along  with  fulfil- 
ment  of  the  bodily  functions,  and  must  avoid  the  pains 
which  entire  non-fulfilinent  of  them  entails.  Complete 
abnegation  means  death ;  excessive  abnegation  means 
illness  ;  abnegation  less  excessive  means  physical  degra 
dation  and  consequent  loss  of  power  to  fulfil  obliga- 
tions,  personal  and  other.  When,  therefore,  we  attempt 
to  specialize  the  proposal  to  live  not  for  self-satisfaction 
but  for  the  satisfaction  of  others,  we  meet  with  the  dif- 
ficulty that  beyond  a  certain  limit  this  cannot  be  done. 
And  when  we  have  decided  what  decrease  of  bodily 
welfare,  caused  by  sacrifice  of  pleasures  and  acceptance 
of  pains,  it  is  proper  for  the  individual  to  make,  there 
is  forced  on  us  the  fact  that  the  portion  of  happiness, 
or  means  to  happiness,  which  it  is  possible  for  him  to 
yield  up  for  redistribution,  is  a  limited  portion. 

Even  more  rigorous  on  another  side  is  the  restriction 
put  upon  the  transfer  of  happiness,  or  the  means  to 
happiness.  The  pleasures  gained  by  efficient  action  — 
by  successful  pursuit  of  ends,  cannot  by  any  process  be 
parted  with,  and  cannot  in  any  w^ay  be  appropriated 
by  another.  The  habit  of  arguing  about  general 
happiness  sometimes  as  though  it  were  a  concrete 
product  to  be  portioned  out,  and  sometimes  as  though 
it  were  co-extensive  with  the  use  of  those  material  aids 
to  pleasure  whicli  may  be  given  and  received,  has 
caused  inattention  to  the  truth  that  the  pleasures  of 
achievement  are  not  transferable.  Alike  in  the  boy 
who  has  won  a  game  of  marbles,  the  athlete  who  has 
performed  a  feat,  the  statesman  who  has  gained  a 
party  triumj)h,  the  inventor  who  has  devised  a  new 
machine,  the  man  of  science  who  has  discovered  a 
truth,  tlie  novelist  who  lias  well  delineated  a  character, 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE, 


269 


the  poet  who  has  finely  rendered  an  emotion,  we  see 
pleasures  which  must,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be 
enjoyed  exclusively  by  those  to  whom  they  come. 
And  if  Ave  look  at  all  such  occupations  as  men  are  not 
impelled  to  by  their  necessities  —  if  we  contemplate  the 
various  ambitions  which  play  so  large  a  part  in  life  ; 
we  are  reminded  that  so  long  as  the  consciousness  of 
efficiency  remains  a  dominant  pleasure,  there  will 
remain  a  dominant  pleasure  which  cannot  be  pursued 
altruistically  but  must  be  pursued  egoistically. 

Cutting  off,  then,  at  the  one  end,  those  pleasures 
which  are  inseparable  from  maintenance  of  the  phy- 
sique in  an  uninjured  state ;  and  cutting  off  at  the 
other  end  the  pleasures  of  successful  action  ;  the  amount 
that  remains  is  so  greatly  diminished  as  to  make  un- 
tenable the  assumption  that  happiness  at  large  admits 
of  distribution  after  the  manner  which  utilitarianism 
assumes. 

§  90.  In  yet  one  more  way  may  be  shown  the  incon- 
sistency of  this  transfigured  utilitarianism  which  re- 
gards its  doctrine  as  embodying  the  Christian  maxim  — 

Love  your  neighbor  as  yourself,"  and  of  that  altruism 
which,  going  still  further,  enunciates  the  maxim  — 

Live  for  others." 

A  right  rule  of  conduct  must  be  one  which  may  with 
advantage  be  adopted  by  all.  Act  according  to  that 
maxim  only,  which  you  can  wish,  at  the  same  time,  to 
become  a  universal  law,"  says  Kant.  And  clearly, 
passing  over  needful  qualifications  of  this  maxim,  we 
may  accept  it  to  the  extent  of  admitting  that  a  mode 
of  action  which  becomes  impracticable  as  it  approaches 
universality,  must  be  wrong.    Hence,  if  tlie  theory  of 


270 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


pure  altruism,  implying  that  effort  should  be  expended 
for  the  benefit  of  others  and  not  for  personal  benefit, 
is  defensible,  it  must  be  shown  that  it  will  produce 
good  results  Avhen  acted  upon  by  all.  Mark  the  con- 
sequences if  all  are  purely  altruistic. 

First,  an  impossible  combination  of  moral  attributes 
is  implied.  Each  is  supposed  by  the  hypothesis  to 
regard  self  so  little  and  others  so  much,  that  he  will- 
ingly sacrifices  his  own  pleasures  to  give  pleasures  to 
them.  But  if  this  is  a  universal  trait,  and  if  action  is 
universally  congruous  with  it,  we  have  to  conceive 
each  as  being  not  only  a  sacrificer  but  also  one  who 
accepts  sacrifices.  While  he  is  so  unselfish  as  will- 
ingly to  yield  up  the  benefit  for  which  he  has  labored, 
he  is  so  selfish  as  willingly  to  let  others  yield  up  to 
him  the  benefits  they  have  labored  for.  To  make  pure 
altruism  possible  for  all,  each  must  be  at  once  extremely 
unegoistic  and  extremely  egoistic.  As  a  giver,  he  must 
have  no  thought  for  self ;  as  a  receiver,  no  thought  for 
others.  Evidently,  this  implies  an  inconceivable  men- 
tal constitution.  The  sympathy  which  is  so  solicitous 
for  others  as  willingly  to  injure  self  in  benefiting  them, 
cannot  at  the  same  time  be  so  regardless  of  others  as  to 
accept  benefits  which  they  injure  themselves  in  giving. 

The  incongruities  that  emerge  if  we  assume  pure 
altruism  to  be  universally  practised,  may  be  otherwise 
exhibited  thus.  Suppose  that  each,  instead  of  enjoy- 
ing such  pleasures  as  come  to  him,  or  such  consumable 
appliances  to  pleasure  as  he  has  worked  for,  or  such 
occasions  for  pleasure  as  reward  his  efforts,  relinquishes 
these  to  a  single  other,  or  adds  them  to  a  common  stock 
from  which  others  benefit,  what  will  result?  Different 
answiers  may  be  given  according  as  we  assume  that 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE. 


271 


there  are,  or  are  not,  additional  influences  brought  into 
play. 

Suppose  there  are  no  additional  influences.  Then,  if 
each  transfers  to  another  his  happiness,  or  means  to 
happiness,  or  occasions  for  happiness,  while  some  one 
else  does  the  like  to  him,  the  distribution  of  hapjjiness 
is,  on  the  average,  unchanged;  or  if  each  adds  to  a 
common  stock  his  happiness,  or  means  to  happiness,  or 
occasions  for  happiness,  from  which  common  stock  each 
appropriates  his  portion,  the  average  state  is  still,  as 
before,  unchanged.  The  only  obvious  effect  is  that 
transactions  must  be  gone  through  in  the  redistribution ; 
and  loss  of  time  and  labor  must  result. 

Now  suppose  some  additional  influence  which  makes 
the  process  beneficial ;  what  must  it  be  ?  The  totality 
can  be  increased  only  if  the  acts  of  transfer  increase 
the  quantity  of  that  which  is  transferred.  The  happi- 
ness, or  that  which  brings  it,  must  be  greater  to  one 
who  derives  it  from  another's  efforts  than  it  would  have 
been  had  his  own  efforts  procured  it;  or  otherwise, 
supposing  a  fund  of  happiness,  or  of  that  which  brings 
it,  has  been  formed  by  contributions  from  each,  then 
each,  in  appropriating  his  share,  must  find  it  larger 
than  it  would  have  been  had  no  such  aggregation  and 
dispersion  taken  place.  To  justify  belief  in  such 
increase,  two  conceivable  assumptions  may  be  made. 
One  is  that  though  the  sum  of  pleasures,  or  of  pleasure- 
yielding  things,  remains  the  same,  yet  the  kind  of  pleas- 
ure, or  of  pleasure-yielding  things,  which  each  receives 
in  exchange  from  another,  or  from  the  aggregate  of 
others,  is  one  which  he  appreciates  more  than  that  for 
which  he  labored.  But  to  assume  this  is  to  assume 
that   each   labors   directly  for   the   tiling  which  he 


272 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


enjoys  less,  rather  than  for  the  thing  which  he  enjoys 
more;  which  is  absurd.  The  other  assumption  is  that 
while  the  exchanged,  or  redistributed  pleasure  of  the 
egoistic  kind,  remains  the  same  in  amount  for  each, 
there  is  added  to  it  the  altruistic  pleasure  accompanying 
the  exchange.  But  this  assumption  is  clearly  inadmis- 
sible if,  as  is  implied,  the  transaction  is  universal  —  is 
one  through  which  each  becomes  giver  and  receiver  to 
equal  extents.  For  if  the  transfer  of  pleasures,  or  of 
pleasure-yielding  things,  from  one  to  another  or  others, 
IS  always  accompanied  by  the  consciousness  that  there 
will  be  received  from  him  or  them  an  equivalent ;  there 
results  merely  a  tacit  exchange,  either  direct  or  round- 
about. Each  becomes  altruistic  in  no  greater  degree  than 
is  implied  by  being  equitable ;  and  each,  having  nothing 
to  exalt  his  happiness,  sympathetically  or  otherwise, 
cannot  be  a  source  of  sympathetic  happiness  to  others. 

§  91.  Thus,  when  the  meanings  of  its  words  are 
inquired  into,  or  when  the  necessary  implications  of  its 
theory  are  examined,  pure  altruism,  in  whatever  form 
expressed,  commits  its  adherents  to  various  absurdities. 

If  "  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number," 
or,  in  other  words,  "the  general  happiness,"  is  the 
proper  end  of  action,  then  not  only  for  all  public  action, 
but  for  all  private  action,  it  must  be  the  end ;  because, 
otherwise,  the  greater  part  of  action  remains  unguided. 
Consider  its  fitness  for  each.  If  corporate  action  is  to 
be  guided  by  the  principle,  with  its  interpreting  com- 
ment, ''everybody  to  count  for  one,  nobody  for  more 
than  one,"  there  must  be  an  ignoring  of  all  differences 
of  character  and  conduct,  merits  and  demerits,  among 
citizens,  since  no  discriiniiiation  is  pi'ovided  for,  and, 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE. 


273 


moreover,  since  that  in  respect  of  which  all  are  to 
count  alike  cannot  be  happiness  itself,  which  is  indis- 
tributable,  and  since  equal  sharing  of  the  concrete 
means  to  happiness,  besides  failing  ultimately,  would 
fail  proximately  to  produce  the  greatest  happiness  ;  it 
results  that  equal  distribution  of  the  conditions  under 
which  happiness  may  be  pursued  is  the  only  tenable 
meaning;  we  discover  in  the  principle  nothing  but  a 
roundabout  insistence  on  equity.  If,  taking  happiness 
at  large  as  the  aim  of  private  action,  the  individual  is 
required  to  judge  between  his  own  happiness  and  that 
of  others  as  an  impartial  spectator  would  do,  we  see 
that  no  supposition  concerning  the  spectator  save  one 
which  suicidally  ascribes  partiality  to  him,  can  bring 
out  any  other  result  than  that  each  shall  enjoy  such 
happiness,  or  appropriate  such  means  to  happiness,  as 
his  own  efforts  gain :  equity  is  again  the  sole  content. 
When,  adopting  another  method,  we  consider  hovr  the 
greatest  sum  of  happiness  may  be  composed,  and, 
recognizing  the  fact  that  equitable  egoism  will  produce 
a  certain  sum,  ask  how  pure  altruism  is  to  produce  a 
greater  sum ;  we  are  shown  that  if  all,  exclusively  pur- 
suing altruistic  pleasures,  are  so  to  produce  a  greater 
sum  of  pleasures,  the  implication  is  that  altruistic  pleas- 
ures, which  arise  from  sympathy,  can  exist  in  the 
absence  of  egoistic  pleasures  with  which  there  may  be 
sympathy  —  an  impossibility ;  and  another  implication 
is  that  if,  the  necessity  for  egoistic  ple^^sures  being 
admitted,  it  is  said  that  the  greatest  sum  of  happiness 
will  be  attained  if  all  individuals  are  more  altruistic 
than  egoistic,  it  is  indirectly  said  that  as  a  general 
truth,  representative  feelings  are  stronger  than  pre- 
sentative  feelings  —  another  impossibility.    Again,  the 


274 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


doctrine  of  pure  altruism  assumes  that  happiness  may 
be  to  any  extent  transferred  or  redistributed ;  whereas 
the  fact  is  that  pleasures  of  one  order  cannot  be  trans- 
ferred in  large  measure  without  results  which  are  fatal 
or  extremely  injurious,  and  that  pleasures  of  another 
order  cannot  be  transferred  in  any  degree.  Further, 
pure  altruism  presents  this  fatal  anomaly,  that  while  a 
right  principle  of  action  must  be  more  and  more  prac- 
tised as  men  improve,  the  altruistic  principle  becomes 
less  and  less  practicable  as  men  approach  an  ideal  form, 
because  the  sphere  for  practising  it  continually  de- 
creases. Finally,  its  self-destructiveness  is  made  mani- 
fest on  observing  that  for  all  to  adopt  it  as  a  principle 
of  action,  which  they  must  do  if  it  is  a  sound  principle, 
implies  that  all  are  at  once  extremely  unegoistic  and 
extremely  egoistic  —  ready  to  injure  self  for  others' 
benefit,  and  ready  to  accept  benefit  at  the  cost  of  injury 
to  others  :  traits  which  cannot  co-exist. 

The  need  for  a  compromise  between  egoism  and 
altruism  is  thus  made  conspicuous.  We  are  forced  to 
recognize  the  claims  which  his  own  w^ell-being  has  on 
the  attention  of  each,  by  noting  how  in  some  directions 
we  come  to  a  deadlock,  in  others  to  contradictions,  and 
in  others  to  disastrous  results,  if  they  are  ignored. 
Conversely,  it  is  undeniable  that  disregard  of  others  by 
each,  carried  to  a  great  extent,  is  fatal  to  society,  and 
carried  to  a  still  greater  extent  is  fatal  to  tlie  family, 
and  eventually  to  the  race.  Egoism  and  altruism  are 
therefore  co-essential. 

§  92.  What  form  is  the  compromise  between  egoism 
and  altruism  to  assume?  how  are  their  respective  claims 
to  be  satisfied  in  due  degrees? 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE, 


275 


It  is  a  truth  insisted  on  by  moralists  and  recognized 
in  common  life,  that  the  achievement  of  individual  hap- 
piness is  not  proportionate  to  the  degree  in  which  indi- 
vidual happiness  is  made  the  object  of  direct  pursuit ; 
but  there  has  not  yet  become  current  the  belief  that,  in 
like  manner,  the  achievement  of  general  happiness  is 
not  proportionate  to  the  degree  in  which  general  happi- 
ness is  made  the  object  of  direct  pursuit.  Yet  failure 
of  direct  pursuit  in  the  last  case  is  more  reasonably  to 
be  expected  than  in  the  first. 

When  discussing  the  relations  of  means  and  ends,  we 
saw  that  as  individual  conduct  evolves,  its  principle  be- 
comes more  and  more  that  of  making  fulfilment  of 
means  the  proximate  end,  and  leaving  the  ultimate  end, 
welfare  or  happiness,  to  come  as  a  result.  And  we  saw 
that  when  general  welfare  or  happiness  is  the  ultimate 
end,  the  same  principle  holds  even  more  rigorously ; 
since  the  ultimate  end  under  its  personal  form  is  less  de- 
terminate than  under  its  general  form,  and  the  difii- 
culties  in  the  way  of  achieving  it  by  direct  pursuit  still 
greater.  Recognizing,  then,  the  fact  ttiat  corporate  hap- 
piness, still  more  than  individual  happiness,  must  be 
pursued  not  directly,  but  indirectly,  the  first  question 
f OF  us  is  —  What  must  be  the  general  nature  of  the 
means  through  which  it  is  to  be  achieved? 

It  is  admitted  that  self-happiness  is,  in  a  measure,  to 
be  obtained  by  furthering  the  happiness  of  others.  May 
it  not  be  true  that,  conversely,  general  happiness  is  to 
be  obtained  by  furthering  self-happiness  ?  If  the  well- 
being  of  each  unit  is  to  be  reached  partly  through  his 
care  for  the  well-being  of  the  aggregate,  is  not  the 
well-being  of  the  aggregate  to  be  reached  partly  through 
the  care  of  each  unit  for  himself?    Clearly,  our  con- 


276 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


elusion  must  be  that  general  happiness  is  to  be  achieved 
mainly  through  the  adequate  pursuit  of  their  own  hap- 
piness by  individuals ;  while,  reciprocally,  the  happiness 
of  individuals  is  to  be  achieved  in  part  by  their  pur- 
suit of  the  general  happiness. 

And  this  is  the  conclusion  embodied  in  the  progress- 
ing ideas  and  usages  of  mankind.  This  compromise 
between  egoism  and  altruism  has  been  slowly  establish- 
ing itself;  and  toward  recognition  of  its  propriety, 
men's  actual  beliefs,  as  distinguished  from  their  nominal 
beliefs,  have  been  gradually  approaching.  Social  evo- 
lution has  been  bringing  about  a  state  in  which  the 
claims  of  the  individual  to  the  proceeds  of  his  activi- 
ties, and  to  such  satisfactions  as  they  bring,  are  more 
and  more  positively  asserted;  at  the  same  time  that 
insistence  on  others'  claims,  and  habitual  respect  for 
them,  have  been  increasing.  Among  the  rudest  savages 
personal  interests  are  very  vaguely  distinguished  from 
the  interests  of  others.  In  early  stages  of  civilization 
the  proportioning  of  benefits  to  efforts  is  extremely 
rude  :  slaves  and  serfs  get  for  work  arbitrary  amounts 
of  food  and  shelter :  exchange  being  infrequent,  there 
is  little  to  develop  the  idea  of  equivalence.  But  as 
civilization  advances,  and  status  passes  into  contract, 
there  comes  daily  experience  of  the  relation  between 
advantages  enjoyed  and  labor  given:  the  industrial 
system  maintaining,  through  supply  and  demand,  a 
due  adjustment  of  the  one  to  the  other.  And  this 
growth  of  voluntary  co-operation,  this  exchange  of  ser- 
vices under  agreement,  has  been  necessarily  accom- 
panied by  decrease  of  aggressions  one  upon  another, 
and  increase  of  sympathy :  leading  to  exchange  of 
services  beyond  agreement.    That  is  to  say,  the  more 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE, 


277 


distinct  assertions  of  individual  claims,  and  more  rigor- 
ous apportioning  of  personal  enjoyments  to  efforts 
expended,  have  gone  hand  in  hand  with  growth  of  that 
negative  altruism  shown  in  equitable  conduct  and  that 
positive  altruism  shown  in  gratuitous  aid. 

A  higher  phase  of  this  double  change  has  in  our 
own  times  become  conspicuous.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  we 
note  the  struggles  for  political  freedom,  the  contests 
between  labor  and  capital,  the  judicial  reforms  made  to 
facilitate  enforcement  of  rights,  we  see  that  the  tend- 
ency still  is  toward  complete  appropriation  by  each  of 
whatever  benefits  are  due  to  him,  and  consequent  exclu- 
sion of  his  fellows  from  such  benefits.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  we  consider  what  is  meant  by  the  surrender  of 
power  to  the  masses,  the  abolition  of  class-privileges, 
the  efforts  to  diffuse  knowledge,  the  agitations  to  spread 
temperance,  the  multitudinous  philanthropic  societies; 
it  becomes  clear  that  regard  for  the  well-being  of  others 
is  increasing  pari  passu  with  the  taking  of  means  to 
secure  personal  well-being. 

What  holds  of  the  relations  within  each  society 
holds  to  some  extent,  if  to  a  less  extent,  of  the  rela- 
tions between  societies.  Though,  to  maintain  national 
claims,  real  or  imaginary,  often  of  a  trivial  kind,  the 
civilized  still  make  war  on  one  another ;  yet  their 
several  nationalities  are  more  respected  than  in  past 
ages.  Though  by  victors  portions  of  territorj-  are 
taken,  and  money  compensations  exacted ;  yet  conquest 
is  not  now,  as  of  old,  habitually  followed  by  entire 
appropriation  of  territories  and  enslavement  of  peoples. 
The  individualities  of  societies  are  in  a  larger  measure 
preserved.  Meanwhile  the  altruistic  intercourse  is 
greater :  aid  is  rendered  on  occasions  of  disaster  hy 


278 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


flood,  by  fire,  by  famine,  or  otherwise.  And  in  inter- 
national arbitration  as  lately  exemplified,  implying  the 
recognition  of  claims  by  one  nation  upon  another,  we 
see  a  further  progress  in  this  wider  altruism.  Doubt- 
less  there  is  much  to  be  said  by  way  of  set-off ;  for  in 
the  dealings  of  the  civilized  with  the  uncivilized  little 
of  this  progress  can  be  traced.  It  may  be  urged  that 
the  primitive  rule,  Life  for  life,"  has  been  developed 
by  us  into  the  rule,  For  one  life  many  lives,"  as  in 
the  cases  of  Bishop  Patteson  and  Mr.  Birch ;  but  then 
there  is  the  qualifying  fact  that  we  do  not  torture  our 
prisoners  or  mutilate  them.  If  it  be  said  that  as  the 
Hebrews  thought  themselves  warranted  in  seizing  the 
lands  God  promised  to  them,  and  in  some  cases  exter- 
minating the  inhabitants,  so  we,  to  fulfil  the  manifest 
intention  of  Providence,"  dispossess  inferior  races  when- 
ever we  want  their  territories ;  it  may  be  replied  that 
we  do  not  kill  many  more  than  seems  needful,  and 
tolerate  the  existence  of  those  who  submit.  And  should 
any  one  point  out  that  as  Attila,  while  conquering  or 
destroying  peoples  and  nations,  regarded  himself  as 
the  scourge  of  God,"  punishing  men  for  their  sins,  so 
we,  as  represented  by  a  High  Commissioner  and  a  priest 
he  quotes,  think  ourselves  called  on  to  chastise  with 
rifles  and  cannon,  heathens  who  practise  polygamy; 
there  is  the  rejoinder  that  not  even  the  most  ferocious 
disciple  of  the  teacher  of  mercy  Avould  carry  his  ven- 
geance so  far  as  to  depopulate  whole  territories  and 
erase  scores  of  cities.  And  when,  on  the  other  hand, 
we  remember  that  there  is  an  Aborigines  Protection 
Society,  that  there  are  Commissioners  in  certain  colo- 
nies appointed  to  protect  native  interests,  and  that  in 
some  cases  the  lands  of  natives  have  been  purchased 


TRIAL  AND  COMPROMISE. 


279 


in  ways  which,  however  unfair,  have  implied  some 
recognition  of  their  claims ;  we  may  say,  that,  little  as 
the  compromise  between  egoism  and  altruism  has  pro- 
gressed in  international  affairs,  it  has  still  progressed 
somewhat  in  the  direction  indicated. 


280 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

k 

CONCILIATION. 

§  93.  As  exhibited  in  the  last  chapter,  the  com- 
promise between  the  claims  of  self  and  the  claims  of 
others  seems  to  imply  permanent  antagonism  between 
the  two.  The  pursuit  by  each  of  his  own  happiness 
while  paying  due  regard  to  the  happiness  of  his  fellows, 
apparently  necessitates  the  ever-recurring  question  — 
How  far  must  the  one  end  be  sought,  and  how  far  the 
other:  suggesting,  if  not  discord  in  the  life  of  each, 
still,  an  absence  of  complete  harmony.  This  is  not  the 
inevitable  inference,  however. 

When,  in  the  Principles  of  Sociology^  Part  III.,  the 
phenomena  of  race-maintenance  among  living  things 
at  large  were  discussed,  that  the  development  of  the 
domestic  relations  might  be  the  better  understood,  it 
was  shown  that  during  evolution  there  has  been  going 
on  a  conciliation  between  the  interests  of  the  species, 
the  interests  of  the  parents,  and  the  interests  of  the 
offspring.  Proof  was  given  that  as  we  ascend  from  the 
lowest  forms  of  life  to  the  highest,  race-maintenance 
is  achieved  with  a  decreasing  sacrifice  of  life,  alike  of 
young  individuals  and  of  adult  individuals,  and  also 
with  a  decreasing  sacrifice  of  parental  lives  to  the 
lives  of  offspring.  We  saw  that,  with  the  progress  of 
civilization,  like  changes  go  on  among  human  beings; 


CONCILIA  TION. 


281 


and  that  the  highest  domestic  relations  are  those  in 
which  the  conciliation  of  welfares  within  the  family 
becomes  greatest,  while  the  welfare  of  the  society  is 
best  subserved.  Here  it  remains  to  be  shown  that  a 
kindred  conciliation  has  been,  and  is,  taking  place  be- 
tween the  interests  of  each  citizen  and  the  interests  of 
citizens  at  large  ;  tending  ever  toward  a  state  in  which 
the  two  become  merged  in  one,  and  in  which  the  feel- 
ings answering  to  them  respectively,  fall  into  complete 
concord. 

In  the  family  group,  even  as  we  observe  it  among 
many  inferior  vertebrates,  we  see  that  the  parental 
sacrifice,  now  become  so  moderate  in  amount  as  to 
consist  with  long-continued  parental  life,  is  not  accom- 
panied by  consciousness  of  sacrifice ;  but  contrariwise, 
is  made  from  a  direct  desire  to  make  it :  the  altruistic 
labors  on  behalf  of  young  are  carried  on  in  satisfac- 
tion of  parental  instincts.  If  we  trace  these  relations 
up  through  the  grades  of  mankind,  and  observe  how 
largely  love  rather  than  obligation  prompts  the  care  of 
children,  we  see  the  conciliation  of  interests  to  be  such 
that  achievement  of  parental  happiness  coincides  with 
securing  the  happiness  of  offspring :  the  wish  for  chil- 
dren among  the  childless,  and  the  occasional  adoption 
of  children,  showing  how  needful  for  attainment  of 
certain  egoistic  satisfactions  are  these  altruistic  activi- 
ties. And  further  evolution,  causing  along  with  higher 
nature  diminished  fertility,  and  therefore  smaller  burdens 
on  parents,  may  be  expected  to  bring  a  state  in  which, 
far  more  than  now,  the  pleasures  of  adult  life  will 
consist  in  raising  offspring  to  perfection  while  simul- 
taneously furthering  the  immediate  happiness  of  off- 
spring. 


282 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


Now  though  altruism  of  a  social  kind,  lacking  cer- 
tain elements  of  parental  altruism,  can  never  attain 
the  same  level,  yet  it  may  be  expected  to  attain  a 
level  at  which  it  will  be  like  parental  altruism  in 
spontaneity  —  a  level  such  that  ministration  to  others' 
happiness  will  become  a  daily  need  —  a  level  such  that 
the  lower  egoistic  satisfactions  will  be  continually  sub- 
ordinated to  this  higher  egoistic  satisfaction,  not  by 
any  effort  to  subordinate  them,  but  by  the  preference 
for  this  higher  egoistic  satisfaction  whenever  it  can  be 
obtained. 

Let  us  consider  how  the  development  of  sympathy, 
which  must  advance  as  fast  as  conditions  permit,  will 
bring  about  this  state. 

§  94.  We  have  seen  that  during  the  evolution  of  life, 
pleasures  and  pains  have  necessarily  been  the  incentives 
to,  and  deterrents  from,  actions  which  the  conditions 
of  existence  demanded  and  negatived.  An  implied 
truth  to  be  here  noted  is,  that  faculties  which,  under 
given  conditions,  yield  partly  pain  and  partly  pleasure, 
cannot  develop  beyond  the  limit  at  which  they  yield  a 
surplus  of  pleasure ;  if  beyond  that  limit  more  pain 
than  pleasure  results  from  exercise  of  them,  their 
growth  must  be  arrested. 

Through  sympathy  both  these  forms  of  feeling  are 
excited.  Now  a  pleasurable  consciousness  is  aroused 
on  witnessing  pleasure ;  now  a  painful  consciousness 
is  aroused  on  witnessing  pain.  Hence,  if  beings  around 
him  habitually  manifest  pleasure  and  but  rarely  pain, 
sympathy  yields  to  its  possessor  a  surplus  of  pleasure ; 
while,  contrariwise,  if  little  pleasure  is  ordinarily  wit- 
nessed and  much  pain,  sympathy  yields  a  surplus  of 


CONCILIA  TION. 


283 


pain  to  its  possessor.  The  average  development  of 
sympathy  must,  therefore,  be  regulated  by  the  average 
manifestations  of  pleasure  and  pain  in  others.  If  the 
life  usually  led  under  given  social  conditions  is  such 
that  suffering  is  daily  inflicted,  or  is  daily  displayed 
by  associates,  sympathy  cannot  grow ;  to  assume  growth 
of  it  is  to  assume  that  the  constitution  will  modify 
itself  in  such  way  as  to  increase  its  pains  and  therefore 
depress  its  energies ;  and  is  to  ignore  the  truth  that 
bearing  any  kind  of  pain  gradually  produces  insensi- 
bility to  that  pain,  or  callousness.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  the  social  state  is  such  that  manifestations  of  pleas- 
ure predominate,  sympathy  will  increase  ;  since  sym- 
pathetic pleasures,  adding  to  the  totality  of  pleasures 
enhancing  vitality,  conduce  to  the  physical  prosperity 
of  the  most  sj^mpathetic,  and  since  the  pleasures  of 
sympathy,  exceeding  its  pains  in  all,  lead  to  an  exercise 
of  it  which  strengthens  it. 

The  first  implication  is  one  already  more  than  once 
indicated.  We  have  seen  that  along  with  habitual 
militancy  and  under  the  adapted  type  of  social  organi- 
zation, sympathy  cannot  develop  to  any  considerable 
height.  The  destructive  activities  carried  on  against 
external  enemies  sear  it;  the  state  of  feeling  main- 
tained causes  within  the  society  itself  frequent  acts  of 
aggression  or  cruelty  ;  and  further,  the  compulsory  co- 
operation characterizing  the  militant  regime  necessarily 
represses  sympathy  —  exists  only  on  condition  of  an 
unsympathetic  treatment  of  some  by  others. 

But  even  could  the  militant  regime  forthwith  end, 
the  hinderance  to  development  of  sjmipath}^  would  still 
be  great.  Though  cessation  of  war  would  imply  in- 
creased adaptation  of  man  to  social  life,  and  decrease 


284 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


of  sundry  evils,  yet  there  would  remain  much  non* 
adaptation  and  much  consequent  unhappiness.  In  the 
first  place,  that  form  of  nature  which  has  generated 
and  still  generates  wars,  though  by  implication  raised 
to  a  higher  form,  would  not  at  once  be  raised  to  so 
high  a  form  that  there  would  cease  all  injustices  and 
the  pains  they  cause.  For  a  considerable  period  after 
predatory  activities  had  ended,  the  defects  of  the  pred- 
atory nature  would  continue ;  entailing  their  slowly 
diminishing  evils.  In  the  second  place,  the  ill-adjust- 
ment of  the  human  constitution  to  the  pursuits  of  in- 
dustrial life,  must  long  persist,  and  may  be  expected  to 
survive  in  a  measure  the  cessation  of  wars ;  the  re- 
quired modes  of  activity  must  remain  for  innumerable 
generations  in  some  degree  displeasurable.  And  in  the 
third  place,  deficiencies  of  self-control  such  as  the  im- 
provident show  us,  as  well  as  those  many  failures  of 
conduct  due  to  inadequate  foresight  of  consequences, 
though  less  marked  than  now,  could  not  fail  still  to 
produce  suffering. 

Nor  would  even  complete  adaptation,  if  limited  to 
disappearance  of  the  non-adaptations  just  indicated, 
remove  all  sources  of  those  miseries  which,  to  the  ex- 
tent of  their  manifestation,  check  the  growth  of  sym- 
pathy. For  while  the  rate  of  multiplication  continues 
so  to  exceed  the  rate  of  mortality  as  to  cause  pressure 
on  the  means  of  subsistence,  there  must  continue  to 
result  much  unhappiness  ;  either  froni  balked  affections 
or  from  overwork  and  stinted  means.  Only  as  fast  as 
fertility  diminishes,  which  we  have  seen  it  must  do 
along  with  further  mental  development  (^Principles  of 
Biology^  §§  367-377),  can  there  go  on  such  diminution 
of  the  labors  required  for  efficiently  supporting  self  and 


CONCILIA  TION. 


285 


family,  that  they  will  not  constitute  a  displeasurable 
tax  on  the  energies. 

Gradually  then,  and  only  gradually,  as  these  various 
causes  of  unh?ppiness  become  less,  can  sympathy  be- 
come greater.  Life  would  be  intolerable  if,  while  the 
causes  of  misery  remained  as  they  now  are,  all  men 
were  not  only  in  a  high  degree  sensitive  to  the  pains, 
bodily  and  mental,  felt  by  those  around  and  expressed 
in  the  faces  of  those  they  met,  but  were  unceasingly 
conscious  of  the  miseries  everywhere  being  suffered  as 
consequences  of  war,  crime,  misconduct,  misfortune, 
improvidence,  incapacity.  But,  as  the  moulding  and 
re-moulding  of  man  and  society  into  mutual  fitness 
progresses,  and  as  the  pains  caused  by  unfitness  de- 
crease, sympathy  can  increase  in  presence  of  the  pleas- 
ures that  come  from  fitness.  The  two  changes  are 
indeed  so  related  that  each  furthers  the  other.  Such 
growth  of  sympathy  as  conditions  permit,  itself  aids 
in  lessening  pain  and  augmenting  pleasure ;  and  the 
greater  surplus  of  pleasure  that  results,  makes  possible 
further  growth  of  sympathy. 

§  95.  The  extent  to  which  sympathy  may  develop 
when  the  hinderances  are  removed,  will  be  better  con- 
ceived after  observing  the  agencies  through  which  it  is 
excited,  and  setting  down  the  reasons  for  expecting 
those  agencies  to  become  more  efficient.  Two  factors 
have  to  be  considered  —  the  natural  language  of  feeling 
in  the  being  sympathized  with,  and  the  power  of  inter- 
preting that  language  in  the  being  who  sympathizes 
We  may  anticipate  development  of  both. 

Movements  of  the  body  and  facial  changes  are 
visible  effects  of  feeling  which,  when  the  feeling  is 


286 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


strong,  are  uncontrollable.  When  the  feeling  is  less 
strong,  however,  be  it  sensational  or  emotional,  they 
may  be  wholly  or  partially  repressed ;  and  there  is  a 
habit,  more  or  less  constant,  of  repressing  them ;  this 
habit  being  the  concomitant  of  a  nature  such  that  it  is 
often  undesirable  that  others  should  see  what  is  felt. 
So  necessary  with  our  existing  characters  and  condi- 
tions are  concealments  thus  prompted,  that  they  have 
come  to  form  a  part  of  moral  duty ;  and  concealment 
for  its  own  sake  is  often  insisted  upon  as  an  element 
in  good  manners.  All  this  is  caused  by  the  prevalence 
of  feelings  at  variance  with  social  good  —  feelings 
which  cannot  be  shown  without  producing  discords  or 
estrangements.  But  in  proportion  as  the  egoistic 
desires  fall  more  under  control  of  the  altruistic,  and 
there  come  fewer  and  slighter  impulses  of  a  kind  to 
be  reprobated,  the  need  for  keeping  guard  over  facial 
expression  and  bodily  movement  will  decrease,  and 
these  will  with  increasing  clearness  convey  to  specta- 
tors the  mental  state.  Nor  is  this  all.  Restrained  as 
its  use  is,  this  language  of  the  emotions  is  at  present 
prevented  from  growing.  But  as  fast  as  the  emotions 
become  such  that  they  may  be  more  candidly  displayed, 
there  will  go,  along  with  the  habit  of  display,  develop- 
ment of  the  means  of  display ;  so  that  besides  the 
stronger  emotions,  the  more  delicate  shades  and  smaller 
degrees  of  emotion  will  visibly  exhibit  themselves ;  the 
emotional  language  will  become  at  once  more  copious, 
more  varied,  more  definite.  And  obviously  sympathy 
will  be  proportionately  facilitated. 

An  equally  important,  if  not  a  more  important,  ad- 
vance of  kindred  nature,  is  to  be  anticipated.  The 
vocal  signs  of  sentient  states  will  simultaneously  evolve 


CONCILIA  TION. 


287 


further.  Loudness  of  tone,  pitch  of  tone,  quality  of 
tone,  and  change  of  tone,  are  severally  marks  of  feeling  5 
and,  combined  in  different  ways  and  proportions,  serve 
to  express  different  amounts  and  kinds  of  feelings.  As 
elsewhere  pointed  out,  cadences  are  the  comments  of 
the  emotions  on  the  propositions  of  the  intellect.^  Not 
in  excited  speech  only,  but  in  ordinary  speech,  we  show 
by  ascending  and  descending  intervals,  by  degrees  of 
deviation  from  the  medium  tone,  as  well  as  hj  place  and 
strength  of  emphasis,  the  kind  of  sentiency  which  ac- 
companies the  thought  expressed.  Now  the  manifesta- 
tion of  feeling  by  cadence,  like  its  manifestation  by  visi- 
ble changes,  is  at  present  under  restraint ;  the  motives 
for  repression  act  in  the  one  case  as  they  act  in  the 
other.  A  double  effect  is  produced.  This  audible  lan- 
guage of  feeling  is  not  used  up  to  the  limit  of  its  exist- 
ing capacitj^ ;  and  it  is  to  a  considerable  degree  mis- 
used, so  as  to  convey  other  feelings  than  those  which 
are  felt.  The  result  of  this  disuse  and  misuse  is  to 
check  that  evolution  which  normal  use  would  cause. 
We  must  infer,  then,  that  as  moral  adaptation  pro- 
gresses, and  there  is  decreasing  need  for  concealment  of 
the  feelings,  their  vocal  signs  will  develop  much  fur- 
ther. Though  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  cadences 
will  ever  convey  emotions  as  exactly  as  words  convey 
thoughts,  yet  it  is  quite  possible  that  the  emotional  lan- 
guage of  the  future  may  rise  as  much  above  our  pres- 
ent emotional  language,  as  our  intellectual  language  has 
already  risen  above  the  intellectual  language  of  the 
lowest  races. 

A  simultaneous  increase  in  the  power  of  interpreting 
both  visible  and  audible  signs  of  feeling  must  be  taken 
^  See  Essay  on    The  Origin  and  Function  of  Music." 


288 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


into  account.  Among  those  around  we  see  differences 
both  of  ability  to  perceive  such  signs  and  of  ability  to 
conceive  the  implied  mental  states  and  their  causes; 
here,  a  stolidity  unimpressed  by  a  slight  facial  change 
or  altered  tone  of  voice,  or  else  unable  to  imagine  what 
is  felt;  and  there,  a  quick  observation  and  a  penetrating 
intuition,  making  instantly  comprehensible  the  state  of 
mind  and  its  origin.  If  we  suppose  both  these  faculties 
exalted  —  both  a  more  delicate  perception  of  the  signs 
and  a  strengthened  constructive  imagination  —  we  shall 
get  some  idea  of  the  deeper  and  wider  sympathy  that 
will  hereafter  arise.  More  vivid  representations  of  the 
feelings  of  others,  implying  ideal  excitements  of  feelings 
approaching  to  real  excitements,  must  imply  a  greater 
likeness  between  the  feelings  of  the  sympathizer  and 
those  of  the  sympathized  with ;  coming  near  to  identity. 

By  simultaneous  increase  .  of  its  subjective  and 
objective  factors,  sympathy  may  thus,  as  the  hinder- 
ances  diminish,  rise  above  that  now  shown  by  the 
sympathetic,  as  much  as  in  them  it  has  risen  above  that 
which  the  callous  show. 

§  96.  What  must  be  the  accompanying  evolution  of 
conduct?  What  must  the  relations  between  egoism 
and  altruism  become  as  this  form  of  nature  is  neared  ? 

A  conclusion  drawn  in  the  chapter  on  the  relativity 
of  pleasures  and  pains,  and  there  emphasized  as  one  to 
be  borne  in  mind,  must  now  be  recalled.  It  was 
pointed  out,  that,  supposing  them  to  be  consistent  with 
continuance  of  life,  there  are  no  activities  which  may 
not  become  sources  of  pleasure,  if  surrounding  con- 
ditions require  persistence  in  them.  And  here  it  is  to 
be  added,  as  a  corollary,  that  if  the  conditions  require 


CONCILIA  TION. 


289 


any  class  of  activities  to  be  relatively  great,  there  will 
arise  a  relatively  great  pleasure  accompanying  that 
class  of  activities.  What  bearing  have  these  general 
inferences  on  the  special  question  before  us  ? 

That  alike  for  public  welfare  and  private  welfare 
sympathy  is  essential,  we  have  seen.  We  have  seen 
that  co-operation,  and  the  benefits  which  it  brings 
to  each  and  all,  become  high  in  proportion  as  the 
altruistic,  that  is  the  sympathetic,  interests  extend. 
The  actions  prompted  by  fellow-feeling  are  thus  to  be 
counted  among  those  demanded  by  social  conditions. 
They  are  actions  which  maintenance  and  further 
development  of  social  organization  tend  ever  to 
increase,  and,  therefore,  actions  with  which  there  will 
be  joined  an  increasing  pleasure.  From  the  laws  of 
life  it  must  be  concluded  that  unceasing  social  disci- 
pline will  so  mould  human  nature  that  eventually 
sympathetic  pleasures  will  be  spontaneously  pursued 
to  the  fullest  extent  advantageous  to  each  and  all. 
The  scope  for  altruistic  activities  will  not  exceed  the 
desire  for  altruistic  satisfactions. 

In  natures  thus  constituted,  though  the  altruistic 
gratifications  must  remain  in  a  transfigured  sense 
egoistic,  yet  they  will  not  be  egoistically  pursued  — 
will  not  be  pursued  from  egoistic  motives.  Though 
pleasure  will  be  gained  by  giving  pleasure,  yet  the 
thought  of  the  sympathetic  pleasure  to  be  gained  will 
not  occupy  consciousness,  but  only  the  thought  of  the 
pleasure  given.  To  a  great  extent  this  is  so  now.  In 
the  truly  sympathetic,  attention  is  so  absorbed  with 
the  proximate  end,  others'  happiness,  that  there  is  none 
given  to  the  prospective  self-happiness  which  may  ulti- 
mately result.    An  analogy  will  make  the  relation  clear. 


290 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


A  miser  accumulates  money,  not  deliberately  saying 
to  himself,  I  shall  by  doing  this  get  the  delight  which 
possession  gives."  He  thinks  only  of  the  money  and 
the  means  of  getting  it,  and  he  experiences  incidentally 
the  pleasure  that  comes  from  possession.  Owning  prop- 
erty is  that  which  he  revels  in  imagining,  and  not  the 
feeling  which  owning  property  will  cause.  Similarly, 
one  who  is  sympathetic  in  the  highest  sense,  is  mentally 
engaged  solely  in  representing  pleasure  as  experienced 
by  another,  and  pursues  it  for  the  benefit  of  that  other, 
forgetting  any  participation  he  will  have  in  it.  Sub- 
jectively considered,  then,  the  conciliation  of  egoism 
and  altruism  will  eventually  become  such  that  though 
the  altruistic  pleasure,  as  being  a  part  of  the  conscious- 
ness of  one  who  experiences  it,  can  never  be  other  than 
egoistic,  it  will  not  be  consciously  egoistic. 

Let  us  now  ask  what  must  happen  in  a  society  com- 
posed of  persons  constituted  in  this  manner. 

§  97.  The  opportunities  for  that  postponement  of 
self  to  others,  which  constitutes  altruism  as  ordinarily 
conceived,  must,  in  several  ways,  be  more  and  more 
limited  as  the  highest  state  is  approached. 

Extensive  demands  on  the  benevolent  presuppose 
much  unhappiness.  Before  there  can  be  many  and 
large  calls  on  some  for  efforts  on  behalf  of  others,  there 
must  be  many  others  in  conditions  needing  help  —  in 
conditions  of  comparative  misery.  But,  as  we  have 
seen  above,  the  development  of  fellow-feeling  can  go  on 
only  as  fast  as  misery  decreases.  Sympathy  can  reach 
its  full  height  only  when  there  have  ceased  to  be  fre- 
quent occasions  for  anything  like  serious  self-sacrifice. 

Change  the  point  of  view,  and  this  truth  presents 


CONCILIATION. 


291 


itself  under  another  aspect.  We  have  already  seen 
that  with  the  progress  of  adaptation  each  becomes  so 
constituted  that  he  cannot  be  helped  without  in  some 
way  arresting  a  pleasurable  activity.  There  cannot  be 
a  beneficial  interference  between  faculty  and  function 
when  the  two  are  adjusted.  Consequently,  in  propor- 
tion as  mankind  approach  complete  adjustment  of  their 
natures  to  social  needs,  there  must  be  fewer  and  smaller 
opportunities  for  giving  aid. 

Yet  again,  as  was  pointed  out  in  the  last  chapter,  the 
sympathy  which  prompts  efforts  for  others'  welfare 
must  be  pained  by  self-injury  on  the  part  of  others ; 
and  must,  therefore,  cause  aversion  to  accept  benefits 
derived  from  their  self-injuries.  What  is  to  be  inferred  ? 
While  each,  when  occasion  offers,  is  ready,  anxious 
even,  to  surrender  egoistic  satisfactions  ;  others,  simi- 
larly natured,  cannot  but  resist  the  surrender.  If  any 
one,  proposing  to  treat  himself  more  hardly  than  a  dis- 
interested spectator  would  direct,  refrains  from  appro- 
priating that  which  is  due :  others,  caring  for  him  if  he 
will  not  care  for  himself,  must  necessarily  insist  that 
he  shall  appropriate  it.  General  altruism  then,  in  its 
developed  form,  must  inevitably  resist  individual  ex- 
cesses of  altruism.  The  relation  at  present  familiar  to 
us  will  be  inverted,  and  instead  of  each  maintaining  his 
own  claims,  others  will  maintain  his  claims  for  him  : 
not,  indeed,  by  active  efforts,  which  will  be  needless, 
but  by  passively  resisting  any  undue  yielding  up  of 
them.  There  is  nothing  in  such  behavior  which  is  not 
even  now  to  be  traced  in  our  daily  experiences  as  begin- 
ning. In  business  transactions  among  honorable  men 
there  is  usually  a  desire  on  either  side  that  the  other 
shall  treat  himself  fairly.    Not  unfrequently  there  is  a 


292 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


refusal  to  take  something  regarded  as  the  other's  due, 
but  which  the  other  offers  to  give  up.  In  social  inter- 
course, too,  the  cases  are  common  in  which  those  who 
would  surrender  their  shares  of  pleasure  are  not  per- 
mitted by  the  rest  to  do  so.  Further  development  of 
sympathy  cannot  but  make  this  mode  of  behaving 
increasingly  general  and  increasingly  genuine. 

Certain  complex  restraints  on  excesses  of  altruism 
exist,  which,  in  another  way,  force  back  the  individual 
upon  a  normal  egoism.    Two  may  here  be  noted. 

In  the  first  place,  self-abnegations  often  repeated 
imply  on  the  part  of  the  actor  a  tacit  ascription  of 
relative  selfishness  to  others  who  profit  by  the  self- 
abnegations.  Even  with  men  as  they  are,  there  occa- 
sionally arises  a  feeling  among  those  for  whom  sacrifices 
are  frequently  made,  that  they  are  being  insulted  by 
the  assumption  that  they  are  ready  to  receive  them,  and 
in  the  mind  of  the  actor  also,  there  sometimes  grows  up 
a  recognition  of  this  feeling  on  their  part,  and  a  conse- 
quent check  on  his  too  great  or  too  frequent  surrenders 
of  pleasure.  Obviously,  in  more  developed  natures, 
this  kind  of  check  must  act  still  more  promptly. 

In  the  second  place,  when,  as  the  hypothesis  implies, 
altruistic  pleasures  have  reached  a  greater  intensity 
than  they  now  possess,  each  person  will  be  debarred 
from  undue  pursuit  of  them  by  the  consciousness  that 
other  persons,  too,  desire  them,  and  that  scope  for 
others'  enjoyment  of  them  must  be  left.  Even  now 
may  be  observed  among  groups  of  friends,  where  some 
competition  in  amiability  is  going  on,  relinquishments 
of  opportunities  for  self-abnegation  that  others  may 
have  tliem.  "  Let  her  give  up  the  gratification,  she  will 
like  to  do  so ; "     Let  him  undertake  the  trouble,  it 


CONCILIA  TION, 


293 


will  please  him ;  "  are  suggestions  which,  from  time  to 
time,  illustrate  this  consciousness.  The  most  developed 
sympathy  will  care  for  the  sympathetic  satisfactions  of 
others  as  well  as  for  their  selfish  satisfactions.  What 
may  be  calleci  a  higher  equity  will  refrain  from  tres- 
passing on  the  spheres  of  others'  altruistic  activities,  as 
a  lower  equity  refrains  from  trespassing  on  the  spheres 
of  their  egoistic  activities.  And  by  this  checking  of 
what  may  be  called  an  egoistic  altruism,  undue  sacri- 
fices on  the  part  of  each  must  be  prevented. 

What  spheres,  then,  will  eventually  remain  for  altru- 
ism as  it  is  commonly  conceived?  There  are  three. 
One  of  them  must  to  the  last  continue  large  in  extent ; 
and  the  others  must  progressively  diminish,  though 
they  do  not  disappear. 

The  first  is  that  which  family  life  affords.  Always 
there  must  be  a  need  for  subordination  of  self-regarding 
feelings  to  other-regarding  feelings  in  the  rearing  of 
children.  Though  this  will  diminish  with  diminution 
in  the  number  to  be  reared,  yet  it  will  increase  with 
the  greater  elaboration  and  prolongation  of  the  activ- 
ities on  their  behalf.  But  as  shown  above,  there  is 
even  now  partially  effected  a  conciliation  such  that 
those  egoistic  satisfactions  which  parenthood  yields  are 
achieved  through  altruistic  activities  —  a  conciliation 
tending  ever  toward  completeness.  An  important  devel- 
opment of  family  altruism  must  be  added :  the  recipro- 
cal care  of  parents  by  children  during  old  age  —  a  care 
becoming  lighter  and  better  fulfilled,  in  which  a  kindred 
conciliation  maj^  be  looked  for. 

Pursuit  of  social  Avelfare  at  large  must  afford  here- 
after, as  it  does  now,  scope  for  the  postponement  of 
selfish  interests  to  unselfish  interests,  but  a  continually 


294 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


lessening  scope ;  because,  as  adaptation  to  the  social 
state  progresses,  the  needs  for  those  regulative  actions 
by  which  social  life  is  made  harmonious  become  less. 
And  here  the  amount  of  altruistic  action  which  each 
undertakes  must  inevitably  be  kept  within  moderate 
bounds  by  others ;  for  if  they  are  similarly  altruistic, 
they  will  not  allow  some  to  pursue  public  ends  to  their 
own  considerable  detriment  that  the  rest  may  profit. 

In  the  private  relations  of  men,  opportunities  for 
self-sacrifice  prompted  by  sympathy,  must  ever  in  some 
degree,  though  eventually  in  a  small  degree,  be  afforded 
by  accidents,  diseases,  and  misfortunes  in  general ; 
since,  however  near  to  completeness  the  adaptation  of 
human  nature  to  the  conditions  of  existence  at  large, 
physical  and  social,  may  become,  it  can  never  reach 
completeness.  Flood,  fire,  and  wreck  must  to  the  last 
yield  at  intervals  opportunities  for  heroic  acts ;  and  in 
the  motives  to  such  acts,  anxiety  for  others  will  be  less 
alloyed  with  love  of  admiration  than  now.  Extreme, 
however,  as  may  be  the  eagerness  for  altruistic  action 
on  the  rare  occasions  hence  arising,  the  amount  falling 
to  the  share  of  each  must,  for  the  reasons  given,  be 
narrowly  limited. 

But  though  in  the  incidents  of  ordinary  life,  post- 
ponements of  self  to  others  in  large  ways  must  become 
very  infrequent,  daily  intercourse  will  still  furnish  mul- 
titudinous small  occasions  for  the  activity  of  fellow-feel- 
ing. Always  each  may  continue  to  further  the  welfare  of 
others  by  warding  off  from  them  evils  they  cannot  see, 
and  by  aiding  their  actions  in  ways  unknown  to  them ; 
or,  conversely  putting  it,  each  may  have,  as  it  were, 
supplementary  eyes  and  ears  in  other  persons,  which 
perceive  for  him  things  he  cannot  perceive  himself :  so 


CONCILIATION. 


295 


perfecting  his  life  in  numerous  details,  by  making  its 
adjustment  to  environing  actions  complete. 

§  98.  Must  it  then  follow  that  eventually,  with  this 
diminution  of  the  spheres  for  it,  altruism  must  diminish 
in  total  amount?  By  no  means.  Such  a  conclusion 
implies  a  misconception. 

Naturally,  under  existing  conditions,  with  suffering 
widely  diffused  and  so  much  of  effort  demanded  from 
the  more  fortunate  in  succoring  the  less  fortunate,  altru- 
ism is  understood  to  mean  only  self-sacrifice ;  or,  at  any 
rate,  a  mode  of  action  which,  while  it  brings  some 
pleasure,  has  an  accompaniment  of  self-surrender  that 
is  not  pleasurable.  But  the  sympathy  which  prompts 
denial  of  self  to  please  others  is  a  sympathy  which  also 
receives  pleasure  from  their  pleasures  when  they  are 
otherwise  originated.  The  stronger  the  fellow-feeling 
which  excites  efforts  to  make  others  happy,  the  stronger 
is  the  fellow-feeling  with  their  happiness  however 
caused. 

In  its  ultimate  form,  then,  altruism  will  be  the 
achievement  of  gratification  through  sympathy  with 
those  gratifications  of  others  which  are  mainly  produced 
by  their  activities  of  all  kinds  successfully  carried  on 
—  sympathetic  gratification  which  costs  the  receiver 
nothing,  but  is  a  gratis  addition  to  his  egoistic  gratifi- 
cations. This  power  of  representing  in  idea  the  mental 
states  of  others,  which,  during  the  process  of  adapta- 
tion, has  had  the  function  of  mitigating  suffering,  must, 
as  the  suffering  falls  to  a  minimum,  come  to  have  almost 
wholly  the  function  of  mutually  exalting  men's  enjoy- 
ments by  giving  every  one  a  vivid  intuition  of  his 
neighbor's  enjoyments.    While  pain  prevails  widely,  it 


296 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


is  undesirable  that  each  should  participate  much  in  the 
consciousnesses  of  others ;  but  with  an  increasing  pre- 
dominance of  pleasure,  participation  in  others'  con- 
sciousnesses becomes  a  gain  of  pleasure  to  all. 

And  so  there  will  disappear  that  apparently  perma- 
nent opposition  between  egoism  and  altruism,  implied 
by  the  compromise  reached  in  the  last  chapter.  Sub- 
jectively looked  at,  the  conciliation  will  be  such  that 
the  individual  will  not  liave  to  balance  between  self- 
regai'ding  impulses  and  other-regarding  impulses ;  but, 
instead,  those  satisfactions  of  other-regarding  impulses 
which  involve  self-sacrifice,  becoming  rare  and  much 
prized,  will  be  so  unhesitatingly  preferred  that  the 
competition  of  self-regarding  impulses  with  them  will 
scarcely  be  felt.  And  the  subjective  conciliation  will 
also  be  such  that  though  altruistic  pleasure  will  be  at- 
tained, yet  the  motive  of  action  will  not  consciously  be 
the  attainment  of  altruistic  pleasure ;  but  the  idea 
present  will  be  the  securing  of  others'  pleasures.  Mean- 
while, the  conciliation  objectively  considered  will  be 
equally  complete.  Though  each,  no  longer  needing  to 
maintain  his  egoistic  claims,  will  tend  rather  when 
occasion  offers  to  surrender  them,  yet  others,  similarly 
natured,  will  not  permit  him  in  any  large  measure  to 
do  this,  and  that  fulfilment  of  personal  desires  required 
for  completion  of  his  life  will  thus  be  secured  to  him ; 
though  not  now  egoistic  in  the  ordinarj^  sense,  yet  the 
effects  of  due  egoism  will  be  achieved.  Nor  is  this  all. 
As,  at  an  early  stage,  egoistic  competition,  first  reach- 
ing a  compromise  such  that  each  claims  no  more  than 
his  equitable  share,  afterward  rises  to  a  conciliation 
such  that  each  insists  on  the  taking  of  equitable  shares 
by  others ;  so,  at  the  latest  stage,  altruistic  competition, 


CONCILIATION. 


297 


first  reaching  a  compromise  under  which  each  restrains 
himself  from  taking  an  undue  share  of  altruistic  satis- 
factions, eventually  rises  to  a  conciliation  under  which 
each  takes  care  that  others  shall  have  their  opportunities 
for  altruistic  satisfaction:  the  highest  altruism  being 
that  which  ministers  not  to  the  egoistic  satisfactions  of 
others  only,  but  also  to  their  altruistic  satisfactions. 

Far  off  as  seems  such  a  state,  yet  every  one  of  the 
factors  counted  on  to  produce  it  may  already  be  traced 
in  operation  among  those  of  highest  natures.  What 
now  in  them  is  occasional  and  feeble,  may  be  expected 
with  further  evolution  to  become  habitual  and  strong ; 
and  what  now  characterizes  the  exceptionally  high  may 
be  expected  eventually  to  characterize  all.  For  that 
which  the  best  human  nature  is  capable  of,  is  within 
the  reach  of  human  nature  at  large. 

§  99.  That  these  conclusions  will  meet  with  any  con- 
siderable acceptance  is  improbable.  Neither  with  current 
ideas  nor  with  current  sentiments  are  they  sufficiently 
congruous. 

Such  a  view  will  not  be  agreeable  to  those  who 
lament  the  spreading  disbelief  in  eternal  damnation; 
nor  to  those  who  follow  the  apostle  of  brute  force  in 
thinking  that  because  the  rule  of  the  strong  hand  was 
once  good  it  is  good  for  all  time ;  nor  to  those  whose 
reverence  for  one  who  told  them  to  put  up  the  sword, 
is  shown  by  using  the  sword  to  spread  his  doctrine 
among  heathens.  From  the  ten  thousand  priests  of 
the  religion  of  love,  who  are  silent  when  the  nation  is 
moved  by  the  religion  of  hate,  will  come  no  sign  of 
assent;  nor  from  their  bishops  who,  far  from  urging 
the  extreme  precept  of  the  master  they  pretend  to 


298 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


follow,  to  turn  the  other  cheek  when  one  is  smitten, 
vote  for  acting  on  the  principle  —  strike  lest  ye  be 
struck.  Nor  will  any  approval  be  felt  by  legislators 
who,  after  praying  to  be  forgiven  their  trespasses  ^s 
they  forgive  the  trespasses  of  others,  forthwith  decide 
to  attack  those  who  have  not  trespassed  against  them, 
and  who,  after  a  Queen's  Speech  has  invoked  "the 
blessing  of  Almighty  God"  on  their  councils,  imme- 
diately provide  means  for  committing  political  burg- 
lary. 

But,  though  men  who  profess  Christianity  and  prac- 
tise Paganism  can  feel  no  sympathy  with  such  a  view, 
there  are  some,  classed  as  antagonists  to  the  current 
creed,  who  may  not  think  it  absurd  to  believe  that  a 
rationalized  version  of  its  ethical  principles  will  event- 
ually be  acted  upon. 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  299 


CHAPTER  XV. 

ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS. 

§  100.  As  applied  to  Ethics,  the  word  "  absolute " 
will  by  many  be  supposed  to  imply  principles  of  right 
conduct  that  exist  out  of  relation  to  life  as  conditioned 
on  the  Earth,  out  of  relation  to  time  and  place,  and 
independent  of  the  Universe  as  now  visible  to  us, 
"  eternal "  principles  as  they  are  called.  Those,  how- 
ever, who  recall  the  doctrine  set  forth  in  First  Princi- 
ples^ will  hesitate  to  put  this  interpretation  on  the 
word.  Right,  as  we  can  think  it,  necessitates  the 
thought  of  not-right,  or  wrong,  for  its  correlative,  and 
hence,  to  ascribe  rightness  to  the  acts  of  the  Power 
manifested  through  phenomena,  is  to  assume  the  possi- 
bility that  wrong  acts  may  be  committed  by  this  Power. 
But  how  come  there  to  exist,  apart  from  this  Power,  con- 
ditions of  such  kind  that  subordination  of  its  acts  to 
them  makes  them  right  and  insubordination  wrong? 
How  can  Unconditioned  Being  be  subject  to  conditions 
beyond  itself? 

If,  for  example,  any  one  should  assert  that  the  Cause 
of  Things,  conceived  in  respect  of  fundamental  moral 
attributes  as  like  ourselves,  did  right  in  producing  a 
Universe  which,  in  the  course  of  immeasurable  time, 
has  given  origin  to  beings  capable  of  pleasure,  and 
would  have  done  wrong  in  abstaining  from  the  produc- 
tion of  such  a  Universe ;  then,  the  comment  to  be 


300 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


made  is,  that,  imposing  the  moral  ideas  generated  in 
his  finite  consciousness,  upon  the  Infinite  Existence 
which  transcends  consciousness,  he  goes  behind  that 
Infinite  Existence  and  prescribes  for  it  principles  of 
action. 

As  implied  in  foregoing  chapters,  right  and  wrong  as 
conceived  by  us  can  exist  only  in  relation  to  the  actions 
of  creatures  capable  of  pleasures  and  pains ;  seeing 
that  analysis  carries  us  back  to  pleasures  and  pains  as 
the  elements  out  of  which  the  conceptions  are  framedo 

But  if  the  word  "  absolute,"  as  used  above,  does  not 
refer  to  the  Unconditioned  Being  —  if  the  principles  of 
action  distinguished  as  absolute  and  relative  concern 
the  conduct  of  conditioned  beings,  in  what  way  are  the 
words  to  be  understood  ?  An  explanation  of  their 
meanings  will  be  best  conveyed  by  a  criticism  on  the 
current  conceptions  of  right  and  wrong. 

§  101.  Conversations  about  the  affairs  of  life  habit- 
uallj^  imply  the  belief  that  everj^  deed  named  may  be 
placed  under  the  one  head  or  the  other.  In  discussing 
a  political  question,  both  sides  take  it  for  granted  that 
some  line  of  action  may  be  chosen  v/hich  is  right, 
while  all  other  lines  of  action  are  wrong.  So,  too,  is 
it  with  judgments  on  the  doings  of  individuals ;  each 
of  these  is  approved  or  disapproved  on  the  assumption 
that  it  is  definitely  classable  as  good  or  bad.  Even 
where  qualifications  are  admitted,  they  are  admitted 
with  an  implied  idea  that  some  such  positive  character- 
ization is  to  be  made. 

Nor  is  it  in  popular  thought  and  speech  only  that 
we  see  this.  If  not  wholly  and  definitely,  yet  partially 
and  by  implication,  the  belief  is  expressed  by  moral- 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  301 


ists.  In  his  Methods  of  Ethics  (1st  ed.,  p.  6),  Mr. 
Sidgwick  says :  That  there  is  in  any  given  circum- 
stances some  one  thing  which  ought  to  be  done,  and 
that  this  can  be  known,  is  a  fundamental  assumption 
made  not  by  philosophers  only,  but  by  all  who  perform 
any  processes  of  moral  reasoning."  ^  In  this  sentence 
there  is  specifically  asserted  only  the  last  of  the  above 
propositions ;  namely,  that,  in  every  case,  what  "  ought 
to  be  done  "  "  can  be  known."  But  though  that which 
ought  to  be  done  "  is  not  distinctly  identified  with  ''the 
right,"  it  may  be  inferred,  in  the  absence  of  any  indica- 
tion to  the  contrary,  that  Mr.  Sidgwick  regards  the  two 
as  identical ;  and  doubtless,  in  so  conceiving  the  postu- 
lates of  moral  science,  he  is  at  one  with  most,  if  not  all, 
who  have  made  it  a  subject  of  study.  At  first  sight, 
indeed,  nothing  seems  more  obvious  than  that  if  actions 
are  to  be  judged  at  all,  these  postulates  must  be  accepted. 
Nevertheless  they  may  both  be  called  in  question,  and 
I  think  it  may  be  shown  that  neither  of  them  is  tenable. 
Instead  of  admitting  that  there  is  in  every  case  a  right 
and  a  wrong,  it  may  be  contended  that  in  multitudinous 
cases  no  right,  properly  so  called,  can  be  alleged,  but 
only  a  least  wrong ;  and  further,  it  may  be  contended 
that  in  many  of  these  cases  where  there  can  be  alleged 
only  a  least  wrong,  it  is  not  possible  to  ascertain  with 
any  precision  which  is  the  least  wrong. 

A  great  part  of  the  perplexities  in  ethical  specula- 
tion arise  from  neglect  of  this  distinction  between  right 
and  least  wrong  —  between  the  absolutely  right  and  the 
relatively  right.     And  many  further  perplexities  are 

1  I  do  not  find  this  passage  in  the  second  edition;  but  the  omission  of 
it  appears  to  have  arisen  not  from  any  change  of  view,  but  because  it  did 
not  nntnrally  come  into  the  recast  form  of  the  argument  which  the  section 
contains. 


802 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


due  to  the  assumption  that  it  can,  in  some  way,  be  de- 
cided in  every  case  which  of  two  courses  is  morally 
obligatory. 

§  102.  The  law  of  absolute  right  can  take  no  cogni- 
zance of  pain,  save  the  cognizance  implied  by  negation. 
Pain  is  the  correlative  of  some  species  of  wrong  — 
some  kind  of  divergence  from  that  course  of  action 
which  perfectl}^  fulfils  all  requirements.  If,  as  was 
shown  in  an  early  chapter,  the  conception  of  good 
conduct  always  proves,  when  analyzed,  to  be  the  con- 
ception of  a  conduct  which  produces  a  surplus  of  pleas- 
ure somewhere ;  while,  conversely,  the  conduct  conceived 
as  bad  proves  always  to  be  that  which  inflicts  some- 
where a  surplus  of  either  positive  or  negative  pain ; 
then  the  absolutely  good,  the  absolutely  right,  in  con- 
duct, can  be  that  only  which  produces  pure  pleasure  — 
pleasure  unalloyed  with  pain  anywhere.  By  implica- 
tion, conduct  which  has  any  concomitant  of  pain,  or  any 
painful  consequence,  is  partially  wrong ;  and  the  high- 
est claim  to  be  made  for  such  conduct  is  that  it  is  the 
least  wrong  which,  under  the  conditions,  is  possible  — 
the  relatively  right. 

The  contents  of  preceding  chapters  imply  throughout 
that,  considered  from  the  evolution  point  of  view,  the 
acts  of  men  during  the  transition  which  has  been,  is 
still,  and  long  will  be,  in  progress,  must,  in  most  cases, 
be  of  the  kind  here  classed  as  least  wrong.  In  propor- 
tion to  the  incongruity  between  the  natures  men 
inherit  from  the  pre-social  state,  and  the  requirements 
of  social  life,  must  be  the  amount  of  pain  entailed 
by  tlieir  actions,  either  on  themselves  or  on  others. 
In  so  far  as  pain  is  suffered,  evil  is  inflicted;  and 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  303 


conduct  which  inflicts  any  evil  cannot  be  absolutely 
good. 

To  make  clear  the  distinction  here  insisted  upon 
between  that  perfect  conduct  which  is  the  subject- 
matter  of  Absolute  Ethics,  and  that  imperfect  conduct 
which  is  the  subject-matter  of  Relative  Ethics,  some 
illustrations  must  be  given. 

§  103.  Among  the  best  examples  of  absolutely  right 
actions  to  be  named  are  those  arising  where  the  nature 
and  the  requirements  have  been  moulded  to  one  another 
before  social  evolution  began.    Two  will  here  suffice. 

Consider  the  relation  of  a  healthy  mother  to  a  healthy 
infant.  Between  the  two  there  exists  a  mutual  depend- 
ence which  is  a  source  of  pleasure  to  both.  In  yielding 
its  natural  food  to  the  child,  the  mother  receives  grat- 
ification ;  and  to  the  child  there  comes  the  satisfaction 
of  appetite  —  a  satisfaction  which  accompanies  further- 
ance of  life,  growth,  and  increasing  enjoyment.  Let 
the  relation  be  suspended,  and  on  both  sides  there  is 
suffering.  The  mother  experiences  both  bodily  pain 
and  mental  pain,  and  the  painful  sensation  borne  by 
the  child  brings  as  its  result  physical  mischief  and 
some  damage  to  the  em^otional  nature.  Thus  the  act 
is  one  that  is  to  both  exclusively  pleasurable,  while  ab- 
stention entails  pain  on  both ;  and  it  is  consequently  of 
the  kind  we  here  call  absolutely  right. 

In  the  parental  relations  of  the  father  we  are  fur- 
nished with  a  kindred  example.  If  he  is  w^ell  consti- 
tuted in  body  and  mind,  his  boy,  eager  for  play,  finds 
in  him  a  sympathetic  response,  and  their  frolics,  giving 
mutual  pleasure,  not  only  further  the  child's  physical 
welfare,  but  strengthen  that  bond   of   good  feeling 


304 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


between  the  two  which  makes  subsequent  guidance 
easier.  And  then  if,  repudiating  the  stupidities  of 
early  education  as  at  present  conceived  and  unhappily 
State-enacted,  he  has  rational  ideas  of  mental  develop- 
ment, and  sees  that  the  second-hand  knowledge  gained 
through  books  should  begin  to  supplement  the  first- 
hand  knowledge  gained  by  direct  observation,  only 
when  a  good  stock  of  this  has  been  acquired,  he  will, 
with  active  sympathy,  aid  in  the  exploration  of  the 
surrounding  world  which  his  boy  pursues  with  delight ; 
giving  and  receiving  gratification  from  moment  to 
moment  while  furthering  ultimate  welfare.  Here, 
again,  are  actions  of  a  kind  purely  pleasurable  alike  in 
their  immediate  and  remote  effects  —  actions  absolutely 
right. 

The  intercourse  of  adults  yields,  for  the  reason  as- 
signed, relatively  few  cases  that  fall  completely  within 
the  same  category.  In  their  transactions  from  hour  to 
hour,  more  or  less  of  deduction  from  pure  gratification 
is  caused  on  one  or  other  side  by  imperfect  fitness  to 
the  requirements.  The  pleasures  men  gain  by  laboring 
in  their  vocations  and  receiving  in  one  form  or  other 
returns  for  their  services  usually  have  the  drawback 
that  the  labors  are  in  a  considerable  degree  displeasur- 
able.  Cases,  however,  do  occur  where  the  energies  are 
so  abundant  that  inaction  is  irksome;  and  where  the 
daily  work,  not  too  great  in  duration,  is  of  a  kind  appro- 
priate to  the  nature ;  and  where,  as  a  consequence, 
pleasure  rather  than  pain  is  a  concomitant.  When  ser- 
vices yielded  by  such  a  one  are  paid  for  by  another 
similarly  adapted  to  his  occupation,  the  entire  transac- 
tion is  of  the  kind  we  are  here  considering :  exchange 
under  agreement  between  two  so  constituted  becomes  a 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  305 


means  of  pleasure  to  both,  with  no  set-off  of  pain.  Bear- 
ing in  mind  the  form  of  nature  which  social  discipline 
is  producing,  as  shown  in  the  contrast  between  savage 
and  civilized,  the  implication  is  that  ultimately  men's 
activities  at  large  will  assume  this  character.  Remem- 
bering that  in  the  course  of  organic  evolution,  the  means 
to  enjoyment  themselves  eventually  become  sources  of 
enjoyment;  and  that  there  is  no  form  of  action  which 
may  not  through  the  development  of  appropriate  struc- 
tures become  pleasurable ;  the  inference  must  be  that 
industrial  activities,  carried  on  through  voluntary  co-op- 
eration, will  in  time  acquire  the  character  of  absolute 
Tightness  as  here  conceived.  Already,  indeed,  some- 
thing like  such  a  state  has  been  reached  among  certain 
of  those  who  minister  to  our  aesthetic  gratifications. 
The  artist  of  genius  —  poet,  painter,  or  musician  —  is 
one  who  obtains  the  means  of  living  by  acts  that  are 
directly  pleasurable  to  him,  while  they  yield,  immedi- 
ately or  retnotely,  pleasures  to  others. 

Once  more,  among  absolutely  right  acts  may  be  named 
certain  of  those  which  we  class  as  benevolent.  I  say 
certain  of  them,  because  such  benevolent  acts  as  entail 
submission  to  pain,  positive  or  negative,  that  others 
may  receive  pleasure,  are,  by  the  definition,  excluded. 
But  there  are  benevolent  acts  of  a  kind  yielding  pleas- 
ure solely.  Some  one  who  has  slipped  is  saved  from 
falling  by  a  bystander ;  a  hurt  is  prevented,  and  satis- 
faction is  felt  by  both.  A  pedestrian  is  choosing  a  dan- 
gerous route,  or  a  fellow-passenger  is  about  to  alight  at 
the  wrong  station,  and,  warned  against  doing  so,  is  saved 
from  evil:  each  being,  as  a  consequence,  gratified. 
There  is  a  misunderstanding  between  friends,  and  one 
who  sees  how  it  has  arisen  explains,  the  result  being 


306 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


agreeable  to  all.  Services  to  those  around  in  the  small 
affairs  of  life,  may  be,  and  often  are,  of  a  kind  which 
there  is  equal  pleasure  in  giving  and  receiving.  In- 
deed, as  was  urged  in  the  last  chapter,  the  actions  of 
developed  altruism  must  habitually  have  this  character. 
And  so,  in  countless  ways  suggested  by  these  few,  men 
may  add  to  one  another's  happiness  without  anywhere 
producing  unhappiness  —  ways  which  are  therefore  ab- 
solutely right. 

In  contrast  with  these  consider  the  many  actions 
which  from  hour  to  hour  are  gone  through,  now  with 
an  accompaniment  of  some  pain  to  the  actor  and  now 
bringing  results  that  are  partially  painful  to  others, 
but  which  nevertheless  are  imperative.  As  implied 
by  antithesis  with  cases  above  referred  to,  the  weari- 
someness  of  productive  labor,  as  ordinarily  pursued, 
renders  it  in  so  far  wrong ;  but  then  far  greater  suffer- 
ing would  result,  both  to  the  laborer  and  his  family, 
and  therefore  far  greater  wrong  would  be  'done,  were 
this  wearisomeness  not  borne.  Though  the  pains  which 
the  care  of  many  children  entail  on  a  mother  form  a 
considerable  set-off  from  the  pleasures  secured  by  them 
to  her  children  and  herself,  yet  the  miseries,  immediate 
and  remote,  which  neglect  would  entail,  so  far  exceed 
them  that  submission  to  such  pains  up  to  the  limit  of 
physical  ability  to  bear  them  becomes  morally  impera- 
tive as  being  the  least  wrong.  A  servant  who  fails  to 
fulfil  an  agreement  in  respect  of  work,  or  who  is  per- 
petually breaking  crockery,  or  who  pilfers,  may  have 
to  suffer  pain  from  being  discharged ;  but  since  the 
evils  to  be  borne  by  all  concerned  if  incapacity  or  mis- 
conduct is  tolerated,  not  in  one  case  only  but  habitually, 
must  be  much  greater,  such  infliction  of  pain  is  war- 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  307 


ranted  as  a  means  to  preventing  greater  pain.  With- 
drawal of  custom  from  a  tradesman  whose  charges  are 
too  high,  or  whose  commodities  are  inferior,  or  who 
gives  short  measure,  or  who  is  unpunctual,  decreases 
his  welfare,  and  perhaps  injures  his  belongings ;  but  as 
saving  him  from  these  evils  would  imply  bearing  the 
evils  his  conduct  causes,  and  as  such  regard  for  his 
well-being  would  imply  disregard  of  the  well-being  of 
some  more  worthy  or  more  efficient  tradesman  to  whom 
the  custom  would  else  go,  and  as,  chiefly,  general 
adoption  of  the  implied  course,  having  the  effect  that 
the  inferior  would  not  suffer  from  their  inferiority  nor 
the  superior  gain  by  their  superiority,  would  produce 
universal  misery,  withdrawal  is  justified  —  the  act  is 
relatively  right. 

§  104.  I  pass  now  to  the  second  of  the  two  proposi- 
tions above  enunciated.  After  recognizing  the  truth 
that  a  large  part  of  human  conduct  is  not  absolutely 
right,  but  only  relatively  right,  we  have  to  recognize 
the  further  truth  that  in  many  cases  where  there  is  no 
absolutely  right  course,  but  only  courses  that  are  more 
or  less  wrong,  it  is  not  possible  to  say  which  is  the 
least  wrong.  Recurrence  to  the  instances  just  given 
will  show  this. 

There  is  a  point  up  to  which  it  is  relatively  right  for 
a  parent  to  carry  self-sacrifice  for  the  benefit  of  off- 
spring, and  there  is  a  point  beyond  which  self-sacrifice 
cannot  be  pushed  without  bringing,  not  only  on  him- 
self or  herself,  but  also  on  the  family,  evils  greater 
than  those  to  be  prevented  by  the  self-sacrifice.  Who 
shall  say  where  this  point  is  ?  Depending  on  the  con- 
stitutions and  needs  of  those  concerned,  it  is  in  no  two 


308 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


cases  the  same,  and  cannot  be  by  any  one  more  than 
guessed.  The  transgressions  or  short-comings  of  a 
servant  vary  from  the  trivial  to  the  grave,  and  the 
evils  which  discharge  may  bring  range  through  count- 
less degrees  from  slight  to  serious.  The  penalty  may 
be  inflicted  for  a  very  small  offence,  and  then  there  is 
wrong  done,  or,  after  numerous  grave  offences,  it  may 
not  be  inflicted,  and  again  there  is  wrong  done.  How 
shall  be  determined  the  degree  of  transgression  beyond 
which  to  discharge  is  less  wrong  than  not  to  discharge  ? 
In  like  manner  with  the  shopkeeper's  misdemeanors. 
No  one  can  sum  up  either  the  amount  of  positive  and 
negative  pain  which  tolerating  them  involves,  nor  the 
amount  of  positive  and  negative  pain  involved  by  not 
tolerating  them,  and  in  medium  cases  no  one  can  say 
where  the  one  exceeds  the  other. 

In  men's  wider  relations  frequently  occur  circum- 
stances under  which  a  decision  one  or  other  way  is 
imperative,  and  yet  under  which  not  even  the  most 
sensitive  conscience,  helped  by  the  clearest  judgment, 
can  decide  which  of  the  alternatives  is  relatively  right. 
Two  examples  will  suffice. 

Here  is  a  merchant  who  loses  by  the  failure  of  a  man 
indebted  to  him.  Unless  he  gets  help  he  himself  will 
fail,  and  if  he  fails  he  will  bring  disaster  not  only  on 
his  family,  but  on  all  who  have  given  him  credit.  Even 
if  by  borrowing  he  is  enabled  to  meet  immediate  engage- 
ments, he  is  not  safe  ;  for  the  time  is  one  of  panic,  and 
others  of  his  debtors  by  going  to  the  wall  may  put  him 
in  further  difficulties.  Shall  he  ask  a  friend  for  a  loan? 
On  the  one  hand,  is  it  not  wrong  forthwith  to  bring 
on  himself,  his  family,  and  those  who  have  business 
relations  with  him,  the  evils  of  his  failure?    On  the 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS,  309 


other  hand,  is  it  not  wrong  to  hypothecate  the  property 
of  his  friend,  and  lead  him,  too,  with  his  belongings 
and  dependents,  into  similar  risks?  The  loan  would 
probably  tide  him  over  his  difficulty,  in  which  case 
would  it  not  be  unjust  to  his  creditors  did  he  refrain 
from  asking  it?  Contrariwise,  the  loan  would  very 
possibly  fail  to  stave  off  his  bankruptcy,  in  which  case 
is  not  his  action  in  trying  to  obtain  it,  practically  fraud- 
ulent? Though,  in  extreme  cases,  it  may  be  easy  to 
say  which  course  is  the  least  wrong,  how  is  it  possible 
in  all  those  medium  cases  where  even  by  the  keenest 
man  of  business  the  contingencies  cannot  be  calcu- 
lated? 

Take,  again,  the  difficulties  that  not  unfrequently 
arise  from  antagonism  between  family  duties  and  social 
duties.  Here  is  a  tenant  farmer  whose  political  princi- 
ples prompt  him  to  vote  in  opposition  to  his  landlord. 
If,  being  a  Liberal,  he  votes  for  a  Conservative,  not  only 
does  he  by  his  act  say  that  he  thinks  what  he  does  not 
think,  but  he  may  perhaps  assist  what  he  regards  as  bad 
legislation  :  his  vote  may  by  chance  turn  the  election, 
and  on  a  Parliamentary  division  a  single  member  may 
decide  the  fate  of  a  measure.  Even  neglecting,  as  too 
improbable,  such  serious  consequences,  there  is  the  man- 
ifest truth  that  if  all  who  hold  like  views  with  himself 
are  similarly  deterred  from  electoral  expression  of  them, 
there  must  result  a  different  balance  of  power  and  a 
different  national  policy :  making  it  clear  that  only  by 
adherence  of  all  to  their  political  principles  can  the 
policy  he  thinks  right  be  maintained.  But  now,  on  the 
other  hand,  how  can  he  absolve  himself  from  responsi- 
bility for  the  evils  which  those  depending  on  him  may 
suffer  if  he  fulfils  what  appears  to  be  a  peremptory 


310 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


public  duty?  Is  not  his  duty  to  his  children  even  more 
peremptory  ?  Does  not  the  family  precede  the  State ; 
and  does  not  the  welfare  of  the  State  depend  on  the 
welfare  of  the  family  ?  May  he,  then,  take  a  course 
which,  if  the  threats  uttered  are  carried  out,  will  eject 
him  from  his  farm;  and  so  cause  inability,  perhaps 
teraporary,  perhaps  prolonged,  to  feed  his  children? 
The  contingent  evils  are  infinitely  varied  in  their  ratios. 
In  one  case  the  imperativeness  of  the  public  duty  is 
great,  and  the  evil  that  may  come  on  dependents  small ; 
in  another  case  the  political  issue  is  of  trivial  moment, 
and  the  possible  injury  which  the  family  may  suffer  is 
great ;  and  between  these  extremes  there  are  all  grada- 
tions. Further,  the  degrees  of  probability  of  each 
result,  public  and  private,  range  from  the  nearly  certain 
to  the  almost  impossible.  Admitting,  then,  that  it  is 
wrong  to  act  in  a  way  likely  to  injure  the  State ;  and 
admitting  that  it  is  wrong  to  act  in  a  way  likely  to 
injure  the  family,  we  have  to  recognize  the  fact  that 
in  countless  cases  no  one  can  decide  by  which  of 
the  alternative  courses  the  least  wrong  is  likely  to 
be  done. 

These  instances  will  sufficiently  show  that  in  conduct 
at  large,  including  men's  dealings  with  themselves,  with 
their  families,  with  their  friends,  with  their  debtors 
and  creditors,  and  with  the  public,  it  usually  happens 
that  whatever  course  is  taken  entails  some  pain  some- 
where ;  forming  a  deduction  from  the  pleasure  achieved, 
and  making  the  course  in  so  far  not  absolutely  right. 
Further,  they  will  show  that  throughout  a  considerable 
part  of  conduct,  no  guiding  principle,  no  method  of 
estimation,  enables  us  to  say  whetlier  a  proposed  course 
is  even  relatively  right;  as  causing,  proximately  and 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  311 


remotely,  specially  and  generally,  the  greatest  surplus 
of  good  over  evil. 

§  105.  And  now  we  are  prepared  for  dealing  in  a 
systematic  way  with  the  distinction  between  Absolute 
Ethics  and  Relative  Ethics. 

Scientific  truths,  of  whatever  order,  are  reached  by 
eliminating  perturbing  or  conflicting  factors,  and  rec- 
ognizing only  fundamental  factors.  When,  by  dealing 
with  fundamental  factors  in  the  abstract,  not  as  pre- 
sented in  actual  phenomena,  but  as  presented  in  ideal 
separation,  general  laws  have  been  ascertained,  it  be- 
comes possible  to  draw  inferences  in  concrete  cases  by 
taking  into  account  incidental  factors.  But  it  is  only 
by  first  ignoring  these  and  recognizing  the  essential 
elements  alone  that  we  can  discover  the  essential 
truths  sought.  Take,  in  illustration,  the  progress  of 
mechanics  from  its  empirical  form  to  its  rational  form. 

All  have  occasional  experience  of  the  fact  that  a 
person  pushed  on  one  side  beyond  a  certain  degree 
loses  his  balance  and  falls.  It  is  observed  that  a  stone 
flung,  or  an  arrow  shot,  does  not  proceed  in  a  straight 
line,  but  comes  to  the  earth  after  pursuing  a  course 
which  deviates  more  and  more  from  its  original  course. 
When  trying  to  break  a  stick  across  the  knee,  it  is 
found  that  success  is  easier  if  the  stick  is  seized  at 
considerable  distances  from  the  knee  on  each  side  than 
if  seized  close  to  the  knee.  Daily  use  of  a  spear  draws 
attention  to  the  truth  that  by  thrusting  its  point  under 
a  stone  and  depressing  the  shaft,  the  stone  may  be 
raised  the  more  readily  the  farther  away  the  hand  is 
toward  the  end.  Here,  then,  are  sundry  experiences, 
eventually  grouped  into  empirical  generalizations,  which 


312 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


serve  to  guide  conduct  in  certain  simple  cases.  How 
does  mechanical  science  evolve  from  these  experiences  ? 
To  reach  a  formula  expressing  the  powers  of  the  lever, 
it  supposes  a  lever  which  does  not,  like  the  stick,  admit 
of  being  bent,  but  is  absolutely  rigid ;  and  it  supposes 
a  fulcrum  not  having  a  broad  surface,  like  that  of  one 
ordinarily  used,  but  a  fulcrum  without  breadth ;  and  it 
supposes  that  the  weight  to  be  raised  bears  on  a  definite 
point,  instead  of  bearing  over  a  considerable  portion  of 
the  lever.  Similarly  wdth  the  leaning  body,  which, 
passing  a  certain  inclination,  overbalances.  Before  the 
truth  respecting  the  relations  of  centre  of  gravity  and 
base  can  be  formulated,  it  must  be  assumed  that  the 
surface  on  which  the  body  stands  is  unyielding,  that 
the  edge  of  the  body  itself  is  unyielding,  and  that  its 
mass,  while  made  to  lean  more  and  more,  does  not 
change  its  form  —  conditions  not  fulfilled  in  the  cases 
common^  observed.  And  so,  too,  is  it  with  the  pro- 
jectile :  determination  of  its  course  by  deduction  from 
mechanical  laws,  primarily  ignores  all  deviations  caused 
by  its  shape  and  by  the  resistance  of  the  air.  The 
science  of  rational  mechanics  is  a  science  which  consists 
of  such  ideal  truths,  and  can  come  into  existence  only 
by  thus  dealing  with  ideal  cases.  It  remains  impossible 
so  long  as  attention  is  restricted  to  concrete  cases  pre- 
senting all  the  complications  of  friction,  plasticity,  and 
so  forth. 

But  now,  after  disentangling  certain  fundamental 
mechanical  truths,  it  becomes  possible  by  their  help  to 
guide  actions  better ;  and  it  becomes  possible  to  guide 
them  still  better  when,  as  presently  liappens,  the  com- 
plicating elements  from  wliich  they  have  been  disen- 
tangled are  themselves  taken  into  account.    At  an 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  S13 

advanced  stage  the  modifying  effects  of  friction  are 
allowed  for,  and  the  inferences  are  qualified  to  the 
requisite  extent.  The  theory  of  the  pulley  is  corrected 
in  its  application  to  actual  cases  by  recognizing  the 
rigidity  of  cordage ;  the  effects  of  which  are  formu- 
lated. The  stabilities  of  masses,  determinable  in  the 
abstract  by  reference  to  the  centres  of  gravity  of  the 
masses  in  relation  to  the  bases,  come  to  be  determined 
in  the  concrete  by  including  also  their  characters  in 
respect  of  cohesion.  The  courses  of  projectiles,  having 
been  theoretically  settled  as  though  they  moved  through 
a  vacuum,  are  afterward  settled  in  more  exact  corre- 
spondence with  fact  by  taking  into  account  atmospheric 
resistance. 

And  thus,  we  see  illustrated  the  relation  between 
certain  absolute  truths  of  mechanical  science,  and  cer- 
tain relative  truths  which  involve  them.  We  are 
shown  that  no  scientific  establishment  of  relative  truths 
is  possible  until  the  absolute  truths  have  been  formu- 
lated independently.  We  see  that  mechanical  science, 
fitted  for  dealing  with  the  real,  can  arise  only  after 
ideal  mechanical  science  has  arisen. 

All  this  holds  of  moral  science.  As  by  early  and 
rude  experiences  there  were  inductively  reached,  vague 
but  partially  true  notions  respecting  the  overbalancing 
of  bodies,  the  motions  of  missiles,  the  actions  of  levers ; 
so  by  early  and  rude  experiences  there  were  in- 
ductively reached,  vague  but  partially  true  notions 
respecting  the  effects  of  men's  behavior  on  themselves, 
on  one  another,  and  on  society ;  to  a  certain  extent 
serving  in  the  last  case,  as  in  the  first,  for  the  guidance 
of  conduct.  Moreover,  as  this  rudimentary  mechani- 
cal knowledge,  though  still  remaining  empirical,  be- 


314 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


comes  during  early  stages  of  civilization  at  once  more 
definite  and  more  extensive ;  so  during  early  stages  of 
civilization  these  ethical  ideas,  still  retaining  their  em- 
pirical character,  increase  in  precision  and  multiplicity. 
But  just  as  we  have  seen  that  mechanical  knowledge  of 
the  empirical  sort  can  evolve  into  mechanical  science 
only  by  first  omitting  all  qualifying  circumstances,  and 
generalizing  in  absolute  ways  the  fundamental  laws  of 
forces ;  so  here  we  have  to  see  that  empirical  ethics  can 
evolve  into  rational  ethics  only  by  first  neglecting  all 
complicating  incidents,  and  formulating  the  laws  of 
right  action  apart  from  the  obscuring  effects  of  special 
conditions.  And  the  final  implication  is  that  just  as  the 
system  of  mechanical  truths,  conceived  in  ideal  separa- 
tion as  absolute,  becomes  applicable  to  real  mechanical 
problems  in  such  way  that  making  allowance  for  all 
incidental  circumstances  there  can  be  reached  conclu- 
sions far  nearer  to  the  truth  than  could  otherwise  be 
reached ;  so  a  system  of  ideal  ethical  truths,  expressing 
the  absolutely  right,  will  be  applicable  to  the  questions 
of  our  transitional  state  in  such  ways  that,  allowing  for 
the  friction  of  an  incomplete  life  and  the  imperfection 
of  existing  natures,  we  may  ascertain  with  approximate 
correctness  what  is  the  relatively  right. 

§  106.  In  a  chapter  entitled  "  Definition  of  Morality  " 
in  Social  Statics^  I  contended  that  the  moral  law,  prop- 
erly so  called,  is  the  law  of  the  perfect  man  —  is  the 
formula  of  ideal  conduct  —  is  the  statement  in  all  cases 
of  that  which  should  be,  and  cannot  recognize  in  its 
propositions  any  elements  implying  existence  of  that 
which  should  not  be.  Instancing  questions  concerning 
the  l  ight  course  to  be  taken  in  cases  where  wrong  has 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS. 


315 


already  been  done,  I  alleged  that  the  answers  to  such 
questions  cannot  be  given  "  on  purely  ethical  princi- 
ples."   I  argued  that:  — 

No  conclusions  can  lay  claim  to  absolute  truth,  but  such  as 
depend  upon  truths  that  are  themselves  absolute.  Before  there  can 
be  exactness  in  an  inference,  there  must  be  exactness  in  the  antece- 
dent propositions.  A  geometrician  requires  that  the  straight  lines 
with  which  he  deals  shall  be  veritably  straight;  and  that  his  circles, 
and  ellipses,  and  parabolas  shall  agree  with  precise  definitions  —  shall 
perfectly  and  invariably  answer  to  specified  equations.  If  you  put 
to  him  a  question  in  which  these  conditions  are  not  complied  with,  he 
tells  you  that  it  cannot  be  answered.  So  likewise  is  it  with  the  philo- 
sophical moralist.  He  treats  solely  of  the  straight  man.  He  deter- 
mines the  properties  of  the  straight  man ;  describes  how  the  straight 
man  comports  himself ;  shows  in  what  relationship  he  stands  to  other 
straight  men;  shows  how  a  community  of  straight  men  is  constituted. 
Any  deviation  from  strict  rectitude  he  is  obliged  wholly  to  ignore.  It 
cannot  be  admitted  into  his  premises  without  vitiating  all  his  conclu- 
sions. A  problem  in  which  a  crooked  man  forms  one  of  the  elements 
is  insoluble  to  him. 

Referring  to  this  view,  specifically  in  the  first  edition 
of  the  Methods  of  Ethics^  but  more  generally  in  the 
second  edition,  Mr.  Sidgwick  says  :  — 

Those  who  take  this  view  adduce  the  analogy  of  Geometry  to 
show  that  Ethics  ought  to  deal  with  ideally  perfect  human  relations, 
just  as  Geometry  treats  of  ideally  perfect  lines  and  circles.  But  the 
most  irregular  line  has  definite  spatial  relations  with  which  Geometry 
does  not  refuse  to  deal:  though  of  course  they  are  more  complex  than 
those  of  a  straight  line.  So  in  Astronomy,  it  would  be  more  conven- 
ient for  purposes  of  study  if  the  stars  moved  in  circles,  as  was  once 
believed;  but  the  fact  that  they  move  not  in  circles  but  in  ellipses, 
and  even  in  imperfect  and  perturbed  ellipses,  does  not  take  them  out 
of  the  sphere  of  scientific  investigation:  by  patience  and  industry  we 
have  learned  how  to  reduce  to  principles  and  calculate  even  these 
more  complicated  motions.  It  is,  no  doubt,  a  convenient  artifice  for 
purposes  of  instruction  to  assume  that  the  planets  move  in  perfect 
ellipses  (or even  —  at  an  earlier  stage  of  study  —  in  circles):  we  thus 
allow  the  individual's  knowledge  to  pass  through  the  same  gradations 
in  accuracy  as  that  of  the  race  has  done.    But  what  we  want,  as 


316 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


astronomers,  to  know;  is  the  actual  motion  of  the  stars  and  its  causes: 
and  similarly  as  moralists  we  naturally  inquire  what  ought  to  be  done 
in  the  actual  world  in  which  we  live."    (P.  19,  2d  ed.) 

Beginning  Avith  the  first  of  these  two  statements, 
which  concerns  Geometry,  I  must  confess  myself  sur- 
prised to  find  my  propositions  called  into  question ;  and 
after  full  consideration  I  remain  at  a  loss  to  understand 
Mr.  Sidgwick's  mode  of  viewing  the  matter.  When, 
in  a  sentence  preceding  those  quoted  above,  I  remarked 
on  the  impossibility  of  solving  ''mathematically  a  series 
of  problems  respecting  crooked  lines  and  broken-backed 
curves,"  it  never  occurred  to  me  that  I  should  be  met 
by  the  direct  assertion  that  ''  Geometry  does  not  refuse 
to  deal "  with  ''  the  most  irregular  line."  Mr.  Sidgwick 
states  that  an  irregular  line,  say  such  as  a  child  makes 
in  scribbling,  has  ''definite  spatial  relations."  What 
meaning  does  he  here  give  to  the  word  "  definite  "  ?  If 
he  means  that  its  relations  to  space  at  large  are  definite 
in  the  sense  that  by  an  infinite  intelligence  they  would 
be  definable,  the  reply  is  that  to  an  infinite  intelligence 
all  spatial  relations  would  be  definable :  there  could  be 
no  indefinite  spatial  relations — the  word  "definite" 
thus  ceasing  to  mark  any  distinction.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  when  saying  that  an  irregular  line  has  "  definite 
spatial  relations,"  he  means  relations  knowable  definitely 
by  human  intelligence,  there  still  comes  the  question, 
how  is  the  word  "definite"  to  be  understood?  Surely 
anytliing  distinguished  as  definite  admits  of  being 
defined;  but  how  can  we  define  an  irregular  line? 
And  if  we  cannot  define  the  irregular  line  itself,  how 
can  we  know  its  "spatial  relations"  definite?  And 
how,  in  the  absence  of  definition,  can  Geometry  deal 
with  it?    If  Mr.  Sidgwick  means  that  it  can  be  dealt 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS,  317 


with  by  the  method  of  limits,"  then  the  reply  is  that 
in  such  case,  not  the  line  itself  is  dealt  with  geometri- 
cally, but  certain  definite  lines  artificially  put  in  quasi- 
definite  relations  to  it;  the  indefinite  becomes  cognizable 
only  through  the  medium  of  the  hypothetically  definitCo 
Turning  to  the  second  illustration,  the  rejoinder  to 
be  made  is  that  in  so  far  as  it  concerns  the  relations 
between  the  ideal  and  the  real,  the  analogy  drawn  does 
not  shake,  but  strengthens,  my  argument.  For  whether 
considered  under  its  geometrical  or  under  its  dynamical 
aspect,  and  whether  considered  in  the  necessary  order 
of  its  development  or  in  the  order  historically  dis- 
played. Astronomy  shows  us  throughout  that  truths 
respecting  simple,  theoretically  exact  relations,  must  be 
ascertained  before  truths  respecting  the  complex  and 
practically  inexact  relations  that  actually  exist  can  be 
ascertained.  As  applied  to  the  interpretation  of  plane- 
tary movements,  we  see  that  the  theory  of  cycles  and 
epicycles  was  based  on  pre-existing  knowledge  of  the 
circle:  the  properties  of  an  ideal  curve  having  been 
learned,  a  power  was  acquired  of  giving  some  expres- 
sion to  the  celestial  motions.  We  see  that  the  Coper- 
nican  interpretation  expressed  the  facts  in  terms  of 
circular  movements  otherwise  distributed  and  combined. 
We  see  that  Kepler's  advance  from  the  conception  of 
circular  movements  to  the  conception  of  elliptic  move- 
ments was  made  possible  by  comparing  the  facts  as  they 
are  with  the  facts  as  they  would  be  were  the  movements 
circular.  We  see  that  the  subsequently  learned  devia- 
tions from  elliptic  movements  were  learned  only  through 
the  presupposition  that  the  movements  are  elli2:)tical. 
And  we  see,  lastly,  that  even  now  predictions  concern- 
ing the  exact  positions  of  planets,  after  taking  account 


318 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


of  perturbations,  imply  constant  references  to  ellipses 
that  are  regarded  as  their  normal  or  average  orbits  for 
the  time  being.  Thus,  ascertainment  of  the  actual 
truths  has  been  made  possible  only  by  pre-ascertainment 
of  certain  ideal  truths.  To  be  convinced  that  by  no 
other  course  could  the  actual  truths  have  been  ascer- 
tained, it  needs  only  to  suppose  any  one  saying  that  it 
did  not  concern  him,  as  an  astronomer,  to  know  any- 
thing about  the  properties  of  circles  and  ellipses,  but 
that  he  had  to  deal  with  the  Solar  System  as  it  exists, 
to  which  end  it  was  his  business  to  observe  and  tabulate 
positions  and  directions  and  to  be  guided  by  the  facts 
as  he  found  them. 

So,  too,  is  it  if  we  look  at  the  development  of  dynam- 
ical astronomy.  The  first  proposition  in  Newton's 
Principia  deals  with  the  movement  of  a  single  body 
round  a  single  centre  of  force ;  and  the  phenomena  of 
central  motion  are  first  formulated  in  a  case  which  is 
not  simply  ideal,  but  in  which  there  is  no  specification 
of  the  force  concerned:  detachment  from  the  real  is 
the  greatest  possible.  Again,  postulating  a  principle 
of  action  conforming  to  an  ideal  law,  the  theory  of 
gravitation  deals  with  the  several  problems  of  the 
Solar  System  in  fictitious  detachment  from  the  rest; 
and  it  makes  certain  fictitious  assumptions,  such  as 
that  the  mass  of  each  body  concerned  is  concentrated 
in  its  centre  of  gravity.  Only  later,  after  establishing 
the  leading  truths  by  this  artifice  of  disentangling  the 
major  factors  from  the  minor  factors,  is  the  theory 
applied  to  the  actual  problems  in  their  ascending  de- 
grees of  complexity ;  taking  in  more  and  more  of  the 
minor  factors.  And  if  we  ask  whether  the  dynamics 
of  the  Solar  System  could  have  been  established  in  any 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS,  319 


other  way,  we  see  that  here,  too,  simple  truths  holding 
under  ideal  conditions,  have  to  be  ascertained  before 
real  truths  existing  under  .complex  conditions  can  be 
ascertained. 

The  alleged  necessary  precedence  of  Absolute  Ethics 
over  Relative  Ethics  is  thus,  I  think,  further  elucidated. 
One  who  has  followed  the  general  argument  thus  far, 
will  not  deny  that  an  ideal  social  being  may  be  con- 
ceived as  so  constituted  that  his  spontaneous  activities 
are  congruous  with  the  conditions  imposed  by  the  social 
environment  formed  by  other  such  beings.  In  many 
places,  and  in  various  ways,  I  have  argued  that  con- 
formably with  the  laws  of  evolution  in  general,  and 
conformably  with  the  laws  of  organization  in  partic- 
ular, there  has  been,  and  is,  in  progress,  an  adaptation 
of  humanity  to  the  social  state,  changing  it  in  the 
direction  of  such  an  ideal  congruity.  And  the  corol- 
lary before  drawn,  and  here  repeated,  is  that  the  ulti- 
mate man  is  one  in  whom  this  process  has  gone  so  far 
as  to  produce  a  correspondence  between  all  the  prompt- 
ings of  his  nature  and  all  the  requirements  of  his  life 
as  carried  on  in  society.  If  so  it  is  a  necessary  impli- 
cation that  there  exists  an  ideal  code  of  conduct  formu- 
lating the  behavior  of  the  completely  adapted  man  in 
the  completely  evolved  society.  Such  a  code  is  that 
here  called  Absolute  Ethics  as  distinguished  from  Rela- 
tive Ethics — a  code  the  injunctions  of  which  are  alone 
to  be  considered  as  absolutely  right  in  contrast  with 
those  that  are  relatively  light  or  least  wrong;  and 
which,  as  a  system  of  ideal  conduct,  is  to  serve  as  a 
standard  for  our  guidance  in  solving,  as  well  as  we 
can,  the  problems  of  real  conduct. 


820 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


§  107.  A  clear  conception  of  this  matter  is  so  impor- 
tant that  I  must  be  excused  for  bringing  in  aid  of  it 
a  further  illustration,  more  obviously  appropriate  as 
being  furnished  by  organic  science  instead  of  by  inor- 
ganic science.  The  relation  between  morality  proper, 
and  morality  as  commonly  conceived,  is  analogous  to 
the  relation  between  physiology  and  pathology ;  and  the 
course  usually  pursued  by  moralists  is  much  like  the 
course  of  one  who  studies  pathology  without  previous 
study  of  physiology. 

Physiology  describes  the  various  functions  which,  as 
combined,  constitute  and  maintain  life ;  and  in  treating 
of  them  it  assumes  that  they  are  severally  performed 
in  right  ways,  in  due  amounts,  and  in  proper  order ;  it 
recognizes  only  healthy  functions.  If  it  explains  diges- 
tion, it  supposes  that  the  heart  is  supplying  blood  and 
that  the  visceral  nervous  system  is  stimulating  the 
organs  immediately  concerned.  If  it  gives  a  theory  of 
the  circulation,  it  assumes  that  blood  has  been  produced 
by  the  combined  actions  of  the  structures  devoted  to 
its  production,  and  that  it  is  properly  aerated.  If  the 
relations  between  respiration  and  the  vital  processes  at 
large  are  interpreted,  it  is  on  the  presupposition  that 
the  heart  goes  on  sending  blood,  not  only  to  the  lungs 
and  to  certain  nervous  centres,  but  to  the  diaphragm 
and  intercostal  muscles.  Physiology  ignores  failures 
in  the  actions  of  these  several  organs.  It  takes  no 
account  of  imperfections,  it  neglects  derangements,  it 
does  not  recognize  pain,  it  knows  nothing  of  vital 
wrong.  It  simply  formulates  that  which  goes  on  as  a 
result  of  complete  adaptation  of  all  parts  to  all  needs. 
That  is  to  say,  in  relation  to  the  inner  actions  consti- 
tuting bodily  life,  pliysiological  theory  has  a  position 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS,  321 


like  that  wliich  ethical  theory,  under  its  absolute  form 
as  above  conceived,  has  to  the  outer  actions  constituting 
conduct.  The  moment  cognizance  is  taken  of  excess  of 
function,  or  arrest  of  function,  or  defect  of  function, 
with  the  resulting  evil,  physiology  passes  into  pathology. 
We  begin  now  to  take  account  of  wrong  actions  in  the 
inner  life  analoofous  to  the  wronof  actions  in  the  outer 
life  taken  account  of  by  ordinary  theories  of  morals. 

The  antithesis  thus  drawn,  however,  is  but  prelimi- 
nary. After  observing  the  fact  that  there  is  a  science 
of  vital  actions  normally  carried  on,  which  ignores 
abnormal  actions,  we  have  more  especially  to  observe 
that  the  science  of  abnormal  actions  can  reach  such 
dfefiniteness  as  is  possible  to  it,  only  on  condition  that 
the  science  of  normal  actions  has  previously  become 
definite  ;  or  rather,  let  us  say  that  pathological  science 
depends  for  its  advances  on  previous  advances  made 
by  physiological  science.  The  very  conception  of  dis- 
ordered action  implies  a  preconception  of  well-ordered 
action.  Before  it  can  be  decided  that  the  heart  is 
beating  faster  or  slower  than  it  should,  its  healthy  rate 
of  beating  must  be  learned;  before  the  pulse  can  be 
recognized  as  too  weak  or  too  strong,  its  proper  strength 
must  be  known,  and  so  throughout.  Even  the  rudest 
and  most  empirical  ideas  of  diseases  presuppose  ideas 
of  the  healthy  states  from  which  they  are  deviations ; 
and,  obviously,  the  diagnosis  of  diseases  can  become 
scientific  only  as  fast  as  there  arises  scientific  knowledge 
of  organic  actions  that  are  undiseased. 

Similarly,  then,  is  it  with  the  relation  between 
absolute  morality,  or  the  lav/  of  perfect  right  in  human 
conduct,  and  relative  morality,  which,  recognizing 
wrong  in  human  conduct,  has  to  decide  in  what  way 


322 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


the  wrong  deviates  from  the  right,  and  how  the  right 
is  to  be  most  nearly  approached.  When,  formulating 
normal  conduct  in  an  ideal  society,  we  have  reached 
a  science  of  absolute  ethics,  we  have  simultaneously 
reached  a  science  which,  when  used  to  interpret  the 
phenomena  of  real  societies  in  their  transitional  states, 
full  of  the  miseries  due  to  non-adaptation  (which  we 
may  call  pathological  states),  enables  us  to  form  approx- 
imately true  conclusions  respecting  the  natures  of  the 
abnormalities,  and  the  courses  which  tend  most  in  the 
direction  of  the  normal. 

§  108.  And  now  let  it  be  observed  that  the  concep- 
tion of  ethics  thus  set  forth,  strange  as  many  will  think 
it,  is  one  which  really  lies  latent  in  the  beliefs  of  moral- 
ists at  large.  Though  not  definitely  acknowledged  it  is 
vaguely  implied  in  many  of  their  propositions. 

From  early  times  downward  we  find  in  ethical 
speculations,  references  to  the  ideal  man,  his  acts,  his 
feelings,  his  judgments.  Well-doing  is  conceived  by 
Socrates  as  the  doing  of  "  the  best  man,"  who,  "  as  a 
husbandman,  performs  well  the  duties  of  husbandry ; 
as  a  surgeon,  the  duties  of  the  medical  art ;  in  political 
life,  his  duty  toward  the  commonwealth."  Plato,  in 
Minos,  as  a  standard  to  which  State  law  should  con- 
form, "  postulates  the  decision  of  some  ideal  wise 
man,"  and  in  Laches  the  wise  man's  knowledge  of 
good  and  evil  is  supposed  to  furnish  the  standard:  dis- 
regarding the  maxims  of  the  existing  society "  as 
unscientific,  Plato  regards  as  the  proper  guide,  that 
''Idea  of  the  Good  which  only  a  philosopher  can 
ascend  to."  Aristotle  (Uth.,  Bk.  III.  ch.  4),  making 
the  decisions  of  the  good  man  the  standard,  says: 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS, 


323 


For  the  good  man  judges  everytliing  rightly,  and  in 
every  case  the  truth  appears  so  to  him.  .  .  .  And, 
perhaps,  the  principal  difference  between  the  good  and 
the  bad  man  is  that  the  good  man  sees  the  truth  in 
every  case,  since  he  is,  as  it  were,  the  rule  and  measure 
of  it."  The  Stoics,  too,  conceived  of  complete  recti- 
tude of  action  "  as  that  which  none  could  achieve 
except  the  wise  man  "  —  the  ideal  man.  And  Epicurus 
had  an  ideal  standard.  He  held  the  virtuous  state  to 
be  "  a  tranquil,  undisturbed,  innocuous,  non-competitive 
fruition,  which  approached  most  nearly  to  the  perfect 
happiness  of  the  gods,"  who  ''neither  suffered  vexation 
in  themselves  nor  caused  vexation  to  others."  ^ 

If,  in  modern  times,  influenced  by  theological 
dogmas  concerning  the  fall  and  human  sinfulness,  and 
by  a  theory  of  obligation  derived  from  the  current 
creed,  moralists  have  less  frequently  referred  to  an 
ideal,  yet  references  are  traceable.  We  see  one  in  the 
dictum  of  Kant  — ''  Act  according  to  the  maxim  only, 
which  you  can  wish,  at  the  same  time,  to  become  a 
universal  law."  For  this  implies  the  thought  of  a 
society  in  whicli  the  maxim  is  acted  upon  by  all,  and 
universal  benefit  recognized  as  the  effect:  there  is  a 
conception  of  ideal  conduct  under  ideal  conditions. 
And  though  Mr.  Sidgwick,  in  the  quotation  above 
made  from  him,  implies  that  Ethics  is  concerned  with 
man  as  he  is,  rather  than  with  man  as  he  should  be ; 
yet,  in  elsewhere  speaking  of  Ethics  as  dealing  with 
conduct  as  it  should  be,  rather  than  Avith  conduct  as  it 
is,  he  postulates  ideal  conduct  and  indirectly  the  ideal 
man.  On  his  first  page,  speaking  of  Ethics  along  with 
Jurisprudence  and  Politics,  he  says  that  they  are  dis- 

^  Most  of  these  quotations  I  make  from  Dr.  Bain's  Mental  and 
Moral  Science, 


324 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


tinguished  by  the  characteristic  that  they  attempt  to 
determine  not  the  actual  but  the  ideal  —  what  ought  to 
exist,  not  what  does  exist." 

It  requires  only  that  these  various  conceptions  of  an 
ideal  conduct,  and  of  an  ideal  humanity,  should  be 
made  consistent  and  definite,  to  bring  them  into  agree- 
ment with  the  conception  above  set  forth.  At  present 
such  conceptions  are  habitually  vague.  The  ideal  man, 
having  been  conceived  in  terms  of  the  current  morality, 
is  thereupon  erected  into  a  moral  standard  by  which 
the  goodness  of  actions  may  be  judged ;  and  the  reason- 
ing becomes  circular.  To  make  the  ideal  man  serve  as 
a  standard,  he  has  to  be  defined  in  terms  of  the  condir 
tions  which  his  nature  fulfils  —  in  terms  of  those  objec- 
tive requirements  which  must  be  met  before  conduct 
can  be  right ;  and  the  common  defect  of  these  concep- 
tions of  the  ideal  man  is  that  they  suppose  him  out  of 
relation  to  such  conditions. 

All  the  above  references  to  him,  direct  or  indirect, 
imply  that  the  ideal  man  is  supposed  to  live  and  act 
under  existing  social  conditions.  The  tacit  inquiry  is, 
not  what  his  actions  would  be  under  circumstances  alto- 
gether changed,  but  what  they  would  be  under  present 
circumstances.  And  this  inquiry  is  futile  for  two  rea- 
sons. The  co-existence  of  a  perfect  man  and  an  imper- 
fect society  is  impossible ;  and  could  the  two  co-exist, 
the  resulting  conduct  would  not  furnish  the  ethical 
standard  sought. 

In  the  first  place,  given  the  laws  of  life  as  they  are, 
and  a  man  of  ideal  nature  cannot  be  produced  in  a  soci- 
ety consisting  of  men  having  natures  remote  from  the 
ideal.  As  well  might  we  expect  a  child  of  English 
type  to  be  born  among  Negroes,  as  expect  that  among 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  325 


the  organically  immoral,  one  who  is  organically  moral 
will  arise.  Unless  it  be  denied  that  character  results 
from  inherited  structure,  it  must  be  admitted  that  since, 
in  any  society,  each  individual  descends  from  a  stock 
which,  traced  back  a  few  generations,  ramifies  everj^- 
where  through  the  society,  and  participates  in  its  aver- 
age nature,  there  must,  notwithstanding  marked  indi- 
vidual diversities,  be  preserved  such  community  as 
prevents  any  one  from  reaching  an  ideal  form  while  the 
rest  remain  far  below  it. 

In  the  second  place,  ideal  conduct  such  as  ethical 
theory  is  concerned  with,  is  not  possible  for  the  ideal 
man  in  the  midst  of  men  otherwise  constituted.  An 
absolutely  just  or  perfectly  sympathetic  person  could 
not  live  and  act  according  to  his  nature  in  a  tribe  of 
cannibals.  Among  people  who  are  treacherous  and 
utterly  without  scruple,  entire  truthfulness  and  open- 
ness must  bring  ruin.  If  all  around  recognize  only  the 
law  of  the  strongest,  one  whose  nature  will  not  allow 
him  to  inflict  pain  on  others  must  go  to  the  Avail.  There 
requires  a  certain  congruity  between  the  conduct  of 
each  member  of  a  society  and  others'  conduct.  A  mode 
of  action  entirely  alien  to  the  prevailing  modes  of  action 
cannot  be  successfully  persisted  in  —  must  eventuate  in 
death  of  self,  or  posterity,  or  both. 

Hence  it  is  manifest  that  we  must  consider  the  ideal 
man  as  existing  in  the  ideal  social  state.  On  the  evo- 
lution hypothesis,  the  two  presuppose  one  another : 
and  only  when  they  co-exist  can  there  exist  that  ideal 
conduct  which  Absolute  Ethics  has  to  formulate,  and 
which  Relative  Ethics  has  to  take  as  the  standard  by 
which  to  estimate  divergences  from  right,  or  degrees 
of  wrong. 


326 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE  SCOPE  OF  ETHICS. 

§  109.  At  the  outset  it  was  shown  that  as  the  con- 
duct with  which  Ethics  deals  is  a  part  of  conduct  at 
large,  conduct  at  large  must  be  understood  before  this 
part  can  be  understood.  After  taking  a  general  view 
of  conduct,  not  human  only  but  sub-human,  and  not 
only  as  existing  but  as  evolving,  we  saw  that  Ethics 
has  for  its  subject-matter  the  most  highly  evolved  con- 
duct as  displayed  by  the  most  highly  evolved  being, 
Man  —  is  a  specification  of  those  traits  which  his  con- 
duct assumes  on  reaching  its  limit  of  evolution.  Con- 
ceived thus  as  comprehending  the  laws  of  right  living 
at  large.  Ethics  has  a  wider  field  than  is  commonly 
assigned  to  it.  Beyond  the  conduct  commonly 
approved  or  reprobated  as  right  or  wrong,  it  includes 
all  conduct  which  furthers  or  hinders,  in  either  direct 
or  indirect  ways,  the  welfare  of  self  or  others. 

As  foregoing  chapters  in  various  places  imply,  the 
entire  field  of  Ethics  includes  the  two  great  divisions, 
personal  and  social.  There  is  a  class  of  actions  directed 
to  personal  ends,  which  are  to  be  judged  in  their  rela- 
tions to  personal  well-being,  considered  apart  from  the 
well-being  of  others  ;  though  they  secondarily  affect 
fellow-men,  these  primarily  affect  the  agent  himself, 
and  must  be  classed  as  intrinsically  right  or  wrong 
according  to  their  beneficial  or  detrimental  effects  on 


THE  SCOPE  OF  ETHICS. 


327 


him.  There  are  actions  of  another  chiss  which  affect 
fellow-men  immediately  and  remotely,  and  which, 
though  their  results  to  self  are  not  to  be  ignored,  must 
be  judged  as  good  or  bad  mainly  by  their  results  to 
others.  Actions  of  this  last  class  fall  into  two  groups. 
Those  of  the  one  group  achieve  ends  in  ways  that  do 
or  do  not  unduly  interfere  with  the  pursuit  of  ends  by 
others  —  actions  which,  because  of  this  difference,  we 
call  respectively  unjust  or  just.  Those  forming  the 
other  group  are  of  a  kind  which  influence  the  states  of 
others  without  directly  interfering  with  the  relations 
between  their  labors  and  the  results,  in  one  way  or  the 
other  —  actions  which  we  speak  of  as  beneficent  or 
maleficent.  And  the  conduct  which  we  regard  as 
beneficent  is  itself  subdivisible  according  as  it  shows 
us  a  self-repression  to  avoid  giving  pain,  or  an  expendi- 
ture of  effort  to  give  pleasure  —  negative  beneficence 
and  positive  beneficence. 

Each  of  these  divisions  and  subdivisions  has  to  be 
considered  first  as  a  part  of  Absolute  Ethics,  and  then 
as  a  part  of  Relative  Ethics.  Having  seen  what  its 
injunctions  must  be  for  the  ideal  man  under  the  implied 
ideal  conditions,  we  shall  be  prepared  to  see  how  such 
injunctions  are  to  be  most  nearly  fulfilled  by  actual 
men  under  existing  conditions. 

§  110.  For  reasons  already  pointed  out,  a  code  of 
perfect  personal  conduct  can  never  be  made  definite. 
Many  forms  of  life,  diverging  from  one  another  in 
considerable  degrees,  may  be  so  carried  on  in  society 
as  entirely  to  fulfil  the  conditions  to  harmonious  co- 
operation. And  if  various  types  of  men,  adapted  to 
various  types  of  activities,  may  thus  lead  lives  that 


328 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 


are  severally  complete  after  their  kinds,  no  specific 
statement  of  the  activities  universally  required  for 
personal  well-being  is  possible. 

But,  though  the  particular  requirements  to  be  ful- 
filled for  perfect  individual  well-being,  must  vary  along 
with  variations  in  the  material  conditions  of  each 
society,  certain  general  requirements  have  to  be  ful- 
filled by  the  individuals  of  all  societies.  An  average 
balance  between  waste  and  nutrition  has  universally  to 
be  preserved.  Normal  vitality  implies  a  relation  be- 
tween activity  and  rest  falling  within  moderate  limits 
of  variation.  Continuance  of  the  society  depends  on 
satisfaction  of  those  primarily  personal  needs  which 
result  in  marriage  and  parenthood.  Perfection  of  in- 
dividual life  hence  implies  certain  modes  of  action 
which  are  approximately  alike  in  all  cases,  and  which, 
therefore,  become  part  of  the  subject  matter  of  Ethics. 

That  it  is  possible  to  reduce  even  this  restricted  part 
to  scientific  definiteness,  can  scarcely  be  said.  But 
ethical  requirements  may  here  be  to  such  extent  affili- 
ated upon  physical  necessities,  as  to  give  them  a  par- 
tially scientific  authority.  It  is  clear,  that  between  the 
expenditure  of  bodily  substance  in  vital  activities,  and 
the  taking  in  of  materials  from  which  this  substance 
may  be  renewed,  there  is  a  direct  relation.  It  is  clear, 
too,  that  there  is  a  direct  relation  between  the  wasting 
of  tissue  by  effort,  and  the  need  for  those  cessations  of 
effort  during  wliich  repair  may  overtake  waste.  Nor  is 
it  less  clear  that  between  the  rate  of  mortality  and  the 
rate  of  niultipli(;ation  in  any  society,  there  is  a  relation 
such  that  the  last  must  leach  a  certain  level  before  it 
can  balance  the  first,  and  prevent  disappearance  of  the 
society.    And  it  may  be  inferred  that  pursuits  of  other 


THE  SCOPE  OF  ETHICS, 


329 


leading  ends  are,  in  like  manner,  determined  by  certain 
natural  necessities,  and  from  these  derive  their  ethical 
sanctions.  That  it  will  ever  be  practicable  to  lay  down 
precise  rules  for  private  conduct  in  conformity  with 
such  requirements,  may  be  doubted.  But  the  function 
of  Absolute  Ethics  in  relation  to  private  conduct  will 
have  been  discharged  Avhen  it  has  produced  the  war- 
rant for  its  requirements  as  generally  expressed ;  when 
it  has  shown  the  imperativeness  of  obedience  to  them ; 
and  when  it  has  thus  taught  the  need  for  deliberately 
considering  whether  the  conduct  fulfils  them  as  well  as 
may  be. 

Under  the  ethics  of  personal  considered  in  relation 
to  existing  conditions,  have  to  come  all  questions  con- 
cerning the  degree  in  which  immediate  personal  welfare 
has  to  be  postponed,  either  to  ultimate  personal  welfare 
or  to  the  welfare  of  others.  As  now  carried  on,  life 
hourly  sets  the  claims  of  present  self  against  the  claims 
of  future  self,  and  hourly  brings  individual  interests 
face  to  face  with  the  interests  of  other  individuals, 
taken  singly  or  as  associated.  In  many  of  such  cases 
the  decisions  can  be  nothing  more  than  compromises ; 
and  ethical  science,  here  necessarily  empirical,  can  do 
no  more  than  aid  in  making  compromises  that  are  the 
least  objectionable.  To  arrive  at  the  best  compromise 
in  any  case,  implies  correct  conceptions  of  the  alterna- 
tive results  of  this  or  that  course.  And,  consequently, 
in  so  far  as  the  absolute  ethics  of  individual  conduct 
can  be  made  definite,  it  must  help  us  to  decide  between 
conflicting  personal  requirements,  and  also  between  the 
needs  for  asserting  self  and  the  needs  for  subordinating 
self. 


330 


THE  DATA  OF  ErillCS. 


§  111.  From  that  division  of  Ethics  which  deals  with 
the  right  reguhition  of  private  conduct,  considered 
apart  from  the  effects  directly  produced  on  others,  we 
pass  now  to  that  division  of  Ethics  which,  considering 
exclusively  the  effects  of  conduct  on  others,  treats  of 
the  right  regulation  of  it  with  a  view  to  such  effects. 

The  first  set  of  regulations  coming  under  this  head 
are  those  concerning  what  we  distinguish  as  justice. 
Individual  life  is  possible  only  on  condition  that  each 
organ  is  paid  for  its  action  by  an  equivalent  of  blood, 
while  the  organism  as  a  whole  obtains  from  the  envi- 
ronment assimilable  matters  that  compensate  for  its 
efforts ;  and  the  mutual  dependence  of  parts  in  the 
social  organism,  necessitates  that,  alike  for  its  total  life 
and  the  lives  of  its  units,  there  similarly  shall  be  main- 
tained a  due  proportion  between  returns  and  labors: 
the  natural  relation  between  work  and  welfare  shall  be 
preserved  intact.  Justice,  which  formulates  the  range 
of  conduct  and  limitations  to  conduct  hence  arising,  is 
at  once  the  most  important  division  of  Ethics  and  the 
division  whicli  admits  of  the  greatest  definiteness. 
That  .principle  of  equivalence  which  meets  us  when 
we  seek  its  roots  in  the  laws  of  individual  life,  involves 
the  idea  of  measure;  and  on  passing  to  social  life,  the 
same  principle  inti'oduces  us  to  the  conception  of  equity 
or  equalness^  in  the  relations  of  citizens  to  one  another ; 
the  elements  of  the  questions  arising  are  quantitative^ 
and  hence  the  solutions  assume  a  more  scientific  form. 
Though,  having  to  recognize  differences  among  individ- 
uals due  to  age,  sex,  or  other  cause,  we  cannot  regard 
the  members  of  a  society  as  absolutely  equal,  and  there- 
fore cannot  deal  with  problems  growing  out  of  their 
relations  with  tliat  precision  wlii(;h  absolute  equality 


THE  SCOPE  OF  ETHICS, 


331 


might  make  possible ;  yet,  considering  them  as  approxi- 
mately equal  in  virtue  of  their  common  human  nature, 
and  dealing  with  questions  of  equity  on  this  supposi- 
tion, we  may  reach  conclusions  of  a  sufficiently  definite 
kind. 

This  division  of  Ethics  considered  under  its  absolute 
form,  has  to  define  the  equitable  relations  among  perfect 
individuals  who  limit  one  another's  spheres  of  action  by 
co-existing,  and  who  achieve  their  ends  by  co-operation. 
It  has  to  do  much  more  than  this.  Beyond  justice  be- 
tween man  and  man,  justice  between  each  man  and  the 
aggregate  of  men  has  to  be  dealt  with  by  it.  The  rela- 
tions between  the  individual  and  the  State,  considered 
as  representing  all  individuals,  have  to  be  deduced  —  an 
important  and  a  relatively  difficult  matter.  What  is 
the  ethical  warrant  for  governmental  authority?  To 
what  ends  may  it  be  legitimately  exercised  ?  How  far 
may  it  rightly  be  carried?  Up  to  what  point  is  the 
citizen  bound  to  recognize  the  collective  decisions  of 
other  citizens,  and  beyond  what  point  may  he  properly 
refuse  to  obey  them  ? 

These  relations,  private  and  public,  considered  as 
maintained  under  ideal  conditions,  having  been  formu- 
lated, there  come  to  be  dealt  with  the  analogous  rela- 
tions under  real  conditions  —  absolute  justice  being  the 
standard,  relative  justice  has  to  be  determined  by  con- 
sidering how  near  an  approach  may,  under  present  cir- 
cumstances, be  made  to  it.  As  alread}^  implied  in  vari- 
ous places,  it  is  impossible  during  stages  of  transition 
which  necessitate  ever-changing  compromises,  to  fulfil 
the  dictates  of  absolute  equity;  and  nothing  beyond 
empirical  judgments  can  be  formed  of  the  extent  to 
which  thej^  may  be,  at  any  given  time,  fulfilled.  While 


832 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


war  continues,  and  injustice  is  done  between  societies, 
there  cannot  be  anything  like  complete  justice  within 
each  society.  Militant  organization,  no  less  than  mili- 
tant action,  is  irreconcilable  with  pure  equity ;  and  the 
inequity  implied  by  it  inevitably  ramifies  throughout 
all  social  relations.  But  there  is  at  every  stage  in  social 
evolution  a  certain  range  of  variation  within  which  it  is 
possible  to  approach  nearer  to,  or  diverge  further  from, 
the  requirements  of  absolute  equitj^  Hence  these  re- 
quirements have  ever  to  be  kept  in  view,  that  relative 
equity  may  be  ascertained. 

§  112.  Of  the  two  subdivisions  into  which  benefi- 
cence falls,  the  negative  and  the  positive,  neither  can  be 
specialized.  Under  ideal  conditions  the  first  of  them 
has  but  a  nominal  existence ;  and  the  second  of  them 
passes  largely  into  a  transfigured  form  admitting  of  but 
general  definition. 

In  the  conduct  of  the  ideal  man  among  ideal  men, 
that  self-regulation  which  has  for  its  motive  to  avoid 
giving  pain,  practically  disappears.  No  one  having 
feelings  which  prompt  acts  that  disagreeably  affect 
others,  there  can  exist  no  code  of  restraints  referring  to 
this  division  of  conduct. 

But  though  negative  beneficence  is  only  a  nominal 
part  of  Absolute  Ethics,  it  is  an  actual  and  consider- 
able part  of  Relative  Ethics.  For,  while  men's  natures 
remain  imperfectly  adapted  to  social  life,  there  must 
continue  in  them  impulses  which,  causing  in  some 
cases  the  actions  we  name  unjust,  cause  in  other  cases 
the  actions  we  name  unkind  —  unkind  now  in  deed  and 
now  in  word ;  and  in  respect  of  these  modes  of  be- 
havior which,  though  not  aggressive,  give  pain,  there 


THE  SCOPE  OF  ETHICS. 


833 


arise  numerous  and  complicated  problems.  Pain  is 
sometimes  given  to  others  simply  by  maintaining  an 
equitable  claim ;  pain  is  at  other  times  given  by  refus- 
ing a  request;  and  again  at  other  times  by  maintain- 
ing an  opinion.  In  these  and  numerous  cases  sug- 
gested by  them,  there  have  to  be  answered  the  ques- 
tions whether,  to  avoid  inflicting  pain,  personal  feelings 
should  be  sacrificed,  and  how  far  sacrificed.  Again, 
in  cases  of  another  class,  pain  is  given  not  by  a  passive 
course,  but  by  an  active  course.  How  far  shall  a  per- 
son who  has  misbehaved  be  grieved  by  showing  aversion 
to  him?  Shall  one  whose  action  is  to  be  reprobated 
have  the  reprobation  expressed  to  him,  or  shall  nothing 
be  said  ?  Is  it  right  to  annoy  by  condemning  a  preju- 
dice which  another  displays?  These  and  kindred 
queries  have  to  be  answered  after  taking  into  account 
the  immediate  pain  given,  the  possible  benefit  caused 
by  giving  it,  and  the  possible  evil  caused  by  not  giving 
it.  In  solving  problems  of  this  class,  the  only  help 
Absolute  Ethics  gives  is  by  enforcing  the  considera- 
tion that  inflicting  more  pain  than  is  necessitated  by 
proper  self-regard,  or  by  desire  for  another's  benefit, 
or  by  the  maintenance  of  a  general  principle,  is  un- 
warranted. 

Of  positive  beneficence  under  its  absolute  form  noth- 
ing more  specific  can  be  said  than  that  it  must  become 
co-extensive  with  whatever  sphere  remains  for  it ;  aid- 
ing to  complete  the  life  of  each  as  a  recipient  of  ser- 
vices and  to  exalt  the  life  of  each  as  a  renderer  of 
services.  As  with  a  developed  humanity  the  desire 
for  it  by  every  one  will  so  increase,  and  the  sphere  for 
exercise  of  it  so  decrease,  as  to  involve  an  altruistic 
competition,  analogous  to  the  existing  egoistic  compe- 


384 


THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS, 


tition,  it  may  be  that  Absolute  Ethics  will  eventually 
include  what  we  before  called  a  higher  equity,  prescrib- 
ing the  mutual  limitations  of  altruistic  activities. 

Under  its  relative  form,  positive  beneficence  presents 
numerous  problems,  alike  important  and  difficult,  ad- 
mitting only  of  empirical  solutions.  How  far  is  self- 
sacrifice  for  another's  benefit  to  be  carried  in  each  case  ? 
—  a  question  which  must  be  answered  differently  ac- 
cording to  the  character  of  the  other,  the  needs  of  the 
other,  and  the  various  claims  of  self  and  belongings 
which  have  to  be  met.  To  what  extent  under  given 
circumstances  shall  private  welfare  be  subordinated  to 
public  welfare  ?  —  a  question  to  be  answered  after  con- 
sidering the  importance  of  the  end  and  the  seriousness 
of  the  sacrifice.  What  benefit  and  what  detriment  will 
result  from  gratuitous  aid  yielded  to  another  ?  —  a 
question  in  each  case  implying  an  estimate  of  probabili- 
ties. Is  there  any  unfair  treatment  of  sundry  others, 
involved  by  more  than  fair  treatment  of  this  one  other? 
Up  to  what  limit  may  help  be  given  to  the  existing 
generation  of  the  inferior,  without  entailing  mischief 
on  future  generations  of  the  superior?  Evidently  to 
these  ani  many  kindred  questions  included  in  this 
division  of  Relative  Ethics,  approximately  true  answers 
only  can  be  given. 

But  though  here  Absolute  Ethics,  by  the  standard 
it  supplies,  does  not  greatly  aid  Relative  Ethics,  yet,  as 
in  other  cases,  it  aids  somewhat  by  keeping  before  con- 
sciousness an  ideal  conciliation  of  the  various  claims 
involved;  and  by  suggesting  the  search  for  such  com- 
promise among  them,  as  shall  not  disregard  any,  but 
shall  satisfy  all  to  the  greatest  extent  practicable. 


